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Abstract 
In order to bring together developmental psychology and social neuroscience 
approaches to moral decision-making, several theoretical approaches were 
integrated, creating the Social Information Processing-Moral Decision-making 
framework (SIP-MDM). 
Initially, a systematic review and meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of moral 
decision-making was conducted. The meta-analysis identified brain regions that 
consistently show increased activation when making moral decisions. Analysis also 
revealed that making one’s own moral response decisions is associated with 
increased activation in additional brain areas compared to when making moral 
evaluations. 
Secondly, an empirical study using a typically developing sample of eighty 11-18 
year olds explored hypotheses generated from the SIP-MDM framework. Moral 
reasoning, working memory and some social information processing (SIP) skills 
were found to positively correlate with age, and moral reasoning predicted some 
steps of the SIP-MDM framework. There was a significant relationship between 
moral reasoning and working memory but not between moral reasoning and 
perspective taking, empathy, or emotion recognition, calling largely untested 
theoretical assumptions into question. There were also no significant relationships 
between moral reasoning and self or parent reported behavioural difficulties. 
A final study used two different instruments to measure and compare the moral 
reasoning of twenty 11-21 year olds with acquired brain injuries (ABIs) to twenty 
neurologically healthy (NH) adolescents, matched on age and gender. The 
Sociomoral Reasoning Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) and the So-Mature 
measures had satisfactory psychometric properties for the ABI and NH group. The 
ABI group showed developmentally immature moral reasoning compared to the NH 
group for reasoning about moral response decisions, based on scores for the So-
Mature, but there were no significant group differences for reasoning about moral 
values, based on scores for the SRM-SF. So-Mature scores negatively correlated 
with self-report behavioural difficulties for the ABI group but there were no 
significant relationships between moral reasoning and behaviour for the NH group. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Chapter overview 
There is a long and rich tradition of theory and research into moral maturity 
within developmental psychology, from both a cognitive-developmental and affective 
perspective (Gibbs, 2013; Haidt, 2001; Hoffman, 2000; Kohlberg, 1984b; Piaget, 
1932; Rest, 1984). Developmental psychology research in this area tends to focus 
on the reasons or justifications given by individuals for their moral decisions, as a 
measure of moral maturity. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in 
moral decision-making within social neuroscience, with neuroimaging methods 
being used to measure the activation of brain regions while individuals are making 
moral-decisions, or studies measuring moral decision-making in individuals with 
brain injuries. The disciplines of developmental psychology and social neuroscience 
have developed mostly in isolation with regards to moral decision-making and 
development, using different research approaches and informed by separate 
theories. While social neuroscience focuses on the brain regions and processes 
involved when making moral decisions, developmental psychology focuses more on 
how moral decision-making matures over time. Social information processing theory 
(SIP; Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000) 
theory may offer a suitable framework for integrating aspects from developmental 
psychology and social neuroscience, providing an explanation of how moral 
decision-making occurs and typically matures over time, and how moral decision-
making and development may be affected following a brain injury.  
In this introductory chapter, moral terms will firstly be defined, and the 
definition and prevalence of acquired brain injuries will be outlined. This will be 
followed by a review of the main moral theories from developmental psychology and 
social neuroscience. Differences between these disciplines in terms of theoretical 
focus and research approaches will be outlined, followed by a discussion of why a 
new, integrative framework of moral decision-making and development is 
necessary. SIP theory will be introduced, with a focus on how it could provide the 
basis for an integrative framework. Selected research into moral decision-making 
and moral development (including related processes such as perspective taking and 
working memory) will then be presented. Research discussed will include typical 
moral decision-making and development, the brain regions thought to underpin 
moral decision-making and development, and how real-time moral decisions and 
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moral maturity are affected following a brain injury. This thesis will mainly focus on 
moral development during adolescence (age 10-19 years; World Health 
Organisation, 2017) so this introductory chapter will finish with a brief discussion of 
the importance of adolescence for moral development.  
1.2 Defining moral terms 
Differences in the research approaches to moral decision-making and 
development have led to a discrepancy in the definitions and usage of moral terms, 
which can cause confusion. The terms ‘moral judgement’, ‘moral reasoning’, and 
‘moral cognition’ are often used interchangeably, and with differing definitions. The 
broader term moral decision-making will be used in this thesis, to refer to any 
decision, including judgements, evaluations, and response choices, made within the 
‘moral domain’ (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983), i.e. decisions regarding moral issues 
or principles such as justice, harm, fairness and care. A moral decision can be a 
response decision about how to behave in a real or hypothetical moral dilemma (a 
situation with moral rules or principles attached, where a response choice is 
required), or it can be a judgement or evaluation about the moral acceptability of the 
actions, or moral character of others, including judgements of individuals, groups or 
institutions. Moral reasoning is one process that can guide moral decisions, but 
other processes are also involved, and the extent of their involvement can differ 
depending on the type of decision being made. Moral reasoning differs from other 
forms of reasoning because it is guided by morally relevant rules, knowledge and 
understanding, stored in memory as moral schemas. Moral development is the 
maturation of moral decision-making, including the development of moral reasoning 
and related processes that increase the capacity for making mature moral 
decisions.  
The moral domain covers the fairly universal principles of harm, justice, 
fairness and care, though how these principles are set out as rules or laws can differ 
between societies, cultures and religions, and may change over time. It does not 
necessarily follow that mature moral decisions based on a deep understanding and 
appreciation of moral principles will lead to behaviour that conforms to a law of 
society. For example, an individual with a mature understanding of the moral 
principle of fairness may feel they cannot obey laws that violate the human rights of 
a certain group. Furthermore, whether or not a moral decision leads to enactment of 
a chosen behaviour may depend on other contextual and situational factors. 
Behaviour which conforms to or follows moral principles (though not necessarily 
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laws) of society can be referred to as moral or prosocial behaviour, and behaviour 
which violates a moral principle of society can be referred to as immoral or 
antisocial behaviour. The major moral principles of a society are generally reflected 
in the laws of that society, so violating a moral principle can in some cases also be 
referred to as rule-breaking or offending behaviour. The term moral action has been 
used by some moral theorists (Gibbs, 2013; Rest, 1983; Rest, Bebeau, & Thoma, 
1999) but the broader term behaviour, defined as ‘the way in which a person 
behaves in response to a particular situation or stimulus’ (OxfordDictionaries.com, 
2017), also covers inaction; a behavioural response to a situation in the moral 
domain may be to take no action. The term moral behaviour will be used in this 
thesis to refer to any behaviour (action or inaction) within the moral domain (a 
situation with moral rules or principle attached), including behaviour in accordance 
with or in violation with moral principles (moral or prosocial; immoral or antisocial). 
1.3 Definition and prevalence of acquired brain injury  
An acquired brain injury (ABI) is any injury to the brain that occurs after birth. 
This can be the result of a traumatic brain injury (TBI; e.g. road traffic accidents and 
sports injuries) or a non-traumatic brain injury (nTBI; e.g. brain tumours, stroke or 
infection). An ABI can have physical, emotional, cognitive, social and behavioural 
effects (Babikian, Merkley, Savage, Giza, & Levin, 2015; Kirkham, 2017). Up- to-
date prevalence data for all types of ABI in children and adolescents is scarce. 
There is some data for hospital admission for ABIs across all ages. For the years 
2013-2014, it is estimated that 348,934 people were admitted to hospital with an 
ABI in the UK, including 162,544 admitted for a head injury and 130,551 admitted 
for a stroke (Headway, 2015). There is also some data relating to hospital 
admissions for children and adolescents with TBIs. A population-based study of one 
hospital in North Staffordshire (UK) found that 280 children a year, out of a 
population of 100,000, require hospitalisation for 24 hours or more due to a TBI, 
with 82.7% being for mild TBI (Hawley, Ward, Long, Owen, & Magnay, 2003). An 
epidemiology study of individuals attending the accident and emergency department 
at one hospital in Devon (UK) found that head injuries accounted for 3.4% of all 
cases per year, and attendance rates for moderate and severe injuries was highest 
for males aged 15-19 years (Yates, Williams, Harris, Round, & Jenkins, 2006).  
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1.4 Review of moral theories and perspectives 
1.4.1 Cognitive-developmental and affective development theories. 
Historically, moral psychology has been dominated by the rationalist, cognitive-
developmental theoretical perspective, employing stage theories to explain 
development. Piaget’s (1932) theory, often considered to be the first cognitive-
developmental theory of moral development, outlined four stages of logical 
reasoning and two stages of moral development: heteronomy and autonomy. 
Children in the heteronomous stage feel an obligation to abide by the external rules 
set by adults and when they reach the autonomous stage they realise that rules are 
worthy of respect and are based on mutual consent (Piaget, 1932). Piaget (1932) 
proposed that logical reasoning develops alongside related cognitive processes 
such as abstract reasoning, and this paves the way for moral development. At stage 
four, logical reasoning is defined by the ability to use complex, abstract cognitive 
skills to solve problems, in turn facilitating more mature moral decisions. Piaget 
(1932) hypothesised that moral development occurs as a child moves away from 
egocentrism, which requires the cognitive capacity to differentiate between the ego 
and social environment, and is facilitated by the maturation of language and 
imagination. From the age of about six or seven, a child’s opportunities for peer co-
operation facilitates the development of mutual respect, and so the child moves 
away from egocentric thought (Duska & Whelan, 1977). Piaget (1932) proposed that 
children construct their social and moral intelligence through managing their social 
interactions, and he emphasised peer interactions over parent interactions. 
Kohlberg (1976, 1981, 1984a) expanded Piaget’s theory beyond childhood, 
to encompass adolescence and adulthood, and argued that, “since moral reasoning 
clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical 
reasoning. There is a parallel between an individual’s logical stage and his or her 
moral stage” (Kohlberg, 1984b, p. 171). Kohlberg (1976, 1981) proposed six stages 
of moral judgement, grouped into three levels: pre-conventional, conventional and 
post-conventional. The pre-conventional level is the level of most children under 
nine, while most adolescents and adults are at the conventional stage, and the post-
conventional level is reached by a minority of adults. Similarly to Piaget (1932), 
Kohlberg (1976, 1981) emphasised the importance of role-taking (taking another’s 
perspective) in moral development and proposed that a child’s social environment 
provides role-taking opportunities and such participation in role-taking spurs on 
moral development. Kohlberg saw his six stages as sequential, one must pass 
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through each in turn. Development to the next stage occurs when cognitive 
disequilibrium is created, or when a person’s perspective is not sufficient to deal 
with a moral dilemma. This disequilibrium causes a person to think about the 
inadequacies of their reasoning and to search for more adequate reasons (Duska & 
Whelan, 1977). There have been some notable criticisms of Kohlberg’s theory. 
Others have commented that his theory is masculine in perspective (Gilligan, 1982), 
and there is evidence to doubt whether the higher developmental stages are cultural 
universal (Snarey, 1985). 
Rest and colleagues (1999) developed what they called a neo-Kohlbergian 
approach, moving the field away from stage theory, and argued that rather than one 
stage at a time, development is a gradual increase of developmentally mature forms 
of thinking. Rest’s componential model of moral developmental (Rest, 1984; Rest et 
al., 1999) proposed that the four components underlying moral action are moral 
sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation and moral character. Moral sensitivity 
involves interpreting the situation and an awareness of the relevant moral factors 
and implications, including how actions would affect others, which requires 
perspective taking. The moral judgement component involves deliberation over 
possible courses of action and deciding which would be most morally justifiable. The 
moral motivation component involves prioritising moral values over other competing 
values, and moral character refers to skills and strategies that support the moral 
choice, such as self-control (Rest, 1984; Walker, 2002). This model integrated both 
cognitive and affective processes and also highlighted that moral action (behaviour), 
not just moral judgements, requires explanation. Rest and colleagues (1999) also 
recognised the usefulness of schema theory to moral development, which was 
further developed by Gibbs (2013). 
Cognitive-developmental theories proposed that cognition, and particularly 
reasoning, is the main driver of moral decisions. Hoffman’s theory (2000), on the 
other hand, is one of affective primacy, and focused on affective empathy as the 
main driver of moral decisions, rather than cognition, though he did highlight the role 
of cognition for development and for achieving a “self-other” distinction. He 
proposed that empathy is congruent with the moral principles of caring and justice, 
playing an important role in moral decision-making and reasoning. Hoffman’s (2000) 
developmental framework of empathy involved three primitive modes: mimicry, 
conditioning and direct association, and two mature modes: verbally mediated 
association and social perspective taking, with language and cognitive development 
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facilitating the development of the mature modes. He proposed that affective 
empathy, construed as affect rather than cognition, becomes bonded with moral 
principles, giving the principles motive force, while empathy could act as a powerful 
retrieval cue, triggering moral schemas stored in memory. Hoffman (2000) also 
linked cognition with emotion, as he hypothesised that the attributions people make 
about the cause of events can affect the level of empathy experienced; empathic 
distress may be neutralised if a victim is viewed as being responsible for their own 
plight. He hypothesised that a person’s moral structure, made up of empathic 
affects, cognitive representations and motives is internalised when they accept and 
abide by its principles without regard to external reward or punishment.  
Gibbs (2013) offered an alternative to affective or cognitive primacy theories, 
and argued that the most plausible position within developmental theory is that 
moral motivation occurs as a consequence of affective and cognitive coprimacy; 
that is, both affect and cognition act as motives for moral action. While Kohlberg 
proposed six stages, Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller (1992) and Gibbs (2013) proposed 
four stages, grouped into immature and mature levels and added more transitional 
stages. Gibbs (2013) argued that the standard stages of moral development reflect 
gains in working memory, and hypothesised that attentional abilities are required to 
develop for the maturation of moral decisions. Increasing attentional abilities allow 
individuals to attend to more than one feature of a situation, moving away from an 
egocentric bias, and gains in working memory capacity allow for more than one 
source of information to be held in mind when making decisions (Gibbs, 2013).  
Gibbs (2013) also hypothesised other factors relevant to explaining moral 
behaviour; he proposed that antisocial behaviour can be explained as a function of 
a developmental delay in moral judgement, self-serving cognitive distortions (e.g. 
self-centred, blaming others and minimising biases) and deficiencies in social skills. 
Gibbs (2013) proposed that the mature stages of moral development are 
constructed through social perspective taking. He developed Rest and colleagues’ 
(1999) proposition that moral stages should be conceptualised as schemas, 
proposing that adaptive refinement and reorganisation of schemas enables moral 
development to take place. Schemas are “general knowledge structures that reside 
in long-term memory and facilitate information processing” (Walker, 2002, p. 361), 
with moral schemas being knowledge structures regarding moral events. However, 
moral decisions do not just mature because they are based on an increased quality 
and quantity of empirical knowledge; schemas are frameworks, and moral maturity, 
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or “growing beyond the superficial” requires a deeper understanding of fairness and 
moral reciprocity (Gibbs, 2013). 
While Rest and colleagues (1999) and Gibbs (2013) revised Kohlberg’s 
theory (Kohlberg, 1976, 1981, 1984a, 1984b), retaining the cognitive-developmental 
perspective, others have criticised Kohlberg’s theory and called for a new approach, 
due to the lack of correlation between moral maturity and behaviour (Krebs & 
Denton, 2005). It has been argued that the study of morality has been dominated by 
investigating moral decisions as an end product, whereas in real life, behaviour is 
the end product (Krebs and Denton, 2005), and moral reasoning does not fully 
explain behaviour (Blasi, 1983). Rest (1983, 1999) and Gibbs’s work (2013) has 
been crucial for advancing the moral development field towards a co-primacy 
approach and in conceptualising moral stages as schemas. Both theories focus on 
moral action as the end point, and go some way to explaining moral motivations and 
the moral decision-making processes that occur when weighing up different courses 
of action. These theories could be expanded by also taking into account other, non-
moral factors, such as situational factors, that might affect the process from moral 
decisions to behaviour. Rather than rejecting cognitive-developmental perspectives, 
an integrative approach incorporating aspects from cognitive-developmental 
theories with additional aspects from other relevant theories may lead to a theory 
which predicts moral behaviour more robustly. 
1.4.2 Social intuitionist theory and the somatic marker hypothesis. 
Through their focus on the development of logical reasoning development, early 
moral development theorists proposed that moral decisions are driven by reasoning, 
within the cognitive domain. On the other hand, social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 
2001) has proposed that moral decisions are driven by emotionally-based intuitions, 
and that moral reasoning is constructed after a decision, to explain a decision that 
had been made intuitively. Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) argued that moral beliefs and 
motivations come from a small set of intuitions that have evolved. Support for the 
theory comes from studies which show ‘moral dumbfounding’; people give quick 
answers to moral dilemmas but then struggle to explain their answers (Haidt & 
Hersh, 2001). The real difference between rationalist and intuitionist theories is one 
of emphasis; while rationalists believe that the real action is reasoning, intuitionists 
believe that the real action is “gut feeling”, moral emotions and quick intuition (Haidt 
& Bjorklund, 2008).  
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The social intuitionist view of intuitions driving moral decisions is not entirely 
dissimilar to Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, although there are 
differences with reference to the role of reasoning. Somatic markers are another 
intuitive, automatic process which may guide some moral decisions. The somatic 
marker hypothesis (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994) recognised the role 
of emotions in decision-making and proposed that when we think of a bad outcome 
connected with a given response option that comes to mind, we experience an 
unpleasant gut feeling, which is a ‘somatic marker’. This somatic marker then forces 
our attention onto the negative outcome and may lead to rejection of this option. 
Somatic markers can be stored in memory as affect-event links, which further aid 
future decision-making (Damasio, 1994) as they can guide decision-making by 
anticipating future events, even when not consciously recognised (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). While somatic markers can operate without coming to 
consciousness, when they are conscious they can help to narrow down the number 
of response options and this process occurs before reasoning, increasing the 
accuracy and efficiency of the decision process (Damasio, 1994). This is in contrast 
to the social intuitionist view that reasoning is not involved in the decision-making 
process but is only carried out to explain a decision already made.  
Haidt (2001) argued that the important distinction between intuition and 
reasoning is that intuition occurs quickly, effortlessly and automatically, while 
reasoning is slow and requires more effort, including attentional resources. 
Kahnemann (2011) uses the metaphors of System 1 and System 2 to describe fast 
and slow thinking. System 1 is responsible for intuitive, automatic thinking and 
operates with little or no effort, while System 2 is responsible for more deliberate 
thought and reasoning and requires effortful mental activities. Kahneman (2011) 
argued that System 1 is responsible for more of the decisions we make than System 
2, and his view seems to mirror that of the social intuitionists: “If System 1 is 
involved the conclusion comes first and the arguments follow” (p 45). However, 
System 2 is needed to monitor and control thoughts and actions suggested by 
System 1, so deliberate thought and reasoning are needed to confirm, reject or 
reformulate the automatic suggestions, or intuitions of System 1.  
1.4.3 Domain theory. Domain theory, referred to as social-cognitive domain 
theory or moral domain theory, views morality as one of several strands of the 
developing social knowledge of children (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983). This theory 
makes the important distinction between the personal, moral, and social domains 
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and proposed that these domains follow different developmental trajectories, with 
knowledge being constructed through reciprocal social interactions. The majority of 
research based on domain theory has focused on establishing whether children of 
different ages can distinguish between moral and social conventional acts (Killen & 
Smetana, 1999; Smetana, 1985; Song, Smetana & Kim, 1987; Tisak & Turiel, 
1988). Hypothetical situations used in studies are either in the personal, moral or 
social domain, yet real-life situations often involve more than one domain. Nucci 
(2001) argued that in mixed-domain situations there are individual differences in 
whether the situation is interpreted as being in the social or moral domain.   
While domain research has been helpful in highlighting the distinction 
between domains, the predictions made about how moral decisions develop and 
mature with age require greater theoretical elaboration. In summarising domain-
related research, Smetana (2006) argued that studies with children of different ages 
confirm understanding within the moral domain develops from a focus on concrete 
harm in early childhood to an understanding of fairness in later childhood. This is 
similar to how cognitive-developmental theorists propose that moral reasoning 
maturity occurs, with the development of an appreciation of fairness and equality, 
but domain theory does not elaborate on the cognitive or affective processes that 
allow for this development to occur. A review of domain theory concluded that it 
should be seen as a complementary rather than alternative to existing accounts of 
moral development because of its conceptual and methodological flaws (Lourenço, 
2014).  
1.4.4 Social neuroscience theories and perspectives. There has been an 
increased interest in moral decision-making amongst social neuroscientists. Some 
social neuroscience theories of moral decision-making and development have been 
proposed, but these do not always reference the rich tradition within developmental 
psychology. The dominant theory within social neuroscience has been the dual-
process theory (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2001). This theory proposed that people make moral decisions based either 
on negative emotional responses elicited by a dilemma, or by engaging in utilitarian 
moral reasoning. Initial emotional responses can be overridden by moral reasoning 
but this requires increased cognitive control. Support for this theory comes from 
studies showing increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (emotional 
responses), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (cognitive reasoning) and the anterior 
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cingulate cortex (signals the need for cognitive control) when choosing responses to 
hypothetical moral dilemmas (Greene, 2009). This theoretical perspective focuses 
only on explaining utilitarian moral decision-making (i.e. approving harmful actions 
that maximise good consequences) and while this theory can help in understanding 
how utilitarian moral decisions are made, it tells us little about how moral maturity 
occurs.  
Other social-neuroscience perspectives have been proposed which are 
more developmental in focus than the dual-process account. Kagan (2008) 
presented a developmental theory of morality, drawing on both cognitive-
developmental stages and neuroscience, with the inclusion of affective components 
such as guilt and empathy. He proposed that children follow a universal sequence 
of stages and each stage involves the emergence of a new cognitive achievement, 
due to corresponding changes in brain circuitry. Kagan’s fifth stage, occurring 
between ages 5 and 10 years is an understanding of abstract constructs such as 
fairness and ideals, which is facilitated by profound maturational changes in the 
brain between ages 5 and 7 years. Similar to Kagan (2008), Baird (2008) linked 
moral development to brain development within her theory, although she particularly 
focused on brain development in adolescence and argued that the maturation of the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) produces significant improvements in behavioural and 
emotional control, decision-making and abstract reasoning. Baird (2008) also 
focused on the integration of emotion and cognition in adolescence, and argued that 
we have an innate capacity to develop a moral sense. She incorporated ideas from 
the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) to explain how emotional states 
can guide future decisions, by proposing that developmental improvements in 
cognition lead to the development of self-conscious emotions. 
Taber-Thomas and Tranel (2012) presented a cognitive neuroscience 
perspective of social and moral functioning, and argued that there is a functional 
hierarchy underlying socio-moral functioning, from basic functions such as 
processing emotion from faces, to higher cognitive processes such as moral 
cognition. They concluded that social and moral functioning critically depend on a 
core fronto-limbic network centred on the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), but 
acknowledged that this network does not function in isolation and relies on other 
social functions. As with Baird’s theory (2008), their perspective incorporated 
aspects of the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) and they asserted that 
the vmPFC is crucial for the anticipation of emotional consequences of behaviour.  
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There are other social neuroscience theories, which while not specifically 
moral theories, are of relevance here, as they incorporated moral reasoning and 
some of the relevant component skills and processes. Anderson and Beauchamp 
(2012) presented the Socio-Cognitive Integration of Abilities Model (SOCIAL), a 
theoretical framework of social function, which defined social function/skills as social 
competence, social interaction and social adjustment. The SOCIAL framework 
posited that the emergence of social function is shaped by internal factors (e.g. 
temperament and personality), external factors (e.g. family environment, 
socioeconomic status (SES) and culture) and brain development and integrity. Brain 
development and integrity has not yet been explicitly included in any models of 
moral development. The SOCIAL framework also included higher-order cognitive 
processes critical for social functioning: attention, executive skills (including 
attentional control, cognitive flexibility and goal setting), communication and social 
cognition (including emotion perception, attribution, Theory of Mind (ToM) and moral 
reasoning) (Anderson & Beauchamp, 2012). While this framework included moral 
reasoning as a sub-skill of social cognition, this relationship could be reframed to 
explain how social cognition may impact upon moral reasoning maturity.  
Yeates and colleagues (2012) suggested an integrative model of social 
competence in children with brain disorders, including three main components: SIP, 
social interaction and social adjustment. The authors defined SIP as a series of 
problem solving steps, and they referenced the importance of executive functions 
and ToM to SIP. The three components of the model can impact upon and interact 
with each other, and factors that can affect the development of these components 
are parenting style, family function and SES, as well as brain injury related factors 
such as type and severity of insult and regional brain abnormalities (Yeates et al., 
2012). While this is a theory of social competence rather than moral development, 
social competence can influence interactions with peers, which can in turn impact 
upon the development of perspective taking, which is proposed to be crucial for 
moral development (Gibbs, 2013; Hoffman, 2000; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1932). 
Components from these social perspectives could be incorporated into a framework 
of moral development in an attempt to explain how social functioning may affect 
social interactions, moral decisions and moral behaviour. 
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1.5 Divides between developmental psychology and social neuroscience 
approaches to moral decision-making and development 
1.5.1 Theoretical focus. The theories outlined above differ in their focus. 
Moral theories within developmental psychology focus on the maturity of moral 
reasoning, as a process that guides moral decision-making. These theories explain 
how moral reasoning develops and matures, through processes such as increased 
role-taking opportunities leading to improvements in perspective taking and a move 
away from egocentrism. Cognitive-developmental theories focused on the role of 
reasoning maturity in moral decision-making while Hoffman (2000) focused on the 
role of affective empathy development (Hoffman, 2000) and Gibbs (2013) 
suggested a co-primacy approach. Social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001) focused 
on automatic intuitions as a driver for moral decisions but does not propose how 
moral decision-making matures over time. Similarly, dual-process theory (Greene et 
al., 2008; Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001) focused on real-time moral 
decision-making rather than development of moral maturity, and inferences about 
which cognitive and affective processes are involved are made based on the extent 
to which different brain regions are activated. Other social neuroscience approaches 
are more developmental in focus (Baird, 2008; Kagan, 2008) and focused on how 
brain development correlates with moral development, through its effect on the 
emergence of relevant cognitive and affective processes, such as abstract 
reasoning and emotion recognition. 
There are strengths and weaknesses of the various theories discussed in 
this chapter. Piaget’s (1932) theory was the first cognitive-developmental theory and 
highlighted the role of logical reasoning for moral development. While Piaget 
proposed how moral development can occur (though social interactions), his theory 
focused on only development in children. Kohlberg (1976, 1981, 1984a) extended 
this theory beyond childhood, and also proposed how moral development occurs 
(through role-taking opportunities). However, Kohlberg’s theory has received some 
criticisms that it is masculine in focus and the stages may not be culturally universal. 
A further weakness of Kohlberg’s theory is his proposition that stages are sequential 
and that higher stages of reasoning replace immature stages. It has been found that 
individuals are not consistent in their stage of reasoning in response to different 
hypothetical dilemmas, suggesting that immature stages can co-exist alongside 
mature stages (Krebs & Denton, 2005). In contrast to Kohlberg’s proposition that 
stages are sequential, Rest and colleagues (1999) and Gibbs (2013) proposed that 
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development is gradual and can be conceptualised as schemas. Moral schemas, 
and the extent to which they are activated, may develop over time and be 
dependent upon situational factors. A further strength of the work of Rest and Gibbs 
is in their focus on moral behaviour rather than just moral decisions, and they go 
some way to explaining links between moral decisions and behaviour, though this 
could be expanded upon. Furthermore, Gibbs’s theory is one of co-primacy, which 
brings together competing viewpoints in the field by proposing that both cognition 
and affect can act as motives for moral action.  
While social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001) can help to explain why some 
moral decisions appear automatic, the theory does not focus on individual 
differences in the proposed set of evolved moral beliefs or motivations, or how they 
develop and lead to moral maturity. Domain theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) 
has been helpful in highlighting the distinction between domains but does not make 
strong predictions about how moral development occurs. One limitation of moral 
psychology theories is that they have not explicitly included brain development, and 
how this can impact on moral development. Social neuroscience theories and 
perspectives have attempted to link stages of development to corresponding brain 
circuitry, helping to explain how brain development relates to moral development 
(Baird, 2008; Kagan, 2008). However, social neuroscience perspectives do not 
always reference the rich tradition of developmental psychology theory in this area, 
such as Anderson and Beauchamp (2012) who cite Kohlberg (1984a) in explaining 
the moral reasoning component of SOCIAL, without reference to criticisms of his 
theory, or more recent formulations, such as Gibbs (2013). 
1.5.2 Differing research approaches. Differences in focus within these 
moral theories have led to different research priorities. Within developmental 
psychology, there is a tradition of trying to measure developmental stages of moral 
reasoning, with a lack of focus on other factors, such as situational factors, which 
may influence moral decisions and behaviour. Social neuroscience research tends 
to use either neuroimaging methods while individuals are making moral-decisions, 
as a measure of which brain regions and related processes are involved, or, 
measures moral decision-making in individuals with brain injuries. Social 
neuroscience research typically focuses on the real-time moral decision-making 
process, without focusing on development, while developmental psychology 
research focuses on moral maturity rather than other processes involved in 
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decision-making, with neither research discipline focusing on moral behaviour as 
the end product. 
Instruments used in developmental psychology studies for assessing moral 
reasoning can be divided into two groups: production and recognition measures. 
Recognition measures ( e.g. The Defining Issues Test; Rest, 1979) involve 
participants selecting their justification for a decision from a predefined set of moral 
justifications. Some recognition instruments do not measure younger stages of 
development, and people with communication difficulties may have difficulties with 
them (Gibbs et al., 1992; Rest, 1979). Production measures require participants to 
articulate their own reasons for their moral decisions, which are then scored 
developmentally, providing a moral maturity score. Lower, or immature levels of 
moral reasoning are characterised by references to authority, rules and physical 
consequences, whereas higher, or mature levels are characterised by references to 
empathic role-taking, interpersonal relations and societal requirements (Dooley, 
Beauchamp, & Anderson, 2010; Gibbs et al., 1992). Moral reasoning is elicited by 
“why?” questions in production measures, in response to either moral value 
judgements, e.g. “In general, how important is it to break the law?” (The Sociomoral 
Reasoning Measure Short-Form (SRM-SF); Gibbs et al., 1992), or response 
decisions in hypothetical dilemmas, e.g. if you saw your friend cheat in an exam, do 
you tell the teacher about it or not? (The So-Mature section of The Socio-Moral 
Reasoning Aptitude Level Task (So-Moral); Dooley et al., 2010). Moral reasoning 
measures provide rich detail about developmental level, and an indication of a 
person’s highest capacity for moral reasoning across differing questions or moral 
dilemmas. However, it has been found that moral reasoning does not always 
correlate with behaviour (Blasi, 1983) and people do not always use their highest 
capacity of reasoning for moral decision-making (Krebs & Denton, 1997). 
Alternative methods for measuring moral decision-making involve presenting 
hypothetical dilemmas or stories involving moral transgressions and asking 
participants to make moral response decisions (e.g. “What would you do?”) or moral 
evaluations (e.g. “Was it OK for X to do that?”). Such instruments are less 
developmental in focus and so do not provide a moral maturity score. Hypothetical 
dilemmas are often used in moral neuroscience studies; either asking respondents 
to choose between two possible actions, judge the appropriateness of possible 
actions, or judge the permissibility of other people’s actions. Many studies use 
Greene and colleagues’ dilemmas (2001), or adapted versions. Such dilemmas are 
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impersonal, personal or non-moral dilemmas and participants typically choose 
whether the suggested response is appropriate or not for each dilemma. Personal 
dilemmas involve expected harm to other people, are more emotionally engaging 
than impersonal dilemmas, and relate to utilitarian decisions (e.g. stealing one 
person’s organs in order to distribute them to five others), whereas impersonal 
moral dilemmas are less emotionally engaging and relate to other moral issues (e.g. 
whether to keep money found in a lost wallet). Dilemmas involving everyday social 
harm elicit different decisions to life or death dilemmas (Vyas, Jameel, Bellesi, 
Crawford, & Channon, 2017), so research using utilitarian dilemmas may not be 
generalisable to everyday moral decision-making involving less extreme outcomes.  
1.6 Why is an integrative framework needed? 
Taken together, moral theories from developmental psychology and social 
neuroscience provide a fuller picture of the skills and processes required for moral 
decision-making, and how these might develop to enable moral maturity. The 
different component skills and processes proposed to be required for moral 
development have not yet been integrated into one comprehensive theory of moral 
development. An integrative framework could include both affective and cognitive 
processes and also show how both intuitions and reasoning can guide moral 
decisions. Developmental psychology theories have outlined that the cognitive and 
affective processes required for mature moral decision-making develop with age, 
but have not explicitly explained how this occurs as a consequence of brain 
development. More recent neuroscience perspectives have emphasised the 
importance of brain development for the maturation of moral reasoning and related 
skills, but often neglect the moral developmental psychology literature. The field of 
moral development would benefit from clearer integration of the developmental 
psychology literature with insights from social neuroscience research.  
In a review of the neuroscience of moral cognition, Van Bavel, FeldmanHall, 
and Mende-Siedlecki (2015) argued that hypothetical scenarios used in 
neuroscience research usually ignore the influence of social and contextual factors, 
and they advocated a shift from dual-process theories to a dynamic systems model 
of moral cognition. Most moral theories and the research focus on moral decisions 
(judgements, evaluations or response decisions) as the end point, rather than 
seeking to explain how these moral decisions relate to behaviour. Some theories 
have sought to explain moral action, including the interpretation of a situation (Rest, 
1984), cognitive distortions and social skills (Gibbs, 2013) within theory, but 
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additional factors may also be relevant. For a dynamic explanation of moral 
decision-making, development and behaviour, it is necessary to understand (a) how 
moral decisions are made (including relevant social and contextual factors), (b) what 
processes are required to develop to enable mature moral decisions, and how these 
develop over time, and (c) how moral decisions relate to behaviour. Further theory 
development is needed to answer these questions and provide a predictive model of 
moral behaviour. An integrative framework incorporating aspects from 
developmental psychology and social neuroscience could be a first step, to guide 
future research and theory development in this area. 
1.7 Social information processing  
1.7.1 Social information processing theory. SIP theory (Crick & Dodge, 
1994) was proposed as an explanation of how decisions are made in relation to 
aggression. Aggression is a behaviour which harms, or is intended to harm another 
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002). The original SIP model therefore relates to the moral 
principle of harm, and has the potential to be expanded to explain the processing 
involved in other behaviours within the moral domain (i.e. justice, fairness and care). 
SIP theory has previously been integrated with moral domain theory (Arsenio & 
Lemerise, 2004) but such an integration can be greatly expanded upon, 
incorporating aspects from other moral theories. 
According to SIP theory (Figure 1.1; Crick & Dodge, 1994), children’s 
behavioural responses are a function of the processing of information in a situation. 
The model consists of six steps: (1) encoding of cues, (2) interpretation of cues, (3) 
clarification of goals, (4) response access or construction, (5) response decision, 
and (6) behavioural enactment. The six steps represent a logical order but do not 
necessarily occur in this order and can co-occur. Children come to a social situation 
with a set of biologically determined capabilities and a database of memories of past 
experiences, which can affect how information is processed (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Memories of past events are stored in the database as acquired rules, social 
schemas and social knowledge. SIP abilities are theorised to develop with age due 
to a growth in experience with social interactions, developmental shifts in attentional 
ability, mental capacity or speed of processing, and the organisation and 
interpretation of social information (Crick & Dodge, 1994). This is similar to how 
moral development is proposed to occur, according to the various moral 
development theories, suggesting that moral development could be explained using 
a SIP framework.  
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Figure 1.1. Crick and Dodge’s (1994) Social information processing model. 
 
 
 
 
Emotional processes were incorporated into the SIP model by Lemerise and 
Arsenio (2000), suggesting that a SIP approach can be used to address the 
cognition vs. affect divide within moral psychology. They added emotional 
processes at certain steps of the SIP model, such as emotion recognition at Step 1 
and empathic responsiveness at Step 5. Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) also added 
affect-event links to the database in the centre of the model, and theorised that 
memories of past events include affective as well as cognitive components. This is 
From Crick, Nicki, R & Dodge, Kenneth, A. (1994). A review and reformulation of 
social information-processing mechanisms in children’s social adjustment. Psychological 
bulletin, 115(1), 74. Fig. 2: “A reformulated social information-processing model of children’s 
social adjustment”, p.76. Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association. 
Reprinted with permission. 
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similar to Hoffman’s (2000) proposal that affective empathy can act as a powerful 
retrieval cue, triggering moral schemas stored in memory, and also similar to 
Damasio’s (1994) proposal that somatic markers can be stored in memory as affect-
event links, aiding future decision-making. In addition, Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) 
added emotional processes to the centre of the SIP model and hypothesised that 
individual differences in emotionality and emotion regulation can influence each step 
of SIP. They proposed that children enter a social situation with a level of 
physiological arousal or mood and differ in their ability to regulate this, partly due to 
biological predispositions of their emotionality or temperament.  
Following their integration of emotional processes into the SIP model, 
Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) incorporated SIP with moral domain theory, proposing 
that moral domain theory can be used to expand on the latent mental structures, or 
the database of the model. They hypothesised that social experiences lead to the 
generation of latent mental structures that are stored in memory, or the database. 
Domain knowledge stored in memory must be activated and used in the processing 
of a situation in order to influence behaviour. If domain knowledge is retrieved early 
in the process, it can influence other steps of SIP, such as goal clarification (Arsenio 
& Lemerise, 2004). Social schemas are in the centre of the SIP model, as a 
component that can influence all steps of processing. Calvete and Orue (2012) 
found that adolescents who scored higher on a justification for violence schema 
were more likely to choose an aggressive behaviour in response to a hypothetical 
ambiguous situation, and a narcissism schema predicted anger and access to 
aggressive responses. This study also found that aggressive response access 
predicted aggression, and so response access may play a mediating role between 
schemas and behaviour (Calvete & Orue, 2012). Moral schemas will be relevant for 
moral decision-making, but how they relate to moral behaviour, including any 
potential mediating factors or processes, remains to be explored. The integration of 
domain theory with SIP theory added moral domain knowledge to the centre of the 
model, as a component that can affect all steps of processing. However, moral 
decision-making does not mature based solely on an increase of moral knowledge; 
it also involves other processes, such as the development of perspective taking and 
a move away from egocentricity (Gibbs, 2013; Kohlberg, 1976, 1984a, 1984b; 
Piaget, 1932).  
Aspects from other moral theories could be integrated into a SIP framework; 
Rest’s (1984) moral sensitivity component involves interpretation of the situation, 
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which is similar to Step 2 of the SIP model, and his proposed moral judgement 
component which involves deliberation could be formulated as Step 5 of a SIP 
model. Palmer (2003) proposed a model of offending behaviour which incorporated 
both moral reasoning development and SIP skills, and she theorised that SIP 
mediates the link between parenting and offending (Palmer, 2000). Palmer (2003) 
proposed that developmental levels of moral reasoning can affect SIP steps. At 
Steps 1 and 2, perspective taking and degree of egocentricity, both associated with 
moral reasoning level, are likely to influence an individual’s ability to make accurate 
attributions about intent and causality (Palmer, 2003). She proposed that immature 
levels of moral reasoning will be associated with biases in processing, such as a 
hostile attribution bias. At Step 3, Palmer (2003) theorised that the types of goals 
chosen are likely to be associated with level of perspective taking and egocentricity, 
and increasing maturity of moral reasoning will be associated with goals that take 
the feelings and needs of other people and wider society into account. At Steps 4 
and 5, moral reasoning maturity will impact on response generation; different 
responses will be justifiable depending on moral reasoning maturity, with individuals 
reasoning at a higher level less likely to perceive physical aggression as justifiable, 
based on moral concerns for the feelings of others (Palmer, 2003). Components 
from various moral theories could be added to a SIP framework, to show how moral 
maturity can affect each step of processing.  
1.7.2 Social information processing research. SIP skills are typically 
measured using hypothetical dilemmas presented as vignettes (videos or drawings) 
followed by an interview to assess the different steps, such as how much 
information was encoded, what attributions were made, and the response decision. 
While SIP skills are hypothesised to develop with age, there is limited research into 
the typical developmental trajectory of SIP skills, as most research focuses on the 
relationship between SIP skills and aggressive behaviour, or SIP skills in atypical 
populations. However, it has been found that SIP skills correlate with age in typically 
developing (TD) children, including a decrease of endorsing aggressive responses 
with age (Feldman & Dodge, 1987). Aggressive children display atypical SIP skills, 
such as making hostile intent attributions in ambiguous situations, and positively 
evaluating aggressive response options, and SIP problems are predictive of 
aggressive behaviour (Dodge, Laird, Lochman, & Zelli, 2002; Lansford, Malone, 
Dodge, Crozier, Pettit, & Bates, 2006; Oostermeijer, Nieuwenhuijzen, van de Ven, 
Popma, & Jansen, 2016; Ziv & Sorongon, 2011). Not as much research has focused 
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on the relationship between SIP skills and prosocial behaviour so this relationship 
remains less clear (Nelson & Crick, 1999; Yagmurlu, 2014).  
Atypical patterns of SIP have been found for children with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (Embregts & Van Nieuwenhuijzen, 2009; Flood, Julian Hare, & Wallis, 
2011; Mazza, Mariano, Peretti, Masedu, Pino, & Valenti, 2017; Ziv, Hadad, & 
Khateeb, 2014), intellectual disabilities (Embregts & Van Nieuwenhuijzen, 2009; van 
Nieuwenhuijzen, Vriens, Scheepmaker, Smit, & Porton, 2011) and Fragile X 
Syndrome (Russo-Ponsaran, Berry-Kravis, McKown, & Lipton, 2014). Some social-
cognitive skills such as working memory and perspective taking have been studied 
alongside SIP steps in children and adolescents (aged 8-12 years) with intellectual 
disabilities, finding that emotion recognition and interpretation skills are particularly 
important cognitive skills that predict different steps of SIP (van Nieuwenhuijzen & 
Vriens, 2012). Relationships between SIP and social-cognitive skills remain to be 
explored for TD children and adolescents.  
There is limited research into SIP steps following a brain injury but there is 
some research into social problem-solving in children with TBIs. Warschausky, 
Cohen, Parker, Levendosky, and Okun (1997) found that children with TBIs 
generated fewer total solutions and fewer positive assertive solutions than a healthy 
comparison group on a social problem-solving measure. In a study using a virtual 
reality measure, Cook and colleagues (2013) found that adolescents with TBIs 
provided significantly fewer long-term consequences for decisions made by actors 
in hypothetical situations, including situations relating to moral issues (e.g. using a 
friend’s answers to cheat on an exam), suggesting that TBI may affect decision-
making through its effect on consequential thinking. Janusz, Kirkwood, Yeates, and 
Taylor (2002) looked at social problem solving in children and adolescents (aged 9-
18 years) with TBIs, using the Interpersonal Negotiation Strategies interview (INS; 
Yeates, Schultz, & Selman, 1991). The INS asks individuals to identify the problem 
and how a protagonist feels in a hypothetical dilemma, generate and select 
response options and evaluate outcomes, so is similar to SIP measures. The TBI 
group defined the problem and generated strategies to solve the problem at the 
same developmental level as a comparison group of children with orthopaedic 
injuries (OIs) but showed lower level strategies for solving problems (Janusz et al., 
2002). Although Janusz et al. (2002) found no group differences for defining the 
problem, a study using a virtual reality version of the INS with adolescents found the 
strongest group differences between a TBI and uninjured comparison group for 
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defining the problem (Hanten et al., 2011). Within this study, the virtual reality 
dilemma presented the social conflict using naturalistic dialogue between two 
characters, rather than a text summary as in the original INS; it may be that 
adolescents with TBI struggle to identify social problems from conversations.  
Although SIP has been integrated with moral domain theory (Arsenio & 
Lemerise, 2004), little research has focused on relationships between SIP and 
moral variables. Arsenio, Adams, and Gold (2009) measured some SIP skills and 
moral reasoning, using a moral reasoning measure based on the ‘happy victimiser’ 
paradigm (Arsenio & Lover, 1995). This measure presents three stories in which the 
reader is described as deliberately victimising another person, and then asks the 
reader how they would feel and why, and how the victim would feel and why, with 
answers scored according to mentions of moral concerns. Arsenio et al. (2009) 
found that adolescents who expected to feel happier following acts of unprovoked 
acts of aggression explained these emotions in terms of material gains, referring 
less to moral concerns. While some conclusions about relationships between SIP 
and moral reasoning were made, arguably, stronger conclusions about 
developmental relationships could be made from research using a moral reasoning 
measure grounded more firmly in developmental psychology (e.g. SRM-SF; Gibbs 
et al., 1992). 
1.8 Moral decision-making and moral development research 
1.8.1 Typical moral decision-making and development. Most research 
into moral decision-making has focused on moral evaluations or response choices 
in adults, but there is some research into the development of moral preferences in 
children and adolescents. Evidence of an understanding of moral rules, as well as 
showing moral preferences and expectations have been found to be present in 
children as young as three months, shown by their preference to attend to a 
prosocial character (Kiley Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010). When asked to judge the 
actions of others, young children weigh up the costs and benefits of harm, as older 
children and adults do, but children aged 6 years old judge decisions involving harm 
negatively, regardless of whether it leads to a greater benefit (Powell, Derbyshire, & 
Guttentag, 2012), suggesting that young children are influenced by outcome when 
making moral evaluations.  
Cognitive-developmental theorists propose that taking situational 
circumstances, including an actor’s intentions into account when reasoning about 
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moral issues only occurs at the mature level, transition stage 3/4 according to Gibbs 
and colleagues (1992). In contrast to this proposal, research has found that even 
young children are able to take intentions into account when making moral 
judgements. Although influenced by outcome, young children, similarly to adults, are 
also influenced by an actor’s intentions when making moral evaluations; the reliance 
on intent when making moral decisions, and the ability to distinguish more clearly 
between ill and well-intentioned actions both develop with age (Cushman, 
Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Bartholomew, 2016; 
Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009). It may be the case that young children are 
able to take intent into account when their attention is oriented towards this feature 
of an event, as in the studies mentioned above (e.g. “What did X want to do?” or 
“‘‘Did [the character] want [the relevant outcome to occur]?’’), but they do not 
independently focus on intent until later ages, or at least do not articulate intent 
when explaining their reasoning. Moral reasoning is often measured as an indicator 
of an individual’s highest capacity for reasoning across different questions or moral 
dilemmas and research has found that these abilities develop with age (Chiasson, 
Vera-Estay, Lalonde, Dooley, & Beauchamp, 2017b; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, 
Lieberman, Fischer, & Saltzstein, 1983; Gibbs et al., 1992; Humphries, Parker, & 
Jagers, 2000; Vera-Estay, Seni, Champagne, & Beauchamp, 2016).  
1.8.2 The neuroscience of moral decision-making and development. 
Social neuroscience studies can reveal which brain regions are more active during 
moral decision-making, or how damage to certain brain regions affects moral 
decision-making. Neuroimaging studies using moral decision-making tasks have 
found that the brain region most commonly activated is the vmPFC (Fumagalli & 
Priori, 2012). The vmPFC is involved in emotional processing (Etkin, Egner, & 
Kalisch, 2011) so its recruitment during moral decision-making offers some support 
for the view that moral decisions are driven by emotions. Neuroimaging studies into 
moral decision-making typically employ tasks which involve judging the actions of 
others rather than making your own response decisions about how to act; it remains 
to be explored whether the vmPFC is involved in all types of moral decision-making.  
The large majority of neuroimaging studies of moral decision-making involve 
adults and there is limited research into how the maturation of relevant brain regions 
may correlate with mature moral decision-making. Harenski and colleagues (2012) 
did include 15 adolescents in their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
sample (aged 13-18 years) alongside an adult sample (aged 19-53 years) and 
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found a positive correlation between age and hemodynamic activity in the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) when participants rated the severity of moral 
transgressions. This region is known to contribute to mentalising during moral 
decision-making in adults, so the authors concluded that adolescents use 
mentalising less than adults when rating moral transgressions. There were no 
significant age differences for ratings of transgressions, indicating that adults and 
adolescents were similarly able to identify violations and rate their severity. It may, 
therefore, be the case that adolescents use mentalising as much as adults when 
rating transgressions, but that mentalising in adolescence activates other regions in 
the network; neuroimaging research of cognition has found that children and 
adolescents activate networks more extensively, while adults show activation in 
more specific regions (Scherf, Sweeney, & Luna, 2006; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 
2002).  
A brain injury may directly disrupt moral decision-making if brain regions or 
networks thought to be required for making moral decisions are damaged. 
Additionally, a brain injury may indirectly affect moral development if it damages 
brain areas required for related processes, such as empathy or working memory, or 
if it impacts or limits interaction with peers and role-taking opportunities, which can 
in turn impact on the development of perspective taking. There has been some 
research into moral decision-making following an ABI, though this has mostly 
focused on the types of moral decisions, (typically moral judgements and 
evaluations), made in hypothetical scenarios and dilemmas, and has not always 
been grounded in developmental psychology. In studies using hypothetical 
scenarios which depict a protagonist either intending to cause harm or not to 
another (intent) and resulting in either harm or no harm (outcome), it has been 
found that adult patients with damage to the vmPFC, and patients with frontal 
lesions, judge attempted harm (intent) as more permissible than healthy comparison 
groups (Baez et al., 2014; Young, Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Hauser, & Damasio, 
2010). These results suggest that adults with damage to frontal regions of the brain 
judge intent differently to neurologically healthy (NH) adults when assessing the 
permissibility of other people’s actions. Numerous studies have investigated moral 
decision-making in individuals with brain damage using Greene and colleagues’ 
dilemmas (2001), or adapted versions. Such studies have found that adults with TBI 
or damage to the vmPFC show an abnormal utilitarian response pattern for personal 
dilemmas, judging more as appropriate compared to NH comparison participants 
(Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Làdavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Martins, 
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Faisca, Esteves, Muresan, & Reis, 2012; Moretto, Làdavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 
2010; Thomas, Croft, & Tranel, 2011). Evidence for increased utilitarian decision-
making for personal moral dilemmas in individuals with TBI has been interpreted as 
TBI resulting in an impairment emotional processing. Martins and colleagues (2012) 
found that patients with TBI showed impairments in an emotion recognition task 
compared to comparison participants, but this reduction in emotion recognition 
performance did note mediate the link between TBI and utilitarian decision-making. 
It has also been found that only TBI patients displaying apathy symptoms make 
more utilitarian moral decisions compared to NH participants (Njomboro, 
Humphreys, & Deb, 2014), suggesting that apathy may mediate the relationship 
between TBI and utilitarian decision-making.  
There is limited developmental research which measures moral reasoning in 
individuals with ABI, but the available studies have suggested that children and 
adolescents with TBIs and frontal or temporal lesions are reasoning at a lower level 
than would be expected of their chronological age. Couper and colleagues (2002) 
found that children with frontal lobe lesions had lower levels of moral maturity than 
an age-matched comparison group, as measured by the SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 
1992). Dooley and colleagues (2010) did not find a significant difference between 
moral reasoning abilities, as measured by the So-Mature section of the So-Moral, 
for adolescents with TBIs and an age-matched comparison group. In a subsequent 
study using the same measure, the authors did find a significant difference, with TD 
participants scoring higher on moral reasoning than adolescents with TBI 
(Beauchamp, Dooley, & Anderson, 2013). The discrepancy between the results on 
the So-Moral may be due to the comparison groups used. While both used a 
sample of 25 adolescents with TBI (mean age 13 years) including a majority of mild 
TBIs, Dooley et al (2010) used an age-matched TD comparison group of 26 
adolescents and Beauchamp et al (2013) compared moral reasoning of the TBI 
group to 66 TD participants, not age-matched to the TBI group. A recent study by 
Chiasson, Elkaim, Weil, Crevier, and Beauchamp (2017a) using the So-Mature 
found that moral reasoning in 15 adolescents (aged 8-12 years) with frontal or 
temporal lobe lesions was significantly lower than a TD comparison group, matched 
on age, gender and parental education. Lower moral reasoning has also been found 
for older adolescents and adults with TBIs; Wigg (2013) found that individuals aged 
17-25 years with TBIs had significantly lower SRM-SF scores than a NH 
comparison group matched on age, gender and SES.  
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Most moral neuroscience research focuses on patterns of utilitarian 
decision-making (i.e. approving harmful actions that maximise good consequences) 
and cannot provide detail about how damage to certain areas of the brain may 
affect other types of moral decisions, or what brain regions are involved in other 
types of moral decision. There has been some research using developmental 
psychology methods for measuring moral maturity in individuals with brain injuries 
(Beauchamp et al., 2013; Chiasson et al., 2017a; Couper et al., 2002; Dooley et al., 
2010). Such research provides promise that developmental psychology and social 
neuroscience approaches can be brought together to provide a richer picture of 
typical and atypical moral development. 
1.8.3 Relationships between moral reasoning maturity and cognitive 
and affective processes. While a strong relationship between moral 
reasoning and mental capacity, or general intellectual functioning, has long been 
established (Hoffman, 1977; Stewart & Pascual-Leone, 1992), there has been 
limited research investigating whether the specific cognitive and affective 
components proposed to be important for moral development, (e.g. empathy and 
working memory), correlate with moral reasoning maturity. There is some evidence 
of a positive relationship between empathy and moral reasoning for TD adolescents, 
but the research uses different measures of both moral reasoning and empathy. 
Dooley et al. (2010) found positive correlations between self-report empathy and 
moral reasoning scores on the So-Mature for 11-19 year olds. Humphries and 
colleagues (2000) found a positive correlation between the perspective taking and 
empathic concern scales of the Davis empathy scale (Davis, 1983) and scores on 
the SRM-SF in TD children and adolescents aged 10-13 years old. In contrast to 
this, while Littler (2015) found a positive association between working memory and 
SRM-SF scores in TD adolescents aged 11-14 years old, she found no associations 
between SRM-SF scores and cognitive flexibility, empathy, or self-reported 
behaviour. Relationships between empathy and SRM-SF scores have also been 
found for juvenile delinquents aged 13-21 years, even after controlling for self-
serving cognitive distortion and social desirability (Barriga, Sullivan-Cosetti, & 
Gibbs, 2009). There is limited research which has investigated relationships 
between moral reasoning and other cognitive and affective processes. A recent 
study by Vera-Estay and colleagues (2016) found that moral reasoning (as 
measured by the So-Mature) correlated positively with inhibition, verbal fluency, 
attentional control, ToM and affect recognition in TD children and adolescents aged 
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6-12 years old. This study also found that age, verbal fluency and ToM predicted 
moral maturity (Vera-Estay et al., 2016).  
Many of the aforementioned studies indicated that the relationships between 
moral reasoning and empathy for individuals with TBIs are mixed. Beauchamp, 
Dooley, and Anderson (2013) found a significant positive correlation between 
empathy and moral reasoning (as measured by the So-Mature) in a TBI group. 
Conversely, Wigg (2013) found no significant relationship between empathy and 
moral reasoning (as measured by the SRM-SF) in a TBI group. This discrepancy 
may be due to either the different ages of the samples, or the different moral 
reasoning measures used. Wigg (2013) did find a relationship between SRM-SF 
scores and empathy for the NH comparison group (aged 17-25 years), with 
empathy accounting for 12% of variance in moral reasoning scores, and higher 
empathy associated with more mature moral reasoning. Similarly, Beauchamp et al. 
(2013) found that general intellectual functioning and empathy explained 11.7% of 
the variance in moral reasoning maturity, with empathy making a larger contribution, 
in a sample of TD adolescents and adolescents with TBIs. The relationship between 
moral reasoning and empathy (both cognitive and affective) remains unclear and 
there is a lack of research measuring relationships between moral reasoning and 
other cognitive and affective processes in individuals with ABIs.  
1.8.4 Development of cognitive and affective processes. While there is 
little research which explores relationships between the cognitive and affective 
processes proposed to be required for moral development, and moral reasoning 
maturity, there is research into the typical and atypical development of these 
processes. Findings about how these processes typically develop can allow for 
hypotheses to be made about their potential interaction, and how they may relate to 
moral maturity at different ages. There is evidence that individuals with ABIs may 
show developmental delays or impairments in some of the components of moral 
development, which can allow for hypotheses to be made about how this in turn 
may affect moral maturity, decision-making and behaviour. There is also evidence 
from neuroimaging research of which brain regions are involved in the component 
processes, and some developmental neuroimaging research, which can provide 
detail about how recruitment of brain networks for these components may develop 
and change with age.  
  
44 
 
 Perspective taking. The component cited by most theories as being 1.8.4.1
crucial for moral development is perspective taking. Perspective taking in this 
context is considered to be the cognitive component of empathy and refers to the 
ability to infer another’s mental states and attributions; also referred to as 
mentalisation ability or ToM.  Perspective taking is important for moral development 
as it allows for the thoughts and feelings of others to be taken into account when 
making moral decisions, as attributions of intent can affect how moral decisions are 
processed, and whether empathy is triggered. While perspective taking is the 
component most frequently proposed to be involved in moral development, as 
discussed, there is little research linking the development of perspective taking to 
moral decision-making. Research has found that visual perspective taking (taking 
into account what others can see) develops between 12-14 months (Sodian, 
Thoermer, & Metz, 2007) and that by four years old children can pass false belief 
tasks (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), showing an understanding that a person 
can have a belief that contradicts reality. There is limited research into the 
development of perspective taking in adolescence but it has been found that more 
complex perspective taking, such as the ability to take into account another person’s 
perspective to direct appropriate behaviour, and the ability to understand another’s 
emotional states are still developing into late adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, & 
Blakemore, 2010; Vetter, Altgassen, Phillips, Mahy, & Kliegel, 2013). It has been 
found that males only show increases in perspective taking from 15 years onwards, 
suggesting gender differences in developmental trajectories (Van der Graaff, 
Branje, De Wied, Hawk, Van Lier, & Meeus, 2014).  
Perspective taking is hypothesised to develop through social interaction and 
pretend play (Kohlberg, 1976, 1981; Piaget, 1932; Selman, 1976). The importance 
of peer interaction for perspective taking development in adolescence has been 
emphasised over parent interaction (Baird, 2008) and research has found that 
children’s competence in peer interaction is significantly related to ToM 
understanding (Peterson, Slaughter, Moore, & Wellman, 2016). Children and 
adolescents with ABIs can experience difficulties in peer relationships (Tonks, 
Yates, Williams, Frampton, & Slater, 2010; Yeates et al., 2013) and limited social 
participation (Bedell & Dumas, 2004), which may impact upon role-taking 
opportunities with peers, and subsequently perspective taking development. 
Gracey, Watson, McHugh, Swan, Humphrey, and Adlam (2014) found that age at 
injury was significantly associated with more peer relationship problems in children 
with ABIs, and this relationship was mediated by metacognitive skills (working 
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memory, planning/organising and monitoring). As perspective taking develops 
through an interaction with the social environment, social factors (e.g. SES) can 
influence its development, which in turn affects moral development. A framework of 
moral development, therefore, needs to include perspective taking, along with the 
factors affected by perspective taking (e.g. affective empathy), and factors which 
influence the development of perspective taking (e.g. peer interaction).  
 “The brain regions that undergo the most significant development during 
adolescence overlap with those that have been linked to the ability to take other 
people’s perspectives and infer mental states.” (Choudhury, Blakemore, & 
Charman, 2006, p. 168). A study into the development of the neural network 
associated with perspective taking found that in adults (aged 25-32 years), activity 
increased in the left inferior parietal cortex and precuneus when processing third 
person, compared to first person judgments, and children (aged 8-10 years) 
additionally showed increased activity in the dorsolateral PFC and the right inferior 
parietal cortex (Dosch, Loenneker, Bucher, Martin, & Klaver, 2010). There was also 
a decrease in reaction time differences between third and first person perspective 
judgements with age, suggesting that adults are more efficient at processing third 
person perspectives (Dosch et al., 2010). Sebastian and colleagues (2012) found 
an increased neural response in the vmPFC for adolescents compared to adults 
during an affective ToM task, but no significant difference during a cognitive ToM 
task, and an increased amount of errors in the adolescent group for the affective but 
not the cognitive ToM condition. These findings suggest that the development of 
affective ToM, understanding the emotional states of others, is more complex and 
continues beyond that that of cognitive ToM. Bivona and colleagues (2014) found 
evidence suggesting a causal relationship between low self-awareness and 
perspective taking difficulties in adults with TBIs, and adults with moderate-severe 
TBIs have been found to exhibit difficulties inhibiting self-referential thoughts to 
cater for another’s perspective (McDonald, Gowland, Randall, Fisher, Osborne-
Crowley, & Honan, 2014). Perspective taking difficulties have also been found for 
children with TBIs (Dennis et al., 2013).  
  
46 
 
 Attention and working memory. The cognitive processes of 1.8.4.2
attention and working memory are proposed to be required for moral development 
(Gibbs, 2013). Development of working memory can refer to both an increase in 
capacity, i.e. the amount of information that can be temporarily stored while 
processing information, and to an increased ability to direct attention to relevant 
information while ignoring irrelevant information (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Engle, 
Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). A linear increase in performance from age 4-
15 years has been found for working memory measures associated with the 
phonological loop (phonological short-term store where rehearsal takes place), the 
visuospatial sketchpad (stores visual and spatial material) and the central executive 
(responsible for regulatory functions including attention and problem solving) 
(Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004). de Wilde, Koot, and van Lier 
(2016) found that lower working memory scores were related to increases in 
teacher-child conflict one year later, and that teacher-child conflict was negatively 
associated with the development of working memory, suggesting that working 
memory can affect social development, and vice-versa. Decision-making is more 
difficult in situations with high working memory load, i.e. when there is a lot of 
information from different sources. Increased working memory load can lead to 
more impulsive decisions (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003) and prevent somatic 
markers from being produced (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002), suggesting that 
adolescents with low working memory capacity are likely to have more difficulty 
making moral decisions when working memory demands are high. 
A longitudinal study into the neural networks of working memory in a sample 
of 6-25 year olds revealed that working memory capacity correlated with activity in 
frontal and parietal regions, cortical thickness in the parietal cortex, and white matter 
structure of fronto-parietal and fronto-striatal tracts, while fractional anisotropy in 
white matter tracts and caudate activity predicted future working memory capacity 
(Darki & Klingberg, 2015). It has been found that adults show similar patterns of 
neural activation as children and adolescents during working memory tasks, but 
adults have more refined, localised activation of regions (Scherf et al., 2006). A 
meta-analysis found that children and adolescents with TBIs exhibited deficits in the 
central executive and phonological loop but not the visuospatial sketchpad (Phillips, 
Parry, Mandalis, & Lah, 2017). A separate meta-analysis concluded that moderate-
severe TBI results in deficits in verbal and visuospatial working memory and verbal 
short-term memory (Dunning, Westgate, & Adlam, 2016). Additionally, it has been 
found that TBI significantly reduces levels of activation and connectivity between 
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areas of the working memory brain network (Manktelow, Menon, Sahakian, & 
Stamatakis, 2017). 
Attention works as a filtering process to determine what information from the 
environment is selected for subsequent perception (Amso & Scerif, 2015) and 
development of attentional processes may allow individuals to focus on more details 
within a situation, or filter out irrelevant information. Three main visuospatial 
attention functions have been proposed: alerting (a state of arousal elicited by an 
unexpected external cue), orienting (shifting attention to select information in the 
environment) and executive attention (resolving conflict between competing inputs) 
(Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). It has been found that visual 
attention develops rapidly during the first 5-10 months (Ross‐Sheehy, Schneegans, 
& Spencer, 2015) and staying alert to cues shows significant developmental 
improvement after age 7 years in terms of speed of processing (Pozuelos, Paz-
Alonso, Castillo, Fuentes, & Rueda, 2014). Executive attention develops strongly 
between ages 4-6 years (Rueda, Rothbart, McCandliss, Saccomanno, & Posner, 
2005) showing further improvements in late childhood (Pozuelos et al., 2014). A 
study of 400 3-12 year olds found a staging in the development of attention and 
executive functions from age 6 years, starting with the maturing of inhibitory 
functions, followed by maturation of auditory and visual attention at age 10 years 
and the development of fluency in adolescence (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-
Nuuttila, 2001).  
A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study of children (aged 7-12 years) 
and adults (aged 18-31 years) found that children showed greater functional 
connectivity of regions in the dorsal attention network compared to adults, whereas 
adults showed greater functional connectivity between regions within the ventral 
attention network than children (Farrant & Uddin, 2015). This pattern of 
development of attention networks may be a neural signature of the developmental 
shift from bottom-up attention mechanisms to top-down attentional capacities 
(Farrant & Uddin, 2015). Research has found that orienting and executive attention 
are significantly affected after a mild TBI, but alerting is not, with deficits in executive 
attention taking longer to recover than orienting processes (Halterman et al., 2006). 
A meta-analysis of the effects of childhood TBI on attention concluded that divided 
and sustained attention are the most vulnerable to TBI, and deficits often persist into 
adulthood (Ginstfeldt & Emanuelson, 2010). In addition, deficits for both cognitive 
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and behavioural aspects of attention have been found in children with severe TBIs 
compared to children with OIs (Yeates et al., 2005).  
 Abstract reasoning.  Abstract reasoning has also been proposed to 1.8.4.3
be important for moral development (Baird, 2008; Piaget, 1932) and refers to the 
ability to base reasoning on relationships between representations rather than just 
simple features of a stimulus (Dumontheil, 2014). Abstract reasoning may be 
important for moral development if it enables moral concepts to be understood and 
applied across different settings, even those not previously experienced. The 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is used as a measure of abstract reasoning, attention 
regulation and working memory in research studies, and performance on the task 
has been found to increase with age (Bujoreanu & Willis, 2008; Somsen, 2007). A 
shift from using concrete to abstract strategies to solve algebra problems has been 
found by age 15-16 years (Susac, Bubic, Vrbanc, & Planinic, 2014) and abstract 
reasoning has been found to be impaired in children and adolescents with autism 
spectrum disorders (Solomon, Buaminger, & Rogers, 2011).  
A neurodevelopmental study of relational reasoning (abstract reasoning) 
found that similar to adults, children recruited the rostrolateral PFC when processing 
relations but failed to use this region when integrating across two relations (Crone, 
Wendelken, Van Leijenhorst, Honomichl, Christoff, & Bunge, 2009). Despite the 
proposal of the importance of abstract reasoning to moral reasoning development, 
there is a lack of research linking these components. 
 Affective empathy, emotion regulation and emotion recognition. 1.8.4.4
Perspective taking, the ability to know and understand the mental states of other 
people, is the cognitive component of empathy, while affective empathy allows 
individuals to experience the feelings of others. Affective empathy (hereafter 
referred to as empathy) is the main affective process proposed to be important for 
moral development. It is proposed that empathy can act as a motivator for moral 
behaviour and also a powerful retrieval cue (Hoffman, 2000). Similarly to moral 
terms, there are issues with how empathy is defined in the literature (Decety & 
Cowell, 2014) and it is often unclear what aspect of empathy is being measured in 
studies.  
Concern for others has been measured in infants aged 8-16 months, based 
on their responses to a caregiver and a peer in distress, finding that levels of 
affective and cognitive empathy were evident before 12 months and increased 
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gradually to 16 months (Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011). It was also 
found that empathy at 10 months predicted prosocial behaviour assessed 2-4 
months later (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Children as young as 18 months old have 
been found to help adults in instrumental, empathic and altruistic contexts, although 
empathic helping required greater communication input from the adults (Svetlova, 
Nichols, & Brownell, 2010).  
A critical review of affective empathy did not find a consistent relationship 
between empathy and aggression in children but did find evidence of a negative 
relationship between empathy and aggression in adolescence (Lovett & Sheffield, 
2007). Research has found that self-reported empathy develops during adolescence 
(Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2011) but there is some evidence that 
empathic concern does not develop between ages 10-14 years (Garaigordobil, 
2009), 13-18 years (Van der Graaff et al., 2014) or during adulthood (Grühn, 
Rebucal, Diehl, Lumley, & Labouvie-Vief, 2008). Neuroimaging research has found 
evidence of separate neural systems for cognitive and affective empathy, with the 
affective network consisting of the inferior frontal gyrus, the inferior parietal lobe, the 
anterior cingulate and the anterior insula (See Shamay-Tsoory, 2011 for a review). 
Patients with TBI and lesions in the PFC have been found to have impaired 
cognitive and affective empathy (de Sousa, McDonald, Rushby, Li, Dimoska, & 
James, 2010, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 
2004). 
The role of empathy in moral development may be linked to other processes; 
for empathy to motivate moral behaviour, individuals must to be able to correctly 
recognise the emotions of other people, regulate their own emotions, and retrieve 
relevant empathy-cognition bonds from memory. Emotion regulation is the control of 
emotional experience and expression (Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989) and 
consists of extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating 
and modifying emotional reactions (Thompson, 1994). It has been suggested that 
there are multiple dimensions of emotion regulation, including difficulties controlling 
impulses and engaging in goal-directed behaviours when experiencing negative 
emotions and difficulties (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Eisenberg and colleagues (2000) 
found that emotion regulation predicted externalising behaviour for children prone to 
negative emotionality and Lockwood, Seara-Cardoso and Viding (2014) found that 
emotion regulation moderated the relationship between empathy and self-reported 
prosocial behaviour in TD adults. A review of emotion regulation concluded that it 
  
50 
 
develops through observational learning and modelling, and its development can be 
affected by parenting style and the family environment (Morris, Silk, Steinberg, 
Myers, & Robinson, 2007). The brain regions involved in emotion regulation, 
including the limbic region and PFC, undergo structural and functional development 
during adolescence (See Ahmed, Bittencourt-Hewitt, & Sebastian, 2015 for a 
review) and damage to the PFC has been found to be related to deficits in emotion 
regulation (Anderson, Barrash, Bechara, & Tranel, 2006; Salas, Castro, Yuen, 
Radovic, d'Avossa, & Turnbull, 2016).  
The ability to correctly identify emotions has been proposed to be indirectly 
involved in moral development; emotion recognition facilitates social interactions 
which lead to increases in perspective taking abilities (Anderson & Beauchamp, 
2012; Taber-Thomas & Tranel, 2012). Children as young as 4-6 months old are able 
to distinguish between different emotions, and recognise emotions from faces 
(Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 1992), but these abilities continue developing into 
adulthood (Thomas, De Bellis, Graham, & LaBar, 2007). Various brain regions have 
been found to be involved in emotion recognition from facial expressions and from 
speech, including the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex and the fusiform gyrus (See 
Adolphs, 2002 for a review), while different emotions appear to activate different 
brain regions, suggesting separate neural systems for different emotions 
(Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek, 1998). The ability to correctly 
recognise emotions from faces has been found to be compromised following brain 
injuries. Reviews have concluded that affect recognition difficulties are a frequent 
and significant problem related to adult TBI (Babbage, Yim, Zupan, Neumann, 
Tomita, & Willer, 2011; Radice-Neumann, Zupan, Babbage, & Willer, 2007) and 
deficits in emotion recognition and processing have been found in children and 
adults with a brain injury (Croker & McDonald, 2005; Ryan et al., 2014; Tonks, 
Williams, Frampton, Yates, & Slater, 2007).   
1.8.5 Moral decision-making and behaviour. Moral psychology research 
tends to focus on reasoning or judgements rather than on behaviour as the end 
point. It has been found that moral reasoning does not always correlate with 
behaviour (Blasi, 1983) but there is some research showing relationships between 
moral decision-making and behaviour. A recent meta-analysis found a significant 
association between moral decisions or reasoning (measured using various 
instruments) and behaviour, associated with a medium effect size. d=.20 (Villegas 
de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo, 2015). Dooley and colleagues (2010) found a strong 
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negative correlation between moral reasoning scores on the So-Mature and 
aggressive behaviours and oppositional defiant symptoms in TD adolescents while 
positive relationships have been found for prosocial moral reasoning and prosocial 
behaviour in TD children and adolescents (Carlo et al., 2011; Miller, Eisenberg, 
Fabes, & Shell, 1996). The mixed evidence of a link between moral decision-making 
and behaviour may be partly due to differences in the measures of moral decision-
making (e.g. productive vs. recognition instruments of moral reasoning) and 
behaviour measures (e.g. self vs. other reported behaviour) used across different 
studies.  
There is some research comparing moral decision-making for groups whose 
behaviour is known to differ, such as offenders vs. non-offenders, and patients 
diagnosed with psychopathy vs. healthy controls. Using hypothetical moral 
dilemmas, Blair (1995) found that patients diagnosed with psychopathy were unable 
to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions while Koenigs, 
Kruepke, Zeier, and Newman (2012) found that low-anxious psychopaths exhibited 
abnormally utilitarian personal moral judgements. Baez, Herrera, García, Manes, 
Young, and Ibáñez (2017) found that terrorists judged accidental harm as less 
permissible and attempted harm as more permissible n non-criminals, and these 
differences were not affected by executive skills. Political violence has also been 
found to impact on the development of moral reasoning; Ferguson and Cairns 
(1996) found that children and adolescents living in areas of high political violence in 
Northern Ireland scored lower on the SRM-SF than those in areas of low political 
violence. Meta-analyses have revealed a strong relationship between immature 
moral reasoning and adolescent offending (Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; Stams, 
Brugman, Deković, van Rosmalen, van der Laan, & Gibbs, 2006). A study of male 
sex offenders with a mean age of 45 years found that, on average, they were 
reasoning at the transitional Stage 2(3) on the SRM-SF showing developmental 
delay (Amador, 2016). However, there are some conflicting results, as Tarry and 
Emler (2007) did not find relationship between moral reasoning (as measured by the 
SRM-SF) and delinquency, with or without controlling for effects of age, general 
intellectual functioning and social background in a sample of males aged 12-15 
years old. It may be that persistent developmental delay into adulthood becomes a 
risk factor for engaging in offending behaviour.  
There is evidence of a link between brain injuries and offending, with high 
rates of TBI among offender populations (Farrer & Hedges, 2011; Hughes, Williams, 
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Chitsabesan, Walesby, Mounce, & Clasby, 2015; Shiroma, Ferguson, & 
Pickelsimer, 2010; Williams, Cordan, Mewse, Tonks, & Burgess, 2010), and 
childhood TBI has been found as a risk factor for engaging in offending behaviour 
later in life (McKinlay, Grace, McLellan, Roger, Clarbour, & MacFarlane, 2014). 
There is evidence that prisoners with a self-reported TBI show greater impairments 
on neuropsychological measures, have committed significantly more offences, and 
are more likely to have committed a violent offence compared to prisoners without 
TBIs (Pitman, Haddlesey, Ramos, Oddy, & Fortescue, 2015). Luiselli, Arons, 
Marchese, Potoczny-Gray and Rossi (2000) reported that almost one third of a 
community sample of children and adolescents with an ABI had engaged in criminal 
acts, and the majority of those who had committed offences had multiple violations. 
Their sample included TBI and also nTBIs such as brain abscess, stroke and 
tumour, and found no significant differences in the types of brain injury sustained by 
the participants, which suggests that all types of ABI may be a risk factor for 
engaging in criminal behaviour. As moral reasoning has been found to be delayed 
for offenders and individuals with brain injuries, moral reasoning may be a mediator 
in the relationship between brain injury and offending behaviour, but further 
research in this area is needed.  
1.8.6 The importance of adolescence for moral development. 
Adolescence is the period of growth and development that occurs between 
childhood and adulthood, between the ages of 10-19 years and is characterised by 
many physical, neurodevelopmental and social changes (World Health 
Organisation, 2017). It is a sensitive period for brain development, moral 
development, decision-making and moral behaviour. The brain continues 
developing into the mid-20s (Blakemore, 2008; Giedd, 2004). Brain development is 
a non-linear process and adolescence is second only to infancy in terms of the rate 
of developmental change in the brain, with a dramatic development of structure and 
function taking place during adolescence (Andersen, 2003; Arain et al., 2013). 
Cortical grey matter development follows the functional maturation sequence. Brain 
regions associated with basic functions such as motor and sensory brain areas 
mature first, with the PFC, involved in executive functions, being the last to mature 
(Gogtay et al., 2004). There are sex differences in the development of the 
adolescent brain, with females reaching peak values of brain volumes earlier than 
males (Giedd et al., 2006; Giedd et al., 1996; Lenroot & Giedd, 2010). Relevant 
brain regions, such as those in the social brain network, develop during 
adolescence (Mills, Lalonde, Clasen, Giedd, & Blakemore, 2014), which can aid the 
  
53 
 
maturation of cognitive and affective processes involved in moral development (e.g. 
working memory and empathy). Damage to the brain which occurs before these 
processes have matured may affect their developmental trajectory, in turn leading to 
moral developmental delay. Adolescence is a risk period for sustaining a TBI (Yates 
et al., 2006), and high rates of nTBIs have been found for 15-19 year olds (Chan, 
Pole, Keightley, Mann, & Colantonio, 2016).  
Moral developmental delay has been associated with offending behaviour 
(Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; Stams, Brugman, Deković, van Rosmalen, van der 
Laan, & Gibbs, 2006) and adolescence is a risk period for engaging in offending 
behaviours (Farrington, 1986; Moffitt, 1993). Adolescent decision-making has been 
studied in relation to risk-taking behaviours; increased risk-taking during this period 
may be due to competing reward and control systems in the adolescent brain 
(Steinberg, 2007). Adolescent decision-making is particularly susceptible to peer 
influence (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). Although peer influence may increase risky 
decision-making during adolescence, increased interaction with peers may facilitate 
moral development through increasing in role-taking opportunities, which allows for 
the development of perspective taking abilities, and a move away from egocentrism. 
Relationships between brain development, decision-making, moral development, 
and moral behaviour are likely to be complex during adolescence which is 
characterised as a period of great change.  
1.9 Summary 
The main moral theories from developmental psychology and social 
neuroscience were reviewed in this introductory chapter, and SIP theory was 
introduced as an approach which may be able to bring together components from 
various disciplines. An integrative framework using a SIP approach has the potential 
to provide a fuller picture of moral decision-making, moral development and moral 
behaviour. Research discussed in this chapter highlighted that there is a lack of 
research measuring relationships between moral reasoning and the cognitive and 
affective processes proposed to be involved in moral development. In addition, 
while there is some evidence of a relationship between moral reasoning and 
behaviour, these two do not always correlate.  
Many components are proposed as required for moral development, and as 
a consequence, the maturation of many brain regions, and connections between 
regions, may underpin moral development. Furthermore, there is no strong 
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evidence for a uniquely ‘moral brain’, as regions involved in moral decision-making 
are also involved in other processes. Due to the importance of brain development, a 
brain injury that occurs while the brain is still maturing may affect the developmental 
trajectory of moral decision-making maturity. Research suggests that children and 
adolescents with ABIs show developmental delays or deficits in some of the 
proposed components of moral development, such as emotion recognition (Tonks et 
al., 2007) and working memory (Phillips et al., 2017), as well as delayed moral 
reasoning (Beauchamp et al., 2013; Chiasson et al., 2017a; Couper et al., 2002; 
Dooley et al., 2010). Research into moral decision-making and development in 
adolescents with ABIs is sparse and not always grounded firmly in developmental 
psychology. The following chapter will outline how this thesis will attempt to address 
some of the theoretical and research issues raised in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Aims 
2.1 Chapter overview 
The overall aim of this thesis is to attempt to link both developmental 
psychology and social neuroscience approaches to moral decision-making and 
development. It is hoped that this will prove fruitful for further theory development 
and research in this area. This thesis will be split into three parts, with Part One 
addressing theoretical issues and Parts Two and Three presenting original research 
into moral decision-making and development. In Part One, comprising Chapter 3, 
theoretical issues will attempt to be addressed by the presentation a new theoretical 
framework which draws together aspects from social neuroscience and 
developmental psychology. In Part Two, comprising Chapter 4, a systematic review 
and meta-analysis of neuroimaging research into moral decision-making will be 
presented, to investigate which brain regions show increased activation when 
making different types of moral decisions. In Part Three, comprising Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7, two empirical studies will be presented which investigated moral 
development in TD adolescents, and adolescents with ABIs. Specific objectives and 
research questions for each chapter will now be discussed in turn. 
2.2 Objectives and research questions 
2.2.1 Part One. Following the review of the main theories related to moral 
decision-making and its development in Chapter 1, a new, integrative framework will 
be proposed in Chapter 3. This new framework, the Social Information Processing-
Moral Decision-Making (SIP-MDM) framework is based on a SIP approach and 
incorporates concepts from traditional moral theories and more recent findings from 
social neuroscience, placing brain development at the centre. The framework 
attempts to explain both how real-time decisions are made, and how they mature 
over time, expanding the definition of moral development to incorporate the 
maturation of moral decisions, reasoning and related component skills and 
processes such as empathy and SIP skills. The SIP-MDM framework is also an 
attempt to reconcile the debate concerning whether moral decisions are driven by 
reasoning or intuitions, by suggesting how both can be incorporated into an 
explanation of moral decision-making. The specific objectives of Chapter 3 were to: 
 Highlight the theoretical components of moral development proposed by various 
theories. 
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 Incorporate the main components of moral developmental theory into a new 
framework based on a SIP approach. 
 Explain how this new framework can be used both as an explanation of real-
time moral decision-making, and of moral development. 
 Outline some of the hypotheses generated by the framework and how they can 
be investigated. 
2.2.2 Part Two. In Chapter 4, the ‘brain development’ component of the SIP-
MDM framework proposed in Chapter 3 will attempt to be expanded on by 
systematically reviewing the neuroimaging evidence pertaining to moral decision-
making. A meta-analysis that aimed to assess which brain regions are consistently 
activated when making one’s own moral response decisions and when making 
moral evaluations will be presented in Chapter 4. The specific objectives of Chapter 
4 were to: 
 Systematically review the neuroimaging literature on moral decision-making. 
 Differentiate between studies which measure brain activation while making 
one’s own moral response choices and those which involve evaluating or 
judging the moral permissibility of others’ actions or identifying moral issues. 
 Employ the co-ordinate based meta-analysis technique of activation likelihood 
estimate analysis (ALE) to investigate which brain areas are consistently 
activated for: (a) moral response decisions, (b) moral evaluations, and (c) to 
assess convergent and divergent activation for both types of decision. 
 Compare the findings to results of related meta-analyses. 
2.2.3 Part Three. In Part Three of the thesis, developmental psychology and 
social neuroscience approaches will be integrated by investigating hypotheses 
generated by the integrative SIP-MDM framework. Some hypotheses of this 
framework will be explored in TD adolescents, and moral maturity will be explored in 
adolescents with ABIs. Chapter 5 presents Study 1 which was an exploration of 
some of the hypotheses of the SIP-MDM framework in TD adolescents. Whether the 
cognitive and affective processes proposed by various theories to be important for 
moral development relate to moral maturity, and whether moral maturity correlates 
with behaviour in TD adolescents was explored in Study 1. The specific research 
questions addressed were: 
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 Do moral reasoning, and the cognitive and affective processes hypothesised to 
be required for moral development (empathy, perspective taking, emotion 
recognition and working memory) develop with age in TD adolescents? 
 Do these cognitive and affective processes relate to moral reasoning maturity in 
TD adolescents?  
 Does moral reasoning maturity relate to behavioural difficulties in TD 
adolescents? 
Whether components of the SIP-MDM framework relate to information 
processing at different steps of the framework, (e.g. does emotion recognition relate 
to encoding of information?) were also explored in Study 1. The specific research 
questions addressed were:   
 Do components of the SIP-MDM framework mature with age amongst TD 
adolescents? 
 Do components in the centre of the framework (e.g. SES and working memory) 
relate to processing at each step of the SIP-MDM framework?  
 Do components listed under the steps of the SIP-MDM framework (e.g. emotion 
recognition at Step 1) relate to processing at that step? 
Before hypotheses related to the SIP-MDM framework can be fully explored 
in an ABI sample, suitable measures need to be identified. In Chapter 6, Study 2 will 
be presented which: (a) explored the psychometric properties of two measures of 
moral reasoning when used with adolescents with ABIs, (b) compared 
developmental levels of moral reasoning for an ABI group compared to a NH 
comparison group, matched on age and gender, and (c) investigated behavioural 
differences between the groups, and whether moral reasoning is related to 
behaviour. This study was a first step towards exploring relationships of the SIP-
MDM framework in populations with a brain injury. The specific research questions 
addressed in Study 2 were: 
 What are the psychometric properties, specifically internal consistency, 
convergent validity and test-retest reliability of the SRM-SF and the So-Mature 
measures of moral reasoning in a sample of adolescents with ABI, and a NH 
comparison group? 
 Is the ABI group reasoning at a lower level than the NH group on these two 
measures of moral reasoning? 
 Do the ABI group show more behavioural difficulties than the NH Group? 
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 Does moral reasoning score relate to behaviour in the ABI and NH group? 
In Chapter 7 the main findings from the systematic review and empirical 
studies will be summarised, and strengths and limitations of these studies will be 
discussed. Clinical and theoretical implications will be outlined, as well as areas for 
future research. 
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Chapter 3: A Social information processing-moral decision-making 
framework  
 
“Judgments and decisions of any sort-including those that involve matters of 
morality-are not a matter of magic but result from processing of information.”  
(Fiedler & Glöckner, 2015, p. 139) 
 
3.1 Chapter overview 
For a full picture of moral decision-making, moral development and moral 
behaviour it is necessary to understand: (a) how real-time moral decisions are made 
(including relevant social and contextual factors), (b) what processes are required to 
develop to enable mature moral decisions, and how these develop over time, and 
(c) how moral decisions relate to behaviour. In a first step towards this full picture, 
an integrative framework will be introduced in this chapter, which can be used to 
guide further research and theory development in this area. Proposed components 
of moral development will firstly be introduced before they are integrated into a new 
framework based on a SIP approach. The framework will incorporate situational 
factors, show how both affective and cognitive processes can guide moral 
decisions, and will integrate aspects from developmental psychology and social 
neuroscience. How this framework goes beyond previous SIP models will then be 
outlined, followed by a discussion of how it can explain both real-time moral 
decisions and moral development. This chapter will conclude with how the SIP-
MDM framework could be used to guide future research and theory development in 
this area.  
3.2 The components of moral decision-making and development 
“Central to any discussion of developmental issues is the consideration of 
‘what develops’” (Crick & Dodge, 1994, p. 80). Table 3.1 displays the main 
components of moral development suggested by the various theories and 
perspectives reviewed in Chapter 1, grouped into broad categories of cognitive, 
affective, social and other. Some of the affective components listed could be viewed 
as either cognitive or affective (e.g. emotion regulation) but within this thesis they 
have been considered as by and large affective. Selected research into how the 
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main components typically develop, and are affected following a brain injury was 
discussed in Chapter 1. This research outlined that there are various components 
relevant and related to moral development, and these develop and mature with age, 
with some abilities or processes being evident in early infancy and developing partly 
due to increased socialisation and brain maturation. Taken together, neuroscience 
research into development of the components suggests that various brain regions 
and networks are involved in moral development, and that the structure and 
functional connectivity of these networks change over time. Some components such 
as perspective taking and empathy are proximal factors of moral development, while 
other components are more distal factors. For example, social skills, while distal 
factors, still affect the development of components such as moral schemas and 
perspective taking by facilitating opportunities for social perspective taking, which in 
turn facilitates moral development.  
There are many bi-directional relationships between components; for 
example, peer interaction influences the development of perspective taking abilities, 
which in turn can affect peer interactions. Some research has found developmental 
and predictive relationships between components, (e.g. Vera-Estay et al., 2016), 
suggesting that the various components could be integrated into one framework of 
moral development. Neuroscience research has highlighted that moral decision-
making is a dynamic process emerging from the integration and coordination of 
widely distributed brain regions (Van Bavel et al., 2015) and so neuroscience has 
much to offer the field of moral psychology, moving it towards a more dynamic 
explanation. An integrative framework could include both affective and cognitive 
processes, show how both intuitions and reasoning can guide moral decisions and 
bring together aspects from developmental psychology and social neuroscience. 
The components of moral development will now be integrated into a SIP framework, 
which expands on previous SIP models, in an attempt to explain moral decision-
making, moral development, and moral behaviour. 
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Table 3.1 The components of moral development. 
Component 
type 
Component Main theories to have proposed this 
component is involved in moral 
decision-making or development 
Cognitive  Working memory Gibbs (2013) 
Perspective taking Baird (2008); Piaget (1932); Gibbs (2013); 
Kohlberg (1976; 1984a, b); Rest (1984; 
1999) 
Attention Gibbs (2013); Crick and Dodge (1994) 
Abstract 
thought/reasoning 
Baird (2008); Piaget (1932) 
Logical reasoning Piaget (1932); Kohlberg (1984a, b) 
Schemas/ 
scripts 
Gibbs (2013); Hoffman (2000); Rest et al. 
(1999); Crick and Dodge (1994); Arsenio 
and Lemerise (2004); Lemerise and 
Arsenio (2000) 
Attributions Hoffman (2000); Gibbs (2013); Crick and 
Dodge (1994); Arsenio and Lemerise 
(2004); Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) 
Self-control Rest (1984; 1999) 
Affective  Affective empathy Hoffman (2000); Kohlberg (1984a, b); 
Gibbs (2013) 
Emotion regulation Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) 
Emotion recognition Anderson and Beauchamp (2012); Taber-
Thomas and Tranel (2012) 
Somatic markers Baird (2008); Taber-Thomas and Tranel 
(2012) 
Intuition Haidt (2001) 
Social Social functioning/ 
competence/ skills 
Anderson and Beauchamp (2012); Gibbs 
(2013); Yeates et al (2012) 
Peer interaction/ 
socialisation 
Piaget (1932); Gibbs (2013); Hoffman 
(2000); Haidt (2001); Turiel (1983); 
Smetana (2006); Yeates et al (2012); 
Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) 
Socio-economic 
status 
Anderson and Beauchamp (2012); Yeates 
et al (2012) 
Culture Haidt (2001); Anderson and Beauchamp 
(2012) 
Parenting/family 
function 
Piaget (1932); Hoffman (2000) Palmer 
(2003);  Anderson and Beauchamp (2012); 
Yeates et al (2012) 
Other Brain development 
and integrity 
Baird (2008); Kagan (2008); Taber-
Thomas and Tranel (2012); Anderson and 
Beauchamp (2012);  Yeates et al (2012) 
Temperament/ 
personality 
Haidt (2001); Kagan (2008); Lemerise and 
Arsenio (2000) 
Social information 
processing 
Arsenio and Lemerise (2004); Palmer 
(2000)  
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3.3 Moral decision-making and development: Toward an integrative 
framework 
Moral decision-making differs from other types of decision-making because 
the situation has moral rules or principles attached, which may invoke moral 
reasoning and the activation of morally relevant schemas from memory. Moral 
decision-making also shares similarities with other types of decision-making as it 
involves the processing of information and making judgements, evaluations, and 
response decisions, which may lead to behavioural action. Like other types of 
decision-making, moral decision-making is subject to influences such as situational 
factors, personality factors and biases. SIP theory can provide a useful framework 
for explaining how decisions are made, and can be adapted to include the 
components of moral development. Moral principles are necessary but not sufficient 
for moral behaviour, (Kohlberg, 1984a); other components and factors which affect 
decision-making and behaviour enactment need to be considered. The original SIP 
model was proposed as an explanation of aggressive behaviour in children (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994) and it has been found that aggressive children display atypical SIP 
skills, and SIP problems are predictive of aggressive behaviour (Dodge et al., 2002; 
Lansford et al., 2006; Oostermeijer et al., 2016; Ziv & Sorongon, 2011). Such 
research suggests that the SIP model provides a sound basis for explaining 
behaviour, which has not been the focus of previous moral theories. What is known 
about the development of moral maturity and related components, therefore, needs 
to be linked with what is known about decision-making, to gain a better 
understanding of how moral decisions are made, how they mature over time, and in 
turn, have a better understanding of moral behaviour.  
Although many social, biological and psychological factors are involved in 
the development of behaviour, the actual behavioural act is preceded by a decision-
making process, whether cognitive, affective or both, which serves as the proximal 
control mechanism (Burks, Laird, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999). Moral response 
decisions can be conceptualised as the response decision step in a SIP framework, 
as the proximal decision before a behavioural response, although a behavioural 
response may only follow if it is perceived that one is necessary, and the intended 
behaviour is able to be carried out. Emotional processes, such as empathic arousal 
were incorporated into the SIP model by Lemerise and Arsenio (2000), suggesting 
that a SIP approach can be used to bridge the cognition vs. affect division within 
moral psychology.  
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3.4 The SIP-MDM framework 
Within this section, a conceptual, illustrative framework of moral decision-
making and development is introduced, showing how the components of moral 
development suggested by various theories can be integrated into one dynamic 
explanation of how moral decisions are made and mature over time. This has been 
termed the Social Information Processing–Moral Decision-Making (SIP-MDM) 
framework. The format owes much to the original (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and more 
recent models (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000) but 
components have been added to each step and the centre of the model has been 
reconceptualised, incorporating ideas from developmental psychology and social 
neuroscience. 
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Figure 3.1. The Social Information Processing-Moral Decision-Making Framework 
(SIP-MDM).  
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3.4.1 How this framework differs from previous SIP models. Arsenio and 
Lemerise (2004) incorporated some aspects of moral theory by integrating SIP with 
domain theory, but the SIP-MDM framework takes integration further by adding 
components from other moral theories and attempting to add a developmental 
aspect. Components marked with a ‘+’ bullet point have been added to previous 
models. Italics have been used to show where a component is not completely new 
but has been amended slightly, e.g. ‘moral’ added to social schemas. Relevant 
components have been added at each step, the centre has been reformulated and 
Step 5 has been conceptualised as moral response decision. A horizontal arrow has 
been added to represent maturation over time and each component is hypothesised 
to develop over time, increasing the capacity for more mature moral decisions. 
Conceptualising Step 5 as moral response decision allows for the framework 
to explain response decisions made within a moral dilemma, i.e. a situation within 
the moral domain where a response decision is required. The SIP-MDM framework 
could also be used to explain decision-making in other domains, but if a situation is 
in the moral domain, and recognised by the individual as having moral rules or 
principles attached, then components relevant to moral decision-making,  such as 
moral reasoning, will be activated. The 6 steps of the SIP-MDM framework 
specifically indicate the processing that is occurring when making a decision about 
how to behave in a moral dilemma. Although the steps of the framework are not 
strictly sequential, a moral response decision is the proximal step made before 
behaviour enactment. Moral decisions which are not response decisions, such as 
judging or evaluating the actions of others have been added at Step 2. Such moral 
judgements and evaluations made when interpreting a situation can influence 
whether a situation itself is viewed as moral or not and can have an effect on 
subsequent processing, including the response decision that is chosen at Step 5. 
Reformulation of the centre of the SIP-MDM framework expands the 
database component of previous models by adding aspects relevant to moral 
decision-making and development such as moral schemas and perspective taking.  
The database can be viewed as a ‘store’ of resources that can be drawn upon when 
processing information. Social factors and brain development have also been added 
to the centre alongside the database (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and emotion processes 
(Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). Social factors can influence the development of other 
components. For example, peer interaction can influence the development of 
perspective taking through role-taking with peers (Gibbs, 2013; Piaget, 1932), and 
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the relationships between parenting practice and behaviour may be mediated by 
SIP (Palmer, 2000). Brain development can influence moral decision-making 
directly, as brain regions relevant to real-time decision-making mature, and also 
indirectly, via its influence on the development of component processes such as 
working memory and empathy. Connections between regions can also lead to 
increases in processing efficiency. Decreases in reaction times for adults compared 
to adolescents when making moral decisions indicates that adults become more 
efficient at processing such information (Dosch et al., 2010).  
Adding these components to the centre of the framework shows how they 
can be used in making real-time decisions, but also that their development over time 
can lead to more efficient processing and mature moral decision-making. All the 
relationships in this framework are multi-directional: the components in the centre of 
the framework can influence each step of information processing, and engaging in 
processing can influence the development of components within the centre of the 
(e.g. moral schemas), in turn influencing future moral decision-making. The thick 
arrows from the centre to each step indicate the components in the centre 
influencing real-time decisions, and the dashed arrows indicate information 
processing influencing development of components in the centre. The arrows are 
separate as this relationship is not entirely cyclical; although engaging in SIP can 
influence development of factors in the centre, development occurs over time and 
so cannot be used in the same situation.  
This SIP-MDM framework suggests how moral decisions can be driven by 
both automatic processes and by reasoning. Somatic markers have been added 
(Step 4), as a component which can affect decision-making, narrowing down 
possible responses in a situation. It has been found that typical immoral events 
require shorter judgement decision times than atypical events (Fransson & Ask, 
2010), suggesting that more common moral decisions may require less reasoning. 
Moral reasoning has been added at Step 5, as a component involved in making a 
moral response decision. Moral reasoning is just one of the processes which guides 
moral decisions, although it draws upon and is dependent upon other components 
such as emotion expectancies, attention, encoding, working memory, and 
perspective taking. Even though initial decisions may be driven by some somatic 
markers or automatic activation of a moral schema at Step 4, reasoning is required 
to confirm, reject or reformulate this into a moral decision (Kahneman, 2011). Moral 
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reasoning in a given situation depends on the processing at other steps of the 
framework, and to what extent the situation activates moral schemas.  
Cognitive and affective components suggested by various moral theories 
have been added at relevant SIP steps. Crick and Dodge (1994) hypothesised that 
SIP abilities develop with age partly due to developmental shifts in attentional ability, 
and Gibbs (2013) proposed that attention is important for moral development, but it 
has not been explicitly included in previous SIP models. Here, attention has been 
added to Step 1. It is proposed that at Step 1, where cues are encoded, attentional 
abilities (e.g. shifting attention and executive attention) and attentional bias will 
influence what information is encoded, which then impacts upon what information is 
available for subsequent processing. Attention has also been added to the database 
as a process that can develop over time and lead to increased efficiency of SIP and 
the capacity for more mature moral-decisions. Working memory has been added to 
Steps 2 and 5, and to the database of the SIP-MDM framework. It is hypothesised 
that increases in working memory capacity, and the ability to direct attention to 
relevant information while ignoring irrelevant information will aid the interpretation of 
cues and the moral decision-making step. Inhibition/self-control has been added at 
Step 5, as a process that can guide response decisions (Rest, 1984; Rest et al., 
1999), as certain possible responses may need to be inhibited.  
Perspective taking/ToM has been added at Step 2 and the database. Making 
appropriate attributions at Step 2 relies on the ability to accurately infer the beliefs 
and intentions of other people, and as perspective taking develops over time, it can 
influence all SIP steps by making processing less egocentric. Emotional processes 
were added to the SIP model by Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) but the SIP-MDM 
framework also includes empathic arousal at Step 3 and it is proposed that 
individuals with greater empathic arousal will select more prosocial goals. Abstract 
thought/ reasoning has been added at Steps 3 and 4 and to the database. At Step 
3, abstract thought will allow individuals to think of a goal not previously 
experienced, and at Step 4 it will allow for responses not previously enacted to be 
constructed. Development of abstract reasoning skills can impact on other steps of 
processing through its effect on moral development; it allows for moral concepts to 
be understood and applied across different settings, including those not previously 
encountered. ‘Situational factors’ have been added at Steps 1,3,4,5 and 6. Level of 
moral reasoning varies according to context or situation (Krebs, Vermeulen, 
Carpendale, & Denton, 2014), and can be influenced by factors such as alcohol 
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intake (Denton & Krebs, 1990). Situational factors may be of most importance at 
Step 6 following the moral response decision at Step 5 and may account for 
differences between moral decisions and moral behaviour. While the SIP-MDM 
framework acknowledges that situational factors need to be taken into account 
when explaining moral decision-making and behaviour, further research is needed 
into the relevant situational factors.  
3.4.2 Moral decision-making in the SIP-MDM framework. Although the six 
steps are not necessarily how processing occurs in every situation, the order of the 
six steps will now be used to illustrate how a moral response decision may be made 
in an everyday moral dilemma (a situation with moral rules or principles attached 
where a response decision is required), using the example of deciding whether to 
cheat during a game of Monopoly with friends (an example scenario used in the So-
Moral, Dooley et al., 2010). How an individual may decide to cheat in this situation, 
based on the suggested framework will be discussed, but how an alternative 
behavioural action (not cheating) may occur will also be outlined.  
At Step 1 the individual will encode the cues such as looking at how much 
money each player has, encoding the other players’ emotions, including their own 
emotions, and encoding situational cues such as the opportunity to cheat (e.g. other 
players are distracted or have left the room). Encoding these cues will require 
attention abilities and emotion recognition, and which cues are encoded will affect 
subsequent processing. Encoded cues are then interpreted at Step 2; this is an 
important step and is where a situation is recognised as having moral rules attached 
or not, through moral judgements and evaluations. For cheating at the game to 
occur, an individual may either not recognise that this situation has moral rules 
attached, e.g. they may think that because it is a game with friends, “moral rules” 
governing cheating may not apply, or they do recognise the moral rules attached, 
but still decide to cheat for various reasons, e.g. they are losing and want to win, 
which is an attribution and evaluative process. In interpreting cues, the individual 
may engage in perspective taking; thinking how their friends might feel if they 
cheated, or thinking how they would feel if their friends cheated, which could 
influence the goals they set in the situation. In interpreting cues, the individual may 
also engage in various evaluations such as evaluating theirs and their friends’ past 
performances of playing Monopoly, which will require working memory in order to 
keep various sources of information in mind.  
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At Step 3, goals for the situation are set, and these can be influenced by 
whether or not empathic arousal occurs, and also influenced by situational factors 
(e.g. does the opportunity to cheat still exist). This step is where an individual 
decides what they want from the situation, such as to cheat at the game by possibly 
gaining more money to play with, and increasing their chances of winning. Possible 
responses are accessed or constructed at Step 4. In this example, an individual 
may think of various ways in which they can cheat, such as taking some extra 
money from the bank or hiding some of the other players’ money. Responses 
thought about at this step can be influenced by somatic markers and situational 
factors, and may require abstract thought. A Step 5, the moral response decision is 
made, i.e. to cheat and how to cheat, or to not cheat and continue to play by the 
rules. Deliberation occurs at this step, which may include engaging in moral 
reasoning and evaluating the expected outcome. A self-efficacy evaluation may also 
occur at this step, where the individual evaluates their ability to carry out their 
intended behavioural action, e.g. evaluating if they would be able to take extra 
money without being caught by the other players. Deliberation at this step could 
lead to a change in the selected goal, or a change to the chosen response option. 
The response decided upon at Step 5, to cheat or not to cheat at the game, will be 
enacted at Step 6 unless situational factors change (e.g. the opportunity to cheat no 
longer exists, or increases), or the individual over estimated their ability to carry out 
their chosen course of action. As stated, the steps do not necessarily occur in this 
order, and processing can be rapid.  
In terms of choosing a moral or prosocial course of action, in the Monopoly 
example, an individual may not cheat either because they do not consider cheating 
as a possible action, or they may consider it but decide against it for various 
reasons. If an opportunity to cheat was either not encoded (not noticed), or was not 
interpreted as such, then there is no moral dilemma and no response decision to be 
made. An individual may recognise the opportunity to cheat but not consider it a 
possible action, which may be due to knowledge of moral rules related to the 
specific situation (knowledge that cheating is bad), or due to a deeper 
understanding and moral necessities (an appreciation of fairness). As individuals 
develop moral maturity, more decisions will be made based on a deeper 
understanding of moral necessities, rather than on situation specific moral rules. At 
each step, certain components can influence an individual’s decision-making, 
leading them to decide not to cheat. For example, engaging in perspective taking at 
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Step 2 may lead an individual to decide that the other players would be distressed 
and less likely to trust them if they cheated, or thinking about the ways to cheat at 
this step might trigger a somatic marker, or affective empathy, which feels 
unpleasant and rules out cheating as a viable option. As previously stated, the 6 
steps are not sequential and can impact on each other, for example, which cues are 
encoded Step 1 can be affected by existing goals or motivation, which can bias 
encoding of cues through selective attention. 
3.4.3 Moral development within the SIP-MDM framework. In terms of the 
development of moral decision-making in such a framework, the development of 
each of the components of the framework leads to an increased efficiency of 
decision-making. For example, increases in the ability to recognise emotions (Step 
1) will enable such cues to be encoded and used in processing a situation, and 
increases in working memory, including attentional control (Step 2) will allow for 
more relevant features of a situation to be taken into account when making a 
decision. However, to fully achieve the capacity for mature moral decision-making, 
the components in the database also need to develop. One important difference to 
this framework compared to previous SIP models is the extension of the database 
to add components thought to be crucial for moral development, such as 
perspective taking, an understanding of moral necessities, working memory, 
attention and abstract reasoning. Moral development is not just achieved through an 
increase in moral knowledge, but also involves the development of perspective 
taking and an appreciation of moral necessities for “growth beyond the superficial” 
(Gibbs, 2013). This framework is dynamic and is in line with the argument made by 
Rest and colleagues (1999) that development is gradual rather than one step at a 
time. The horizontal arrow at the bottom of the framework is to illustrate that the 
whole process develops over time, but this developmental aspect could be greatly 
expanded upon by research into developmental relationships between components. 
Based on this framework, to be able to make a mature moral decision to a 
moral dilemma, an individual needs to have both a developed database and 
sufficiently developed component skills and processes to be able to process 
information in a situation. In addition to this, situational factors will affect whether a 
mature moral decision is actually made, and what behavioural response is enacted. 
More mature moral decisions may result in prosocial behaviour but other factors 
also influence behaviour, and such factors and their effects (e.g. peer influence) can 
change over time. Behaviour enactment, at Step 6 of this framework is a result of 
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processing that occurs in a situation, the integrity of the component skills and 
processes at each step and in the centre of the framework, and also situational 
factors.  
3.4.4 Using the SIP-MDM to guide research. The framework presented 
here attempts to consider how moral decision-making may occur and how 
development of the components can increase the capacity for mature moral 
decision-making. Research is needed to either confirm or reject the predictions of 
this framework, for example, does developmental progression in emotion 
recognition abilities affect what is encoded in a moral dilemma, and does this in turn 
have any effect on moral decision-making and behaviour? The suggested 
framework can be used to generate hypotheses about moral decision-making and 
moral development, to guide research and theory development. Testing some of 
these hypotheses in TD samples can provide information about the typical 
developmental relationships between components. Testing hypotheses of the SIP-
MDM framework in atypically developing samples can provide information about 
how difficulties in certain components can impact the moral decision-making 
process and moral development.  
Further research into which brain areas are recruited when making different 
types of moral decisions is needed in order to expand on the brain development 
component of the SIP-MDM framework. Developmental neuroimaging studies could 
provide insight into how the brain networks for moral decisions change with age. 
Evidence from neuroscience suggests that the vmPFC is the brain region most 
commonly recruited for moral decision-making, but neuroscience studies tend to 
use utilitarian hypothetical dilemmas involving life or death choices (Greene et al., 
2001), which do not to reflect the everyday moral decision-making of most people. 
Furthermore, the vmPFC has been found to be recruited during other types of 
decision-making, such as decisions relating to food choice (Hare, Malmaud, & 
Rangel, 2011), so it is not a uniquely moral brain region. Many components, such as 
empathy, perspective taking and working memory are proposed to be important for 
moral decision-making maturity, so a wide range of brain regions and networks may 
underpin moral decision-making and development.  
Conceptualising moral response decisions within a SIP framework allows for 
such decisions to be measured with a SIP instrument, using vignettes which depict 
violations of moral rules or principles. Measuring moral decisions this way could 
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allow for an investigation of how more real-life moral response decisions are made, 
based on a response constructed by the individual rather than forced-choices in 
hypothetical dilemmas. For example, the social information processing test (van 
Nieuwenhuijzen et al., 2011) includes a vignette of a boy in a wheelchair being 
bullied, which relates to the moral principles of justice and harm, and decisions 
about this dilemma are more ‘real-life’ than choosing to kill one person or to kill five 
people (Greene et al, 2001). Future studies could use a SIP measure alongside 
measures of moral reasoning and other component processes, to provide a better 
understanding of relationships between the components of moral development  
Measuring some of the components of this framework in individuals (e.g. 
their moral reasoning level and SIP skills) may allow for a prediction of how they are 
likely to act in moral situations, but without further exploration of all relevant 
situational factors, behavioural prediction would not be possible. Further research 
into the situational factors that may affect moral decision-making will help to better 
predict moral behaviour. Situational factors have been incorporated into some steps 
of the SIP-MDM framework but this is an area that needs further research and 
clarification in order to improve the predictive power of such a framework in different 
situations. Research from criminological literature can add to our knowledge of 
relevant contextual and situational factors for offending behaviour, and how these 
interact with other factors. For example, adolescents are more likely to offend when 
unsupervised with peers (Wikström, Ceccato, Hardie, & Treiber, 2010). 
Developmental studies may also be useful here, as situational factors that affect 
moral decision-making may change over time. For example, peer influences are 
particularly important during adolescence; the presence of peers can affect 
adolescents’ decision-making (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). 
3.5 Summary 
Moral development is a complex process involving many factors. The SIP-
MDM framework expands the definition of moral development to incorporate the 
maturation of the component skills or processes, as well as the maturation of moral 
decision-making, including moral reasoning. Development of component skills and 
processes, including the database, can lead to an increase in the capacity for 
making more mature moral decisions, but whether a mature moral response 
decision is made, and results in a moral behaviour, depends on situational factors 
and the processing that occurs in that situation. While there is promise of what a 
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fully integrative working model of moral decision-making and development could 
offer, developing such a model that predicts moral decision-making, moral 
development and moral behaviour is an ambitious task. In incorporating all of the 
components thought to be involved in moral development, there is a risk of creating 
a theory of everything, which is too broad and non-specific, or overly complicated. 
There are also challenges in reconciling differing theories and philosophical 
viewpoints, and also incorporating social neuroscience research which has largely 
developed separately from developmental psychology research. While recognising 
these limitations, the SIP-MDM framework is the first attempt to incorporate all of 
the suggested relevant components into one descriptive framework of moral 
decision-making and behaviour. Such a framework can explain how moral decisions 
are made, and can help in describing the components that need to develop in order 
for mature moral decisions to be able to occur. Further research in this area can 
provide either support for this framework, or arguments for reformulation. For a fully 
working model which explains both moral decision-making and behaviour alongside 
moral development, specific situational factors need to be further explored and 
developmental processes, including brain development, expanded upon.   
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Part Two: Social neuroscience research 
into moral decision-making 
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Chapter 4: The neural correlates of moral decision-making: A 
systematic review and meta-analysis of moral evaluations and 
response decisions  
4.1 Chapter overview 
The SIP-MDM framework introduced in Chapter 3 brings together 
perspectives from developmental psychology and social neuroscience. Brain 
development is included in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework, as a component 
central to moral decision-making and development. This could be expanded on by 
further exploration of which brain regions are recruited during moral decision-
making. In this chapter, a systematic review will be presented that was carried out to 
investigate which brain regions consistently show increased activation during 
different types of moral decision-making. Firstly, different types of tasks used in 
moral decision-making neuroscience studies will be outlined, followed by a 
discussion of previous work in this area, and whether there is evidence for a moral 
brain network. The aims and method will be presented, including an explanation of 
activation likelihood estimate (ALE) analysis, which is used to perform the meta-
analysis of this systematic review. Results will be discussed in relation to previous 
meta-analyses and the quality of included studies.  
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Moral tasks. Over the past decade, fMRI has increasingly been used 
to measure the neural correlates of moral decision-making, adding to our 
understanding of the cognitive and affective processes involved. Nevertheless, 
there are issues with a lack of consistency amongst studies (Christensen & Gomila, 
2012);  a variety of different tasks have been used, and there are no agreed 
definitions, meaning that moral terms such as judgement, reasoning, sensitivity and 
moral cognition are all used differently across experiments. The moral tasks used in 
fMRI experiments which involve an active decision (as opposed to passive 
judgements) can be grouped into two categories based on the questions posed 
following the stimuli. Moral response decision (MRD) tasks ask individuals to make 
a response decision about what they would do in a hypothetical moral dilemma and 
moral evaluation (ME) tasks ask an individual to judge the appropriateness or moral 
permissibility of another’s actions, or asks them to identify or judge a moral issue or 
violation.  
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MRDs require an individual to think about what they would do in a moral 
dilemma, whereas MEs require judging the moral permissibility or appropriateness 
of the actions of others in a moral dilemma. Discrepancy has been found for 
answers to MRD (“Would you do X?”) and ME questions (“Is it wrong to do X?)” in 
moral dilemmas (Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013); “it seems that deciding 
what to do is not processed in the same way as deciding whether an action is right 
or wrong, and that in moral dilemmas it is the first that matters”(Christensen, Flexas, 
Calabrese, Gut, & Gomila, 2014, p. 607). A systematic review of moral decision-
making which compares brain activation patterns for MEs and MRDs can help to 
address whether these different questions are indeed processed in different ways in 
the brain. It was hypothesised that making one’s own decisions about what to do in 
a moral dilemma and judging the moral actions of others will show increased 
activation of different brain areas compared to non-moral decisions, with MRDs 
showing greater activation in self-referential regions and MEs showing greater 
activation in ToM regions.  
A few recent meta-analyses have gone some way to differentiating between 
task types and compared brain activation for different types of moral decision-
making task, but do not make the same distinction as the current review proposes, 
of MRDs and MEs. For instance, Boccia et al. (2016) compared brain activation for 
first and third person perspective moral tasks. Some of the first person perspective 
tasks presented the moral task in the first person but asked a moral evaluation 
question (‘is it appropriate to do X?’) rather than specifically asking ‘would you do 
X?’ or ‘what would you do?’, therefore still measuring evaluations of others rather 
than what someone would do themselves in a moral dilemma. Bryant, Wang, 
Deardeuff, Zoccoli, and Nam (2016) contrasted right/wrong judgements with moral 
dilemma decisions. Within their decision-making domain they did not differentiate 
between studies which asked respondents to make their own decisions about what 
to do, and those which asked if it is acceptable for others to do certain moral 
actions. Han (2016) looked at moral sensibility and moral judgements but within 
the moral judgement domain did not differentiate between making one's own moral 
response choices and other moral decisions. Task-type needs to be taken into 
account when conducting a systematic review and meta-analysis of moral decision-
making. Whether or not moral decisions relating to the one’s own decisions involve 
different processes and activate different brain areas relative to moral decisions 
about others has not yet been considered in previous systematic reviews.   
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4.2.2 The moral brain.  There appears to be no evidence for a uniquely 
“moral brain” (Young & Dungan, 2012), as brain areas that show increased 
activation during moral tasks are also involved in other functions. The brain region 
which appears to be of particular importance for morality, based on neuroimaging 
and lesion studies, is the vmPFC (Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair, & Luo, 2006; 
Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Marazziti, Baroni, Landi, Ceresoli, & Dell’Osso, 2013; 
Raine & Yang, 2006). The vmPFC is thought to be involved in emotion regulation, 
and activation during moral decision-making tasks is seen as evidence of the 
involvement of emotion processes in making moral decisions (Greene et al., 2001). 
Reviews of moral neuroimaging evidence have also suggested that ToM is a key 
cognitive input to moral decisions because ToM brain regions show increased  
activation when making moral judgements (Blair et al., 2006; Young & Dungan, 
2012). However, this conclusion may have been overstated, because most 
neuroimaging experiments utilise ME tasks, where participants are asked to 
evaluate the actions of others. So while ToM is likely to be involved in judging the 
moral permissibility or appropriateness of others’ actions, it remains to be seen 
whether ToM brain regions are as active when making one’s own moral response 
decisions.  
Two recent meta-analyses of brain activation in moral decision-making 
studies are Bzdok et al. (2012) and Sevinc and Spreng (2014). Bzdok et al (2012) 
performed an ALE analysis of morality, empathy and ToM and found overlap in 
activation for ToM and morality. Experiments were only included in the ‘moral 
cognition’ domain, which they defined as a “reflection of the social appropriateness 
of people’s actions” (p. 789) if the task required participants to make judgements of 
other people’s actions. It is, therefore, not surprising that there was overlap with 
ToM brain activation, as ME tasks require thinking in the third person to evaluate the 
actions of others, which may include inferring the intentions of others in order to 
judge the permissibility of their actions. It remains to be investigated whether such 
an overlap with ToM regions would occur for MRD tasks. Sevinc and Spreng’s 
(2014) systematic review of brain processes underlying moral cognition found 
increased activation in the default mode network, a network which is typically most 
active during a resting state but does show increased activation for some tasks 
(Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003). They compared brain activity for active 
vs. passive judgements and found that active judgements showed more activity in 
the TPJ, angular gyrus, and temporal pole compared to passive viewing. However, 
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within the active domain, they did not distinguish between MRDs and MEs, so it still 
remains to be investigated whether brain activity differs between these two types of 
moral decisions.  
4.3 Aims 
The aims of the current systematic review and meta-analysis were twofold:  
(a) to investigate which brain areas are consistently show increased activation when 
making (i) MRDs, or (ii) making MEs compared to non-moral or neutral decisions or 
evaluations; and (b) to compare brain activation patterns for these two types of 
moral decisions, to determine shared or significant differences in brain activation. A 
quality assessment of the included experiments was also undertaken, something 
which is often omitted from ALE reviews. 
All neuroimaging experiments of any type of moral decision-making were 
systematically searched and retrieved. Eligible experiments were categorised as 
either response decisions, or evaluations. ALE analysis was used to assess brain 
areas significantly more activated for both types of moral decisions, while 
conjunction and contrast analyses were performed to determine areas of significant 
difference. This allowed for the potential discrepancy in brain activation between 
task-type to be considered. 
4.4 Method 
4.4.1 Search strategy. A systematic search was conducted to identify all 
neuroimaging experiments of moral decision-making. Three databases, PubMed, 
PsycInfo and Web of Science were searched up to March 2015 using the terms 
“Moral” AND “Neuroimag* OR neural OR fMRI OR functional magnetic resonance 
OR PET OR positron emission tomography OR MEG OR magnetoencephalography 
OR brain”. Where the database allowed, results were limited to humans, English 
language and full text articles (excluding letters, editorials etc.). This search 
returned 3563 results (2521 after duplicates removed) which were exported to 
EndNote X7. A title screen was performed to remove those obviously irrelevant, 
followed by an abstract screen (see Figure 4.1 for PRISMA flowchart). One hundred 
and twenty-one references remained for full text screening, which was performed 
based on the eligibility criteria (Table 4.1). Reference lists of related systematic 
reviews (Bzdok et al., 2012; Sevinc & Spreng, 2014) were also screened for 
additional references. The initial search, title and abstract screen was carried out by 
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the researcher. Full text screening was carried out by the researcher and their 
primary supervisor independently and decisions were compared. Where there was a 
disagreement, these were discussed with reference to the inclusion criteria and a 
joint decision was reached.  
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removed  
(n = 2521) 
Records 
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(n = 2521) 
Records 
excluded  
(n =2400) 
Full-text articles 
assessed for 
eligibility  
(n = 121) 
Full-text articles 
excluded, with reasons  
(n = 93) 
 
 59=Task (not a 
moral decision 
task, or no 
decisions required 
in scanner, or no 
moral vs. non-
moral comparison) 
 21=not 
neuroimaging 
method 
 4=Region of 
interest analysis 
only 
 3=Review papers 
 5= Sample (e.g. 
adolescents only) 
 1=language (full 
text Japanese) 
Studies included 
in quantitative 
synthesis (meta-
analysis) 
(n = 28) 
Records 
identified through 
PsycInfo 
 (n =966) 
Records identified 
through Medline  
(n =1586) 
Figure 4.1 PRISMA flowchart (From Moher, Liberaiti, Tetzlaff & Altman, 2009) 
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Table 4.1 Eligibility criteria for experiments 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Moral decision-making task with active 
decision required (response decision or 
evaluation) 
 
Not moral task, or passive moral task 
(e.g. just viewing moral stimuli with no 
decision required) 
Neuroimaging method 
 
No neuroimaging method used 
Talairach or MNI coordinates reported 
for whole brain analysis 
 
No coordinates reported, or region of 
interest analysis only 
Moral task activation compared to non-
moral or neutral task activation 
No control task, or no moral vs. non-
moral/neutral comparison coordinates 
reported 
 
Typical/healthy adult subjects. (If 
experiment also includes non-typical 
participants, data for comparison group 
must be reported separately) 
Subjects with developmental or 
neurological disorder, psychopathy, drug 
dependency or children/adolescents (can 
include if comparison group/adult data 
reported separately)  
 
English language paper 
 
Not English language 
 
Data extraction was performed for the included experiments. Details of task 
type and description were extracted, along with relevant foci co-ordinates for the 
ALE analysis. Experiments were either categorised as MRDs or MEs based on task 
design. Coordinates of moral vs. non-moral/neutral conditions were extracted into 
an Excel file and any coordinates reported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
space were converted to Talairach using the icbm2tal transformation in GingerALE 
2.3.6 (Laird et al., 2010; Lancaster et al., 2007). Where an experiment did fit the 
inclusions criteria but did not report coordinates of moral vs. non-moral/neutral 
conditions, the main author was contacted via email to request these data. If there 
was no response after three weeks, the experiment was excluded due to lack of 
appropriate data to extract for ALE analysis. Where an experiment included a 
sample of non-typically developing adults, it was only included if coordinates for the 
comparison group were presented separately, and only these data were extracted 
for analysis. For some experiments, there was more than one moral condition (e.g., 
moral personal and moral impersonal) and these were collapsed together to make 
moral vs. non-moral for extraction purposes. Where there was more than one 
comparison condition to a moral condition, data were extracted for moral vs. the 
most neutral condition (i.e., if there was a non-moral and a neutral condition, the 
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moral vs. neutral comparison was extracted). Different experiments had different 
thresholds for significant clusters, but for each experiment, coordinates were 
extracted for moral vs. non-moral or neutral if they met the whole brain threshold set 
by the authors. In some papers, authors reported coordinates under the threshold 
because they related to an a priori hypothesis or region of interest; these 
coordinates were not extracted for the meta-analysis.  
A quality assessment tool was developed by the researcher and their 
primary supervisor, based on guidelines for reporting an fMRI study (Poldrack, 
Fletcher, Henson, Worsley, Brett, & Nichols, 2008), using a binary scale: 1= 
evidence reported, 0= no evidence reported/unclear/not explicit (see Appendix A). 
Experiments scoring 0-10 were classed as low quality, 11-20 classed as medium 
quality and 21-30 classed as high quality. The researcher performed quality 
assessment for all included experiments and the primary supervisor performed 
quality assessment on 20% of included experiments independently.   
4.5 Analysis 
ALE analysis is a commonly used method for coordinate based meta-
analysis. This method assesses the patterns of activation foci reported in different 
experiments, to establish where in the brain convergence is higher than would be 
expected if foci were normally distributed throughout the brain (Eickhoff, Bzdok, 
Laird, Kurth, & Fox, 2012; Eickhoff, Laird, Grefkes, Wang, Zilles, & Fox, 2009; 
Turkeltaub, Eickhoff, Laird, Fox, Wiener, & Fox, 2012), taking sample sizes of 
experiments into account. ALE analysis was performed using GingerALE 2.3.6 on 
the x, y, z coordinates of moral vs. non-moral or neutral conditions. Firstly, ALE 
analysis was performed for all ME experiments and then for all MRD experiments. A 
conjunction analysis was then performed to find shared brain activation for ME and 
MRD decisions. Contrast analyses were performed to assess differences in brain 
activation (MRD-ME and ME-MRD).  
Conjunction analysis comparing the results of the present ALE to results 
from recent ALE systematic reviews was not possible without knowledge of exactly 
which foci had been extracted for each included experiment of previous reviews, 
and was also not practical due to differences in inclusion and exclusion criteria. The 
results of the present ALE were instead compared visually with results from two 
recent reviews (Bzdok et al., 2012; Sevinc & Spreng, 2014) where appropriate, and 
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outlined in the discussion. Results from these previous reviews were reported in 
MNI coordinates, so for an easier comparison with the results of the current review, 
their reported coordinates were transformed to Talairach coordinates using the 
using the icbm2tal transformation in GingerALE 2.3.6 (Laird et al., 2010; Lancaster 
et al., 2007) and then areas were labelled using Talairach client (Lancaster et al., 
1997; Lancaster et al., 2000). 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Significant clusters of activation. After full text screening, 28 
separate experiments were eligible for inclusion, with a total of 271 foci from 642 
participants. All experiments used fMRI, 10 used a MRD task and 18 used a ME 
task. Table 3.1 displays the main characteristics of the included experiments.  
ALE analysis was performed for all ME experiments and all MRD 
experiments, cluster-level = .05, 1000 permutations, p = .001. Conjunction and 
contrast analyses were then performed, p = .01, 1000 permutations, minimum 
cluster = 200mm³, to assess shared and divergent brain activation between the two 
task types. Table 4.3 shows the results of the ALE analysis, and Figure 4.2 shows 
the largest significant clusters of brain activation found for each ALE analysis. All 
coordinates are reported in Talairach space. 
Four significant clusters of activation were found across the ME experiments 
(18 experiments, 174 foci, 383 participants): the left medial frontal gyrus (MFG), the 
left and right superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the left cingulate gyrus (CG). Four 
significant clusters were found across the MRD experiments (10 experiments, 97 
foci, 259 participants): the left and right middle temporal gyrus (MTG), left 
precuneus and the right MFG. Conjunction analysis revealed three clusters of 
shared activation for both moral task types: the left MTG, left CG and left MFG. A 
contrast analysis of MEs-MRDs did not find any significant clusters. However, a 
contrast analysis of MRDs-MEs found three significant clusters: the right MTG, right 
precuneus, and left MTG. 
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Table 4.2. Characteristics of included experiments 
Reference Subjects Conditions No. 
foci 
Moral stimuli Moral task instructions/response format 
Moral response decisions 
 
Borg et al. 
(2006) 
 
24 Moral vs. non-
moral 
7 Written moral scenarios Yes/No button press  to “Is it wrong to do it ?” and 
“Would you do it?” after each scenario 
Chiong et al. 
(2013) 
16 Moral personal 
vs. non-moral 
 
3 Modified Greene (2001) dilemmas 
presented as written text and also 
audible narration 
Yes/No button press to "Would you do X in order to 
X?" after each dilemma 
 
FeldmanHall et 
al (2014) 
 
38 Moral (difficult 
and easy) vs. 
non-moral 
(difficult and 
easy) 
10 Written moral scenarios Yes/No button press to “Do you do (proposed 
response)?” after each scenario 
Han et al 
(2014) 
16 Moral (personal 
and impersonal) 
vs. neutral 
 
28 Modified Greene et al (2001) 
dilemmas, moral-personal and moral-
impersonal, presented as text 
Yes/no button press to “Is it appropriate for you to do 
(proposed solution)?” 
Harrison et al 
(2012) 
73 Moral vs. 
nondilemma 
 
11 Vignettes of modified Greene et al 
(2001) dilemmas. Participants 
familiarised with vignettes within 1 
week of scanning session using 
illustrations and examiner-read 
descriptions. Voice-prompts in 
scanner. 
Yes/no finger raise to “Would you do X?” after each 
dilemma  
Pujol et al 
(2012)  
22 Moral vs. 
nondilemma 
 
14 As Harrison et al 2012 As Harrison et al 2012 
  
86 
 
Table 4.2 Continued. Characteristics of included experiments 
Schneider et al 
(2012) 
28 Moral vs. 
baseline 
4 Written moral dilemmas. Social-
ethical dilemmas and individual gain 
vs. collective losses 
Agree or disagree with proposed solution using 
button press after each dilemma 
Sommer et al 
(2010) 
 
12 Moral vs. neutral 
 
6 Written stories describing moral 
conflict 
“What should I do?” Choose between two response 
alternatives after each dilemma with a button press 
Sommer et al 
(2014) 
 
16 Moral vs. social 
 
6 As Sommer et al 2010 As Sommer et al 2010 
 
Verdejo-Garcia 
et al (2014) 
14 Moral vs. 
nondilemma 
 
8 As Harrison et al 2012 As Harrison et al 2012 
Moral evaluations 
 
Avram et al 
(2013) 
 
 
16 Moral vs. esthetic 8 Written moral statements 
 
Decide whether each moral statement could be 
considered ‘right’ by pressing button 
Avram et al 
(2014) 
16 Moral (1st and 3rd 
person) vs. non-
moral 
10 Written moral statements 
 
Rate each statement as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ using 
button press 
Bahnemann et 
al (2010) 
25 Moral vs. physical  
 
10 Animated stimuli of two people in a 
social interaction. Protagonist's 
behaviour was either in accordance 
with or in violation of a social norm 
Yes/no button press to "Is the protagonist violating a 
norm?" after each moral dilemma 
De Achával et 
al (2013) 
13 Moral vs. non-
moral 
6 Modified version of Moral Dilemmas 
Test (Greene et al, 2001) presented 
as text 
Yes/ no button press to "Would you consider it 
appropriate to….?" after each dilemma 
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Table 4.2 Continued. Characteristics of included experiments 
Harada et al 
(2009) 
 
18 Moral vs. gender 
judgement 
9 Written stories of protagonist 
performing good or bad deed 
Yes/no button press to "Is the protagonist's 
behaviour morally bad?" 
Harenski et al 
(2008) 
28 Moral vs. non-
moral 
 
15 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, 
depicting unpleasant social scenes 
indicating a moral violation 
Determine if the picture represented a moral 
violation and rate the severity of the violation on 
scale of 1-5 using button press to stop rating bar 
Harenski et al 
(2012) 
36 Moral vs. neutral 
 
7 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, 
depicting unpleasant social scenes 
indicating a moral violation 
Rate moral violation severity of picture on scale of 1-
5 using button press to stop rating bar 
Harenski et al 
(2014) 
46 Moral vs. neutral 
 
23 
 
Moral pictures from IAPS and media, 
depicting unpleasant social scenes 
indicating a moral violation 
Rate severity of moral transgression in pictures from 
1-5 using button press to stop rating bar 
Heekeren et al 
(2003) 
8 Moral vs. 
semantic 
 
9 Written sentences (German) Judge whether actions described in sentences were 
“appropriate” or “inappropriate” with button press 
Heekeren et al 
(2005) 
12 Moral vs. 
semantic 
 
8 Written sentences 
(German)containing bodily harm or 
not 
Judge if actions described in moral sentences were 
“appropriate” or “inappropriate” with button press 
Moll et al 
(2001) 
 
10 Moral vs. factual 10 Moral sentences presented aurally 
 
Think about each statement and judge whether they 
are 'right' or 'wrong'. No overt judgement in scanner 
Moll et al 
(2002) 
 
7 Moral vs. non-
moral neutral 
2 Written moral statements 
 
Covertly judge each sentence as 'right' or 'wrong'. 
No overt judgement in scanner 
Parkinson et al 
(2011) 
30 Moral (harmful, 
dishonest and 
disgust) vs. 
neutral 
30 Written moral scenarios 
 
Decide if main character's actions were 'wrong' or 
'not wrong' with button press  
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Table 4.2 Continued. Characteristics of included experiments 
Prehn et al 
(2008) 
 
23 Socio-normative 
vs. grammatical 
6 Written sentences Decide if action described was a social norm 
violation or not with yes/no button press 
Reniers et al 
(2012) 
24 Moral vs. non-
moral 
6 Written scenarios of moral decision-
making 
Yes/no to "Is it ok for X to do this?" using button 
press 
 
Robertson et al 
(2007) 
16 Moral 
(care/justice) vs. 
neutral nonmoral 
5 Written business case scenario 
describing workday of a fictional 
marketing research analyst 
Press button when identify an important point or 
issue 
 
Schleim et al 
(2011) 
40 Moral vs. 
personal 
 
6 Written stories adapted from moral 
issues in media 
 
Had to judge if behaviour in stories was right from a 
moral point of view. Decide between 'yes, rightly' 
and 'no, not rightly' using button press 
Takahashi et al 
(2008) 
15 Moral (beauty 
and depravity) vs. 
neutral 
4 Written sentences (Japanese) Read sentences silently and rate according to how 
moral/immoral or praiseworthy/blameworthy the 
events were (no overt judgement in scanner) 
 
Note. Number of subjects is the number included in the analysis that was extracted for this review (e.g., number of subjects in control group 
sample) not necessarily the total number of subjects in the experiment. The coordinates for the control group in Harenski et al. (2014) were 
sent by main author after an email request. 
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Table 4.3. Significant clusters of activation for moral evaluations, moral response 
decisions, and conjunction and convergence analysis. 
 # Volume 
(mm^3) 
X y z Cerebru
m 
Label Brodmann 
area 
Moral 
evaluations 
1 3296 -6 44 20 Left MFG 9 
2 2176 -44 -56 18 Left STG 39 
3 2024 -2 -56 26 Left CG 31 
4 744 50 6 -20 Right STG 38 
Moral 
response 
decisions 
1 1968 -44 -64 20 Left MTG 39 
2 1928 -2 -60 30 Left Precuneus 7 
3 1512 2 44 36 Right MFG 6 
4 1248 44 -60 24 Right MTG 39 
Conjunction  
of moral 
evaluations 
and moral 
response 
decisions 
1 712 -44 -60 18 Left MTG 19 
2 680 -2 -56 28 Left CG 31 
3 312 -6 44 40 Left MFG 8 
Moral 
response 
decisions-
moral 
evaluations 
1 896 42.9 -56.9 23.4 Right MTG 39 
2 328 2 -61 31 Right Precuneus 7 
3 280 -39 -64.5 16.5 Left MTG 39 
 
Note. X, y, z coordinates are reported in Talairach space and refer to the maximum 
value of each cluster. Moral evaluation and moral response decision ALE analyses 
performed using cluster-level=.05, 1000 permutations, p=.001. Conjunction and 
contrast analysis performed using p=.01, 1000 permutations, minimum 
volume=200mm³. Labels and Brodmann areas generated by GingerALE 2.3.6. 
MFG=medial frontal gyrus, STG=superior temporal gyrus, CG=Cingulate gyrus, 
MTG=middle temporal gyrus. 
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Moral evaluation clusters 
  
Moral response decision clusters 
 
Conjunction analysis: Shared activation for moral evaluation and moral 
response decisions 
 
 Contrast analysis: Moral response decisions-moral evaluations 
 
Figure 4.2 Brain activation maps showing significant clusters of activation  
Note.Images created in GingerALE 2.3.6, overlaid onto Colin 2x2x2 template in 
Mango (Lancaster & Martinez, Copyright 2006-2015).Brain images are axial, sagittal 
and coronal view of main clusters of activation for each ALE analysis. Image labels: 
L=left, R=right, P=posterior, A=anterior, S=superior. 
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It was hypothesised that MRDs would show increased activation in self-
referential brain areas. This was supported, as relative to MEs, MRDs showed 
increased activation in the precuneus which is a brain region more highly developed 
in humans than other animals and involved in higher order cognitive processes 
including self-processing and consciousness (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006) and 
egocentric spatial processing (Freton, Lemogne, Bergouignan, Delaveau, Lehéricy, 
& Fossati, 2014). It was also hypothesised that the ME tasks would be associated 
with increased activation of more ToM related areas than MRD tasks, as they 
involve thinking about the mental states of other people in order to judge moral 
behaviour. This hypothesis was not supported, as the contrast analysis for MEs-
MRDs did not reveal any significant clusters. The right temporoparietal junction 
(rTPJ) has been suggested as an area important for ToM (Saxe & Powell, 2006). 
The rTPJ is a vaguely defined area but is also referred to as Brodmann area (BA) 
39 (Bzdok et al., 2013). Contrary to the hypothesis, the ALE analysis revealed that 
the rTPJ (BA 39, MTG) showed significantly increased activation across the MRD 
tasks (cluster 4) but not across the ME tasks. The surprising finding of significant 
activation of this area for MRDs but not MEs suggests that ToM processes are even 
more involved when making one’s own moral decisions than when making 
evaluations of others. One explanation may be that when thinking about what to do 
in a moral dilemma, individuals think about the consequences of their possible 
actions for others, e.g. “would my actions upset/harm someone?”  
4.6.2 Comparison with previous meta-analyses. The findings from the 
present meta-analysis were compared to those of two recent systematic reviews of 
moral decision-making, Bzdok et al. (2012) and Sevinc and Spreng (2014). As 
previously stated, the criteria for Bzdok et al.’s (2012) moral cognition domain was 
that participants were required to make appropriateness judgements, which is what 
the current review termed moral evaluations. The ALE analysis results for MEs in 
the current review were compared to Bzdok et al.’s (2012) results for the moral 
cognition domain. The ME results are somewhat comparable to Bzdok et al.’s 
(2012); both revealed a significant cluster in the right STG (BA 38, labelled by 
Bzdok et al. as the right temporal pole). However, their results showed significant 
clusters of activation in both the left and right MFG, whereas the current analysis 
only revealed a significant cluster in the left MFG, BA 9. In line with Bzdok et al.’s 
(2012) analysis, the current review found a cluster of activation in the left STG 
(labelled by Bzdok et al. as left TPJ). This cluster was BA 39 in the current analysis 
and BA 22 in Bzdok et al (2012), although these are adjacent areas. As previously 
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stated, Bzdok et al. (2012) found a cluster of activation in the rTPJ (BA 39), which 
the current review did not find. Another discrepancy between the ME activation 
clusters found here, and Bzdok et al.’s (2012) for moral cognition are that they found 
a cluster of activation in the left amygdala, which the current review did not find. 
Also, Bzdok et al. (2012) reported activation in the precuneus, which was not found 
to be a cluster of significant activation for the ME experiments in the current 
analysis, although results did reveal activation in the adjacent cingulate gyrus. 
Differences between the current review and Bzdok et al.’s (2012) may be partly due 
to discrepancies between Talairach labels and the SPM anatomy toolbox, and also 
due to the differences of tasks for the included experiments; Bzdok et al. (2012) 
included only experiments where participants were required to make 
appropriateness judgements on the actions of one individual towards others while 
the current review included any ME judgement, including tasks where participants 
had to judge moral sentences. The ALE analysis results for MRDs are not 
comparable with Bzdok et al.’s (2012) moral cognition results, supporting the finding 
that judging the appropriateness of others actions increases activation of different 
brain regions compared to when making one’s own moral response decisions.  
Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) systematic review compared brain activation for 
active and passive moral tasks. As the current review only included tasks that 
required an active decision, findings for MRDs and MEs were compared to Sevinc 
and Spreng’s (2014) findings for active tasks. ALE results for MEs are fairly 
comparable to Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) ALE results for active tasks, with both 
finding clusters of activation in the left MFG (BA 9, labelled by Sevinc & Spreng as 
medial PFC and anterior superior frontal sulcus), right STG (BA 38, labelled by 
Sevinc & Spreng as MTG) and the left cingulate gyrus (BA 31, labelled by Sevinc & 
Spreng as posterior cingulate cortex). Comparing results for MRDs to Sevinc and 
Spreng’s (2014) active results, there is no direct overlap but there are some 
similarities. Sevinc and Spreng (2014) found a cluster of activation in the left MTG, 
BA 22, whereas the ALE analysis for MRDs in the current review revealed a cluster 
in the left MTG BA 39, adjacent to BA 22. Again, differences may be due to 
discrepancies between Talairach and MNI labelling and also differences between 
tasks of the included experiments. For Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) active domain, 
four of the included experiments were also included in the MRD domain, but the 
current review included an additional six MRD experiments, and the majority of the 
active experiments in Sevinc and Spreng (2014) were MEs.  
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4.6.3 Quality assessment. Quality assessment indicated that 20 
experiments were high quality, eight were medium quality and none were low quality 
(see Appendix B). The medium quality experiments did not report as much 
information as the high quality experiments. Analyses included all experiments 
regardless of quality, but issues regarding the quality of included experiments are 
outlined in the discussion and should be taken into consideration when interpreting 
the results. Agreement between the researcher and their primary supervisor for 
quality assessment was k=1 (p=.14), ICC=.88 (p=.005). As far as the researcher is 
aware, this review is the first ALE meta-analysis to report on the quality of included 
experiments. In the absence of a pre-existing standardised quality assessment tool 
for an ALE systematic review, the quality assessment tool was adapted from 
guidelines for reporting fMRI studies (Poldrack et al., 2008). Future reviews could 
use this checklist, or similar quality assessment tools, and should exclude low 
quality experiments from ALE analysis. While the majority of included experiments 
in this systematic review were found to be of high quality, based on the adapted 
checklist, there were issues with some of the tasks used. 
4.7 Summary 
This systematic review and meta-analysis builds on previous reviews in the 
field by differentiating between MRD’s and ME’s, to assess similarities and 
differences in patterns of brain activation between these two types of moral 
decisions. The ALE analyses found three significant clusters of shared brain 
activation for both task types: the left MTG, CG and MFG. Contrast analysis 
revealed that MRDs additionally activated the right MTG, right precuneus and left 
MTG. These findings show that making one’s own moral decisions about what to do 
in a moral dilemma is associated with increased activation of additional brain areas, 
suggesting that different processes are involved. 
The brain region which has been most commonly implicated in moral 
decision-making, based on neuroimaging and lesion studies is the vmPFC. This 
region is not precisely defined in the literature but usually refers to any brain areas 
in the ventromedial frontal lobe, and BA’s 10, 11, 24, 25 and 32 (Nieuwenhuis & 
Takashima, 2011). The current meta-analysis only found one significant cluster of 
activation in this region for MEs, (MFG, BA 9) adjacent to the regions commonly 
referred to as the vmPFC, and found no significant clusters of activation of the 
vmPFC for MRDs. The lack of a significant cluster of activation in the vmPFC for 
MRDs highlights that most previous conclusions about brain activation for moral 
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decision-making have been made based on ME tasks; further research on the 
involvement of this region for MRDs is needed, as the current review only identified 
10 relevant MRD experiments. Further neuroimaging studies employing MRD tasks 
of real life scenarios are needed before strong conclusions can be made about 
which brain areas are involved when making one’s own, every day MRDs. 
Developmental neuroimaging studies can help to understand how different brain 
regions and networks may be activated at different ages when making moral 
decisions, which could also help to expand on the ‘brain development’ component of 
the SIP-MDM framework. In addition to further social neuroscience research, 
developmental psychology research could explore whether reasoning maturity in 
relation to different moral values, such as life and justice, correlates with reasoning 
maturity about response decisions made in hypothetical moral dilemmas, i.e. do 
people apply their understanding and appreciation of moral values to their own 
decision-making? 
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Part Three: Moral development in typically 
developing adolescents and adolescents with 
acquired brain injuries 
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Chapter 5: Study 1: Investigating hypotheses of the SIP-MDM 
framework in typically developing adolescents 
5.1 Rationale  
Within this thesis, it is proposed that moral decision-making is a complex 
process, involving many different component skills and processes that develop with 
age. The current study aimed to measure multiple components of the SIP-MDM 
framework in TD adolescents (age 11-18 years) to explore how these components 
develop with age and investigate relationships between components in order to test 
some of the hypotheses generated by the SIP-MDM framework. Findings from the 
current study may either provide some initial support for the framework, or evidence 
that the framework may need to be reformulated.  
Although theory and research has suggested various skills and processes 
are required for moral development, studies do not tend to measure these possible 
determinants of moral development simultaneously. For example, while perspective 
taking is the component process most frequently theorised to be involved in moral 
development, there is not a wealth of research exploring the developmental 
relationships between perspective taking and moral decision-making. Study 1 firstly 
aimed to address this by measuring moral reasoning alongside cognitive and 
affective processes such as working memory and perspective taking, in order to 
explore relationships between development of these processes and moral 
reasoning maturity. In terms of links between moral reasoning and behaviour, while 
there is evidence of delayed moral reasoning in offender populations (Nelson et al., 
1990; Stams et al., 2006) there is limited evidence of a link between moral 
reasoning level and behaviour in TD populations. Based on the SIP-MDM 
framework, a relationship between moral reasoning and behaviour would be 
expected, although mature moral reasoning does not necessarily lead to prosocial 
behaviour. Another aim of Study 1 was to explore whether moral reasoning maturity 
was related to self and parent reported behaviour in a sample of TD adolescents.  
The SIP-MDM framework outlined in Chapter 3 proposed six steps that 
occur when making a moral decision. At each step, certain component skills and 
process are suggested to be involved, for example, emotion recognition is proposed 
to be important for Step 1, encoding. Some cognitive and affective processes have 
previously been measured alongside SIP skills, concluding that emotion recognition 
and interpretation are particularly important for predicting SIP skills (van 
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Nieuwenhuijzen & Vriens, 2012). However, these relationships have so far only 
been tested in children with intellectual disabilities and remain to be explored for TD 
adolescents. SIP theory has previously been integrated with moral theory (Arsenio 
& Lemerise, 2004) and SIP skills have been hypothesised to be related to moral 
development (Palmer, 2000) but there is a lack of research investigating the 
relationship between SIP skills and moral reasoning maturity.  
A further aim of Study 1 was to explore relationships between the 
components and steps of the framework, to explore whether the components 
proposed to be involved at each step relate to proficiency at that SIP step. For 
example, do higher empathy scores relate to more prosocial goals being selected at 
Step 3? Additionally, the SIP-MDM framework proposed that components in the 
centre can affect all steps of SIP, so relationships between components in the 
centre and SIP skills were also explored. The SIP-MDM framework proposed that all 
components develop with age, facilitating more efficient processing and increasing 
the capacity for more mature moral decision-making. For example, increases in 
attention and working memory can aid encoding and interpretation, and 
development of perspective taking abilities can allow for the feelings of other people 
to be taken into account, and may therefore result in more prosocial goals being 
selected. The current study therefore also aimed to measure whether SIP skills 
mature with age in a sample of TD adolescents. 
5.2 Hypotheses 
5.2.1  Moral reasoning, cognitive and affective processes and 
behaviour. It was hypothesised that: 
1. Moral reasoning, empathy, perspective taking, working memory and emotion 
recognition will all correlate positively with age. 
2. There will be significant positive relationships between moral reasoning and: 
empathy, perspective taking, working memory and emotion recognition. 
3. The cognitive and affective processes of empathy, perspective taking, 
working memory and emotion recognition will predict moral reasoning level.  
4. Moral reasoning will show a significant negative relationship with self and 
parent-reported behavioural difficulties.  
5.2.2 Steps of the SIP-MDM framework. It was hypothesised that: 
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5. SIP steps will correlate positively with age. Older participants will score more 
highly on SIP encoding and interpretation variables, and will select more 
prosocial goals, generate more prosocial response options and make more 
prosocial decisions. 
Components in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework are hypothesised to 
influence processing that occurs at each step of the framework. The components in 
the centre of the framework which were measured for this study were perspective 
taking, working memory, moral reasoning (as a measure of moral schemas, rules 
and principles), current mood (positive and negative affect), and SES. It was 
hypothesised that: 
6. There will be significant relationships between all SIP steps and perspective 
taking, working memory, moral reasoning, current mood and SES. 
In addition to the relationships between SIP steps and components in the 
centre of the SIP-MDM framework, it was hypothesised that there would be 
significant relationships between SIP steps and components listed under each step. 
It was hypothesised that: 
7. There will be significant relationships between emotion recognition and 
encoding (Step 1). 
8. There will be a significant relationship between empathy and goal 
generation, with a positive relationship between empathy and prosocial goal 
generation, and a negative relationship between empathy and antisocial goal 
generation (Step 3). 
9. There will be a significant relationship between empathy and response 
decisions, with a positive relationship between empathy and prosocial 
response decision, and a negative relationship between empathy and 
antisocial response decision (Step 5). 
10. SIP steps will be predicted by relevant variables at each step, including 
variables in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework. 
 
In addition to these hypotheses, exploratory analyses will also be conducted 
to explore the effect of gender on key variables and on relationships between 
variables, as gender differences have been found for the development of cognitive 
skills (Van der Graaff et al., 2014) and there are sex differences in brain 
development (Giedd et al., 2006; Giedd et al., 1996; Lenroot & Giedd, 2010). If 
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appropriate, age will be broken down into age groups in order to explore whether 
the younger adolescents significantly differ from older adolescents on key variables.  
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Participants.  Eighty TD participants, aged 11-18 years old (M 
age=14.05, SD=2.25, 31 Male, 49 Female) were recruited from schools and 
colleges in Norwich and Devon, and through advertisements at the University of 
East Anglia. Eligibility criteria are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Eligibility criteria for sample 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Age 11-18 Outside of age range 
Typically developing Diagnosis of developmental disability or 
brain injury 
Capacity to provide consent/assent Lack of capacity to consent/assent 
English speaking Non-English speaking 
 
The required sample size was calculated using GPower3 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with 1-β=.80 and 
α=.05. Calculations were hypothesis driven, with estimations based on previous 
research and theoretical assumptions. The largest sample size from these 
calculations was 72, which was rounded to 80. 
5.3.2 Recruitment. Participants were recruited from schools and colleges in 
Norwich (Open Academy, n=36) and Devon (Coombeshead Academy, n=26 and 
Exmouth Community College, n=6), and through advertisements at the University of 
East Anglia (n=12). All participants were entered into a prize draw, with 20 prizes of 
£20 vouchers. Winners were selected using a random number generator at the end 
of the study. Winners of the prize draw were given a choice of either a £20 Amazon, 
Tesco’s or iTunes voucher. 
For school recruitment, the researcher summarised the study at a school 
assembly and students who were interested took letters home to their parents. The 
parent letters invited their child to take part in the study and included relevant 
information sheets. If parents or caregivers wanted their child to take part in the 
study they could return a signed consent form to the child’s school. Those with 
parental consent were then seen for the study sessions during the school day. Sixth 
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form students were invited to take part at an assembly, with interested students 
emailing the researcher, or providing the researcher with their school email address. 
Participant information sheets for over 16 year olds were provided for sixth form 
students. The study was also advertised at the University of East Anglia, through 
staff bulletins, and the researcher presenting details of the study at a summer 
school, where interested students could take letters home to their parents.  
5.3.3 Design and procedure. This study made use of a cross-sectional 
design using a convenience sample. All participants completed a test battery 
containing all of the measures. The test battery was completed in a one-to-one 
session with the researcher, either at the participant’s school, their home or at the 
University of East Anglia. The testing sessions took about 1.5 hours to complete, 
though this was two hours for some younger participants. Where necessary, or 
appropriate, the testing session was split into two sessions, with the second half 
usually completed the following day.  
An undergraduate psychology intern from the University of Exeter assisted 
with some of the testing sessions in Devon, to increase the number of participants 
that could be seen for the study during a school day. The intern was recruited by the 
researcher’s secondary supervisor and was trained on the protocol by the 
researcher. The intern administered part of the test battery (digit span, emotion 
recognition task, participant booklet, animated triangles task). Some participants 
(n=9) were also part of another study (see Chapter 6); where there was an overlap 
of measures, participants only completed these once and the same score was used 
for both studies (for the SRM-SF, the score from Time 1 of the linked study was 
used for the current study). The SRM-SF responses were scored by the researcher 
after completing self-training using the manual (Gibbs et al., 1992) and 20% of the 
SRM-SFs (n=16) were also scored by the researcher’s primary supervisor for inter-
rater reliability. Results indicated excellent agreement between raters with respect 
to total score (ICC =.95). 
5.4 Ethical considerations. 
This study received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of East 
Anglia ethics committee (see Appendix C). Consent was sought from the Head 
teacher of the schools and colleges involved. Consent was obtained for all 
participants and they were made aware that they could withdraw from the study at 
any time. All participants provided informed consent to take part in this study, while 
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parental consent was additionally sought for those under the age of 16 years. The 
participant information sheets and consent forms for those under age 16 used 
simpler language. All testing sessions were on a one-to-one basis with the 
researcher who was able to look out for signs of fatigue and offer breaks where 
necessary. No questions asked in this study were expected to cause distress but a 
disclosure sentence was added to the information sheets and consent forms, 
making participants aware that if they disclosed any information suggesting they 
were at risk of harm, the researcher may have to pass this information onto relevant 
people. The PANAS presented in the participant booklet for the current study asked 
participants to rate how much they were currently feeling different emotions, 
including ‘distressed’ ‘upset’ and ‘afraid’. The researcher checked completed 
PANAS scales during the testing session, to see whether a participant had ticked 
that they were feeling these emotions ‘quite a bit’, or ‘extremely’, to be dealt with on 
a case-by-case basis with advice from the researcher’s supervisors. All participants 
were debriefed after the study and provided with the researcher's contact details.  
5.5 Measures 
5.5.1 Moral reasoning.  Moral reasoning was assessed using the SRM-SF 
(Gibbs et al., 1992). The SRM-SF is a widely used moral reasoning instrument in 
developmental psychology and has been shown to have excellent levels of test-
retest reliability (.88) and internal consistency (.92) (Gibbs et al., 1992). The SRM-
SF (Gibbs et al, 1992) measures reasoning in the sociomoral constructs of contract, 
truth, affiliation, life, property, law and legal justice. The SRM-SF consists of eleven 
short-answer items that address sociomoral values such as keeping a promise and 
saving a life, e.g. “Think about a time when you’ve made a promise to a friend of 
yours. How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to friends?” 
Participants choose between very important, important or not important and are 
then asked “why is it very important/important/not important?” Participants gave 
their answers orally and these were audio-recorded by the researcher. Responses 
to the “why” questions were scored using a reference manual which assesses the 
developmental level of reasoning (Gibbs et al, 1992). Scoring the SRM-SFs requires 
around 30 hours of self-training and completion of practice questions (Gibbs et al, 
1992). At least seven of the eleven questions must have scorable answers in order 
for the SRM-SF to be reliably scored. Each answer is given a value between 1 and 
4 (or U for unscorable) using the reference manual; all scorable answers are then 
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summed, and a mean calculated. The mean score is multiplied by 100 to give a 
score out of 100-400, related to a global moral stage (see Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2. SMR-SF scores in relation to global moral stage 
SRM-SF score Global stage Global stage description 
The immature level 
100-125 Stage 1 Unilateral and 
physicalistic: Justifications 
based on unilateral 
authority, especially 
physical power, and 
absolute rules 
126-149 Transition 1(2)  
 
150-174 Transition 2 (1)  
 
175-225 Stage 2 Exchanging and 
instrumental: Justifications 
based on pragmatic deals 
or exchanges 
226-249 Transition 2 (3)  
 
250-274 Transition 3 (2)  
 
The mature level 
275-325 Stage 3 Mutual and prosocial: 
Justifications based on 
prosocial understanding of 
caring and conduct, 
including empathic role-
taking, and appeals to 
mutual sentiments in 
relationships.  
326-349 Transition 3 (4)  
350-374 Transition 4 (3)  
375-400 Stage 4 Systemic and standard: 
Justifications based on 
societal requirements and 
responsibilities, and basic 
rights or values. 
 
Note. From Gibbs et al (1992). 
 
5.5.2 Empathy. The Index of Empathy for Children and Adolescents (IECA; 
Bryant, 1992) was used as a self-report measure of empathy. This questionnaire 
was developed to assess affective empathy in children aged 6 years and over. For 
12/13 year olds the measure has good internal consistency (.79) and test-retest 
reliability (.83) (Bryant, 1992). The IECA has 22 items requiring a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 
response, such as “I get upset when I see a girl being hurt” and takes around 5 
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minutes to complete. The IECA was administered as part of a pen and paper 
participant booklet.  
5.5.3 Perspective taking. Perspective taking was measured using the 
animated triangles task (Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000) in which participants are 
shown animations of two moving triangles on a computer screen. For the current 
study, the triangles task was presented on a Toshiba laptop. Some of the 
animations are random and others involve actions such as the triangles chasing 
each other or dancing together. Participants are asked to verbalise what they think 
is happening in the animations and their answers are scored according to a manual. 
Participants’ answers were audio-recorded to allow for scoring. Answers were 
scored for appropriateness and intentionality, with these scores added together to 
give a total score. This measure took about 15 minutes to complete.  
5.5.4 Working memory. Working memory capacity was assessed using the 
digit span (forwards and backwards) subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children IV (WISC-IV) (Wechsler, 2003) or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV 
(WAIS-IV) (Wechsler, 2008), depending on the participant’s age. This measure took 
5-10 minutes to administer.  
5.5.5 Emotion recognition. Emotion recognition was measured using a 
version of the Cambridge Cognition Emotion Recognition Task (ERT; Cambridge 
Cognition, 2014), which takes 10 minutes to administer. This task was presented 
using a Toshiba laptop. Computer morphed images derived from facial features of 
real individuals are displayed on a computer screen one at a time for 200ms. 
Participants are then asked to identify which emotion the face was displaying, as 
quickly and as accurately as possible, by clicking one emotion from a choice of six 
possible emotions (fearful, angry, happy, sad, disgusted and surprised). There are a 
total of 90 faces presented, with 15 of each emotion. Scores were calculated for 
accurate responses to each of the six emotions, and a total accuracy score out of 
90, which was used for the current study. 
5.5.6 Behaviour. Behavioural difficulties were measured using the strengths 
and difficulties questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997; Goodman, Meltzer, & Bailey, 
1998). The SDQ is a 25-item questionnaire comprised of five sub scales (emotional 
symptoms, conduct problems, hyperactivity/inattentions, peer relationship problems 
and prosocial behaviour). The subscales (excluding prosocial behaviour) are then 
added together to generate a total difficulties score. The SDQ is a widely used 
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measure and has been found to have good psychometric properties even though it 
is very brief (Goodman & Scott, 1999). A review found that the psychometric 
properties are strong and that it measures both problem behaviours and 
competencies at an early age use (Stone, Otten, Engels, Vermulst, & Janssens, 
2010). The self-report, parent-report and teacher-report versions were administered 
in the current study, with the self-report SDQ administered as part of the participant 
booklet. For all participants, their parent of caregiver was invited to fill in a parent 
SDQ and return it to the researcher. For participants recruited from schools and 
colleges, their form teacher was also invited to fill in a teacher SDQ.  
5.5.7 Social information processing skills.Social information processing 
skills were measured using cartoons and picture vignettes taken from the Social 
information processing test (SIPT; van Nieuwenhuijzen, 2009, 2011, 2012) which is 
based on the SIP model (Crick and Dodge, 1994; Lemerise and Arsenio, 2004). 
This instrument presents vignettes as three comic strips and four situation drawings, 
followed by an interview which asks questions to measure certain SIP skills. Each of 
the situations depicts a form of social disadvantage (e.g. a boy in a wheelchair 
being bullied). The SIPT was administered in a one-to-one interview between the 
researcher and participant and took about 20 minutes to complete. Participants 
gave their answers orally and these were audio recorded to be scored according to 
the SIPT manual. 
Step 1, encoding, was measured by asking participants what was happening 
in the situation (comic or drawing), and coding their answers as either emotional 
cues (e.g. “he looks sad”) verbal cues (e.g. “he is saying…”), non-verbal cues (e.g. 
“he’s looking at her”) or interpretation cues (cues relevant to the situation but not 
actually seen). Scores were generated based on how many times each type of cue 
was mentioned for the three comics and four situations (total of 7), and a total cues 
encoded variable was generated by summing these (total of 28). These Step 1 
outcome variables were a measure of which cues from the situation a participant 
had encoded. Irrelevant cues mentioned by participants were coded but not scored. 
Participants were then asked if the action in the comic or situation happened 
accidently or on purpose. The situation cards presented ambiguous situations, so 
responses to this question for the situations measured hostile intent attribution, 
proposed to be a component of Step 2, interpretation of cues.  
Step 2 was measured by asking participants “How can you tell this?” after 
they had attributed the intent in the comic or situation. Responses to this question 
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were scored similarly to Step 1, coding answers as either emotional, verbal, non-
verbal or interpretation. Scores were generated based on how many of each type of 
cue was mentioned for the three comics and four situations (total of 7), and a total 
intent cues variable was generated by summing these (total of 28). These Step 2 
outcome variables were a measure of which cues participants took into account 
while interpreting intent.  
For the four situation cards, participants were asked what they would do in 
the situation, followed by a question asking “Why would you do what you said in the 
previous question?” as a measure of goal clarification (Step 3). Answers to this 
question were coded as either internal assertive (e.g. “so I’m not mad at her”), 
internal vengeful (e.g. “because they deserve it”), internal avoidance (e.g. “I’d be 
scared”), external social positive (e.g. “so they like me”), external social negative 
(e.g. “so they know I’m strong), external practical (e.g. “otherwise I’d have to wait”) 
and other (e.g. “just because”). The internal assertive and external social positive 
goals were then summed to create a prosocial goals variable, and the internal 
vengeful and external social negative goals were summed to create an antisocial 
goals variable.  
Step 4, response access or construction, was measured by asking 
participants “What would you do in this situation” for the four situation cards, and 
after the initial response, asking “What else could you do?” to encourage 
participants to think of other possible response options. Response options were 
coded as either assertive/prosocial (e.g. “talk to him about it”), aggressive/antisocial 
(e.g. “fight him, get angry”), submissive/passive (e.g. “do nothing and let the 
situation continue”), selected controlled emotion (e.g. “go and do something else”) 
or ask authority for help (e.g. “ask my mum for help”). For the first response given, 
assertive/prosocial responses were summed across the four situations to create a 
prosocial first response variable and aggressive/antisocial first responses were 
summed to create an antisocial first response variable. Subsequent prosocial and 
antisocial responses were summed to create prosocial and antisocial response 
variables. Step 5, response decision, was measured by asking participants to 
choose a response from one of three response options for each of the four 
situations. Possible response options were assertive, aggressive, or submissive. 
The assertive response decisions were summed to create a prosocial decisions 
variable and the aggressive response decisions were summed to create an 
antisocial decisions variable.  
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5.5.8 General intellectual functioning. General intellectual functioning was 
measured to be included within analysis as a potential covariate. General 
intellectual functioning was measured using a two-subtest version of the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence - Second Edition (WASI–II; Wechsler, 2011), 
designed for use with ages 6-90 years. The two subtests are vocabulary and matrix 
reasoning. The WASI-II was the most appropriate measure for the current study as 
it provides an estimate of general intellectual functioning but takes just 15 minutes 
to administer, compared to the 90 minutes for the WISC-IV or WAIS-IV, which would 
add too much burden to an already long test battery. The WASI-II has good 
reliability and validity (Wechsler, 2011). 
5.5.9 Mood. Current mood is a component in the centre of the SIP-MDM 
framework, hypothesised to have an effect on all steps of processing. Current mood 
was measured using the PANAS (Watson et al, 1988) which has good psychometric 
properties when used with children and adolescents (Huebner and Dew, 1995; 
Melvin and Molly, 2000) and is a brief measure that was included in the participant 
booklet. In this instrument participants are asked to rate, on a scale, how much they 
currently feel various feelings and emotions such as excited or nervous. This 
measure was presented before the SIP test, during the same testing session, due to 
the hypothesis that current mood can affect SIP. 
5.5.10 Socio-economic status. SES was measured to be included within 
analysis as a potential covariate. SES measures which ask adolescents about 
parental education and occupation have typically shown poor completion rates 
(Currie, Elton, Todd, & Platt, 1997; Wardle, Robb, & Johnson, 2002) while studies 
which have asked adolescents about material indicators of SES have found good 
completion rates (Currie et al., 1997; Wardle et al., 2002). The Family Affluence 
Scale II (FAS-II Currie et al., 1997; Currie et al., 2004) was used as a measure of 
SES status. This measure consists of four questions which ask adolescents how 
many cars their family own, whether they have their own bedroom, how many family 
holidays they have taken in the last 12 months, and how many computers are 
owned by their family. The FAS-II was administered as part of the participant 
booklet.  
5.5.11 Social desirability. The social desirability bias is the tendency for 
respondents to answer in a manner that will be favourable to others, and was 
measured as covariate in the current study. The Marlowe-Crowne scale (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960) is a frequently used measure of social desirability and was updated 
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by Stöber (2001), as the original reflected social standards of the 1950s. Stöber’s 
Social Desirability Scale (SDS- 17) has shown a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72 and a 
test-retest correlation of 0.82, and a correlation of 0.74 with the Marlowe-Crowne 
scale (Stöber, 2001). The SDS-17 was originally developed to be used for people 
aged 18 and over but Johnson and Krettanauer (2011) administered the SDS-17 to 
205 adolescents ranging in age from 11.33-19.08 years and found that the internal 
consistency was not lower for younger participants compared with the older 
adolescents. For the proposed study, the SDS-17 was used as a measure of social 
desirability. Some of the items were amended to match the age of the sample, 
resulting in 15 items, such as “I am always polite and considerate of others” and “I 
always eat a healthy diet”. The SDS-17 was administered as part of the participant 
booklet.  
5.5.12 Demographic information. In addition to the measures mentioned 
above, data were also collected on age and gender of the participants using a 
demographic questionnaire, which was part of the participant booklet.  
5.6 Data analysis  
All data were entered into IBM SPSS Statistics Version 22. Data were 
checked for normality in three ways: 1) visual inspection of histograms and P-P 
plots, 2), converting skewness and kurtosis scores to z-scores, 3) running the 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. Most of the variables showed a significant departure from 
normality, apart from positive affect scale, general intellectual functioning, emotion 
recognition score and moral reasoning score. Due to departures from normality for 
the remaining variables, bootstrapping using 5000 samples was performed for all 
subsequent analyses, with 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals 
calculated and reported in [ ].  
Pearson’s correlations (two-tailed) with bootstrapping (5000 samples) with 
95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals were performed to explore 
relationships between variables. Correlations with confidence intervals crossing 0 
were interpreted as being non-significant. Age, general intellectual functioning, SES 
and social desirability were explored as potential covariates for moral reasoning. 
Only the cognitive and affective variables which were significantly related to moral 
reasoning were used as predictor variables within the regression analysis and only 
variables which significantly correlated with SIP outcome variables were entered 
into the regression analyses.. For hierarchical multiple regressions, the enter 
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method was used, with covariates entered into the first block, and predictor 
variables entered into the second block. Independence of errors and 
multicollinearity were examined for the multiple regressions and assumptions were 
not violated. 
5.7 Results 
5.7.1 Descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics for the sample are 
displayed in Table 5.3. All 80 participants completed all measures.  
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of sample  
 M (SD) 
Age (years) 14.05 (2.25) 
Gender 31 Male, 49 Female 
WASI-II 101.52 (11.42) 
FAS-II 6.11 (1.71) 
SDS-17 9.89 (3.00) 
SRM-SF 277.46 (31.42) 
IECA 16.75 (2.67) 
Animated triangles task 23.41 (4.70) 
Digit span 16.80 (3.51) 
ERT 54.49 (8.16) 
Self-report total difficulties SDQ 12.19 (5.14) 
Parent-report total difficulties SDQ 9.37 (6.23) 
Positive affect scale 26.67 (7.34) 
Negative affect scale 13.86 (4.34) 
SIPT Emotion cues encoded 1.03 (1.20) 
SIPT Verbal cues encoded .36 (.53) 
SIPT Non-verbal cues encoded 6.34 (.76) 
SIPT Interpretation cues encoded 3.88 (1.46) 
SIPT Total cues encoded 11.60 (2.28) 
SIPT Emotion intent cues 2.51 (1.37) 
SIPT Verbal intent cues .21 (.44) 
SIPT Non-verbal intent cues 2.64 (1.55) 
SIPT Interpretation intent cues 4.07 (1.21) 
SIPT Total intent cues 9.44 (1.85) 
SIPT Prosocial goals .95 (.88) 
SIPT Antisocial goals .35 (.70) 
SIPT Prosocial first response 1.18 (.81) 
SIPT Antisocial first response .23 (.50) 
SIPT Total prosocial responses 3.19 (1.22) 
SIPT Total antisocial responses 4.15 (1.61) 
SIPT Prosocial decisions 3.14 (.82) 
SIPT Antisocial decisions .04 (.19) 
 
Note. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD). 
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5.7.2 Relationships between moral reasoning, cognitive and affective 
processes and age. Age was significantly related to moral reasoning, 
(r= .51, p <.000, [.34, .65]) and working memory (r=.33, p=.003, [.14, .50]. These 
relationships were positive, indicating that older participants scored higher on these 
measures, and as predicted, these constructs would mature with development. 
There were no significant relationships between empathy (r=.09, p=.425, [-.14, .28]), 
perspective taking (r=.02, p=.880, [-.18, .22]) or emotion recognition (r=.17, p=.142, 
[-.07, .40]) and age. Hypothesis 1, that moral reasoning and the cognitive and 
affective processes would correlate positively with age was only partly supported.  
5.7.3 Relationships between moral reasoning and cognitive and 
affective processes. There was a significant positive relationship 
between moral reasoning and working memory (r=.29, p=.010, [.06, .48]). There 
were no significant relationships between moral reasoning and empathy (r=.11, 
p=.341, [-.09, .28]), perspective taking (r=.02, p=.853, [-.22, .26]) or emotion 
recognition (r=.17, p=0.136, [-.07, .38]). Hypothesis 2, that there will be significant 
positive relationships between moral reasoning and the cognitive and affective 
processes was only party supported, as only a significant relationship was found for 
moral reasoning and working memory. The predictive relationship of working 
memory for moral reasoning level was explored for Hypothesis 3.  
In exploring potential covariates for the regression analysis, moral reasoning 
was significantly related to general intellectual functioning (r=.43, p<.000, [.21, .61]). 
There were no significant relationships between moral reasoning and SES (r=-.01, 
p=.912, [-.21, .18]) or social desirability (r= -.23, p=.044, [-.43, .00]). Due to the 
significant relationships between age and general intellectual functioning with moral 
reasoning, these were entered as covariates in the regression analysis for moral 
reasoning. A regression analysis was firstly run without controlling for covariates 
and found that working memory significantly predicted moral reasoning (p=.010), 
explaining 8% of the variance in moral reasoning. After controlling for age and 
general intellectual functioning, working memory did not significantly predict moral 
reasoning, while 45% of the variance in moral reasoning was explained .Results of 
the regression analyses are found in Table 5.4. Hypothesis 3, that the cognitive and 
affective processes would predict moral reasoning level was not supported.  
 111 
 
Table 5.4 Results of moral reasoning regression analysis. 
 
 
Note * Significant at .05, **Significant at .01, ***Significant at .001. Confidence 
intervals (CIs) and standard errors (SE) based on 5000 bias corrected (BCa) 
bootstrap samples. 
 
5.7.4 Relationships between moral reasoning and behaviour.  All 
participants (n=80) completed a self-report SDQ, 62 participants had a completed 
parent-report SDQ and 23 had a completed teacher-report SDQ. For this analysis, 
only self and parent-report SDQs were used as measures of behaviour due to the 
low number of teacher-report SDQs. There was a significant relationship between 
self and parent report SDQs (r=.45, p=.00, [.23, .62]). There was no significant 
relationship between moral reasoning and self-report behaviour (r=.10, p= .451 [-
.20, .37]) or between moral reasoning and parent-report behaviour (r= -.22, p=.086, 
[-.47, .05]), so Hypothesis 4 was not supported. 
 
 
 
Block Predictors B [95% BCa CIs] SE β R² Adjusted 
R² 
R² 
Change 
1 Constant 234.61 
[199.03]*** 
17.68 - .08 .07 .08** 
Working 
memory 
2.56 [.31, 4.35]** .99 .29 
1 Constant 53.29 [-8.10, 
115.30] 
32.00 - .45 .44 .45*** 
Age 7.22 [4.97, 
9.43]*** 
1.13 .52 
General 
intellectual 
functioning 
1.21 [.681, 
1.738]*** 
.27 .44 
2 Constant 53.212 [-8.12, 
115.45] 
32.13 - .45 .43 .00 
Age 7.19 [4.69, 
9.74]*** 
1.28 .52 
General 
intellectual 
functioning 
1.21 [0.64, 
1.74]*** 
.28 .44 
Working 
memory 
.06 [-1.65, 1.82] .88 .01 
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5.7.5 Relationships between SIP skills and age. Age was significantly 
related to number of interpretation cues encoded (r=.24, p=.029 [.04, .43]), total 
number of cues encoded (r=.26, p=.018 [.07, .45]), emotion intent cues (r=.33, 
p=.003 [.13, .51]) and total intent cues (r=.36, p=.001 [.18, .53]). These relationships 
were positive, indicating that older participants scored higher on these measures. 
Age was also significantly related to the number prosocial first responses (r= -.32, 
p=.004, [-.51, -.10]) and prosocial decisions (r= -.45, p <.000, [-.60, -.26]). These 
relationships were negative, indicating that older participants generated fewer 
prosocial responses as their first response, and selected fewer prosocial decisions. 
Hypothesis 5, that SIP steps will correlate positively with age was only supported for 
some Step 1 variables, namely number of interpretation cues and total number of 
cues encoded and some Step 2 variables, namely emotion intent and total intent 
cues.  
5.7.6 Relationships between components in the centre of the SIP-MDM 
framework and SIP steps. Table 5.5 displays the correlations between 
SIP outcome variables and perspective taking, working memory, moral reasoning, 
SES and current mood (positive and negative affect). Hypothesis 6, that there would 
be significant relationships between SIP steps and perspective taking, working 
memory, moral reasoning, SES and current mood was only partially supported. 
Working memory significantly correlated with total number of cues encoded, and 
number of emotion intent and total intent cues. Moral reasoning significantly 
correlated with number of emotion cues, non-verbal cues, interpretation cues and 
total cues encoded. Moral reasoning also significantly correlated with number of 
emotion intent, interpretation intent and total intent cues. There were no significant 
relationships between perspective taking, SES, positive or negative affect and any 
of the SIP variables.  
 113 
 
Table 5.5. Correlations between components in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework and SIP steps. 
Step of SIP-
MDM 
framework 
SIP outcome variable Perspective 
taking 
Working 
memory 
Moral 
reasoning 
SES Positive affect Negative affect 
1  Emotion cues -.10 
[-.30, .13] 
.24 
[-.02, .46] 
.32 
[.12, .51]** 
.05 
[-.19, .30] 
-.20 
[-.38, -.00] 
.02 
[-.23, .26] 
Verbal cues -.02 
[-.24, .20] 
-.14 
[-.36, .10] 
-.18 
[-.39, .05] 
-.21 
[-.42, .01] 
.06 
[-0.18, 0.32] 
-.04 
[-.23, .18] 
Non-verbal cues -.03 
[-.25, .17] 
.18 
[-.05, .37] 
.24 
[.01, .47]* 
.13 
[-.12, .35] 
.06 
[-.18, .29] 
.23 
[-.48, .03] 
Interpretation cues .02 
[-.19, .23] 
.15 
[-.10, .37] 
.34 
[.11, .55]** 
-.06 
[-.26, .16] 
.13 
[-.09, .33] 
.09 
[-.13, .27] 
Total cues encoded -.05 
[-.27, .18] 
.25 
[.02, .46]* 
.43 
[.24, .58]** 
-.01 
[-.23, .20] 
.01 
[-.17, .21] 
-.02 
[-.23, .17] 
2 Emotion intent 005 
[-.18, .28] 
.29 
[.03, .51]** 
.33 
[.13, .51]** 
.05 
[-.16, .25] 
.03 
[-.17, .25] 
-.08 
[-.27, .09] 
Verbal intent .08 
[-.11, .28] 
-.01 
[-.18, .16] 
.01 
[-.18. .18] 
.02 
[-.21, .26] 
.08 
[-.17, .31] 
-.06 
[-.22, .12] 
Non-verbal intent .11 
[-.12, .31] 
-.02 
[-.2, .23] 
-.06 
[-.29, .18] 
-.10 
[-.27, .07] 
-.10 
[-.31, .14] 
.13 
[-.08, .32] 
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Note. * Significant at .05, **Significant at .01, ***Significant at .001. [ ]= 95% BCa CIs.  
Interpretation intent -.14 
[-.38, .10] 
.10 
[-.12, .30] 
.25 
[.03, .45]* 
-.16  
[-.35, .04] 
.07 
[-.16, .27] 
-.07 
[-.30, .20] 
Total intent cues .05 
[-.19, .26] 
.26 
[.05, 0.47]* 
.36 
[.18, .52]** 
-.15 
[-.38, .09] 
.01 
[-.20, .22] 
-.01 
[-.19, .16] 
Hostile intent attribution .07 
[-.14, .27] 
-.16 
[-.38, .06] 
.01 
[-.21, .21] 
-.06 
[-.24, .13] 
.01 
[-.22, .25] 
.05 
[-.15, .22] 
3 Prosocial goals -.12 
[-.32, .09] 
.24 
[-.00, .46] 
.13 
[-.06, .31] 
-.15 
[-.35, .09] 
-.05 
[-.27, .16] 
.03 
[-.15, .21] 
Antisocial goals .03 
[-.19, .29] 
-.14 
[-.39, .07] 
-.04 
[-.22, .11] 
-.04 
[-.21, .14] 
-.17 
[-.34, .03] 
-.05 
[-.20, .14] 
4 Prosocial first response .11 
[-.12, .34] 
.04 
[-.20, .27] 
-.01 
[-.22, .20] 
.05 
[-.18, .29] 
.13 
[-.06, .30] 
.06 
[-.19, .27] 
Antisocial first response .02 
[-.21, .23] 
-.08 
[-.31, .19] 
-.14 
[-.32, .04] 
-.03 
[-.21, .14] 
-.13 
[-.31, .05] 
.03 
[-.14, .21] 
Number of prosocial 
responses generated 
.08 
[-.16, .30] 
.06 
[-.15, .26] 
.06 
[-.16, .27] 
-.06 
[-.30, .21] 
.00 
[-.19, .19] 
.12 
[-.07, .30] 
Number of antisocial 
responses generated 
.06 
[-.17, .28] 
.04 
[-.20, .28] 
.14 
[-.05, .32] 
.11 
[-.07, .28] 
-.04 
[-.23, .16] 
-.11 
[-.35, .11] 
5  Prosocial decisions .05 
[-.16, .26] 
-.14 
[.36, .08] 
-.21 
[-.42, .00] 
.02 
[-.20, .23] 
.14 
[-.08, .33] 
-.05 
[-.25, .16] 
Antisocial decisions .03 
[-.19, .26] 
-.16 
[-.36, .05] 
.00 
[-.08, .09] 
-.05 
[-.16, .02] 
-.05 
[-.27, .13] 
-.07 
[-.17, .02] 
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5.7.7 SIP Step 1 and emotion recognition Table 5.6 displays correlations 
between emotion recognition and SIP encoding variables (Step 1). There were no 
significant relationships between emotion recognition and any of the encoding 
variables, so Hypothesis 7 was not supported. 
 
Table 5.6. Correlations between emotion recognition, empathy, and Steps 1, 3 and 
5 of the SIP-MDM framework. 
 
5.7.8 SIP Step 3 and empathy. Table 5.6 shows correlations between 
empathy and Step 3 variables. There were no significant relationships between 
empathy and prosocial goals or antisocial goals so Hypothesis 8 was not supported.  
5.7.9 SIP Step 5 and empathy. Correlations between empathy and Step 5 
variables are displayed in Table 5.6. There were no significant relationships 
between empathy and prosocial decisions or antisocial decisions so Hypothesis 9 
was not supported.  
Step of SIP-MDM  
framework 
SIP outcome 
variable 
Emotion 
recognition 
Empathy 
1  Emotion cues .08 [-.17, .31] .07 [-.13, .27] 
Verbal cues .06 [-.14, .26] .00 [-.20, .18] 
Non-verbal cues .12 [-.11, .34] -.05 [-.30, .11] 
Interpretation cues -.11 [-.30, .09] -.10 [-0.31, 0.12] 
Total cues 
encoded 
.03 [-.20, .27] -.04 [-.27, .19] 
3 Prosocial goals - -.01 [-.20, .17] 
Antisocial goals - -.10 [-.34, .12] 
5  Prosocial 
decisions 
- -.11 [-.29, .09] 
Antisocial 
decisions 
- -.18 [-.50, .14] 
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5.7.10 Predictive relationships of the SIP-MDM. Where significant 
relationships were found between SIP outcome variables and other variables, 
regression analyses were performed. Regression analyses were performed for 
Steps 1 and 2 of the SIP-MDM framework. Pearson’s correlations were firstly 
performed to assess whether general intellectual functioning and social desirability 
should be entered as covariates for these regressions, with results shown in Table 
5.7. Relationships with age were explored for Hypothesis 5 and relationships with 
SES were explored for Hypothesis 6. No variables correlated with SES but age was 
entered as a covariate for interpretation and total cues (Step 1) and emotion intent 
and total intent cues (Step 2). General intellectual functioning was entered as a 
covariate for non-verbal cues and social desirability was entered as a covariate for 
total cues encoded, emotion intent and total intent cues. Covariates were entered 
into the first block of the regression analyses, using the enter method, with predictor 
variables entered in the following block.  
 
Table 5.7. Correlations for covariates of SIP outcome variables 
 
 
Note. * Significant at .05, **Significant at .01, ***Significant at .001 
 
Table 5.8 displays the results for the regression analyses performed for 
Steps 1 and 2. Moral reasoning and working memory were the only variables found 
to correlate with SIP steps so were entered as predictor variables in regression 
Step of SIP-MDM  
framework 
SIP outcome variable General 
intellectual 
functioning 
Social 
desirability 
Step 1 Encoding Emotion cues .17 
[-.03, .37] 
-.19 
[-.37, -.01] 
Non-verbal cues 25 
[.02, .45]*. 
 
-.14 
[-.33, .06] 
Interpretation cues .10 
[-.16, .35] 
-.13 
[-.31, .06] 
Total cues encoded .23 
[-.02, .47] 
-.23 
[-.40, -.06]* 
Step 2 
Interpretation 
Emotion intent .13 
[-.08, .31] 
-.26 
[-.45, -.06]* 
Interpretation intent .10  
[-.13, .32] 
-.10 
[-.33, .15] 
Total intent cues .01 
[-.23, .21] 
-.27 
[-.46, -.07]** 
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analyses. Analysis was firstly performed without controlling for covariates, followed 
by an analysis controlling for covariates where relevant.  
For Step 1, moral reasoning significantly predicted number of emotion cues 
but did not significantly predict number of non-verbal cues encoded. Moral 
reasoning significantly predicted 12% of the variance in number of interpretation 
cues encoded before controlling for age. After controlling for age, moral reasoning 
still significantly contributed to the model accounting for 12% variance. Moral 
reasoning significantly predicted the number of total cues encoded before 
controlling for age and social desirability, and remained a significant contributor to 
the model after these were controlled for, accounting for 21% of variance. Working 
memory did not predict number of total cues encoded, suggesting that the number 
of cues that can be encoded in a situation does not rely on working memory 
capacity. For Step 2, moral reasoning significantly predicted emotion intent cues 
before controlling for age and social desirability but did not remain a significant 
predictor after analysis controlled for age and social desirability. Working memory 
did not predict emotion intent. For interpretation intent cues, moral reasoning 
predicted 6% of variance. Moral reasoning significantly predicted total intent cues 
before controlling for age and social desirability but did not remain significant after 
analysis controlled for age and social desirability. Working memory did not predict 
total intent cues. Hypothesis 10, that SIP steps will be predicted by relevant 
variables at each step, including variables in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework 
was only partially supported. Moral reasoning significantly predicted number of 
emotion cues and total cues encoded at Step 1. At Step 2, moral reasoning 
significantly predicted interpretation intent cues. Moral reasoning also significantly 
predicted emotion intent and total intent cues at Step 2 but not after controlling for 
age and social desirability. 
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Table 5.8. Regression analyses for Steps 1 and 2 of the SIP-MDM framework. 
Step of 
SIP-MDM 
framework 
Dependent variable Block Predictors B [95% BCa CIs] SE B β R² Adjusted 
R² 
R² Change 
1 Emotion cues 
 
1 
 
Constant -2.41 [-4.42, -.30]** 1.02 - .11 .09 .11** 
Moral reasoning .01 [.01, .02]* .00 .32 
Non-verbal cues 
 
1 Constant  4.70 [2.84, 6.30] .89 - .06 .05 .06* 
Moral reasoning .01 [.00, .01] .00 .24 
1 Constant 4.67 [3.15, 6.21]*** .80 - .06 .05 .06* 
General intellectual 
functioning 
.02 [.00, .03]* .01 .25 
2 Constant 4.0 [1.88, 5.92]** 1.06 - 0.084 .06 .02 
General intellectual 
functioning 
.01 [-.00, .03] .01 .17 
Moral reasoning .00 [-.00, .01] .00 .17 
Interpretation cues 1 Constant -.51 [-3.08, 2.22] 1.39 - .12 .10 .12** 
Moral reasoning .02 [.01, .03]** .01 .34 
1 Constant 1.64 [-.34, 3.55] .97 - .06 .05 .06* 
Age .16 [.03, .29]* .07 .24 
2 Constant -.76 [-3.28, 1.96] 1.37 - .12 .10 .06* 
Age .06 [-.10, .23] .09 .10 
Moral reasoning .01 [.00, .026]* .01 .29 
Total cues encoded 1 Constant 2.29 [-1.55, 5.77] 1.84 - .20 .18 .20*** 
Working memory .09 [-.07, .22] .01 .39 
Moral reasoning .03 [.01, .05]***   
1 Constant 9.78 [6.34, 13.38] 1.81 - .10 .07 .10* 
Age .22 [.017, .42] .10 .22 
Social desirability -.13 [-.26, -.00] .07 -.17 
2 Constant 3.78 [-1.30, 8.20] 2.49 - .21 .17 .12* 
Age .01 [-.21, .24] .11 .01 
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Social desirability -.09 [-.23, .06] .07 -.12 
Working memory .08 [-.09, .21] .08 .36 
Moral reasoning .26 [.01, .05]** .01 .12 
2 Emotion intent cues 1 Constant -2.12 [-5.10, .59] 1.14 - .15 .13 .15** 
Working memory .08 [-.02, .18] .05 .21 
Moral reasoning .01 [.00, .02]*   
1 Constant 1.01 [-1.32, 3.61] 1.21 - .14 .12 .14* 
Age .17 [.04, .30]* .07 .28 
Social desirability -.09 [-.19, .00] .05 -.19 
2 Constant -1.24 [-4.77, 2.23] 1.7  .19 .15 .05 
Age -09 [-.03, .21] .08 .15 
Social desirability -.07 [-.17, .021] .05 -.15 
Working memory .06 [-.04, .16] .05 .16 
Moral reasoning  .01 [-.00, .02] .01 .18 
Interpretation intent 
cues 
1 Constant 1.42 [-1.05, 3.68] 1.28 - .06 .05 .06* 
Moral reasoning .01 [.00, .020]* .01 .25 
Total intent cues 1 Constant 2.80 [-.63, 5.90] 1.7 - .16 .14 .16*** 
Working memory .09 [-.03, .20] .00 .17 
Moral reasoning .02 [.01, .03]** .01 .31 
1 Constant 7.00 [4.21, 9.74]*** 1.322 - .17 .14 .17** 
Age .26 [.11, .40]** 0.077 .31 
Social desirability -.12 [-.24, .01] 0.060 -.19 
2 Constant 4.00 [.37, 7.15]* 1.779 - .21 .17 .04 
Age .15 [-.05, .35] 0.101 .18 
Social desirability -.10 [-.22, .03] 0.061 -.16 
Working memory .10 [-.06, .17] 0.055 .11 
Moral reasoning .01 [-.00, .03] 0.007 .20 
Table 6.6 Continued. Regression analysis for Steps 1 and 1 of the SIP-MDM framework. 
Note. * Significant at .05, **Significant at .01, ***Significant at .001. Confidence intervals (CIs) and standard errors (SE) based on 5000 bias 
corrected (BCa) bootstrap samples. [ ] = 95% BCa CIs. 
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5.7.11 Exploratory analyses. Exploratory analyses were conducted to 
assess the effect of gender on key variables and on relationships between 
variables. Independent t-tests revealed that there were no significant differences 
between males (n=31) and females (n=49) on moral reasoning, cognitive and 
affective processes, self and parent-reported behaviour or SIP variables. Exploring 
whether gender had an effect on relationships between key variables, correlations 
revealed that there was a significant relationship between age and moral reasoning 
for both males (r=.44, p=.014, [.12, .67]) and females (r=.53, p=<.000, [.30, .71]). 
There was a significant relationship between age and working memory for females 
(r=.40, p=.005, [.18, .58]) but not males (r=.27, p=.146, [-.08, .56]). For females 
there was also a significant relationship between age and emotion recognition 
(r=.41, p=.004, [.14, .63]) but this relationship was not significant for males (r=-.27, 
p=.137, [-.56, .08]). There were no significant relationships between age and 
empathy or perspective taking for either males or females. In terms of the 
relationships between moral reasoning and cognitive and affective processes, 
working memory was significantly related to moral reasoning for females (r=.33, 
p=.041, [.03, .60]) but not for males (r= -.20, p= .366, [-.56, .21]). There were no 
significant relationships between moral reasoning and empathy, perspective taking 
or emotion recognition for males or females.  
The age range of the sample was 11-18 years but the mean of 14.05 (2.25) 
years suggests that the sample were more slightly in the younger range. In order to 
explore whether younger and older adolescents showed significant differences on 
key variables, the sample was split into two age groups of 11-14 year olds and 15-
18 year olds. Independent t-tests revealed that there were significant differences 
between age groups for moral reasoning (t (60) = -4.28, p <.000, [-45.07, -19.66]). 
The mean moral reasoning score for the 11-14 year olds was 265.48 (29.56) and 
293.68 (26.48) for the 15-18 year olds. There were also significant differences 
between the age groups for working memory (t (60) = -2.86, p= .006, [-4.18, -.82]). 
The mean working memory score for 11-14 year olds was 15.91 (3.31) and 18 
(3.47) for the 15-18 year olds. There were no significant differences between the 
age groups for emotion recognition, empathy, perspective taking and self or parent-
reported behaviour.  
5.8 Summary  
Partial support was found for Hypothesis 1, as moral reasoning and working 
memory were found to correlate positively with age. This was supported by 
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exploratory analysis which found that the 15-18 year olds had significantly higher 
moral reasoning and working memory scores than the 11-14 year olds.  There were 
no significant correlations between age and empathy, perspective taking, and 
emotion recognition. This suggests that these processes may not show measurable 
improvements between the ages of 11-18 years, as assessed by the measures 
used in this study, which may partly be due to issues with the measures chosen. 
The lack of correlation between age and perspective taking and emotion recognition 
is in contrast to research which has found that both continue to develop in 
adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2007; Van der Graaff et al., 
2014), although exploratory analysis revealed that there was a significant correlation 
between age and emotion recognition for females. The evidence for the 
development of affective empathy during adolescence has been less convincing. 
While the lack of correlation between age and empathy does not support the 
proposal within the SIP-MDM framework, it is consistent with previous research 
which has not found development of affective empathy during adolescence 
(Garaigordobil, 2009; Van der Graaff et al., 2014).  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that the cognitive and affective processes 
would significantly relate to and predict moral reasoning. Working memory was 
found to correlate positively with moral reasoning, but after controlling for age and 
general intellectual functioning, working memory did not significantly predict moral 
reasoning. There were no significant relationships between moral reasoning and the 
other cognitive and affective variables (perspective taking, emotion recognition and 
empathy). The cognitive and affective processes measured in this study are 
proposed to be important for moral development, and are components of the SIP-
MDM framework, but the findings of this study suggest that they do not relate to 
moral maturity levels, as measured by the SRM-SF in TD adolescents. The lack of 
correlation between moral reasoning and perspective taking is particularly surprising 
as perspective taking is the component most frequently cited as being important for 
moral development.  
No support was found for Hypothesis 4 as there was no relationship 
between moral reasoning and either self-report or parent reported behavioural 
difficulties. Previous research has found relationships between low moral reasoning 
on the SRM-SF and offending behaviour, and between scores on the So-Mature 
and aggressive behaviour amongst TD adolescents. However, findings from the 
current study suggest that moral reasoning as measured by the SRM-SF does not 
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relate to self-report or parent reported behavioural difficulties in TD adolescents. 
Based on the SIP-MDM framework it is proposed that moral reasoning can affect all 
steps of processing and influence moral decision-making, but other factors, such as 
situational factors are also relevant to moral behaviour. Individuals displaying 
aggressive or offending behaviour have been found to show biases, such as hostile 
intent attribution (Dodge et al., 2002; Schönenberg & Jusyte, 2014). Such biases 
can influence SIP across different situations, and may result in the relationship 
between moral reasoning and behaviour being consistent, i.e. hostile intent 
attributions are made in most situations and result in biased processing and a 
higher likelihood of aggressive or antisocial behaviour. For TD adolescents who do 
not display such biases which affect SIP in all situations, the role that moral 
reasoning plays in moral decisions and behaviour may vary depending on 
situational and contextual factors, making the relationship between moral reasoning 
and behaviour less consistent.  
Partial support was found for Hypothesis 5, as age positively correlated with 
number of interpretation cues encoded, total number of cues encoded, number of 
emotion intent cues and total number of intent cues. This suggests that older 
adolescents encode more interpretation cues (cues relevant to the situation but not 
actually seen) and more total cues when assessing what is happening in a situation. 
It also suggests that older adolescents use more emotion cues and total cues when 
assessing intent. While it was hypothesised that older participants would generate 
more prosocial responses and make more prosocial decisions, the opposite was 
found, with results indicating that older participants generated fewer prosocial first 
responses and selected fewer prosocial decisions. Increases in prosocial responses 
and decisions were expected based on the SIP-MDM, due to moral development 
being related to less egocentric processing, and an increased ability to take the 
perspectives of others into account. Additionally, previous research has found that 
endorsing aggressive responses decreases with age in children (Feldman & Dodge, 
1987). The current study found that moral reasoning correlated positively with age 
for this sample of adolescents and the sample were reasoning on average at Stage 
3. However, no significant correlation between moral reasoning and response 
generation or response decision was found, suggesting that mature levels of moral 
reasoning did not translate to more prosocial decision-making. It may be that 
younger participants in this sample who were reasoning at the immature stages, 
generated more prosocial responses and made more prosocial decisions based on 
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rules or appeals to authority, which represents curvilinear moral development (Bear 
& Rys, 1994; Langdon, Clare, & Murphy, 2011). 
Hypothesis 6 proposed that there would be significant relationships between 
components in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework and SIP outcome variables. 
There was partial support for this hypothesis, with some significant correlations 
between components in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework and variables at 
Step 1 and 2. Working memory correlated with total number of cues encoded, 
emotion intent and total intent cues. These results suggest that higher working 
memory abilities are associated with encoding more cues in a situation, and using 
more emotion and total cues in assessing intent. Moral reasoning correlated with 
number of emotion cues, non-verbal cues, interpretation cues and total cues 
encoded. Moral reasoning also correlated with emotion intent, interpretation intent 
and total intent cues. This suggests that moral reasoning maturity is associated with 
encoding more emotion, non-verbal, interpretation and total cues in a situation, and 
using more emotion, interpretation and total cues to assess intent. There were no 
significant relationships between perspective taking, SES, positive or negative affect 
and any of the SIP steps.  
No support was found for Hypothesis 7, as emotion recognition was not 
significantly correlated with any of the encoding variables. This suggests that 
increases in emotion recognition abilities did not relate to more cues being encoded 
in a situation. This finding is in contrast to van Nieuwenhuijzen and Vriens (2012) 
who found that emotion recognition significantly predicted number of emotion and 
interpretation cues encoded for children and adolescents with intellectual 
disabilities. The lack of correlation for emotion recognition and Step 1 found for the 
current study may have been due to the situations on the SIPT involving drawings 
rather than photographs or videos of situations which would provide more detail 
from facial expressions. The study by van Nieuwenhuijzen and Vriens (2012) used 
video vignettes in addition to the drawings and cartoons. It was hypothesised that 
empathy would significantly correlate with goal generation (Hypothesis 8) and 
response decisions (Hypothesis 9) but no significant correlations were found. This 
suggests that increase in empathy did not correlate with more prosocial goals being 
generated or more prosocial responses being made. Again, it may be the case that 
this was affected by the situations being presented as drawings, which may have 
limited the extent to which empathy was activated when thinking about goals and 
making response decisions.  
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Hypothesis 10, that SIP steps will be predicted by relevant variables at each 
step, including variables in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework was partially 
supported. Only moral reasoning and working memory were found to correlate with 
some of the SIP variables, and only for Steps 1 and 2. Moral reasoning significantly 
predicted the number of emotion cues encoded. After controlling for age, moral 
reasoning also predicted the number of interpretation cues and total cues encoded. 
Moral reasoning predicted interpretation intent cues but did not predict emotion 
intent or total intent cues after controlling for age and social desirability. Working 
memory was not found to significantly predict any of the variables at Steps 1 and 2. 
 Moral reasoning is a component in the centre or the SIP-MDM framework 
proposed to affect all steps of processing, but these results suggest that moral 
reasoning only predicted some encoding and interpretation variables at Steps 1 and 
2. Working memory is also a component in the centre of the SIP-MDM framework 
but additionally added at Steps 1 and 5, as it is proposed to be particularly important 
at those steps. The findings of the current study suggested that increases in working 
memory abilities are related to but do not predict the amount of information encoded 
at Step 1, and are not related to decision making at Step 5. While increases in 
working memory abilities can facilitate moral decision-making by allowing more 
features of a situation to be encoded and then kept in mind while making decisions, 
it does not necessarily follow that this will always lead to more prosocial decisions 
and moral behaviour. It is not just the amount of information encoded and used for 
processing that is important, it also depends on the content of this information; if 
encoding and processing is biased towards negative information, this will increase 
the likelihood of antisocial responses being made. Additionally, factors such as 
current mood and situational factors can affect other steps of processing which then 
determine how the encoded information is processed and decisions that are made. 
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Chapter 6: Study 2: Moral reasoning and behaviour in adolescents with 
acquired brain injuries. 
6.1 Rationale 
In Study 1 hypotheses generated by the SIP-MDM framework were 
investigated in a sample of TD adolescents. Children and adolescents with ABIs 
have been found to have difficulties or developmental delays in some of the 
components of the SIP-MDM, such as moral reasoning (Beauchamp et al., 2013), 
perspective taking (Dennis et al., 2013) and peer relationships  (Tonks et al., 2010; 
Yeates et al., 2013). Based on the SIP-MDM framework, it is proposed that 
adolescents with ABIs may show atypical moral decision-making and delayed moral 
development due to either damage to the brain networks involved in real-time moral 
decision-making, or due to the negative impact upon maturation of component 
processes of the SIP-MDM framework. Additionally, damage to the brain can either 
impact upon the development of component processes directly, if brain networks 
related to these components are compromised, or indirectly if social participation 
and interaction with peers is limited following a brain injury, which in turn can impact 
upon the development of perspective taking. Testing hypotheses related to the SIP-
MDM in adolescents with ABIs can add to our knowledge about the relationships 
between components, and how difficulties in certain components may impact upon 
the moral decision-making process and moral development. 
Before hypotheses generated by the SIP-MDM framework can be explored 
in adolescents with ABIs, firstly, appropriate measures to use with this population 
need to be validated. The study presented in this chapter focused on exploring the 
psychometric properties of two measures of moral reasoning when used with 
adolescents with ABIs, as a first step. The SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992) and So-
Mature (Dooley et al., 2010), both production measures of moral reasoning have 
been used to measure moral reasoning in adolescents and young adults with ABIs, 
and several studies reported ABI participants to be reasoning at a significantly lower 
level than NH comparison groups. For example, Wigg (2013) found that adults 
(aged 17-25 years) with TBI were reasoning at transition Stage 3 (2) on the SRM-
SF while the comparison group were reasoning at Stage 3. Beauchamp and 
colleagues (2013) found that adolescents (mean age 13.34 years) with mild TBIs 
were reasoning at the same stage as the TD comparison group (Stage 3) on the So-
Mature, though scored significantly lower, while those with moderate-severe TBIs 
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were reasoning at Stage 2. Chiasson and colleagues (2017a) found that children 
and adolescents (aged 8-16 years) were reasoning at Stage 2 on the So-Mature 
while the TD comparison group were reasoning at Stage 3.  
The main aim of this study was to investigate the psychometric properties, 
specifically internal consistency, convergent validity and test-retest reliability of the 
SRM-SF and So-Mature in adolescents with and without an ABI. The SRM-SF and 
the So-Mature are both production measures of moral reasoning, based on similar 
theories, but the convergent validity has not yet been explored, either in TD or ABI 
populations. The scoring manual of the So-Mature is based on Kohlberg’s theory 
(Kohlberg, 1984b) and the scoring manual of the SRM-SF is based on Gibbs’ theory 
(Gibbs, 2013; Gibbs et al., 1992), which updated Kohlberg’s theory, so it could be 
expected that these measures will show convergent validity. However, the 
measures use different methods to elicit justifications to be scored developmentally. 
The SRM-SF scores justifications elicited in response to questions about moral 
values (e.g. How important is it for people to keep promises to friends?) while the 
So-Mature scores justifications following response decisions made by participants in 
hypothetical dilemmas (e.g. choosing ‘yes’; or ‘no’ to cheating at a game of 
Monopoly with friends). Investigating the convergent validity of the SRM-SF and So-
Mature can help to explore whether adolescents’ reasoning about moral values 
correlates with their reasoning about response decisions they have made in moral 
dilemmas.  
The SRM-SF is a widely used moral reasoning instrument in developmental 
psychology and has been shown to have excellent levels of test-retest reliability (r 
=0.88) and internal consistency (k =0.92) when used with TD populations (Gibbs et 
al., 1992). The psychometric properties of the SRM-SF have not yet been looked at 
when used with ABI populations; Couper and colleagues (2002) did not report inter-
rater reliability, which is a requisite of the SRM-SF, to ensure reliable scoring, and 
they, similarly to Wigg (2013), did not report the test-retest reliability or internal 
consistency. The So-Moral/So-Mature was developed specifically to be used for 
young people with brain injuries, with the authors claiming that the lack of 
appropriate measures significantly limits our understanding of moral reasoning 
impairments associated with TBI (Dooley et al., 2010). While the So-Mature has 
been used with both brain injury and TD samples, the internal consistency and test-
retest reliability have not yet been reported.  
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A second aim of the current study was to use the SRM-SF and So-Mature to 
compare levels of moral reasoning across both adolescents with ABIs and a NH 
comparison group. So far, research into moral reasoning in adolescents with ABIs 
has only focused on frontal or temporal lesions (Chiasson et al., 2017a; Couper et 
al., 2002), and TBIs (Beauchamp et al., 2013; Dooley et al., 2010; Wigg, 2013), 
which typically causes damage to frontal and/or temporal lobes (Bigler, 2007). This 
may be due to the vmPFC being implicated in moral decision-making (Blair et al., 
2006; Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Marazziti et al., 2013; Raine & Yang, 2006). 
However, the meta-analysis presented in Chapter 4 revealed that there is not a 
uniquely moral brain network, and non-temporal and non-frontal regions, namely the 
precuneus and the left cingulate gyrus, are recruited during moral decision-making. 
Furthermore, the SIP-MDM framework proposed that many varied component 
processes are involved in moral-decision making and development, so damage to 
any area of the brain may have an impact upon real-time moral decision-making 
and moral maturity. The study presented here therefore includes both TBIs and 
nTBIs among the ABI sample.  
A final aim of this study was to explore the relationship between moral 
reasoning, (as measured by the SRM-SF and So-Mature), and behavioural 
difficulties (both parent and self-report SDQ), and to compare behaviour of the ABI 
group to the NH group. Scores on the So-Mature have been found to negatively 
correlate with aggressive behaviours and oppositional defiant symptoms in TD 
adolescents (Dooley et al., 2010) and a strong relationships has been found 
between low moral reasoning and adolescent offending (Nelson et al., 1990; Stams 
et al., 2006). Based on the SIP-MDM framework, relationships between moral 
reasoning and behaviour would be expected. Study 1, presented in Chapter 5, 
found no significant relationships between moral reasoning and self or parent-
reported behavioural difficulties for TD adolescents but these relationships remain to 
be explored in adolescents with ABIs.  
It has been found that social behaviour is impaired after a TBI (Milders, 
Ietswaart, Crawford, & Currie, 2008) and aggression is a relatively common, long-
term problem following a TBI (Baguley, Cooper, & Felmingham, 2006). Behavioural 
problems have also been reported for children with brain tumours, a type of nTBI 
(Upton & Eiser, 2006; Wilne, Ferris, Nathwani, & Kennedy, 2006). It would be 
expected that adolescents with all types of ABIs will show more behavioural 
difficulties than their NH peers. Additionally, there is evidence of a relationship 
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between brain injuries and offending and low moral reasoning and offending, 
suggesting that moral reasoning could be both a mediator and a moderator within 
the relationship between brain injury and offending behaviour. The current study 
aimed to undertake an exploratory analysis of offending behaviour and moral 
reasoning in adolescents with ABIs as a first step towards investigating the 
relationships between brain injuries, moral reasoning and offending behaviour. 
6.2 Hypotheses 
Considering the psychometric properties of the moral reasoning measures, it 
was hypothesised that: 
1. The Sociomoral Reasoning Measure Short Form (SRM-SF) will show 
excellent internal consistency (0.80 or above) and excellent test-retest 
reliability (0.80 or above) The internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability of the So-Mature have not been reported so no hypotheses will 
be made regarding the psychometric properties of this measure. 
2. The SRM-SF and the So-Mature will correlate highly with each other (0.70 
or above).  
In terms of moral reasoning ability, it was hypothesised that: 
3. There will be a significant difference in moral reasoning scores between 
the ABI and NH group on the SRM-SF and So-Mature, with the ABI group 
reasoning one stage lower than the NH group. 
So far, moral reasoning has not been explored for adolescents with nTBIs. 
This study included participants with nTBIs in the ABI sample and exploratory 
analyses will be performed to compare moral reasoning for the TBI and nTBI 
subgroups, and explore whether moral reasoning levels relate to injury severity, 
age at injury and time since injury. This analysis will be exploratory rather than 
hypothesis driven due to the small sample size.  
In terms of behaviour, it was hypothesised that: 
4. The ABI group will display more behavioural difficulties than the NH 
group, as measured by the self and parent-report behavioural 
questionnaires. 
5. For the ABI and NH group, there will be a significant negative relationship 
between moral reasoning scores on the SRM-SF and behavioural 
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difficulties, as measured by the self and parent-report behavioural 
questionnaires.  
6. For the ABI and NH group, there will be a significant negative relationship 
between moral reasoning scores on the So-Mature and behavioural 
difficulties, as measured by the self and parent-report behavioural 
questionnaires. 
Exploratory analysis will be carried out to explore the relationship between 
moral reasoning and offending behaviour for the ABI and NH group.  
6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Participants. Twenty participants with ABIs (M age=15.48, SD=2.91) 
were recruited from NHS services in Norwich, Cambridge and Sheffield, and also 
through people signing up via the University of Exeter ‘Get Involved’ webpage. A 
NH group of 20 participants (M age=15.33, SD=3.09) were recruited through a 
school and sixth form in Norwich, and also through media advertisements at the 
University of East Anglia. The NH group were matched to the ABI group on gender, 
and matched on age as closely as possible. A parent or caregiver of each 
participant was also invited to take part by completing a parent booklet. Table 6.1 
and Table 6.2 present the eligibility criteria for the ABI and NH participants 
respectively. 
 
Table 6.1. Eligibility criteria for the ABI participants 
 
  
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
6 months post injury/diagnosis Diagnosis of any developmental disorder 
prior to the ABI 
Any type of ABI Lack of physical, cognitive or 
communication ability to engage in the 
assessments 
Age 11-21 years at time of testing  Lack of capacity to consent/assent  
English speaking  
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Table 6.2. Eligibility criteria for the NH participants 
 
 
Type of ABI was categorised as either TBI or nTBI based on the brain injury 
information provided by parents in the parent booklet and relevant medical notes. 
Eleven out of the 20 ABI participants had a TBI, and 9 had a nTBI. Table 6.3 shows 
the causes of TBIs and nTBIs in the sample. Injury severity data was unreported for 
six ABI participants. Based on the available GCS scores, of the 20 ABI participants, 
11 had a mild injury (GCS 13-15), one had a moderate brain injury (GCS 9-12), two 
had a severe brain injury (GCS 8 or less) and six had no severity information 
(1=TBI, 5=nTBI). Table 6.4 shows the age at injury and time since injury for the ABI 
group as a whole, and for the TBI and nTBI subgroups. 
 
Table 6.3. Causes of traumatic and non-traumatic injuries in the ABI group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Age 11-21 at time of testing Diagnosis of any developmental disorder 
English speaking History of any type of brain injury 
 Lack of capacity to consent  
 Lack of physical, cognitive or 
communication ability to engage in the 
assessments 
 Cause of injury Frequency 
Traumatic brain injuries Traffic accident (passenger) 1 
Traffic accident (pedestrian) 3 
Traffic accident (cyclist) 1 
Fall 3 
Sports injury 3 
Total 11 
Non-traumatic brain 
injuries 
Brain tumour 1 
Encephalitis 2 
Brain haemorrhage 2 
Chari 1 malformation 1 
Brain surgery complications 1 
Frontal lobe abscess 1 
Infection 1 
Total 9 
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Table 6.4. Age at injury and time since injury for the ABI group, TBI and nTBI 
subgroups 
 ABI group 
(n=20) 
TBI subgroup 
(n=11) 
nTBI subgroup 
(n=9) 
Age at injury 
(years) 
11.39 (4.38) 11.42 (3.75) 11.34 (5.29) 
Time since injury 
(years) 
4.05 (3.15) 3.52 (2.23) 4.70 (4.07) 
Means and standard deviations ().  
 
The required sample size for .08 power, and 0.5 probability was calculated 
using GPower3 (Faul et al., 2009; Faul et al., 2007). Calculations were based on 
findings from previous similar studies. The largest sample size estimate was 40 
participants, so a total of 40 participants were recruited: 20 in the ABI group and 20 
in the NH group. 
6.3.2 Recruitment. The ABI group was recruited first, with the NH group 
being recruited afterwards so that they could be matched on gender and age as 
closely as possible to the ABI group. The ABI group were recruited via three routes: 
(1) NHS services in Norwich (Colman Centre for Specialist Rehabilitation, n=2), 
Cambridgeshire (Cambridge Centre for Paediatric Neuropsychological 
Rehabilitation, n=2) and Sheffield (Ryegate Children’s Centre, in conjunction with 
co-ordinators from The Children’s Trust, n=10), (2) through people signing up to the 
University of Exeter’s Get Involved webpage (n=4) and (3) through social media 
adverts posted by the Encephalitis Society (n=2).  
At the NHS services, clinicians were asked to distribute information about 
the study to potential participants, or their parents if the child was under 16. Parents 
or individuals who were interested in taking part could contact the researcher or 
return the consent to contact form. For the Exeter Get Involved webpage and the 
Encephalitis Society webpage, the full information sheets were available to view 
online and anyone interested in taking part could fill out their contact details or 
contact the researcher. The researcher then contacted those who were interested in 
taking part (contact was made with the parent or guardian for those under 16 years) 
to explain the study to them, check their (or their child’s) eligibility to take part, and 
send the relevant information sheets. If individuals wanted to take part after reading 
the full information sheet, the researcher arranged a convenient date, time and 
location for both study sessions to take place. Where the study sessions took place 
at a participant’s home, lone worker procedures were followed. 
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NH participants were recruited via a school and sixth form in Norwich (Open 
Academy, n=13), as well as through media advertisements (talk at the University of 
East Anglia’s (UEA) summer school, posters and staff bulletin) at the UEA (n=7). 
Some participants were taking part in another related study (see Chapters 5 and 6) 
and were invited to also take part in the current study if they matched the age and 
gender of an ABI participant (n=9). For school recruitment, the researcher 
summarised the study at a school assembly and students who were interested took 
letters home to their parents. The parent letters invited their child to take part in the 
study and included relevant information sheets. If parents or caregivers wanted their 
child to take part in the study they could return a signed consent form to the child’s 
school. Those with parental consent were then seen for the study sessions during 
the school day. Sixth form students were invited to take part during an assembly, 
with interested students emailing the researcher, or providing the researcher with 
their school email address.  
6.3.3 Design and procedure. Two groups of participants (an ABI Group and 
a matched NH Group) were recruited and completed all the measures at an initial 
timepoint (unless they had already completed a measure of general intellectual 
functioning through the NHS in the past year, or as part of study 1). All participants 
completed the measures during a one-to-one session with the researcher, either at 
the participant’s home (n=22), Open Academy school (n=13) or the University of 
East Anglia (n=5). For some participants recruited via schools, the first timepoint 
needed to be split over two sessions due to the time constraints of conducting the 
study during the school day, but where this was the case, the two moral reasoning 
measures were conducted during the same session.  
Following a two-week interval, participants completed the two moral 
reasoning measures again, to allow for an investigation of test-retest reliability. Two 
weeks were chosen as the appropriate time interval, to allow enough time to pass 
so participants did not remember exactly what they had answered and further 
development was unlikely to have occurred. “There is no hard and fast rule for 
assessing the appropriateness of this lag, but the optimal time lag appears to be in 
the range of 1 to 4 weeks” Thornberry and Krohn (2000, p. 47). 
The measure of general intellectual functioning either the WISC-IV, WAIS-IV 
or the WASI-II was administered first, as this requires the most cognitive effort, and 
the other measures were presented in a randomised order. For the SRM-SF and 
So-Mature, participants gave their responses to the justification questions orally, 
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which were audio recorded by the researcher; verbatim answers were then later 
transcribed for scoring purposes. The remaining measures were presented in a 
paper booklet: the FAS-II, SDS-17 and the SDQ, along with demographic questions 
and questions about police contact. At the end of the second timepoint session, 
participants were debriefed and paid five pounds as a thank you for taking part.  
The participants’ parent or caregiver was also asked to complete the parent 
version of the SDQ. The parent SDQ was included in a short parent booklet which 
also asked questions about any contact their child may have had with the police. 
For the parents of the participants with ABI, the booklet also included questions on 
the participant’s age at injury (in order to determine time since injury), the cause and 
severity of the ABI, including Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 
1974) and Post Traumatic Amnesia scores. Consent was sought to access the NHS 
trust and GP records of the ABI Group, in order to obtain details about their ABI, 
such as age at injury and severity and type of ABI. 
Verbatim responses for the So-Mature were anonymised and sent to 
researchers in Canada to be scored according to the coding manual (Beauchamp & 
Dooley, 2012). These researchers were blinded as to whether the participants were 
from the ABI or NH group, and to whether the responses were for timepoint one or 
two. The inter-rater reliability of the So-Mature was examined for the current study, 
with a second rating scoring 20% (n=16). Results indicated excellent agreement 
between raters with respect to total score (r=.94). The SRM-SF responses were 
scored by the researcher after completing self-training using the manual (Gibbs et 
al., 1992). The SRM-SFs were scored by question rather than by participant so the 
researchers were blind to group allocation, and whether the response was from time 
one or two. Twenty percent of the SRM-SFs (n=16) were also scored by the primary 
supervisor, for inter-rater reliability. Results indicated excellent agreement between 
raters with respect to total score (r=.97). 
6.4 Ethical considerations  
The study received a favourable opinion from Essex National Health Service 
Research Ethics Committee (See Appendix C). Consent was obtained for all 
participants and they were made aware that they could withdraw from the study at 
any time. All participants provided informed consent or assent to take part in this 
study, while parental consent was additionally sought for those under the age of 16 
years. The participant information sheets for those under age 16 years used simpler 
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language. All parents were also provided with participant information sheets 
detailing their own participation in the study and if they consented to take part they 
were provided with a parent consent form and the parent booklet. Some questions 
asked as part of the study could potentially have caused distress, particularly 
questions asking about police contact. This risk was minimised by making it clear to 
participants that all information they provided was confidential and that their data 
would be anonymised. All testing sessions were on a one-to-one basis with the 
researcher who was able to look out for signs of distress or fatigue and offer breaks 
where necessary. All participants were debriefed after the study and provided with 
the researcher's contact details.  
6.5  Measures 
6.5.1 Moral reasoning. The SRM-SF (Gibbs et al, 1992) measures 
reasoning in the sociomoral constructs measured of contract, truth, affiliation, life, 
property, law and legal justice. The SRM-SF consists of eleven short-answer items 
that address sociomoral values such as keeping a promise and saving a life, e.g. 
“Think about a time when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours. How 
important is it for people to keep promises to friends?” Participants choose between 
very important, important or not important and are then asked “why is it very 
important/important/not important?”. Participants gave their answers orally and 
these were audio-recorded by the researcher to allow for scoring according to the 
SRM-SF manual. Participants’ explanations of their answers were scored 
developmentally according to a reference manual and a score ranging from 100-400 
was computed, relating to global moral stage (see Table 5.2). The SRM-SF has 
been found to be valid when used with people with intellectual disabilities (Langdon, 
Murphy, Clare, & Palmer, 2010). The SRM-SF has previously been used in two 
studies with brain injury samples (Couper et al, 2000; Wigg, 2013), which found that 
the brain injury groups had significantly lower levels of moral reasoning than the NH 
groups, but these studies did not report the psychometric properties of the SRM-SF.  
The So-Mature (Dooley et al., 2010) is a sociomoral reasoning evaluation 
instrument based on the moral stages proposed by Kohlberg (1983, 1984) and is 
part of a set of measures, alongside the So-Moral and So-Emotional. The 
instrument is a computer based task presenting 19 gender-specific everyday socio-
moral dilemmas, such as whether to cheat at a game of Monopoly while your friends 
are not looking, or whether to sneak into the cinema if you don’t have enough 
money for a ticket. Each dilemma is presented on a laptop as three photographs, 
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followed by presentation of the two possible responses. Participants are instructed 
to imagine that they are in that situation with their family or friends and following the 
presentation of each dilemma, to choose between two possible response options, 
which is the So-Moral section. The So-Moral dichotomous answers are scored and 
summed, yielding a moral score between 0-19. After choosing what they would do if 
they were in that situation participants then answer a ‘why?’ question, explaining 
why they chose that response, which is the So-Mature part of the instrument. After 
providing a justification, the participant is then asked to choose which emotion they 
would feel the most after making this decision, from the ten available emotions 
(guilt, shame, pride, indifference, anger, happiness, fear, sadness, disgust and 
regret), referred to as So-Emotional. The So-Moral and So-Emotional sections of 
the measure were administered as they are part of the So-Mature presentation, but 
these sections were not used for analysis in the current study. Each So-Mature 
answer is scored according to a manual, based on a five-stage socio-moral 
development model which is a simplification of Kohlberg’s stages (Beauchamp & 
Dooley, 2012). So-Mature scores are summed across the 19 dilemmas, yielding a 
possible maturity score between 0-95, which relate to 5 moral stages (see Table 
6.5).  
Table 6.5. So-Mature score and corresponding global stage, with interpretation. 
So-Mature 
score 
Global socio-moral 
maturity level 
Interpretation 
0-19 Stage 1 Does not acknowledge existence of moral 
dilemmas in certain situations presented. 
Choices are made based on observation of 
rules and fear of being punished by 
authority figures  
20-35 Transition from Stage 
1-2 
Incorporation of reasoning based on 
interest in obtaining personal benefits. 
Mutual exchange of favours and pragmatic 
agreements. 
36-51 Transition from Stage 
2-3 
Incorporation of prosocial reasoning. 
Prosocial emotions (guilt, pride, honesty) 
52-67 Transition from Stage 
3-4 
Evaluation of situation in light of effects in 
others. Incorporation of broader morality 
68-82 Transition from Stage 
4-5 
Prosocial attitude and respect for societal 
standards. Recognition of exceptions to 
rules to protect fundamental values. 
83-95 Stage 5 Analyses situation from various points of 
view to make fairest decision. Protection of 
fundamental values and people’s rights. 
 
Note. Taken from the Administration and Coding Manual SocioMoral Reasoning 
Aptitude Level Task (So Moral), (Beauchamp & Dooley, 2012). 
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A previously completed pilot study found that adolescents with a TBI were 
able to complete the So-Mature instrument but were reasoning at a lower level than 
those without a TBI; however, the difference was not significant (Dooley et al., 
2010). A subsequent study found significant differences in moral reasoning maturity 
level of a TBI group and a healthy TD group (Beauchamp et al., 2013). Although the 
pilot study tested comprehension and familiarity with the dilemmas, and inter-rater 
reliability, it did not assess test-retest reliability or internal consistency, so these 
aspects are yet to be studied.  
6.5.2 Behaviour. Behavioural difficulties were measured using the SDQ 
(Goodman, 1997; Goodman et al., 1998). The SDQ is a 25-item questionnaire 
comprised of five sub scales (emotional symptoms, conduct problems, 
hyperactivity/inattentions, peer relationship problems and prosocial behaviour). The 
subscales (excluding prosocial behaviour) are then added together to generate a 
total difficulties score. The total difficulties score can be categorised into one of four 
classifications, based on a large UK community sample: close to average, slightly 
raised, high or very high. The SDQ includes some antisocial behaviour such as “I 
take things that are not mine from home, school or elsewhere”. The SDQ is a widely 
used measure and has been found to have good psychometric properties even 
though it is very brief (Goodman & Scott, 1999). A review found that the 
psychometric properties are strong and that it measures both problem behaviours 
and competencies at an early age use (Stone et al., 2010). The SDQ has previously 
been used with brain injury samples (Anderson et al., 2009; Tonks et al., 2007). The 
self-report and parent versions were both used in this study. All of the 20 ABI 
participants returned the parent booklets. Of the 20 NH participants, three parent 
booklets were unreturned, meaning that there were three missing parent SDQs for 
the NH group.   
As an exploratory investigation into whether moral reasoning is related to 
offending behaviour in an ABI sample, all participants were also asked some short 
questions about police contact, which were included in the participant booklet. 
Participants were asked “Have you ever been in trouble with the police because of 
your behaviour?” If they answered no there were no further questions but if they 
answered yes there were follow up questions relating to if they had been arrested, 
cautioned or convicted. If they answered yes to any of these follow up questions 
they were asked for details on number of times and dates. Parents were also asked 
to answer the same questions about their child as part of the parent booklet.  
 137 
 
6.5.3 General intellectual functioning. A measure of general intellectual 
functioning was administered to assess whether any differences found for moral 
reasoning levels between the ABI and NH group can be accounted for by 
differences in intellectual functioning. The WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2003) is designed to 
be used for ages 6-16 years. The WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008) is a measure of 
intellectual functioning designed to be used for ages 16 years and over. Both 
versions provide a measure of full scale IQ (FSIQ) as well as subscale scores (e.g. 
verbal comprehension, working memory). The WISC-IV has been shown to be valid 
in children with open and closed head injuries and Wechsler (2003) concludes that 
the WISC-IV is useful as part of a comprehensive assessment of children with TBI.  
The participants aged between 11 years to 15 years and 11 months 
completed a WISC-IV while those aged 16-21 years completed a WAIS-IV, which 
took about 65-80 minutes to complete. Some participants (n=9) were recruited for 
this study via a linked study (see Chapters 5 and 6) and were already completing a 
two-subscale version of the WASI–II (Wechsler, 2011), so their scores from the 
WASI-II were used as an estimate of general intellectual functioning for the current 
study. The WASI-II is designed for use with ages 6-90 years and provides an 
estimate of FSIQ from the two subtests of vocabulary and matrix reasoning, and is 
comparable with the WISC-IV and WAIS-IV. Other NH participants recruited via the 
same routes as participants for the linked study also completed a WASI-II. 
Estimates of general intellectual functioning for the current study were based on the 
WISC-IV (n=13), the WAIS-IV (n=11) and the WASI-II (n=16). Three of the ABI 
group had completed a WISC-IV in the past year; in these cases, consent was 
sought to use their existing scores and the scores were obtained from the parent or 
relevant NHS service, rather than administering the measure of general intellectual 
functioning again.  
6.5.4 Socioeconomic status. SES measures which ask adolescents about 
parental education and occupation have typically shown poor completion rates 
(Currie et al., 1997; Wardle et al., 2002) while studies which have asked 
adolescents about material indicators of SES have found good completion rates 
(Currie et al., 1997; Wardle et al., 2002). The Family Affluence Scale II (FAS-II) 
(Currie, et al., 1997, Currie, et al, 2004) was used as a measure of SES status. This 
measure consists of four questions which ask adolescents how many cars are 
owned by their family, whether they have their own bedroom, how many family 
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holidays they have taken in the last 12 months and how many computers are owned 
by their family.  
6.5.5 Social desirability. The social desirability bias is the tendency for 
respondents to answer in a manner that will be favourable to others. In this study, if 
social desirability correlates highly with the moral reasoning measures then the 
measures are less valid, as respondents are not responding in a true fashion. The 
Marlowe-Crowne scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) is a frequently used measure of 
social desirability and was updated by Stöber (2001), as the original reflected social 
standards of the 1950s. Stöber’s social desirability scale (SDS- 17) has shown a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72 and a test-retest correlation of 0.82, and a correlation of 
0.74 with the Marlowe-Crowne scale (Stöber, 2001). The SDS-17 was originally 
developed to be used for people aged 18 and over but Johnson and Krettanauer 
(2011) administered the SDS-17 to 205 adolescents ranging in age from 11.33-
19.08 years and found that the internal consistency was not lower for younger 
participants compared with the older adolescents. For the current study, the SDS-17 
was used as a measure of social desirability. Some of the items were amended to 
match the age of the sample, resulting in 15 items, such as “I am always polite and 
considerate of others” and “I always eat a healthy diet”. The SDS-17 was 
administered as part of a pen and paper booklet.  
6.6  Data analysis 
All data were entered into IBM SPSS Statistics Version 22. Data were 
checked for normality in three ways: 1) visual inspection of histograms and P-P 
plots, 2), converting skewness and kurtosis scores to z-scores, 3) running the 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. No variables departed substantially from normality. 
Initial comparisons between the ABI and NH group on age, SES, social 
desirability and general intellectual functioning were made using an independent 
samples t-test. Analyses were then performed to explore the psychometric 
properties of the moral reasoning measures at Time 1 and Time 2. Internal 
consistency was examined by calculating Cronbach’s alpha and test-retest reliability 
was examined by calculating the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC; single 
measures). Convergent validity between the moral reasoning measures was 
explored by assessing the Pearson’s correlation coefficients (two-tailed).  
A paired samples t-test was performed to assess the effect of time for the 
ABI and NH group on SRM-SF and So-Mature scores. Pearson’s correlations (two-
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tailed) were calculated to assess the relationships between moral reasoning 
variables at Time 1 and general intellectual functioning, social desirability and SES, 
to assess any potential co-variates. An independent t-test was performed to assess 
differences in moral reasoning scores for the ABI and NH group. A series of 
ANOVAs and ANCOVAs were performed to assess differences in self and parent-
reported behavioural difficulties for the ABI and NH group. Finally, Pearson’s 
correlations were calculated to explore the relationships between SRM-SF and So-
Mature scores and self and parent-reported behavioural difficulties. Exploratory 
analyses are also reported. 
6.7 Results 
6.7.1 Descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics for the sample are 
displayed in Table 6.6. As expected, due to the groups being matched on age, there 
were no significant differences between the ABI and NH group on age (t (38) =.16, 
p=.87). There were also no significant differences between the ABI and NH group 
on social desirability (t (38) = -.28, p=.78) and SES (t (38) =-1.84, p=0.73). The ABI 
group had significantly lower general intellectual functioning than the NH group (t 
(38) = -3.01, p=.01) with a small effect size (r=.21). There were no significant 
differences between the TBI and nTBI subgroups for age at injury (t (18) = -.04, 
p=.97) or time since injury (t (18) =.83, p=.42). All 40 participants completed all 
measures, apart from the parent report SDQ, of which 3 were unreturned for the NH 
group.  
 
 Table 6.6 Descriptive statistics for the ABI and NH group. 
 
Note. Means and standard deviations (). Gender=numbers of male (M) and female 
(F) participants. Age calculated from age at first session. General intellectual 
functioning score from WISC-IV, WASI-IV or WAIS-II. 
 ABI (n=20) NH (n=20) 
Age (years) 15.48 (2.91) 15.33 (3.09) 
General intellectual functioning 89.25 (11.62) 102.55 (15.96) 
Gender 11 M, 9 F 11 M, 9 F 
FAS-II 6.95 (1.47) 6.00 (1.78) 
SDS-17 10.25 (3.28) 10.50 (2.31) 
Parent report total difficulties SDQ 15.85 (9.59) 7.88 (6.22) 
Self-report total difficulties  SDQ 12.90 (5.46) 10.50 (4.76) 
Time 1 So-Mature 48.81 (8.13) 55.53 (8.46) 
Time 2 So-Mature 49.08 (7.49) 55.98 (9.82) 
Time 1 SRM-SF 257.65 (35.51) 279.15 (36.85) 
Time 2 SRM-SF 256.85 (41.51) 285.20 (32.28) 
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6.7.2 Psychometric properties of the SRM-SF. For the ABI group, the 
internal consistency of the SRM-SF was moderate at Time 1 (α=.49) and excellent 
at Time 2 (α =.85). For the NH group, internal consistency of the SRM-SF was 
substantial at both Time 1 (α =.80) and Time 2 (α =.77). For the groups combined, 
internal consistency of the SRM-SF was substantial at Time 1 (α =.74) and excellent 
at Time 2 (α =.85). Hypothesis 1, that the SRM-SF will show excellent internal 
consistency (.80 or above) was supported for the ABI group at Time 2, the NH 
group at Time 1 and for the groups combined at Time 2. The test-retest reliability of 
the SRM-SF was good for the ABI group (ICC =.75), the NH group (ICC =.74) and 
the groups combined (ICC =.77). Hypothesis 1, that the SRM-SF will show excellent 
test-retest reliability (.80 or above) was not met.  
6.7.3 Psychometric properties of the So-Mature. For the ABI group, the 
internal consistency of the So-Mature was substantial at both Time 1 (α =.76) and 
Time 2 (α =.69). For the NH group, the internal consistency of the So-Mature was 
substantial at Time 1 (α =.79) and excellent at Time 2 (α =.83). For the groups 
combined, internal consistency of the So-Mature was substantial at Time 1 (α =.80) 
and excellent at Time 2 (α =.85).The test-retest reliability of the So-Mature was 
good for the ABI group (ICC=.68), excellent for the NH group (ICC=.84) and 
excellent for the groups combined (ICC=.81).  
6.7.4 Convergent validity of the SRM-SF and So-Mature. There was no 
significant association between scores on the SRM-SF and the So-Mature for the 
ABI group at Time 1 (r=.16, p=.508) or Time 2 (r=.36, p=.124), suggesting little 
convergent validity. There were significant associations between scores on the 
SRM-SF and So-Mature for the NH group at Time 1 (r=.68, p=.001) and Time 2 
(r=.47, p=.039). There was a significant association between scores on the SRM-SF 
and the So-Mature for the groups combined at Time 1 (r=.49, p=.001) and Time 2 
(r=.48, p=.002), suggesting moderate convergent validity. Hypothesis 2, that the 
SRM-SF and So-Mature will correlate highly with each other (0.70 or above) was 
not supported, with the highest convergent validity being .68. 
6.7.5 Assessing potential co-variates. A paired samples t-test revealed 
that there was no significant effect of time for the ABI group on SRM-SF scores (t 
(19) =.13, p=.897) or So-Mature scores (t (19) =-.19, p=.850). There was also no 
significant effect of time for the NH group on SRM-SF scores (t (19) = -1.1, p=.289) 
or So-Mature scores t (19) = -.39, p=.700). As there was no effect of time on moral 
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reasoning scores, and Time 2 data were only collected for test-retest reliability 
analysis, Time 1 moral reasoning scores will be used in subsequent analyses. 
 Moral reasoning. To assess whether any variables should be 6.7.5.1
entered as co-variates in subsequent analyses comparing moral reasoning sores for 
the ABI and NH group, Pearson’s correlations (two-tailed) were performed to 
explore relationships between moral reasoning scores and general intellectual 
functioning, social desirability and SES. For the ABI group, there was a significant 
relationship between SRM-SF scores at Time 1 and general intellectual functioning 
(r=.47, p=.035). There was no significant relationship between SRM-SF scores and 
SES (r=.06, p=.811) or social desirability (r=-.06, p=.792). There were no significant 
relationships between So-Mature scores at Time 1 and general intellectual 
functioning (r=.40, p=.083), SES (r=-.41, p=.073) or social desirability (r=.03, 
p=.197), although the relationship between So-Mature scores and general 
intellectual functioning neared significance. 
For the NH group, there were no significant relationships between SRM-SF 
score and general intellectual functioning (r=.37, p=.107), SES (r=.09, p=.713) or 
social desirability (r=-.04, p=.855). There were no significant relationships between 
So-Mature scores at Time 1 and general intellectual functioning (r=.07, p=.786), 
SES (r=.09, p=.697) or social desirability (r=.04, p=.863). General intellectual 
functioning was related to SRM-SF scores for the ABI group but not the NH group. 
As general intellectual functioning significantly differs between the ABI and NH 
group, it is not appropriate to enter general intellectual functioning as a covariate. 
No covariates will be entered for the moral reasoning analyses.  
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 Behaviour. To assess whether any variables should be entered as 6.7.5.2
co-variates in subsequent analyses comparing behavioural difficulties for the ABI 
and NH group, Pearson’s correlations (two-tailed) were performed to explore 
relationships between self and parent-report behavioural difficulties scores and 
general intellectual functioning, social desirability and SES. For the ABI group, there 
were no significant relationships between self-report behavioural difficulties and 
general intellectual functioning (r= -.29, p=.210), SES (r=-.19, p=.436) or social 
desirability (r= -.30, p=.205). There were also no significant relationships between 
parent-report behavioural difficulties and SES (r= -.38, p=.100) or social desirability 
(r= -.22, p=.359). There was a significant relationship between parent-report 
behavioural difficulties and general intellectual functioning (r= -.56, p=.010). As 
stated, as general intellectual functioning significantly differs between the ABI and 
NH group, it is not appropriate to enter this as a covariate.  
For the NH group, there was no significant relationship between self-report 
behavioural difficulties and general intellectual functioning (r= -.03, p=.207) or social 
desirability (r= -.20, p=.395). There was a significant relationship between self-report 
behavioural difficulties and SES (r= -.51. p=.022). There were no significant 
relationships between parent-report behavioural difficulties and general intellectual 
functioning (r= -.38, p=.133) SES (r= -.31, p=.221) or social desirability (r= -.10, 
p=.717). For the analysis comparing self-report behavioural difficulties for the ABI 
and NH group, SES will be entered as a covariate.  
6.7.6 Moral reasoning analysis. An independent t-test found no significant 
difference between the ABI and NH group on SRM-SF scores (t (38) =1.88, p=.068). 
The mean score for the ABI group on the SRM-SF was at transition Stage 3 (2) and 
the mean score for the NH group of the SRM-SF was at Stage 3. For the So-
Mature, the ABI group scored significantly lower than the NH Group (t (38) = 2.56, 
p=.015). The mean score for the ABI group on the So-Moral was at the transition 
from Stage 2 to Stage 3, while the mean score for the NH group was at the 
transition from Stage 3 to Stage 4. Hypothesis 3, that the will be a significant 
difference in moral reasoning for the ABI and NH group was partially supported. 
6.7.7 Behaviour analysis. Self and parent report behavioural difficulties 
were significantly related to each other for the ABI group (r=.51, p=.023) and the NH 
group (r=.74, p=.001). An initial one-way ANOVA found no significant difference 
between the ABI and NH group for self-reported behavioural difficulties (F (1, 38) = 
2.20, p=.147). An ANCOVA controlling for SES revealed that the ABI group scored 
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significantly higher than the comparison group on self-report behavioural difficulties 
(F (1, 37) =4.57, p=.039). The mean estimates for both groups were close to 
average. Parent-reported behavioural difficulties were significantly higher for the ABI 
group compared to the NH group (F (1, 38) =8.63, p=.006). The mean score for the 
NH group was close to average and the mean score for the ABI group was slightly 
raised. Hypothesis 4, that the ABI group will display more behavioural difficulties 
than the NH group was supported.  
6.7.8 Relationships between moral reasoning and behaviour. For the 
ABI group, there were no significant relationships between Time 1 SRM-SF scores 
and self-report behavioural difficulties (r=.13, p=.577) or parent-report behavioural 
difficulties (r= -.27 p=.254).There were no significant relationship between Time 1 
SRM-SF scores and self-report behavioural difficulties (r= -.14, p=.562) or parent-
report behavioural difficulties (r= -.36, p=.154) for the NH group. Hypothesis 5, that 
there will be a significant negative relationship between scores on the SRM-SF and 
behavioural difficulties for the ABI and NH group was not supported. 
For the ABI group, Time 1 So-Mature scores were significantly related to 
self-report behavioural difficulties (r= -.52, p=.020) but not to parent-report 
behavioural difficulties (r= -.09, p=.712). Time 1 So-Mature scores did not correlate 
with self-report behavioural difficulties (r= -.04, p=.860) or parent-reported 
behavioural difficulties (r= -.25, p=.327) for the NH group. Hypothesis 6, that there 
would be a significant negative relationship between So-Moral scores and 
behavioural difficulties was partially supported for the ABI group but not for the NH 
group. 
6.7.9 Exploratory analyses. Exploratory analysis was performed to explore 
differences in moral reasoning scores for the TBI and nTBI subgroups of the ABI 
group, and also to explore the effect of injury severity and age at injury An 
independent t-test  found no significant difference between the TBI and non-TBI 
subgroups on SRM-SF scores (t (18) =.98, p=.448). There was no significant 
difference between the TBI and non-TBI subgroups on So-Mature scores (t (18) = 
.23, p=.393). Injury severity data was incomplete for the nTBI subgroup so could not 
be used for analysis. For the TBI subgroup (n=11), seven had a mild TBI, one a 
moderate TBI, two had a severe TBI and the severity was unreported for one 
participant. Comparing the mild (n=7) to moderate and severe TBIs (n=3), there 
were no significant difference between SRM-SF scores (t (8) =1.17, p=.393) or So-
Mature scores (t (8) = .61 p=.322).  
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For the ABI group as a whole there was no significant relationship between 
age at injury and So-Mature scores at Time 1 (r=-.03, p=.912) or SRM-SF scores at 
Time 1 (r=.43, p=.057), although the latter neared significance. For the TBI 
subgroup there was no significant relationship between age at injury and So-Mature 
scores at Time 1 (r=-.11, p=.753) or SRM-SF scores at Time 1 (r=.34, p=.309). For 
the nTBI subgroup there was no significant relationship between age at injury and 
So-Mature scores at Time 1 (r=.09, p=.829) or SRM-SF scores at Time 1 (r=.52, 
p=.154).For the ABI group as a whole there was no significant relationship between 
time since injury and So-Mature scores at Time 1 (r=.09, p=.706) or SRM-SF scores 
at Time 1 (r=-.19, p=.433). For the TBI subgroup, there was no significant 
relationship between time since injury and So-Mature scores at Time 1 (r= -.06, 
p=.853) or SRM-SF scores at Time 1 (r= -.40, p=.221). For the nTBI subgroup, 
there was no significant relationship between time since injury and So-Mature 
scores at Time 1 (r= .27, p=.489) or SRM-SF scores at Time 1 (r= -.16, p=.683).  
The police contact questions were added as exploratory variables. In total, 
three participants reported some police contact. These participants were all male, 
with an average age of 16 years (SD 2.15). Only one parent reported that their child 
had had some police contact, which was a parent of one of the three who self-
reported police contact. The two participants who had self-reported police contact 
only were from the NH group. Both reported having been in trouble with the police 
for their behaviour, and one reported being cautioned once. The participant with self 
and parent-reported police contact was from the ABI group (TBI; severity unknown) 
and reported being in trouble with the police because of their behaviour, and 
arrested and cautioned once. The same information was reported by their parent. 
For this ABI participant, their SRM-SF score at Time 1 was 206 (Stage 2) which is a 
stage lower than the mean for the ABI group in this study (transition Stage 3 (2)). 
Their So-Mature score at Time 1 was 38 (transition from Stage 2-3), which matches 
the mean stage of the ABI group in this study.  
6.8 Summary  
The aims of this study were to a) examine the psychometric properties of 
two measures of moral reasoning, the SRM-SF and So-Mature, b) use these 
measures to compare moral reasoning levels of an ABI and NH group, and c) 
investigate how behaviour differs between the ABI and NH group, and whether low 
moral reasoning is related to behavioural difficulties.  
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Results indicated that the SRM-SF and So-Mature had satisfactory 
psychometric properties for the ABI and NH group. The test-retest reliability of the 
SRM-SF and So-Mature was good or excellent for both groups. Internal consistency 
of the SRM-SF was higher for the NH group than the ABI group, which was more 
inconsistent, being moderate at Time 1 and excellent at Time 2. This suggests that 
adolescents with ABI may be less consistent in their reasoning across different 
moral values (e.g. truth, affiliation, legal justice). Internal consistency of the So-
Mature was overall higher than for the SRM-SF, ranging from substantial-excellent 
for the ABI and NH group. The So-Moral and So-Mature measures involve 
participants imagining they are in situations (presented on a computer screen), 
making a response decision and then explaining that decision. This may lead to 
more consistent reasoning compared to reasoning about a wide range of moral 
values on the SRM-SF, “e.g. why is it very important/important/not important for 
people to keep promises, if they can, to friends?” The SRM-SF and So-Mature 
showed convergent validity for the NH group but not for the ABI group. This 
suggests that for adolescents with ABIs, moral reasoning about values does not 
correlate with moral reasoning about response decisions they have made in certain 
situations. Again, this would suggest an inconsistency of moral reasoning across 
values and situations for adolescents with ABI. The ABI group had significantly 
lower general intellectual functioning than the NH group, which may impact on the 
ability to apply moral reasoning about values to specific situations. 
The ABI group were on average reasoning at transition Stage 3 (2) and the 
NH group were on average reasoning at Stage 3 on the SRM-SF but the difference 
in score was not significant. A significant difference between groups was found for 
the So-Mature, with the ABI group reasoning at the transition from Stage 2-3 while 
the NH group were reasoning at the transition from Stage 3-4. Exploratory analysis 
found no significant differences between the TBI and nTBI subgroup on either the 
SRM-SF or So-Mature, suggesting that both TBIs and ABIs can have an effect on 
moral reasoning maturity. No significant differences were found between mild and 
moderate/severe TBIs, which is in line other studies (Beauchamp et al., 2012; 
Dooley et al., 2012) but may also be due to the small number of TBI participants 
with reported severity information (n=10). The sub-group analyses should be 
interpreted with caution as they were exploratory and may have been 
underpowered. The significant difference between the ABI and NH group for So-
Mature but not SRM-SF scores suggests that reasoning about moral values is not 
as affected following an ABI than reasoning about moral response decisions. 
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Adolescents with ABIs may have difficulty with moral or social decision-making 
rather than an understanding and appreciation of moral values; they understand 
moral values but may struggle to apply them to their own decision-making. It has 
been found that how people act in moral dilemmas differs from how they say they 
will act in such situations (Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, & Silani, 2014); this 
effect may be more pronounced in adolescents with ABIs, but further research is 
needed in this area.  
In terms of behaviour, the ABI group displayed more behavioural difficulties 
than the NH group. The ABI group scored significantly higher on self-reported 
behavioural difficulties than the NH group, after controlling for SES. The ABI group 
also scored significantly higher on parent-reported behavioural difficulties than the 
NH group. Self-report difficulties were close to average for both groups but ‘slightly 
raised’ on the parent report for the ABI group, which may suggest a lack of insight 
into one’s own behavioural difficulties among the ABI participants, which has been 
found following brain injuries (Ownsworth, McFarland, & Young, 2002; Sherer, Hart, 
& Nick, 2003). In addition, the self and parent report behavioural difficulties were 
more strongly related for the NH group than the ABI group. For the NH group, there 
were no relationships between moral reasoning and behaviour. For the ABI group, 
there was a significant negative relationship between self-report behavioural 
difficulties and scores on the So-Mature, but no relationship between behaviour and 
scores on the SRM-SF. The relationships between behaviour and So-Mature but not 
SRM-SF scores may reflect the fact that the So-Mature involves reasoning about 
response decisions made in everyday situations, so scores on this measure may 
more closely relate to behaviour, compared to reasoning about values measured in 
the SRM-SF. A lack of relationships between the So-Mature and behaviour for the 
NH group is in contrast to previous research which has found relationships between 
the So-Mature and aggressive behaviour for TD adolescents (Dooley et al., 2010).  
Police contact questions were added as exploratory variables, as an initial 
investigation into whether moral reasoning scores are related to offending behaviour 
in an adolescent ABI sample. Only three of the 40 participants reported any police 
contact, with only one of these being from the ABI group. The moral reasoning 
scores for this participant was comparable with the mean scores for the ABI group 
on the So-Mature, but one stage lower than the mean for the ABI group on the 
SRM-SF. Future studies using samples of adolescents with ABIs who have been 
 147 
 
involved in offending behaviour could further explore the relationship between moral 
reasoning and offending in this population.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 Chapter overview 
The overall objective of this thesis was to make some initial strides towards 
integrating aspects of developmental psychology and social neuroscience 
approaches to moral decision-making and development. This objective was 
addressed by (a) presenting a new theoretical framework; the SIP-MDM framework, 
which combines aspects from both disciplines, (b) conducting a systematic review 
and meta-analysis of neuroimaging research into moral decision-making, and (c) 
investigating a series of hypotheses generated using the SIP-MDM framework in TD 
adolescents and adolescents with ABIs. This discussion chapter will firstly 
summarise the SIP-MDM framework introduced in Chapter 3 before summarising 
the main findings of the systematic review and empirical studies. Clinical and 
theoretical implications will be discussed, followed by the strengths and limitations 
of the systematic review and meta-analysis, the TD studies and the ABI study. 
Finally, this chapter will suggest areas for future research before finishing with 
concluding remarks.  
7.2 Summary of findings 
7.2.1 A new theoretical framework. Within Chapter 3, the SIP-MDM 
theoretical framework was introduced, which incorporated aspects from 
developmental psychology and social neuroscience moral theories. In developing 
this framework, SIP theory was incorporated, while moral decision-making was 
placed alongside other types of decision-making, highlighting that moral decisions 
and behaviour are subject to contextual and situational influences. This framework 
can help to explain how real-time moral decisions occur, how they relate to 
behaviour, and how they mature over time. A developmental aspect was also added 
to ensure it was clear that the development of components was associated with 
increased efficiency of information processing and the capacity for making mature 
moral decisions. The SIP-MDM framework expanded the definition of moral 
development to incorporate the maturation of component skills and processes, 
along with the maturation of moral decision-making. The centre of all these 
developmental changes is the brain, and as such, this was added to the centre of 
the framework, as a component that affects all steps of processing and the 
development of other components, but it was acknowledged that this aspect could 
be expanded upon through further research into brain regions involved in moral 
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decision-making. Furthermore, research exploring hypotheses based upon the SIP-
MDM framework may lead to support for the framework or arguments of 
reformulation. 
7.2.2 The neural correlates of moral decision-making. A systematic 
review and meta-analysis was presented in Chapter 4, which aimed to review the 
neuroimaging research into MEs and MRDs. Findings from the ALE meta-analysis 
revealed that when making one’s own moral decisions about what to do in a moral 
dilemma, there was increased activation of additional brain areas compared to when 
judging the moral actions of others, suggesting different processes may be involved. 
Making one’s own decisions appears to involve an extended brain network, 
incorporating self-referential regions which do not show an increase in activation 
when making MEs. While the vmPFC has previously been implicated in moral 
decision-making, the results of this meta-analysis did not find a cluster of activation 
in the vmPFC for MRDs. This finding highlighted that previous conclusions about 
the brain regions involved in moral decision-making have been based on studies 
primarily using ME tasks, and that making your own decisions about what to do in a 
moral dilemma is different to judging the appropriateness of the actions of others or 
judging statements as right or wrong.  
7.2.3 Exploring the SIP-MDM framework in typically developing 
adolescents. Within Study 1 presented in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
proposed relationships between components of the SIP-MDM framework were 
investigated with 80 TD adolescents, aged 11-18 years. Study 1 aimed to 
investigate relationships between cognitive and affective component processes of 
the SIP-MDM framework and moral reasoning, whether these components mature 
with age and whether moral reasoning relates to self-report or parent report 
behavioural difficulties. Findings indicated that working memory and moral 
reasoning correlated positively with age, but perspective taking, empathy and 
emotion recognition did not. Working memory correlated with moral reasoning but 
did not significantly predict moral reasoning after controlling for age and general 
intellectual functioning. There were no significant relationships between moral 
reasoning and perspective taking, empathy or emotion recognition. There were also 
no significant relationships between moral reasoning and behavioural difficulties.  
Study 1 also aimed to investigate whether SIP abilities mature with age, and 
to explore relationships between components processes and steps of the SIP-MDM 
framework. While it was proposed that SIP skills develop with age, there is limited 
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research studying the typical developmental trajectory for SIP skills. Study 1 
presented novel findings regarding how SIP skills relate to age in a TD sample of 
11-18 year olds. It was hypothesised that components in the centre of the SIP-MDM 
framework (e.g. SES and moral reasoning) would correlate with proficiency at each 
SIP step, and that SIP steps would be predicted by components in the centre and 
components relevant at each step. It was found that only Steps 1 and 2, encoding 
and interpretation positively correlated with age. Steps 4 and 5, response access 
and response decision showed negative correlations with age, with older 
participants generating and selecting fewer prosocial responses. In terms of 
predictive relationships of the SIP-MDM framework, it was found that while working 
memory correlated with some variables at Steps 1 and 2, it did not predict scores at 
these steps. Moral reasoning also correlated with some variables at Steps 1 and 2 
and significantly predicted the number of emotion, interpretation and total cues 
encoded, and the number of interpretation cues used when assessing intent. No 
relationships were found between any of the SIP steps and perspective taking, 
empathy, emotion recognition, SES or current mood.  
7.2.4 Moral reasoning and behaviour in adolescents with acquired 
brain injuries. Within Study 2, presented in Chapter 7, some aspects of 
the SIP-MDM framework were investigated with adolescents with ABIs by 
comparing moral reasoning and behaviour of an ABI group (aged 11-21 years, 
n=20) with a NH group (n=20), matched on age and gender. This study aimed to 
investigate the psychometric properties of two measures of moral reasoning, the 
SRM-SF and the So-Mature. Novel findings were presented, as the internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability of the SRM-SF have not previously been 
reported when used with ABI samples, and these psychometric properties of the So-
Moral have not previously been reported for either ABI or non-ABI samples. These 
measures were used to compare moral reasoning maturity of the ABI and NH 
group. In addition, self-report and parent reported behavioural difficulties were 
compared for the groups, and relationships between moral reasoning maturity and 
behaviour were explored. Results indicated that the SRM-SF and So-Mature had 
satisfactory psychometric properties for the ABI and NH group, though internal 
consistency on the SRM-SF was only moderate at Time 1 for the ABI group, 
suggesting an inconsistency in reasoning about moral values among the ABI group. 
The ABI group were reasoning at a stage lower than the NH group on both 
measures, though the difference in reasoning score was only significant for the So-
Mature. It was found that the ABI group displayed more behavioural difficulties 
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based on both the self-report and parent report questionnaires. No relationships 
were found between moral reasoning and behaviour for the NH group, but there 
was a significant negative correlation between self-report behavioural difficulties and 
scores on the So-Moral for the ABI group.  
7.3 Theoretical and clinical implications 
7.3.1 Towards an integrative theory of moral decision-making and 
development. Developmental psychology and social neuroscience 
approaches to moral decision-making and development have developed separately, 
with different research methods and informed by separate theories. Theories and 
research have tended to focus on moral decisions rather than behaviour as the end 
point. There have also been divides within theories from these disciplines, such as 
whether moral decisions are driven by intuitions or reasoning. Furthermore, 
although many components have been proposed to be important for moral decision-
making and development, these have not previously been integrated into one 
comprehensive theory, and research does not tend to measure multiple 
components to assess relationships between them. The SIP-MDM framework 
suggested in this thesis attempted to address these issues by demonstrating how 
suggested components from various moral theories can be integrated. This 
framework combined both automatic processes (somatic markers and schemas) 
and moral reasoning, showing how both can guide moral decisions and the end 
point of moral behaviour (Step 6). 
The SIP-MDM framework was developed by expanding on previous 
integrations of moral theory with SIP, and incorporated other skills and processes 
theorised to be important for moral development. Looking to the future of moral 
theory development, the SIP-MDM framework offers promise that concepts from 
developmental psychology and social neuroscience can be incorporated into one 
integrative framework. This is a step towards a dynamic model of moral decision-
making, which was suggested by Van Bavel and colleagues (2015) and shows how 
moral decisions are not just driven by automatic intuitive processes and/or slower 
reasoning processes, but that many other components and factors are involved. 
This framework included brain development but also referenced the rich tradition of 
developmental psychology. Using the term ‘moral decision-making’ places moral 
decisions alongside other types of decision-making, which can help in thinking 
about the general influences and processes that guide such decisions (e.g. 
situational factors), along with the morally specific processes, creating richer 
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explanations of decisions and behaviour. Predictions can be made based on the 
SIP-MDM framework, which can be tested in future research studies, leading to 
further clarification of the relationships between components and hopefully a 
thorough model which accurately predicts behaviour.  
7.3.2 Challenges to theoretical assumptions. The SIP-MDM framework is 
not at present a working model or theory but can be used to generate hypotheses to 
guide future research and theory development in this area. The empirical studies 
presented in this thesis attempted to explore some of the hypotheses of the SIP-
MDM framework in TD adolescents and adolescents with ABIs, finding only limited 
support and highlighting some inconsistencies with theoretical assumptions of the 
framework and the moral theories it is derived from. 
Firstly, the components of the SIP-MDM framework are proposed to develop 
with age, but empathy, perspective taking and emotion recognition did not correlate 
positively with age, and only some encoding and interpretation variables correlated 
positively with age in Study 1. It may be that some of these processes do not show 
marked developmental changes between the ages of 11 and 18 years. Such an 
interpretation is inconsistent with what is known about adolescent brain 
development; the lack of relationships with age may therefore reflect issues with 
some of the measures used in Study 1, or it may be that there is large individual 
variability in the development of these components and the sample size was too 
small to detect a significant effect of age. Exploratory analyses revealed that for 
females, age was significantly related to working memory and emotion recognition, 
but these relationships were not significant for males. These differences may be due 
to sex-specific maturational changes of the developing brain (Giedd et al., 2006; 
Giedd et al., 1996; Lenroot & Giedd, 2010) or gender-related differences in the 
development of executive functions (Anderson, 2001; McClure, 2000), but these 
findings should be interpreted with caution as the analysis was only exploratory.    
Previous research has failed to find development of affective empathy during 
adolescence (Garaigordobil, 2009; Schwenck, Göhle, Hauf, Warnke, Freitag, & 
Schneider, 2014; Van der Graaff et al., 2014). A study using the ERT in 373 TD 
participants aged 8-75 years found that for the 8-17 year olds, happiness 
significantly correlated positively with age (r=.23) and anger showed a significant 
negative correlation with age (r=-.21) but fear, sadness, disgust and surprise did not 
show development effects for this age group (Kessels, Montagne, Hendriks, Perrett, 
& Haan, 2014). In terms of perspective taking development with age, Abell and 
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colleagues (2000) found that accuracy on the animated triangles task was 
equivalent for TD 8 year olds and adults. However, Schwenck et al. (2014), found 
that age accounted for 29.3% of the variance on the animated triangles task for TD 
participants aged 7-17 years, so the lack of correlation with age for Study 1 of this 
thesis is surprising. Another surprising finding of the empirical studies was that age 
was negatively correlated with prosocial first responses and prosocial decisions in 
Study 1, with older participants displayed less prosocial decision-making. These 
findings suggest that moral decision-making may follow a curvilinear pattern, as 
found for moral reasoning by Bear and Rhys (1994) and Langdon and colleagues 
(2001b). 
Secondly, while a relationship was found between moral reasoning and 
working memory in Study 1, no relationships were found between moral reasoning 
and perspective taking, empathy or emotion recognition. The lack of correlation 
between moral reasoning and these cognitive and affective processes is 
inconsistent with theoretical assumptions, especially as perspective taking is the 
component most frequently cited as being important for moral development. There 
is a lack of research investigating the relationship between moral reasoning and 
perspective taking so before this theoretical assumption is rethought, future studies 
are needed to explore this relationship. Previous research into relationships 
between other cognitive and affective processes and moral reasoning is limited but 
Dooley et al (2010) found a significant positive correlation between empathy, as 
measured by the IECA, and moral reasoning, as measured by the So-Mature in TD 
adolescents. While Study 1 of this thesis also used the IECA as a measure of 
affective empathy, the SRM-SF was used a measure of moral reasoning; it may be 
that empathy correlates more with reasoning about moral response decisions than 
reasoning about moral values. However, relationships have been found between 
scores in the IECA and the SRM-SF in delinquent populations (Lardén, Melin, Holst, 
& Långström, 2006) and adults with intellectual disabilities (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, 
Steverson, & Palmer, 2011). Further research is needed into the relationships 
between affective empathy and moral reasoning in TD adolescents.  
Finally, it was proposed that SIP steps within the SIP-MDM framework are 
influenced by components at each step and components in the centre of the 
framework. However, some components in the centre of the framework did not 
correlate with any of the SIP steps in Study 1, calling into question the hypothesised 
predictive relationships of the framework. Further research using larger samples 
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could look at potential mediating relationships of the framework, for example, 
whether moral reasoning mediates the link between working memory and SIP steps. 
There are many relationships between components proposed within the SIP-MDM 
framework which remain to be tested, such as whether attention is related to Step 1, 
and how parenting impacts on all steps. Further research exploring hypotheses of 
the SIP-MDM framework in TD and atypically developing samples of different ages 
is needed, and findings may call theoretical assumptions into question, leading to 
further theory development. 
7.3.3 A moral brain? The three clusters of significant shared activation for 
MEs and MRDs found in the meta-analysis were the left MTG, left CG, and left 
MFG. These regions are also involved in other processes, so are not unique or 
specific to making moral decisions. All three significant clusters were found in the 
left hemisphere, which is involved in language (Springer et al., 1999) so this may 
reflect the fact that most of the tasks involve language processing. It has been found 
that perceptual decisions engaged the left hemisphere of the MFG (Talati & Hirsch, 
2005) and that the MTG is involved in multimodal semantic processing (Visser, 
Jefferies, Embleton, & Ralph, 2012) with the left MTG being the core component of 
the semantic network (Wei et al., 2012). The cluster of activation in the CG was 
found in BA 31, which is part of the posterior cingulate cortex and has been found to 
show increased activation when judging the valence of emotional words (Maddock, 
Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003); increased activation of this area for MRD and ME 
tasks may therefore reflect processing of written emotional stimuli.  
Neuroimaging and lesion research has implicated the vmPFC in moral 
decision-making. However, the majority of such studies use hypothetical dilemmas 
that involve judging the appropriateness of a protagonist’s actions, rather than 
making a response choice about what you would do. The systematic review and 
meta-analysis presented in Chapter 4 highlighted the differences in ME and MRD 
tasks, and found that the vmPFC was not a significant cluster for MRDs. Relative to 
ME tasks, MRDs were found to additionally activate the left and right MTG and the 
right precuneus, suggesting that making one’s own decisions about what to do in a 
moral dilemma is different to judging the appropriateness of the actions of other 
people and activates additional brain regions. While activation of the right 
precuneus in MRD tasks may reflect increased self-referential processing compared 
to when making MEs of other people’s behaviour, it may just reflect differences 
between the moral task types. The right precuneus is associated with metaphor 
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comprehension (Mashal, Vishne, & Laor, 2014) and verbal creative thinking (Chen 
et al., 2015), so activation of this region during MRD tasks may reflect the fact that 
these tasks tend to involve dilemmas that are not typical to real life (e.g., choosing 
to kill one or five people), thus may require more abstract thinking about unfamiliar 
situations.  
One surprising finding of the meta-analysis presented in this thesis was that 
the rTPJ, an area associated with ToM, showed increased activation for MRDs but 
not MEs, suggesting that ToM processes are even more involved when making 
one’s own moral decisions than when making evaluations of others. One 
explanation for this finding may be the type of tasks used in experiments included in 
the systematic review. The hypothetical dilemmas used in the included MRD 
experiments involved other people, so participants may typically infer the mental 
states or possible mental states of others when deciding their response. Some of 
the included ME tasks did not reference other people, such as judging sentences as 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ so would not have led to participants inferring mental states of 
others. Contrary to the finding for this meta-analysis, Bzdok et al. (2012) found 
significant activation in the rTPJ for their moral cognition domain. However, 
experiments were only included in the moral cognition analysis if tasks involved 
participants making “appropriateness judgements on actions of one individual 
towards others” (p. 785) so always involved judging the actions of other people. 
The results of the meta-analysis in Chapter 4 supported the view that there 
is no ‘moral brain’ (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Young & Dungan, 2012) i.e. no region 
or network uniquely involved in moral decision-making. This is in line with aspects of 
the SIP-MDM framework; real-time moral decision-making involves many different 
processes such as empathy, emotion recognition and working memory and so will 
activate various brain regions and networks to different extents, depending on 
individual and situational factors. Consistent with the SIP-MDM, damage to any 
region of the developing brain may impact on moral decision-making and 
development. Some support for this proposal was found in Study 2, which included 
a wide range of ABIs, including nTBIs, and found a significant difference between 
the ABI and NH group for moral reasoning on the So-Mature. 
7.3.4 Explaining moral behaviour. Most moral theories and research in this 
area have focused on moral decisions, rather than behaviour as the end point. The 
SIP-MDM framework categorised Step 5 as moral response decisions, the step 
before behaviour enactment (Step 6). Other types of moral decision (judgements 
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and evaluations) are important at other steps of processing but moral response 
decisions are a proximal step before behaviour. The systematic review presented in 
this thesis highlighted that choosing what to do in a moral dilemma is different to 
making evaluations such as evaluating the actions of others or judging moral 
sentences as right or wrong, and that choosing what to do recruits additional brain 
regions. Study 2 found convergent validity between the SRM-SF and the So-Mature 
for the NH group, suggesting that reasoning about moral values, such as life and 
justice, correlates with reasoning about response decisions one has made in a 
hypothetical moral dilemma. Although different brain regions are activated for 
different types of moral decisions, there appears to be some relationships between 
an understanding of moral values and reasoning about moral response decisions for 
NH adolescents.  
The lack of convergent validity between the SRM-SF and So-Mature for the 
ABI but not the NH group in Study 2 suggests that adolescents with ABIs may 
struggle to apply their understanding of moral values to their own decision-making. 
Further research is needed to confirm this interpretation of the novel finding of Study 
2. Previous research has found that adults with TBIs and children with frontal lobe 
lesions do show developmentally delayed moral reasoning on the SRM-SF (Couper 
et al., 2002; Wigg, 2013). Before strong conclusions can be made about moral 
reasoning maturity in adolescents with ABIs, further research which includes 
different types and severity of ABIs and different age of injury and time since injury 
is necessary, as Study 2 of this thesis only included a sample of 20 adolescents 
with mostly mild ABIs and a mean age of injury of 11.39 years (4.38). If it is the case 
that adolescents with ABIs show delayed moral reasoning for their own response 
decisions but not for moral values, research could focus on exploring why this is 
true; for example, whether this is due to certain processes such as working memory 
and abstract reasoning being affected after ABI and limiting the ability to apply 
abstract moral values in real-life dilemmas. Such research could add to our 
understanding of the role of moral development in the relationship between brain 
injury and offending.  
A significant relationship between self-reported behavioural difficulties and 
scores on the So-Mature was found for the ABI group in Study 2 of this thesis. 
However, no relationships were found between moral reasoning (as measured by 
the SRM-SF or So-Mature), and self or parent-reported behavioural difficulties for 
TD adolescents in Study 1 or NH adolescents in Study2. While some studies have 
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found relationships between moral reasoning and behaviour (Carlo et al., 2011; 
Dooley et al., 2010; Miller et al., 1996), there is limited research which has 
investigated this relationship using the SRM-SF in TD populations. Dooley and 
colleagues (2010) found a strong negative correlation between moral reasoning 
scores on the So-Mature and aggressive behaviours and oppositional defiant 
symptoms in TD adolescents using the parent-report version of the Child 
Behavioural Checklist (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001) and the self-report Form of 
Aggression Scale (Little, Brauner, Jones, Nock, & Hawley, 2003). No significant 
relationships were found for scores on the So-Mature and either self or parent-
reported behavioural difficulties as measured by the SDQ in Study 2. Further 
research is needed, using various behavioural measures, including measures of 
prosocial behaviour, before strong conclusions can be made about the link between 
moral reasoning and behaviour in TD adolescents. Recent social neuroscience 
research has attempted to shift the focus of study to moral behaviour by using 
virtual reality to measure moral response choices. Such studies have found that 
how people act in virtual reality moral dilemmas differs to how they say they would 
act in hypothetical text-based scenarios describing the same situations (Francis et 
al., 2016; Patil et al., 2014), highlighting that measuring moral decisions or 
reasoning alone is not sufficient to understand behaviour.  
The major moral principles of a society are generally reflected in laws, so 
moral behaviour can in some cases also be referred to as rule-breaking or offending 
behaviour. As offending behaviour involves breaking moral rules of a culture or 
society, the SIP-MDM framework could be used to make predictions about offending 
behaviour. Palmer (2003) proposed placing moral reasoning within a wider 
explanation of offending behaviour, theorising that SIP mediates the link between 
parenting and offending (Palmer, 2000), while Gibbs (2013) proposed that antisocial 
behaviour can be explained as a developmental delay in moral judgement, along 
with self-serving cognitive distortions and deficiencies in social skills. Based on the 
SIP-MDM framework, offending behaviour could be explained as behaviour based 
on immature moral decision-making, which could either be the result of (a) 
developmental delay or deficiencies in one or more of the component processes 
such as perspective taking or working memory, or (b) due to an underdeveloped 
database (a lack of adaptive moral schemas or an understanding of moral 
necessities), or (c) it could be the result of poor information processing, such as a 
the misinterpretation of cues, or failing to recognise a situation as having moral rules 
attached. In addition, contextual and situational factors, such as the presence of 
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peers and current mood, can affect moral decision-making and behaviour, including 
offending behaviour. This fits with the Situational Action Theory of crime (Wikström, 
2005; Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, & Hardie, 2012) which proposed that crimes 
are moral actions involving an interaction of personal and environmental factors, 
and that whether an individual views crime as a possible action in a situation is 
determined by their moral evaluation of action alternatives.  
7.3.5 Interventions. It may be possible to increase moral or prosocial 
behaviour and reduce antisocial behaviour by training individuals in some of the 
components of the SIP-MDM framework. The EQUIPping Youth to Help One 
Another training program (EQUIP) aims to address deficits in social skills, moral 
judgement and cognitive distortions in young people with antisocial behavioural 
problems (Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995). A systematic review found that while 
EQUIP had a significant effect on sociomoral development in juvenile delinquents it 
did not have a significant effect on recidivism (van Stam et al., 2014). It may be that 
more specific interventions which target components of the SIP-MDM framework 
that an individual has difficulties in can impact on behaviour. A study which trained 
perspective taking abilities in preschool children found that training increased visual, 
cognitive and affective perspective taking, and that these increases were related to 
increased prosocial behaviour and decreases in aggressiveness (Cigala, Mori, & 
Fangareggi, 2015). Interventions which aim to enhance SIP skills may help to 
reduce aggressive behaviour. Dodge, Godwin, and The Conduct Problems 
Prevention Research Group (2013) found that long-term positive effects of the ‘Fast 
Track’ intervention on reducing antisocial behaviour in adolescence was partially 
accounted for by improvements in SIP skills such as attributions, response 
generation and evaluations. The ‘Making Choices’ school-based intervention to 
reduce aggression in children by strengthening social-cognitive and emotion 
regulation skills has been found to relate to improved response decisions and lower 
hostile intent attribution, but have no significant effect on encoding (Terzian, Li, 
Fraser, Day, & Rose, 2015). The lack of effect on encoding may suggest that other 
related skills, such as attention may need to be targeted in order to increase 
encoding skills.  
In Study 2 of this thesis it was found that the ABI group were reasoning at a 
significantly lower level than an age and gender-matched NH comparison group on 
the So-Mature but not on the SRM-SF. These findings suggest that adolescents 
with ABIs may have difficulty with moral or social decision-making rather than 
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difficulties understanding moral values, i.e. they understand moral values but may 
struggle to apply them to their own decision-making. Further research is needed to 
establish the mediating factors in the relationship between understanding moral 
values and applying them in real-life moral decision-making, which could then 
inform interventions. For example, if abstract reasoning and memory are required to 
apply moral values across different situations, interventions could target the training 
of these skills and processes. Interventions which help adolescents with ABIs 
understand the moral rules attached to situations they may frequently encounter 
may also be of benefit. 
Screening some of the component skills of the SIP-MDM framework in 
atypically developing individuals, or those at risk of engaging in antisocial 
behaviours could allow for targeted interventions which may prove more useful than 
general interventions. For example, people with ABIs and also offender populations 
have been found to have deficits in facial emotion recognition (Croker & McDonald, 
2005; Robinson et al., 2012). If an individual has deficits in emotion recognition, the 
SIP-MDM framework would suggest that they will have problems encoding this 
information, which may potentially bias subsequent processing and moral decisions 
and behaviour. Teaching generic social problem solving skills may be of limited 
utility in such a case, as in a real-life situation the individual will still struggle to use 
information from other people’s facial expressions in their moral decision-making. It 
has been found that modification training, to encourage the perception of happiness 
over anger in ambiguous facial expressions, results in a decrease in self-reported 
anger and aggression in TD adults and adolescents at risk of engaging in offending 
behaviour (Penton-Voak, Thomas, Gage, McMurran, McDonald, & Munafò, 2013). 
Further investigation of how components relate to behaviour can help to determine 
which component processes it would be most useful to help train and improve.  
7.4 Strengths and limitations 
7.4.1 Systematic review. The systematic review and meta-analysis 
presented in Chapter 4, is, as far as the author is aware, the first systematic review 
of moral decision-making to explicitly acknowledge the different types of moral 
decisions, and to compare brain activity for the two main types, MRDs and MEs. 
This review also performed quality assessment of the included experiments, 
something which is not normally carried out for neuroimaging systematic reviews. 
The novel method of ALE analysis was employed to perform the meta-analysis. This 
analysis allowed for an assessment of which brain areas consistently show 
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increased activation for MRDs and MEs, and also for conjunction and contrast 
analyses to be performed to explore similarities and differences of brain activation 
for these two types of moral decisions. Findings from this analysis can be used to 
expand on the ‘brain development’ component of the SIP-MDM as it indicates which 
regions are particularly involved when making real-time MEs and MRDs.  
There are several limitations to this systematic review. Firstly, only 10 MRD 
experiments were identified from the literature, and 15 is the minimum 
recommended number of experiments for ALE contrast analysis (Laird et al., 2010; 
Lancaster et al., 2007). While significant clusters were still found for MRD’s and 
ME’s, and the findings are novel, the results should be interpreted with caution as 
the MRD clusters are only based on 10 experiments. Secondly, there were some 
experiments where it was ambiguous as to whether the task was a MRD or ME 
task. Experiments were categorised based on the authors’ claims, and the type of 
question participants responded to (evaluation or response decision), but difficulty 
categorising some of the experiments highlights the lack of consistency among 
moral tasks used in fMRI experiments. Thirdly, some of the tasks appeared to lack 
ecological validity as they did not seem to reflect how moral decisions are made in 
real life situations. Also, to ensure comparability across studies, adolescents were 
excluded so the conclusions drawn, therefore, only apply to adults. 
Due to the wide range of moral tasks were used in the included experiments, 
it is important to acknowledge that differences in brain activation may reflect 
differences in the tasks used across studies, in terms of modality and content of the 
moral stimuli, and the nature of the control task. The presentation modality varied, 
and while most tasks used written stimuli presented on screens for participants to 
read, some experiments, such as Bahnemann et al. (2010) used animated stimuli, 
with participants being asked to judge if the protagonist in the animations is violating 
a norm. Also, there were differences in the content and amount of detail of moral 
stimuli across moral tasks. Bahnemman and colleagues’ (2010) animations featured 
a social violation where a protagonist is punching the other person in the face. While 
this is a real life social and moral (harm) violation, it could be argued that this 
scenario is not as emotive as scenarios involving life or death decisions. Differences 
in emotional engagement, paying more attention to out of the ordinary stimuli, or 
having to think more about scenarios not previously encountered are likely to 
contribute to differences across experiments.  
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Another limitation of some of the included experiments was the nature of the 
task that was used as a comparison to the moral task. For some experiments, 
participants were asked to respond similarly across control and experimental 
conditions, while the stimuli varied. For example, in Parkinson et al. (2011), 
participants judged whether a character’s actions were right or wrong within neutral 
or moral tasks. Differences in brain activity may therefore have been partially 
accounted for by differences in reading and processing moral, compared to neutral 
scenarios, rather than for making a moral compared to a neutral evaluation 
decision, which the authors did acknowledge (p. 3166). Similar issues exist across 
other experiments  (Harenski et al., 2012; Harenski et al., 2014; Han et al., 2014; 
Moll, Eslinger & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll et al., 2002; Reniers et al., 2012). 
Several of the included experiments used the same moral task, classified as a MRD 
task, where participants were asked “would you do X?” after reading a scenario 
about Mr Jones’ dilemma (Harrison et al., 2012; Pujol et al., 2008; Verdejo-Garcia et 
al., 2014). For the control condition, participants were asked to recall the correct 
answer to the non-dilemma vignette, which they had been familiarised with before 
the scanner task, e.g., “will he go to the beach?” The control task used in these 
experiments was, therefore, a recall rather than a decision task, thus the results 
show brain activation differences for recall vs. a MRD, rather than brain activation 
for making a moral as opposed to a non-moral decision. For some of the included 
experiments, the control task may not have been an appropriate comparison for 
moral tasks, so the moral decision-making peak coordinates from these 
experiments should be interpreted with caution.  
7.4.2 Typically developing study. 
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 Design and procedure Study 1 was a theoretically driven empirical 7.4.2.1
study, based on testing hypotheses generated using the SIP-MDM framework and 
the moral theories the framework drew upon. Although moral theories have 
proposed cognitive and affective processes thought to be involved in moral 
development, there is a lack of research which measures such processes alongside 
moral reasoning. Study 1 measured multiple components of the SIP-MDM in order 
to explore relationships between components. These studies employed a cross-
sectional design and all measures were administered at one timepoint. Ideally, in 
order to measure developmental relationships between components of the SIP-
MDM, a longitudinal study would be conducted. This would allow measures to be 
administered at different ages, and predictive developmental relationships between 
components to be explored, for example, whether working memory at age 11 years 
predicts moral reasoning maturity in older adolescence. 
 
 163 
 
 Participants. A priori sample size calculations were performed and 7.4.2.2
the required sample size of 80 was achieved. Participants were recruited from 
schools and colleges in Norwich and Devon, and via media advertisements at the 
University of East Anglia. At school assemblies, all participants were invited to take 
part and to take a letter about the study home to their parents, but there may have 
been some self-selection bias in that those who decided to take part in the study 
differed to those who did not take part. Study 1 involved 80 participants. There was 
also some overlap of participants with Study 2, with some taking part in Study 1 and 
being in the NH group for Study 2. This was only the case for 9 participants, so the 
empirical studies included in this thesis involved 111 adolescents, making a total of 
120 participants. Ethnicity was not recorded in the studies of this thesis but 
participants were mainly recruited from schools and colleges in Norwich and Devon 
so findings may not be generalizable to all adolescents. The age range of the 
sample for Study 1 was 11-18 years but the mean of 14.05 (2.25) years suggests 
that the sample were more slightly in the younger range. Of the 80 TD participants, 
46 were aged 11-14 years (57.5%), and 34 were aged 15-18 (42.5%). More 
relationships between age and variables measured in these studies may have been 
evident if there had been more participants in the older age range. 
 Measures. There may have been problems with some of the 7.4.2.3
measures selected for this study, in terms of sensitivity and construct validity. For 
example, no significant relationships were found for age and perspective taking on 
the triangles measure used in this study, yet previous research using different 
measures has found that perspective taking does develop with age (Dumontheil et 
al., 2010; Vetter et al., 2013). Measures for Study 1 were selected based on their 
suitability of use for this age range (11-18 years), their psychometric properties 
(where reported), and the resources available. Length of the overall testing session 
was also taken into account when choosing appropriate measures. For example, 
the two-subtest version of the WASI-II was used rather than a WISC-IV or WAIS-IV 
as the WASI-II takes just 15 minutes to administer, compared to 90 minutes. The 
empirical studies of this thesis may have benefited from also measuring executive 
functions such as abstract reasoning, but this would have made the overall testing 
sessions too long. There is a need for a set of brief measures, validated for use with 
adolescents, in order to fully measure the cognitive and affective processes thought 
to be important for moral development. 
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Some of the measures across the two TD studies were self-report and 
included in a participant booklet: the IECA (empathy), FAS-II (SES), SDS-17 (social 
desirability), the PANAS (current mood) and the self-report SDQ (behaviour). For 
behaviour, the parent and teacher versions of the SDQ were also administered. 
There was a low response rate of teacher reported SDQs, partly due to a low return 
rate from teachers asked to complete an SDQ and also because not all participants 
were recruited from schools. Teacher SDQs were therefore not used in analyses. 
However, parent report SDQs were returned for the majority of the 80 participants in 
Study 1 (n=62) so were used in the analysis for behavioural difficulties, alongside 
self-report SDQs. Social desirability was also explored as a covariate for analyses 
and entered where appropriate, to control for socially desirable responding to self-
report measures. 
The SRM-SF was used as a measure of moral reasoning in this study, as 
moral schemas are proposed to be relevant for all steps of the SIP-MDM 
framework, and moral reasoning is proposed to be important at Step 5. The SRM-
SF was chosen because it is a widely used instrument and has been shown to have 
excellent levels of test-retest reliability (.88) and internal consistency (.92) (Gibbs et 
al., 1992). It has been argued that the SRM-SF measures higher level moral 
reasoning skills and may therefore offer limited insight into moral reasoning skills 
that guide daily social behaviour (Dooley et al., 2010). An instrument that is based 
on a SIP approach and uses dilemmas containing moral issues may have yielded 
clearer findings for Study 1, but as far as the researcher is aware such an 
instrument has not yet been developed. A SIP instrument, such as the SIPT, which 
uses hypothetical but everyday moral dilemmas to measure SIP skills but can also 
elicit and score moral reasoning maturity levels would allow for the relationships 
between moral reasoning and SIP skills to be more effectively studied. The SIPT, 
used to measure SIP skills in Study 1, presented situations as cartoons and 
drawings, which may have limited the extent to which they elicited empathy and 
related to emotion recognition abilities. The SIPT is a Dutch measure which was 
translated into English after being sent to the researcher. There are video vignettes 
which can be used as part of the SIPT but it was unfeasible to translate these into 
English for Study 1. Future studies may benefit from using video vignettes rather 
than drawings to measure SIP skills 
7.4.3 Data analysis.Many of the variables in Study 1 showed significant 
departures from normality so bootstrapping with 5000 samples was performed and 
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bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals were calculated, which is a 
robust method for dealing with non-normally distributed data. The only missing data 
for these studies were some parent SDQs (n=18). Teacher SDQs were not used in 
analyses due to low response rate. While the required sample size was obtained for 
the TD studies, a larger sample size would have allowed for more complex data 
analysis, such as mediation analysis, or structured equation modelling. Such 
analyses would have enabled a more detailed exploration of relationships between 
components of the SIP-MDM. 
7.4.4 Acquired brain injury study.  
 Design and procedure.The NH group was matched on age and 7.4.4.1
gender to the ABI group and matching was done in pairs rather than at the group 
level. However, there were a few cases where age-matching differed by a year, e.g. 
a 13 year-old female was matched to a 14 year-old female. Also, the groups were 
not matched on general intellectual functioning. General intellectual functioning 
differed significantly between the groups and matching groups on this variable 
would have allowed for general intellectual functioning to be entered as a covariate 
for relevant analyses. Another limitation of this study is that there was no pre-injury 
data for any of the measures, so it could be the case that differences in moral 
reasoning between the ABI and NH group could be due to another factor which is 
inherently different between the groups. However, a longitudinal study measuring 
moral reasoning before and after an ABI in the same individuals would be 
unfeasible.  
The relationships between the So-Mature scores at Time 1 and some 
potential covariates neared significance for the ABI group. Some previous studies 
have found a significant relationship between general intellectual functioning and 
scores on the So-Mature for ABI and TD adolescents (Beauchamp et al., 2013; 
Vera-Estay, Dooley, & Beauchamp, 2015) while others have failed to find a 
significant relationship (Vera-Estay et al., 2016). It is possible that the small sample 
size of the ABI study increased the probability of Type II errors, failing to find a 
relationship between general intellectual functioning and So-Mature scores. Future 
studies should continue to assess general intellectual functioning alongside moral 
reasoning measures as a potential covariate. The relationship between age at injury 
and SRM-SF scores also neared significance, with older age at injury related to 
higher moral reasoning scores. Again, a larger ABI sample may have elicited 
significant relationships between age at injury and moral reasoning scores.  
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A priori sample size estimations were performed and the desired sample 
size was reached. Sample size estimations were based on findings for similar 
studies but methods have been proposed to estimate the required sample size for 
clinical reliability studies (Charter, 1999; Shoukri, Asyali, & Donner, 2004; Zou, 
2012). Such methods propose that a minimum of 400 subjects are required 
(Charter, 1999), which would have been unfeasible for this study. Charter (1999) 
noted that smaller sample sizes may need to be used if, for example, the study is of 
a rare population such as people with brain lesions, or if the tests are solely for 
research purposes; both of which apply to the ABI study in this thesis.  
 Recruitment. There are challenges in recruiting participants with 7.4.4.2
ABIs, which were experienced in this study. Separate R&D applications are required 
to cover different NHS Trusts, which adds additional time following the main NHS 
ethics approval before recruitment can begin. In certain regions of the UK there are 
multiple studies recruiting children and adolescents with ABIs, causing a high 
demand for participants. This high demand means that brain injury charities only 
advertise a limited number of studies and brain injury services may already be 
supporting recruitment for a number of studies. In order to overcome these issues, 
the ABI group were recruited from services across England, national adverts via the 
Encephalitis society website and an advert on the University of Exeter’s Get 
Involved pages. While this ensured that ABI participants came from a wide range of 
counties across England (South Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, 
Cambridgeshire, Somerset, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire) there was a time and 
travel burden on recruitment and data collection. 
The researcher is not a clinician and so did not have direct access to 
individuals with ABI and their families at NHS services. Potential participants were 
identified by clinicians working at each service, based on the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, and contact was then made with the researcher. It cannot be 
ruled out that there was selection bias in recruitment, with clinicians not asking all 
potentially eligible participants about the study. There may also have been some 
self-selection bias in that the families or participants who took part in the study may 
differ to those who chose not to. Whether some individuals were asked about the 
study by clinicians but declined to take part is not known the by researcher, as only 
the details of those who wanted to take part were passed on, due to ethical 
considerations.  
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 Participants. Previous research into moral reasoning in adolescents 7.4.4.3
with ABIs has included samples with TBIs and frontal or temporal lobe lesions. 
Study 2 of this thesis included adolescents with nTBIs in the ABI group. Additionally, 
there was heterogeneity of cause of injury for TBIs and nTBIs. As this study found 
significant differences in moral reasoning maturity on the So-Mature for the ABI and 
NH group, this may suggest that damage to any part of the developing brain, either 
through TBIs or nTBIs can impact on moral reasoning maturity. This would fit with 
the SIP-MDM framework, which proposes that many processes are involved in 
moral decision-making and so moral development may be underpinned by various 
brain regions and networks.  
Although injury severity details were collected from parents and from 
medical records for the ABI group, incomplete data meant that injuries were unable 
to be classified as mild, moderate or severe. While all but one of the TBI participants 
(n=10) had GCS scores, there is not a single scale that is used to assess the 
severity of nTBIs so this information was unreported for five of the nine participants 
in the nTBI subgroup. nTBIs are currently under researched as most studies use 
TBI samples to explore the effects of brain injury on development. The severity of 
TBIs can be classified using the GCS and it has been found that the severity of TBIs 
can affect outcomes (Ryan et al., 2016). A scale which categorises the severity of 
nTBIs would allow researchers to study how the severity of ABIs affects outcomes. 
The effects of injury severity on moral reasoning scores were explored for the TBI 
subgroup only, finding no significant difference between mild and moderate/severe 
TBIs, but this was exploratory analysis only and based on small numbers.  
The only types of injury that were excluded were where the participant 
lacked the physical, cognitive or communication ability to engage in the 
assessments, as this was one of the exclusion criteria for all participants, and ABI 
participants had to be at least 6 months post injury or diagnosis. From the GCS 
scores available, the majority of the ABI group (n=11) had a mild brain injury, three 
had a moderate or severe brain injury and six had no severity information. If the 
sample had included more moderate and severe ABIs, significant differences may 
have been found for SRM-SF scores between the ABI and NH group. The findings 
of this study may not be generalizable to moderate or severe ABIs, although it is 
possible that the six ABI participants with no severity data had moderate or severe 
brain injuries.  
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There are many factors that influence outcomes following ABIs, including 
injury-related factors (e.g. age at injury and injury severity) and non-injury factors 
(e.g. family functioning and SES), and these factors interact with each other to 
determine the extent of post-injury recovery (Anderson, Spencer-Smith, & Wood, 
2011; Kline et al., 2017; Li, Fraser, & Wike, 2013). Therefore, it is difficult to 
generalise findings from ABI studies, particularly from studies with small samples, 
due to the heterogeneity among participants with ABIs in terms of pre and post 
injury factors. Brain injuries that occur during neurodevelopmental sensitive periods 
can impact on developmental trajectories. While some functions recover with time 
(Anderson et al, 2005), deficits may also emerge over time (Chapman, Wade, Walz, 
Taylor, Stancin, & Yeates, 2010; Li et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2015). A brain injury 
that occurs during infancy, when skills are emerging, can have widespread 
implications for the development of all skills (Anderson et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 
2011) and adolescence is a sensitive period for the development of social-cognitive 
skills (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006).  A brain injury that occurs during infancy or 
adolescence may therefore particularly impact on the development of skills and 
processes required for moral development, but the effect of a brain injury on moral 
development will depend on a variety of factors and interaction between these 
factors. 
Some studies investigating the social, cognitive or emotional effects of a TBI 
have used an OI group as a comparison, in order to compare the effects of a TBI to 
other traumatic injuries which do not damage the brain (e.g. Janusz et al., 2002; 
Yeates et al., 2013). However, for the ABI study presented in this thesis, nTBIs such 
as encephalitis and brain tumour were included in the ABI group, so it would have 
been difficult to find a suitable injury comparison group. Also, while OI groups are 
used as comparison groups to control for factors which may relate to both TBIs and 
OIs (such as risk-taking behaviour), there are no known common factors related to 
increased incidence of nTBIs. Furthermore, a recent study found that children with 
OIs and non-injured TD children did not significantly differ on a range of 
demographic variables relating to pre-injury and post-injury characteristics 
(Beauchamp, Landry-Roy, Gravel, Beaudoin, & Bernier, 2017). NH adolescents, 
with no incidence of ABIs were therefore used as a comparison group in Study 2. 
Such comparison groups have also been used in other studies of moral reasoning 
after brain injury (Beauchamp et al., 2013; Chiasson et al., 2017a; Wigg, 2013).  
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 Measures.  Some self-report measures were used in this study, such 7.4.4.4
as the FAS-II (SES), SDS-17 (social desirability) and the self-report SDQ. For 
behavioural difficulties, the parent report SDQ was also administered. There was a 
high return rate of parent SDQs, with only three missing for the NH group. Social 
desirability was also investigated as a covariate to control for socially desirable 
responding on self-report measures. Estimates of general intellectual functioning 
were based either on the WISC-IV (n=12) or the WAIS-IV (n=8) for the ABI group. 
Three ABI participants had completed a WISC-IV in the past year so this was not 
administered again by the researcher. For the NH group, the two-subtest WASI-II 
was used for the majority of participants (n=16) due to practical reasons and time 
constraints of testing participants during the school day. While the WASI-II is linked 
to the WISC-IV and WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008), it may be the case that differences 
in general intellectual functioning between the ABI and NH group were due to the 
different measures used. 
One aim of this study was to investigate the psychometric properties of two 
measures of moral reasoning when used with an ABI sample. The SRM-SF and So-
Mature were chosen as the most appropriate measures, as the SRM-SF is widely 
used in developmental psychology and has previously been used with brain injury 
samples, and the So-Moral was designed to be used by adolescents with brain 
injuries. The SRM-SF scores justifications given for evaluations of moral values. 
The authors excluded hypothetical dilemmas from this measure for practical 
reasons, (to make administration and scoring quicker and easier), due to criticisms 
of artificial dilemmas, and argued that moral evaluation questions are sufficient for 
moral reflection (Gibbs et al., 1992). The So-Mature on the other hand, scores the 
justifications given for response decisions made in hypothetical moral dilemmas. 
While this measure uses everyday dilemmas relevant to adolescents (e.g. whether 
or not to tell the teacher that your friend is cheating on an exam), the scoring is 
based on Kohlberg’s theory, which has received some notable criticisms and been 
subject to revisions (Gibbs, 2013; Gibbs et al., 1992; Rest et al., 1999). As one aim 
of Study 2 was to compare moral reasoning about values to moral reasoning about 
response decisions, and as no production measure using dilemmas employs neo-
Kohlbergian theory for scoring, these two measures were the most 
appropriate.Exploratory analysis was performed in this study to explore levels of 
offending behaviour, and relations to moral reasoning for the ABI group compared 
to the NH group. This was explored because there appears to be a relationship 
between both brain injury and offending and low moral reasoning and offending. 
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The analysis was only exploratory as low levels of offending behaviour were 
expected due to the small sample size and participants being recruited from the 
general population rather than prison or young offenders institutions. A self-report 
measure of delinquency would have made the overall testing session too long and 
this question was not a main aim of the study, so participants were instead asked if 
they had ever been in trouble with the police because of their behaviour. The 
questions were short and provided some information about offending behaviour. As 
expected, offending rates were low with only three participants reporting any police 
contact so no conclusions about the link between moral reasoning, offending and 
ABIs could be made. Ideally, in a larger study investigating the links between moral 
reasoning and offending behaviour in adolescents with ABIs, a validated self-report 
measure of delinquency would be used to capture offending behaviour which has 
not led to police contact. 
7.5 Future directions 
7.5.1 Developmental research. Study 1 found limited support for aspects of 
the SIP-MDM framework for TD adolescents so future research is needed to confirm 
or reject proposals of this integrative framework, which can aid the development of 
theory. Study 2 was a first step towards investigating some aspects of the SIP-MDM 
framework in adolescents with ABIs by investigating the psychometric properties of 
a measure of moral reasoning to use with this population. Further studies need to 
investigate psychometric properties of other measures such as empathy and SIP 
when used with adolescents with ABIs. Future studies can then measure 
components of the SIP-MDM framework and relationships between components in 
ABI samples, to explore whether difficulties in one component impact on other 
components. 
There appears to be a link between ABIs and offending, with high rates of 
TBI among offender populations (Farrer & Hedges, 2011; Hughes et al., 2015; 
Shiroma et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010) and a study finding that a community 
sample of children and adolescents with ABIs reported to have committed multiple 
offences (Luiselli et al., 2000). There is also a strong link between low moral 
reasoning and adolescent offending (Nelson et al., 1990; Stams et al., 2006). It may 
be the case that moral development mediates or moderates the relationship 
between ABIs and offending behaviour, through the impact that damage to the brain 
has on moral maturity. An ABI may affect moral development in many ways, either 
through damage to the brain regions required for real-time moral decision-making or 
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due to the impact of brain damage on the maturation of component processes of the 
SIP-MDM framework. An ABI may also limit social participation and interaction with 
peers, which in turn can impact on opportunities for role-taking, affecting the 
development of perspective taking. The ABI study in this thesis was unable to 
address the link between moral reasoning and offending behaviour but future 
studies using larger samples could aim to establish whether (a) nTBIs are related to 
offending behaviour as TBIs have found to be, and (b) the role of moral maturity in 
the relationship between ABIs and offending.  
The relationship between moral reasoning and behaviour in TD adolescents 
remains unclear. Future research could focus on behaviour as the end product, 
assessing whether there are processes which mediate the link between moral 
reasoning and behaviour, and exploring the influence of different situational factors 
on moral behaviour. Future studies measuring moral reasoning alongside different 
behavioural measures can assess the link between reasoning maturity  and 
behaviour. The So-Moral/So-Mature has the potential to be used to measure how 
different situational factors impact on moral response choices and moral reasoning. 
The So-Moral presents hypothetical dilemmas of real life situations, presented in the 
first person via static photographs on a laptop. Respondents are required to choose 
between two response options and then explain their decision. For example, one 
situation depicts a woman dropping her purse, you (the viewer) and your friends 
picking it up and you then decide whether or not to keep it. When this measure was 
used for Study 2, some participants provided justifications for not keeping it such as 
“because she’s right there, she’d know it was me”. While such answers may have 
indicated perspective taking, they also reference situational factors, which are 
currently not explicitly scored, according to the So-Mature manual.  
The influence of situational factors on moral response decisions and moral 
reasoning could be investigated by using situations with the same moral value 
attached but with modified situational factors, for example peers present or not 
present, an authority figure present or not present. In the purse example, the 
majority of respondents may say they would return the purse but this may be 
different if the person who dropped the purse was not present in the situation, 
although the moral value remains the same. It could also be assessed whether 
situational factors affect moral decision-making differently depending on the 
individual’s highest capacity for reasoning, for example, are individuals reasoning at 
lower stages more influenced by situational factors? After dilemmas are first 
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presented on the So-Moral, respondents are asked to explain what is happening in 
the situation. This question is asked to determine if the respondent understands the 
situation, before then asking how they would respond and why. However, this first 
question could be used to assess whether a respondent recognises the situation as 
being in the moral domain, by scoring whether they reference moral values such as 
fairness or harm. Whether recognising a situation as being in the moral domain 
influences the reasoning that then occurs can then be investigated.  
7.5.2 Neuroscience research. Most neuroimaging and lesion research into 
moral decision-making has focused on MEs, but the incorrect use of moral terms 
has led to the misleading conclusion that there is strong evidence of which brain 
regions are involved in all types of moral decisions. Researchers across disciplines 
use different moral terms interchangeably leading to confusion about what each 
term means, or what is actually being studied. Decety and Cowell (2014) made a 
sound argument that the concept of empathy refers to many distinct phenomena 
and it would be useful if scholars used more specific terms such as emotional 
sharing, empathic concern and perspective taking rather than the catch all term of 
empathy. However, while making this argument in relation to understanding the 
relationship between empathy and morality, the authors used the catch all term 
‘morality’ to refer to moral cognition, moral reasoning and moral judgements. 
Clearer definition of moral terms will hopefully lead to consensus among 
researchers, making it clearer what concept/process is actually being studied.  
While we may have a wealth of evidence from fMRI studies of which brain 
areas are involved when judging the moral permissibility or appropriateness of 
another’s actions (MEs), there is much less evidence of brain areas involved when 
making a decision about what you would do in a moral dilemma (MRDs). 
Furthermore, studies which measure MRDs tend to use life or death scenarios, 
which do not reflect the everyday moral decisions of most people and so may lack 
ecological validity. Future research could focus on assesing the neural correlates of 
everyday moral decision-making, by using more real life scenarios for assessing 
moral decision-making (e.g. the So-Moral, or virtual reality moral tasks). Further 
developmental fMRI studies would help to assess how brain activation patterns for 
different types of moral decisions change with age, which can help our 
understanding of moral decision-making development. 
While this thesis has attempted to bring together social neuroscience and 
developmental psychology approaches to moral decision-making and behaviour, 
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this integration could be taken further. Developmental fMRI or structural MRI studies 
could measure the neural correlates of everyday moral decision making, alongside 
measuring moral reasoning maturity (e.g. using the SRM-SF or So-Mature) to see 
whether there are any relationships between age-related brain activation patterns or 
structural changes, and developmental levels of moral maturity. Research 
measuring brain development from infancy to adulthood, alongside measuring moral 
reasoning, moral decision-making and related components such as perspective 
taking would provide a fuller picture of the brain networks required for moral 
decision-making. Such research would allow the ‘brain development’ of the SIP-
MDM framework to be greatly expanded upon, pinpointing which brain regions are 
most important for the maturation of moral decision-making, and highlighting 
developmental windows of importance which can be useful in training to enhance 
moral decision-making.  
7.6 Conclusion 
Developmental psychology and social neuroscience approaches to moral 
decision-making and development have developed mostly in isolation, informed by 
separate theories and leading to differing research focuses. This thesis has taken 
some initial strides towards bridging the gap between these disciplines. Within this 
thesis, the SIP-MDM framework was proposed, which brought together aspects 
from various theories into one descriptive SIP framework. Tentative support was 
found for some of the hypotheses generated by this framework in TD adolescents, 
but hypotheses relating to some predictive relationships were not supported. 
Additionally, no relationships were found between moral reasoning and perspective 
taking, empathy and emotion recognition, calling into question long-held but largely 
untested theoretical assumptions.  
The systematic review presented in this thesis added to our knowledge of 
brain regions involved in making moral decisions and highlighted that making one’s 
own moral decisions activates additional brain regions compared to making moral 
evaluations such as judging the permissibility of other people’s actions. The ABI 
study found that adolescents with ABIs showed delayed moral reasoning relating to 
moral response decisions but not for moral reasoning relating to moral values, 
suggesting that they may understand moral values but struggle to apply them to 
everyday moral decision-making. The empirical studies presented in this thesis 
confirmed that the relationship between moral reasoning and behaviour remains 
unclear for TD adolescents, while a link was found between delayed moral 
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reasoning about response decisions and behavioural difficulties for adolescents with 
ABIs. The SIP-MDM framework can be used to generate hypotheses, guiding 
further research and theory development in this area. It is hoped that such future 
integrative work will lead to better predictions of moral behaviour and identify where 
interventions can be targeted for those at risk of atypical moral development or 
engaging in antisocial behaviour. 
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Appendix A: Quality assessment checklist for systematic review 
Quality assessment table  
Are these criteria reported in the study? 
1=sufficient evidence reported. 0=no evidence reported/unclear/not explicit 
Reference……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………. 
Total scores: 0-10=low quality, 11-20=medium quality, 21-30=high quality. 
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Experimental 
design 
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experimental units per 
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Both must be 
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moral and 12 non 
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example of content 
 
Total (out of 2)   
Subjects Number of subjects    
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Number of males/females   
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participant 
characteristics 
 
States which IRB approved 
the protocol 
Mark as not reported 
if just states ‘local 
ethics committee’ 
without giving 
name/institution 
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Data 
acquisition  
(these details 
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reported for 
functional 
imaging not 
MRI system manufacturer, 
field strength (Tesla), model 
name 
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MRI acquisition (number of 
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volumes acquired per 
session) 
Needs to report both 
no. of volumes and 
sessions 
 
just structural) Field of view, matrix size, 
slice thickness 
All 3 must be reported  
Pulse sequence type  E.g. gradient/spin 
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TE/TR/flip angle All 3 must be reported  
Total (out of 5)   
Data pre-
processing 
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pre-processing  software 
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Specifies order of pre-
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correlation ratio 
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resolution  
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see below) 
 
Coordinate space  Reports if coordinates 
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normalised to (see 
above). In text not just 
tables 
 
Specifies exactly which 
conditions were subtracted 
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Statistical model reported E.g. Multiple 
regression, ANOVA, 
t-test 
 
Estimation method reported GLS or OLS. Tick as 
reported if e.g. ‘A 
regression using 
3dREMLfit in ANFI’, 
as this is software for 
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states ‘according to 
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OLS) 
Inference type   Mixed or random 
effects 
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E.g. Group activation 
contrasts 
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space 
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tables 
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tables 
Must report X, y, z co-
ordinates, cluster size 
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value 
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OVERALL TOTAL (out of 30) 
  
Appendix B: Quality assessment results for systematic review 
Quality assessment results 
 
Author Year Experimental 
design (/2) 
Task 
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Subjects 
(/6) 
Data 
acquisition 
(/5) 
Data pre-
processing 
(/5) 
Analysis 
(/7) 
Tables 
(/3) 
Total 
(/30) 
Descriptive 
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Avram et al 2013 2 2 3 4 3 3 2 19 Medium 
Avram et al 2014 2 2 5 4 3 4 2 22 High 
Bahnemann 
et al 
2010 2 2 4 2 4 5 3 22 High 
Borg et al 2006 2 2 5 3 1 5 2 20 Medium 
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de Achaval et 
al 
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FeldmanHall 
et al 
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Han et al  2014 2 2 5 5 3 6 3 26 High 
Harada et al 2009 2 2 4 5 2 7 2 24 High 
Harenski et al  2014 2 2 5 4 4 4 1 22 High 
Harenski et al  2008 1 2 3 5 3 6 1 21 High 
Harenski et al  2012 2 2 5 4 4 4 3 24 High 
Harrison et al 2012 2 2 6 5 4 5 2 26 High 
Heekeren et 
al 
2003 2 2 3 5 2 5 2 21 High 
Heekeren et 
al 
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Moll et al 2001 2 1 3 5 2 6 1 20 Medium 
Moll et al 2002 2 2 4 3 2 4 3 20 Medium 
Parkinson et 2011 1 2 2 4 3 6 2 20 Medium 
al 
Prehn et al 2008 2 2 3 3 4 5 3 22 High 
Pujol et al 2012 1 2 6 4 4 6 2 25 High 
Reniers et al 2012 2 2 5 4 5 5 2 25 High 
Roberston et 
al  
2007 2 2 5 3 3 4 3 22 High 
Schleim et al 2011 2 2 3 4 3 6 3 23 High 
Schneider et 
al 
2012 2 2 5 4 4 5 3 25 High 
Sommer et al  2010 2 2 3 4 3 4 2 20 Medium 
Sommer et al  2014 1 2 4 4 3 6 2 22 High 
Takahashi et 
al 
2008 2 2 2 4 4 5 1 20 Medium 
Verdejo-
Garcia et al 
2012 1 2 4 5 2 3 2 19 Medium 
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The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Vice-Chair.  
 
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the NRES website, 
together with your contact details, unless you expressly withhold permission to do so.  
Publication will be no earlier than three months from the date of this favourable opinion letter.  
Should you wish to provide a substitute contact point, require further information, or wish to 
withhold permission to publish, please contact the REC Manager Miss Kate Donaldson, 
NRESCommittee.EastofEngland-Essex@nhs.net. 
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation 
as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
NHS sites 
 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to management 
permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the start of the study (see 
"Conditions of the favourable opinion" below). 
 
Non-NHS sites 
 
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of the 
study. 
 
The Committee was not content with Q2 in the Participant Booklet asking for the age in years 
and months. It was agreed that it is not appropriate to ask for age in years and months in these 
very small groups as this would allow easy identification of individuals. The Committee request 
that 
 
1. ‘Months’ is removed  
 
Or 
 
2. The researcher provides significant justification as to why this degree of participant 
identifiable data is needed. 
 
You should notify the REC in writing once all conditions have been met (except for site 
approvals from host organisations) and provide copies of any revised documentation 
with updated version numbers. The REC will acknowledge receipt and provide a final list 
of the approved documentation for the study, which can be made available to host 
organisations to facilitate their permission for the study. Failure to provide the final 
versions to the REC may cause delay in obtaining permissions. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the 
start of the study at the site concerned. 
 
Management permission ("R&D approval") should be sought from all NHS organ isations 
involved in the study in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements.  
 
Guidance on applying for NHS permission for research is available in the Integrated Research 
Application System or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.   
 
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and referring potential 
participants to research sites ("participant identification centre"), guidance should be sought 
from the R&D office on the information it requires to give permission for this activity.  
 
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
For non-NHS sites, site management permission should be obtained in accordance with the 
procedures of the relevant host organisation.  
 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of approvals from host organisations  
 
Registration of Clinical Trials 
 
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) must be registered 
on a publically accessible database within 6 weeks of recruitment of the first participant (for 
medical device studies, within the timeline determined by the current registration and publication 
trees).   
 
There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you should do so at the earliest 
opportunity e.g when submitting an amendment.  We will audit the registration details as part of 
the annual progress reporting process. 
 
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research is registered but 
for non clinical trials this is not currently mandatory. 
 
If a sponsor wishes to contest the need for registration they should contact Catherine Blewett 
(catherineblewett@nhs.net), the HRA does not, however, expect exceptions to be made. 
Guidance on where to register is provided within IRAS. 
 
 
 
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are complied with 
before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular site (as applicable).  
 
Approved documents 
 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
Advertisement: Recruitment Poster to advertise for 
participants at UEA 
1  10 May 2013  
Advertisement: Recruitment Poster to advertise for ABI 
group 11-16 (poster for parents) 
1  10 May 2013  
Advertisement: Recruitment poster to advertise for ABI 
group 16-21 
1  10 May 2013  
Evidence of insurance or indemnity: Zurich Municipal 
Policy Number NHE-09CA01-0013 
 22 May 2013  
GP/Consultant Information Sheets: Letter for clinicians or 
charities 
 10 May 2013  
GP/Consultant Information Sheets: Letter for schools 1  10 May 2013  
GP/Consultant Information Sheets: Letter for colleges 1  10 May 2013  
Investigator CV: Beverley Garrigan  10 May 2013  
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
Letter from Sponsor: Letter from UEA Sue Steel  09 July 2013  
Letter of invitation to participant: Letter for parents of 
potential participants recruited from schools 
1  10 May 2013  
Letter of invitation to participant: Info for clinicians to give 
to potential participants aged 16-21 
1  10 May 2013  
Letter of invitation to participant: Info for clinicians to give 
to potential participants aged 11-16 
1  10 May 2013  
Letter of invitation to participant: Information for schools to 
give to potential participants 
1  10 May 2013  
Letter of invitation to participant: Information summary 
sheet for colleges to give to potential participants 
1  10 May 2013  
Other: Academic Supervisor CV: Dr Peter Langdon    13 September 2011  
Other: Academic Supervisor CV: Dr Anna Adlam       
Other: Email from Peter Langdon - Scientific Critique    07 August 2013  
Other: Information Summary Sheet for Colleges to give to 
Potential Participants  
1  18 September 2013  
Other: Information for Schools to give to Potential 
Participants  
1  18 September 2013  
Other: Debriefing Sheet for Under 16 year olds  1  18 September 2013  
Other: Debriefing Sheet for Parents of Under 16s  1  18 September 2013  
Other: Debriefing Sheet for Over 16s  1  18 September 2013  
Other: Email from Dr Jerosch-Herold: Peer Review    20 September 2013  
Other: Checklist for home visits  1  23 September 2013  
Other: Covering letter for parents, to include with parent 
booklet  
1  18 September 2013  
Other: Debriefing Sheet for Parents  1  18 September 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Consent to contact form for 
participants age 16-21  
1  10 May 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Consent to contact form for 
participants age 11-16  
1  10 May 2013  
Participant Consent Form: for Parents  2  18 September 2013  
Participant Consent Form: for Comparison Group age 16-
21  
2  18 September 2013  
Participant Consent Form: for Comparison Group Parents 
to give Consent for Child  
2  18 September 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Assent Form for Comparison 
Group age 11-16  
2  18 September 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Assent form for ABI group age 
11-16  
3  15 October 2013  
Participant Consent Form: for ABI group age 16-21  3  15 October 2013  
Participant Consent Form: for ABI group parents to give 
consent for child  
3  15 October 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: for Parents  2  18 September 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: for Parents of Comparison 
Children  
2  18 September 2013  
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
Participant Information Sheet: for Comparison Group Age 
16-21  
2  18 September 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: for ABI group 16-21  2  18 September 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: for Parents of ABI Children  2  18 September 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: Comparison Group age 11-
16  
2  18 September 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: ABI Group age 11-16  2  18 September 2012  
Protocol  2  08 September 2013  
Questionnaire: Parent/Caregiver Booklet ABI group  1  10 May 2013  
Questionnaire: Parent/Caregiver Booklet Comparison 
Group  
1  10 May 2013  
Questionnaire: Participant Booklet  3  15 October 2013  
REC application  123083/484298/1/918  18 July 2013  
Response to Request for Further Information: Letter from 
Beverley Garrigan 
 02 October 2013  
Response to Request for Further Information: Email from 
Beverley Garrigan 
 16 October 2013  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
After ethical review 
 
Reporting requirements 
 
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed 
guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including:  
 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Adding new sites and investigators 
 Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
 Progress and safety reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of 
changes in reporting requirements or procedures. 
 
Feedback 
 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National 
Research Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you wish to make your views known 
please use the feedback form available on the website. 
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
 
Further information is available at National Research Ethics Service website > After Review 
 
13/EE/0289                          Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
We are pleased to welcome researchers and R & D staff at our NRES committee members’  
training days – see details at http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/  
 
With the Committee’s best wishes for the success of this project. 
 
Yours sincerely 
pp 
 
 
Niki Bannister 
Vice-Chair 
 
Email:NRESCommittee.EastofEngland-Essex@nhs.net 
 
Enclosures:  “After ethical review – guidance for 
   researchers” SL-AR2 
 
Copy to:                        Mrs Sue Steel 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
 
NRES Committee East of England - Essex 
 
London REC Office  
Health Research Authority 
Ground Floor, Skipton House 
80 London Road 
London 
SE1 6LH 
 
Tel: 020 797 22560 
12 November 2013 
 
Miss Beverley Garrigan 
PhD Student 
University of East Anglia 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
 
Dear Miss Garrigan 
 
Study title: Understanding how brain injury affects development. 
REC reference: 13/EE/0289 
Amendment number: Minor Amendment 01  
Amendment date: 07 November 2013 
IRAS project ID: 123083 
 
Thank you for your letter of 07 November 2013, notifying the Committee of the above 
amendment. 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees.  The amendment does 
not therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the R&D 
office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The documents received were as follows: 
 
 Document  Version  Date  
Notification of a Minor Amendment (Email from Beverley Garrigan)  07 November 2013  
Participant Booklet  5  07 November 2013  
Injury Characteristics  1  04 November 2013  
  
 
 
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
13/EE/0289:    Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Miss Kate Donaldson 
REC Manager 
 
E-mail: NRESCommittee.EastofEngland-Essex@nhs.net 
 
Copy to: Mrs Sue Steel 
 
 
 
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
the National Patient Safety Agency and Research Ethics Committees in England  
 
 
 
NRES Committee East of England - Essex 
 
London REC Office  
Health Research Authority 
Ground Floor, Skipton House 
80 London Road 
London 
SE1 6LH 
 
Tel: 020 797 22560 
29 November 2013 
 
Miss Beverley Garrigan 
PhD Student 
University of East Anglia 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
 
Dear Miss Garrigan 
 
Study title: Understanding how brain injury affects development. 
REC reference: 13/EE/0289 
Amendment number: Minor Amendment 02 to Protocol and Consent Forms 
Amendment date: 28 November 2013 
IRAS project ID: 123083 
 
Thank you for your letter of 28 November 2013, notifying the Committee of the above 
amendment. 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees. The amendment does not 
therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the R&D 
office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The documents received were as follows: 
 
 Document  Version  Date  
Participant Consent Form: Consent Form for ABI group age 16-21  5  28 November 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Consent Form for comparison group age 
16-21  
3  28 November 2013  
Protocol  3  28 November 2013  
Notification of a Minor Amendment (Email from Beverley Garrigan)  28 November 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Assent Form for ABI group age 11-16  5  28 November 2013  
This Research Ethics Committee is an advisory committee to London Strategic Health Authority  
The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) represents the NRES Directorate within  
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Participant Consent Form: Assent Form for comparison group age 
11-16  
3  28 November 2013  
  
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
13/EE/0289:    Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Miss Kate Donaldson 
REC Manager 
 
E-mail: NRESCommittee.EastofEngland-Essex@nhs.net 
 
Copy to: Mrs Sue Steel 
 
 
 
 
NRES Committee East of England - Essex 
 
London REC Office  
Health Research Authority 
Ground Floor, Skipton House 
80 London Road 
London 
SE1 6LH 
 
Tel:  
Fax:  
 
 
02 May 2014 
 
Miss Beverley Garrigan 
PhD Student 
University of East Anglia 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
 
Dear Miss Garrigan 
 
Study title: Understanding how brain injury affects development. 
REC reference: 13/EE/0289 
Amendment number: Minor Amendment for information only 
Amendment date: 02 May 2014 
IRAS project ID: 123083 
 
Thank you for your email of 02 May 2014, notifying the Committee of the above amendment. 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees.  The amendment does 
not therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the R&D 
office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The documents received were as follows: 
 
 Document  Version  Date  
Participant Information Sheet: ABI group aged 11-15  4  02 May 2014  
Participant Consent Form: for ABI group aged 16-21  6  02 May 2014  
Participant Information Sheet: for clinicians to give to potential 
participants aged 11-16  
2  02 May 2014  
Participant Consent Form: Parents go give consent for child  5  02 May 2014  
Participant Information Sheet: for clinicians to give to potential 
participants aged 16-21  
2  02 May 2014  
Participant Information Sheet: Parents of ABI children  4  02 May 2014  
Participant Consent Form: Assent Form for ABI group aged 11-16  6  02 May 2014  
Notification of a Minor Amendment  email from 
Beverley 
Garrigan  
02 May 2014  
Participant Information Sheet: ABI group aged 16-21  4  02 May 2014  
  
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
13/EE/0289:    Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Mrs. Alison   O'Kane   
Committee Co-ordinator 
 
Copy to: Mrs Sue Steel 
 
 
 
 
NRES Committee East of England - Essex 
Health Research Authority 
Ground Floor, Skipton House 
80 London Road 
London 
SE1 6LH 
 
Tel:  
Fax:  
 
 
25 July 2014 
 
Miss Beverley Garrigan 
PhD Student 
University of East Anglia 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
 
Dear Miss Garrigan 
 
Study title: Understanding how brain injury affects development. 
REC reference: 13/EE/0289 
Amendment number: Minor amendment for information only 
Amendment date: 24 July 2014 
IRAS project ID: 123083 
 
Thank you for your letter of 24 July 2014, notifying the Committee of the above amendment. 
It is noted you would like to add that participants (over 16), or parents (of the participants 
under 16) can also request a report of their/their child’s scores on standardised measures 
used in the study, which are the IQ measure (WISC/WAIS) and the behaviour measure 
(SDQ). 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees.  The amendment does 
not therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the R&D 
office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The documents received were as follows: 
 
Document   Version   Date   
Notice of Minor Amendment [email ]    24 July 2014  
Participant consent form [ABI group parents to give consent for 
child]  
7  24 July 2014  
Participant consent form [Comparison group]  5  24 July 2014  
Participant consent form [ABI Group aged 16-21]  8  24 July 2014  
Participant consent form [Comparison group parents to give consent 
for child]  
4  24 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Parents of ABI group]  6  24 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [ABI group aged 16-21]  6  24 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Comparison group age 16-21]  4  24 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [ABI group aged 11-15]  6  24 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Parents of comparison children]  4  24 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Comparison group aged 11-16]  4  24 July 2014  
Research protocol or project proposal  5  24 July 2014  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
13/EE/0289:    Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Mrs. Alison   O'Kane   
REC Manager 
 
E-mail: nrescommittee.eastofengland-essex@nhs.net 
 
Copy to:  
Mrs  Sue Steel  
 
 
 
NRES Committee East of England - Essex 
Health Research Authority 
Ground Floor, Skipton House 
80 London Road 
London 
SE1 6LH 
 
Tel:  
Fax:  
 
 
14 July 2014 
 
Miss Beverley Garrigan 
PhD Student 
University of East Anglia 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
 
Dear Miss Garrigan 
 
Study title: Understanding how brain injury affects development. 
REC reference: 13/EE/0289 
Amendment number:  
Amendment date: 14 July 2014 
IRAS project ID: 123083 
 
Thank you for your letter of 14 July 2014, notifying the Committee of the above amendment. 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees.  The amendment does 
not therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the R&D 
office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The documents received were as follows: 
 
Document   Version   Date   
Notice of Minor Amendment [email]    14 July 2014  
Participant consent form [comparison group parents to give consent 
for child]  
3  11 July 2014  
Participant consent form [ABI group parents to give consent for 
child]  
6  11 July 2014  
Participant consent form [comparison group age 16-21]  4  11 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [parents of comparison children]  3  11 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [ABI group age 11-15]  5  11 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [comparison group age 16-21]  3  11 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [comparison group age 11-16]  3  11 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [ABI group 16-21]  5  11 July 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [parents of ABI children]  5  11 July 2014  
Research protocol or project proposal  4  11 July 2014  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
13/EE/0289:    Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Mrs. Alison O'Kane   
REC Manager 
 
E-mail: nrescommittee.eastofengland-essex@nhs.net 
 
Copy to:  
Mrs  Sue Steel  
 
 
 
NRES Committee East of England - Essex 
The Old Chapel 
Royal Standard Place 
Nottingham 
NG1 6FS 
 
Tel: 0115 8839697 
18 November 2014 
 
Miss Beverley Garrigan 
PhD Student 
University of East Anglia 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
Dear Miss Garrigan, 
 
Study title: Understanding how brain injury affects development. 
REC reference: 13/EE/0289 
Amendment date: 14 November 2014 
IRAS project ID: 123083 
 
Thank you for your letter of 14 November 2014, notifying the Committee of the above 
amendment. 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees.  The amendment does 
not therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the R&D 
office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The documents received were as follows: 
 
Document   Version   Date   
Notice of Minor Amendment    14 November 2014  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
13/EE/0289:    Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Ms Rachel  Nelson 
REC Manager 
 
E-mail:   nrescommittee.eastofengland-essex@nhs.net 
 
Copy to: Mrs Sue Steel  
 
 
 
East of England - Essex Research Ethics Committee 
The Old Chapel 
Royal Standard Place 
Nottingham 
NG1 6FS 
18 February 2016 
 
Miss Beverley Garrigan 
PhD Student 
University of East Anglia 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
 
Dear Miss Garrigan 
 
Study title: Understanding how brain injury affects development. 
REC reference: 13/EE/0289 
Amendment number: Extend study & shorter IQ test 
Amendment date: 06 February 2016 
IRAS project ID: 123083 
 
Thank you for your letter of 06 February 2016, notifying the Committee of the above 
amendment. 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees. The amendment does not 
therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the R&D 
office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The documents received were as follows: 
 
Document  Version  Date  
Notice of Minor Amendment [2016.02.08 13EE0289 Minor 
Amendment notice - email from CI]  
Extend study 
& shorter IQ 
test  
06 February 2016  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Participant info sheet 
Comparison 11-16]  
5  05 February 2016  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Participant Information Sheet 
Comparison 16-21]  
5  05 February 2016  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Participant Information Sheet for 
parents of comparison children under 16]  
5  05 February 2016  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
 
13/EE/0289:    Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Adam Garretty 
REC Assistant 
 
Email: NRESCommittee.EastofEngland-Essex@nhs.net 
 
Copy to: Mrs Sue Steel  
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a b s t r a c t
The aims of this systematic review were to determine: (a) which brain areas are consistently more active
when making (i) moral response decisions, defined as choosing a response to a moral dilemma, or decid-
ing whether to accept a proposed solution, or (ii) moral evaluations, defined as judging the appropriate-
ness of another’s actions in a moral dilemma, rating moral statements as right or wrong, or identifying
important moral issues; and (b) shared and significantly different activation patterns for these two types
of moral judgements. A systematic search of the literature returned 28 experiments. Activation likelihood
estimate analysis identified the brain areas commonly more active for moral response decisions and for
moral evaluations. Conjunction analysis revealed shared activation for both types of moral judgement in
the left middle temporal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, and medial frontal gyrus. Contrast analyses found no sig-
nificant clusters of increased activation for the moral evaluations-moral response decisions contrast, but
found that moral response decisions additionally activated the left and right middle temporal gyrus and
the right precuneus. Making one’s own moral decisions involves different brain areas compared to judg-
ing the moral actions of others, implying that these judgements may involve different processes.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) has increasingly been used to measure the neural correlates
of moral decision-making, adding to our understanding of the cog-
nitive and affective processes involved. Nevertheless, there are
issues with a lack of consistency amongst studies (Christensen &
Gomila, 2012); a variety of different tasks have been used, and
there are no agreed definitions, meaning that moral terms such
as judgement, reasoning, sensitivity and moral cognition are all
used differently across experiments. For the purpose of this study,
we define moral judgements from a developmental psychology
perspective; a moral judgement can refer to any judgement made
within the moral domain, i.e. judgements relating to moral princi-
ples such as harm, justice, and fairness (Smetana, 2006; Turiel,
1983). Moral judgements can either be response decisions about
what to do in a moral dilemma (self), or can be judgements of
others, including judging individuals, groups, institutions or moral
principles. The distinction between different types of moral judge-
ment has not been explicitly recognised amongst cognitive neuro-
scientists, with recent meta-analyses in this field grouping all task
types together when analysing the neural correlates of moral
decision-making. Task-type may influence the results, and whether
moral judgements related to the self involve different processes,
and different brain areas relative to moral judgements about others
has not yet been considered in previous systematic reviews.
The moral tasks used in fMRI experiments which involve an
active judgement (as opposed to passive judgements) can be
grouped into two categories: (a) moral response decision tasks,
where an individual is asked to make a decision (judgement) about
what they would do in a hypothetical moral dilemma; and (b)
moral evaluation tasks, where an individual is asked to judge the
appropriateness or moral permissibility of another’s actions, or
asked to identify or judge a moral issue or violation. Moral
response decisions require an individual to think about what they
would do in a moral dilemma, whereas moral evaluations require
judging the moral permissibility or appropriateness of the actions
of others in a moral dilemma. Discrepancy has been found for
answers to moral response questions (‘‘Would you do X?”) and
moral evaluation questions (‘‘Is it wrong to do X?)” in moral
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.07.007
0278-2626/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author at: Tizard Centre, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7LR,
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dilemmas (Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013); ‘‘it seems that
deciding what to do is not processed in the same way as deciding
whether an action is right or wrong, and that in moral dilemmas
it is the first that matters” (Christensen, Flexas, Calabrese, Gut, &
Gomila, 2014, p. 5). A systematic review of moral decision-
making which compares brain activation patterns for moral evalu-
ations and moral response decisions can help to address whether
these different questions are indeed processed in different ways
in the brain. We hypothesised that making one’s own decisions
about what to do in a moral dilemma and judging the moral
actions of others will show increased activation of different brain
areas, with response decisions showing greater activation in self-
referential regions and evaluations showing greater activation in
theory of mind (ToM) regions.
There appears to be no evidence for a uniquely ‘‘moral brain”
(Young & Dungan, 2012), as brain areas that show increased activa-
tion during moral tasks are also involved in other functions. How-
ever, the brain region which appears to be of particular importance
for morality, based on neuroimaging and lesion studies, is the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair, &
Luo, 2006; Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Marazziti, Baroni, Landi,
Ceresoli, & Dell’Osso, 2013; Raine & Yang, 2006). The vmPFC is
thought to be involved in emotion regulation, and activation dur-
ing moral decision-making tasks is seen as evidence of the involve-
ment of emotion processes in making moral judgements (Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Reviews of moral
neuroimaging evidence have also suggested that ToM is a key cog-
nitive input to moral judgement because ToM brain regions show
increased activation when making moral judgements (Blair et al.,
2006; Young & Dungan, 2012). However, this conclusion may have
been overstated because most neuroimaging experiments utilise
moral evaluation tasks, where participants are asked to evaluate
the actions of others. So while ToM is likely to be involved in judg-
ing the moral permissibility or appropriateness of others’ actions, it
remains to be seen whether ToM brain regions are as active when
making one’s own moral response decisions.
Two recent meta-analyses have been conducted on brain areas
consistently showing increased activation in moral decision-
making studies. Bzdok et al. (2012) performed an activation likeli-
hood estimate (ALE) analysis of morality, empathy and ToM and
found overlap in activation for ToM and morality. Experiments
were only included in the ‘moral cognition’ domain, which they
defined as a ‘‘reflection of the social appropriateness of people’s
actions” (p. 789) if the task required participants to make judge-
ments of other people’s actions. It is, therefore, not surprising that
there was overlap with ToM brain activation, as moral evaluation
tasks require thinking in the third person to evaluate the actions
of others, which may include inferring others’ intentions to judge
the permissibility of their actions. It remains to be investigated
whether such an overlap with ToM regions would occur for moral
response decision tasks. Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) recent system-
atic review of brain processes underlying moral cognition found
activation in the default mode network. They compared brain
activity for active vs. passive judgements and found that active
judgements showed more activity in the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ), angular gyrus, and temporal pole compared to passive view-
ing. Within the active domain however, they did not distinguish
between moral response decision judgements and moral evalua-
tion judgements, so it still remains to be investigated whether
brain activity differs between these two types of moral decisions.
The aims of the current systematic review and meta-analysis
are twofold: (a) to investigate which brain areas consistently show
increased activation when making (i) moral response decisions
(MRD), or (ii) making moral evaluations (ME) compared to non-
moral or neutral decisions or evaluations; and (b) to compare brain
activation patterns for these two types of moral judgements to
determine shared or significant differences in brain activation. A
quality assessment of the included experiments was also under-
taken, something which is often omitted from ALE studies.
All neuroimaging experiments of any type of moral decision-
making were systematically searched and retrieved. Eligible
experiments were categorised as either response decisions, or
evaluations. ALE analysis was used to assess brain areas signifi-
cantly more activated for both types of moral judgement, while
conjunction and contrast analyses were performed to determine
areas of significant difference. This allowed for the potential
discrepancy in brain activation between task-type to be considered.
2. Method
2.1. Search strategy
A systematic search was conducted to identify all neuroimaging
experiments of moral decision-making. Three databases, PubMed,
PsycInfo and Web of Science were searched up to March 2015
using the terms ‘‘Moral” AND ‘‘Neuroimag⁄ OR neural OR fMRI
OR functional magnetic resonance OR PET OR positron emission
tomography OR MEG OR magnetoencephalography OR brain”.
Where the database allowed, results were limited to humans, Eng-
lish language and full text articles (excluding letters, editorials
etc.). This search returned 3563 results (2521 after duplicates
removed) which were exported to EndNote X7. A title screen was
performed to remove those obviously irrelevant, followed by an
abstract screen (see Fig. 1 for PRISMA flowchart). One hundred
and twenty-one references remained for full text screening, which
was performed based on the eligibility criteria (Table 1). The refer-
ence list of recent systematic reviews (Bzdok et al., 2012; Sevinc &
Spreng, 2014) were also screened for additional references. The ini-
tial search, title and abstract screen was carried out by BG. Full text
screening was carried out by BG and PL independently and deci-
sions were compared. Where there was a disagreement, these were
discussed with reference to the inclusion criteria and a joint deci-
sion was reached.
Data extraction was performed by BG for the included experi-
ments. Details of task type and description were extracted, along
with relevant foci co-ordinates for the ALE analysis. Experiments
were either categorised as MRDs or MEs based on task design.
Coordinates of moral vs. non-moral/neutral conditions were
extracted into an Excel file and any coordinates reported in Mon-
treal Neurological Institute (MNI) space were converted to Talair-
ach using the icbm2tal transformation in GingerAle 2.3.4 (Laird
et al., 2010; Lancaster et al., 2007). Where an experiment did fit
the inclusions criteria but did not report coordinates of moral vs.
non-moral/neutral conditions, the main author was contacted via
email to request these data. If there was no response after three
weeks, the experiment was excluded due to lack of appropriate
data to extract for ALE analysis. Where an experiment included a
sample of non-typically developing adults, it was only included if
coordinates for the comparison group were presented separately,
and only these data were extracted for analysis. For some experi-
ments, there was more than one moral condition (e.g., moral per-
sonal and moral impersonal) and these were collapsed together
to make moral vs. non-moral for extraction purposes. Where there
was more than one comparison condition to a moral condition,
data were extracted for moral vs. the most neutral condition (i.e.,
if there was a non-moral and a neutral condition, the moral vs.
neutral comparison was extracted). Different experiments had dif-
ferent thresholds for significant clusters, but for each experiment,
coordinates were extracted for moral vs. non-moral or neutral if
they met the whole brain threshold set by the authors. In some
papers, authors reported coordinates under the threshold because
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they related to an a priori hypothesis or region of interest; these
coordinates were not extracted for meta-analysis.
A quality assessment tool was developed by BG and PL, based
on guidelines for reporting an fMRI study (Poldrack et al., 2008),
using a binary scale (1 = evidence reported, 0 = no evidence
reported/unclear/not explicit; see Supplementary Material). Exper-
iments scoring 0–10 were classed as low quality, 11–20 classed as
medium quality and 21–30 classed as high quality. BG performed
quality assessment for all included experiments and PL performed
quality assessment on 20% of included experiments independently.
2.2. Analysis
ALE analysis is a commonly used method for coordinate based
meta-analysis. This method assesses the patterns of activation foci
reported in different experiments, to establish where in the brain
convergence is higher than would be expected if foci were nor-
mally distributed throughout the brain (Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird,
Kurth, & Fox, 2012; Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2012),
taking sample sizes of experiments into account. ALE analysis
was performed using GingerAle 2.3.4 on the x, y, z coordinates of
moral vs. non-moral or neutral conditions. Firstly, ALE analysis
Fig. 1. PRISMA flowchart (from Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2009).
Table 1
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for experiments.
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Moral decision-making task with
active judgement required
(response decision or evaluation)
Not moral task, or passive moral task
(e.g. just viewing moral stimuli with
no judgement required)
Neuroimaging method No neuroimaging method used
Talairach or MNI coordinates
reported for whole brain analysis
No coordinates reported, or region of
interest analysis only
Moral task activation compared to
non-moral or neutral task
activation
No control task, or no moral vs. non-
moral/neutral comparison
coordinates reported
Typical/healthy adult subjects. (If
experiment also includes non-
typical participants, data for
comparison group must be
reported separately)
Subjects with developmental or
neurological disorder, psychopathy,
drug dependency or children/
adolescents (can include if
comparison group/adult data
reported separately)
English language paper Not English language
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was performed for all ME experiments and then for all MRD exper-
iments. A conjunction analysis was then performed to find shared
brain activation for ME and MRD judgements. Contrast analyses
were performed to assess differences in brain activation (MRD-
ME and ME-MRD).
Conjunction analysis comparing the results of the present ALE
to results from recent ALE systematic reviews was not possible
without knowledge of exactly which foci had been extracted for
each included experiment of previous reviews, and was also not
practical due to differences in inclusion and exclusion criteria.
The results of the present ALE were instead compared visually with
results from two recent reviews (Bzdok et al., 2012; Sevinc &
Spreng, 2014) where appropriate, and outlined in the discussion.
Results from these previous reviews were reported in MNI coordi-
nates, so for an easier comparison with our results we transformed
their reported coordinates to Talairach coordinates using the using
the icbm2tal transformation in GingerAle 2.3.4 (Laird et al., 2010;
Lancaster et al., 2007) and then labelled the areas using Talairach
client (Lancaster et al., 1997, 2000).
3. Results
After full text screening, 28 separate experiments were eligible
for inclusion, with a total of 271 foci from 642 participants. All
experiments used fMRI, 10 used a MRD task and 18 used a ME task.
Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the included
experiments.
ALE analysis was performed for all ME experiments and all MRD
experiments, cluster-level = 0.05, 1000 permutations, p = 0.001. Con-
junction and contrast analyses were then performed, p = 0.01, 1000
permutations, minimum cluster = 200mm3, to assess shared and
divergent brain activation between the two task types. Table 3
shows the results of ALE analysis, and Fig. 2 shows the largest sig-
nificant clusters of brain activation found for each ALE analysis. All
coordinates are reported in Talairach space.
Six significant clusters of activation were found across the ME
experiments (18 experiments, 174 foci, 383 participants): two in
the left medial frontal gyrus (MFG), the left superior temporal
gyrus (STG), left cingulate gyrus (CG), right STG and right MFG.
Six significant clusters were found across the MRD experiments
(10 experiments, 97 foci, 259 participants): left middle temporal
gyrus (MTG), left precuneus, right MFG, right MTG, right inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) and left caudate. Conjunction analysis revealed
three clusters of shared activation for both moral task types: the
left MTG, left cingulate gyrus and left MFG. A contrast analysis of
MEs-MRDs did not find any significant clusters. However, a con-
trast analysis of MRDs-MEs found three significant clusters: the
right MTG, right precuneus, and left MTG.
Quality assessment indicated that 20 experiments were high
quality, eight were medium quality and none were low quality
(see Supplementary Material). The medium quality experiments
did not report as much information as the high quality experi-
ments. Analyses included all experiments regardless of quality,
but issues regarding the quality of included experiments are out-
lined in the discussion and should be taken into consideration
when interpreting the results. Agreement between BG and PL for
quality assessment was k = 1 (p = 0.14), ICC = 0.88 (p = 0.005).
4. Discussion
4.1. Interpretation of significant clusters of activation
This systematic review and meta-analysis builds on previous
reviews in the field by differentiating between MRD judgements
and ME judgements, to assess similarities and differences in Ta
bl
e
2
Ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
of
in
cl
ud
ed
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
.
R
ef
er
en
ce
Su
bj
ec
ts
C
on
di
ti
on
s
N
o.
fo
ci
M
or
al
st
im
u
li
M
or
al
ta
sk
in
st
ru
ct
io
n
s/
re
sp
on
se
fo
rm
at
M
or
al
re
sp
on
se
de
ci
si
on
s
B
or
g,
H
yn
es
,V
an
H
or
n
,G
ra
ft
on
,a
n
d
Si
n
n
ot
t-
A
rm
st
ro
n
g
(2
00
6)
24
M
or
al
vs
.n
on
-m
or
al
7
W
ri
tt
en
m
or
al
sc
en
ar
io
s
Y
es
/N
o
bu
tt
on
pr
es
s
to
‘‘I
s
it
w
ro
n
g
to
do
it
?”
an
d
‘‘W
ou
ld
yo
u
do
it
?”
af
te
r
ea
ch
sc
en
ar
io
C
h
io
n
g
et
al
.(
20
13
)
16
M
or
al
pe
rs
on
al
vs
.n
on
-
m
or
al
3
M
od
ifi
ed
G
re
en
e
(2
00
1)
di
le
m
m
as
pr
es
en
te
d
as
w
ri
tt
en
te
xt
an
d
al
so
au
di
bl
e
n
ar
ra
ti
on
Y
es
/N
o
bu
tt
on
pr
es
s
to
‘‘W
ou
ld
yo
u
do
X
in
or
de
r
to
X
?”
af
te
r
ea
ch
di
le
m
m
a
Fe
ld
m
an
H
al
l,
So
ko
l-
H
es
sn
er
,
V
an
B
av
el
,a
n
d
Ph
el
ps
(2
01
4)
38
M
or
al
(d
if
fi
cu
lt
an
d
ea
sy
)
vs
.
n
on
-m
or
al
(d
if
fi
cu
lt
an
d
ea
sy
)
10
W
ri
tt
en
m
or
al
sc
en
ar
io
s
Y
es
/N
o
bu
tt
on
pr
es
s
to
‘‘D
o
yo
u
do
(p
ro
po
se
d
re
sp
on
se
)?
”
af
te
r
ea
ch
sc
en
ar
io
H
an
et
al
.(
20
14
)
16
M
or
al
(p
er
so
n
al
an
d
im
pe
rs
on
al
)
vs
.n
eu
tr
al
28
M
od
ifi
ed
G
re
en
e
et
al
.(
20
01
)
di
le
m
m
as
,m
or
al
-p
er
so
n
al
an
d
m
or
al
-i
m
pe
rs
on
al
,p
re
se
n
te
d
as
te
xt
Y
es
/n
o
bu
tt
on
pr
es
s
to
‘‘I
s
it
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e
fo
r
yo
u
to
do
(p
ro
po
se
d
so
lu
ti
on
)?
”
H
ar
ri
so
n
et
al
.(
20
12
)
73
M
or
al
vs
.n
on
di
le
m
m
a
11
V
ig
n
et
te
s
of
m
od
ifi
ed
G
re
en
e
et
al
.(
20
01
)
di
le
m
m
as
.P
ar
ti
c-
ip
an
ts
fa
m
il
ia
ri
se
d
w
it
h
vi
gn
et
te
s
w
it
h
in
1
w
ee
k
of
sc
an
n
in
g
se
ss
io
n
u
si
n
g
il
lu
st
ra
ti
on
s
an
d
ex
am
in
er
-r
ea
d
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n
s.
V
oi
ce
-p
ro
m
pt
s
in
sc
an
n
er
Y
es
/n
o
fi
n
ge
r
ra
is
e
to
‘‘W
ou
ld
yo
u
do
X
?”
af
te
r
ea
ch
di
le
m
m
a
Pu
jo
l
et
al
.(
20
12
)
22
M
or
al
vs
.n
on
di
le
m
m
a
14
A
s
H
ar
ri
so
n
et
al
.(
20
12
)
A
s
H
ar
ri
so
n
et
al
.(
20
12
)
Sc
h
n
ei
de
r
et
al
.(
20
12
)
28
M
or
al
vs
.b
as
el
in
e
4
W
ri
tt
en
m
or
al
di
le
m
m
as
.S
oc
ia
l-
et
h
ic
al
di
le
m
m
as
an
d
in
di
vi
du
al
ga
in
vs
.c
ol
le
ct
iv
e
lo
ss
es
A
gr
ee
or
di
sa
gr
ee
w
it
h
pr
op
os
ed
so
lu
ti
on
u
si
n
g
bu
tt
on
pr
es
s
af
te
r
ea
ch
di
le
m
m
a
So
m
m
er
et
al
.(
20
10
)
12
M
or
al
vs
.n
eu
tr
al
6
W
ri
tt
en
st
or
ie
s
de
sc
ri
bi
n
g
m
or
al
co
n
fl
ic
t
‘‘W
h
at
sh
ou
ld
I
do
?”
C
h
oo
se
be
tw
ee
n
tw
o
re
sp
on
se
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
af
te
r
ea
ch
di
le
m
m
a
w
it
h
a
bu
tt
on
pr
es
s
So
m
m
er
et
al
.(
20
14
)
16
M
or
al
vs
.s
oc
ia
l
6
A
s
So
m
m
er
et
al
.(
20
10
)
A
s
So
m
m
er
et
al
.(
20
10
)
V
er
de
jo
-G
ar
ci
a
et
al
.(
20
14
)
14
M
or
al
vs
.n
on
di
le
m
m
a
8
A
s
H
ar
ri
so
n
et
al
.(
20
12
)
A
s
H
ar
ri
so
n
et
al
.(
20
12
)
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
B. Garrigan et al. / Brain and Cognition 108 (2016) 88–97 91
Table 2 (continued)
Reference Subjects Conditions No.
foci
Moral stimuli Moral task instructions/response format
Moral evaluations
Avram et al. (2013) 16 Moral vs. esthetic 8 Written moral statements Decide whether each moral statement could be considered
‘right’ by pressing button
Avram et al. (2014) 16 Moral (1st and 3rd person)
vs. non-moral
10 Written moral statements Rate each statement as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ using button press
Bahnemann et al. (2010) 25 Moral vs. physical 10 Animated stimuli of two people in a social interaction.
Protagonist’s behaviour was either in accordance with or in
violation of a social norm
Yes/no button press to ‘‘Is the protagonist violating a norm?”
after each moral dilemma
de Achával et al. (2013) 13 Moral vs. non-moral 6 Modified version of Moral Dilemmas Test (Greene et al.,
2001) presented as text
Yes/ no button press to ‘‘Would you consider it appropriate
to. . .?” after each dilemma
Harada et al. (2009) 18 Moral vs. gender judgement 9 Written stories of protagonist performing good or bad deed Yes/no button press to ‘‘Is the protagonist’s behaviour
morally bad?”
Harenski, Antonenko, Shane, and Kiehl
(2008)
28 Moral vs. non-moral 15 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, depicting unpleasant
social scenes indicating a moral violation
Determine if the picture represented a moral violation and
rate the severity of the violation on scale of 1–5 using button
press to stop rating bar
Harenski et al. (2012) 36 Moral vs. neutral 7 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, depicting unpleasant
social scenes indicating a moral violation
Rate moral violation severity of picture on scale of 1–5 using
button press to stop rating bar
Harenski et al. (2014) 46 Moral vs. neutral 23 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, depicting unpleasant
social scenes indicating a moral violation
Rate severity of moral transgression in pictures from 1 to 5
using button press to stop rating bar
Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt,
Schwintowski, and Villringer (2003)
8 Moral vs. semantic 9 Written sentences (German) Judge whether actions described in sentences were
‘‘appropriate” or ‘‘inappropriate” with button press
Heekeren et al. (2005) 12 Moral vs. semantic 8 Written sentences (German)containing bodily harm or not Judge if actions described in moral sentences were
‘‘appropriate” or ‘‘inappropriate” with button press
Moll et al. (2001) 10 Moral vs. factual 10 Moral sentences presented aurally Think about each statement and judge whether they are
’right’ or ’wrong’. No overt judgement in scanner
Moll et al. (2002) 7 Moral vs. non-moral neutral 2 Written moral statements Covertly judge each sentence as ’right’ or ’wrong’. No overt
judgement in scanner
Parkinson et al. (2011) 30 Moral (harmful, dishonest
and disgust) vs. neutral
30 Written moral scenarios Decide if main character’s actions were ’wrong’ or ’not wrong’
with button press
Prehn et al. (2008) 23 Socio-normative vs.
grammatical
6 Written sentences Decide if action described was a social norm violation or not
with yes/no button press
Reniers et al. (2012) 24 Moral vs. non-moral 6 Written scenarios of moral decision-making Yes/no to ‘‘Is it ok for X to do this?” using button press
Robertson et al. (2007) 16 Moral (care/justice) vs.
neutral nonmoral
5 Written business case scenario describing workday of a
fictional marketing research analyst
Press button when identify an important point or issue
Schleim, Spranger, Erk, and Walter (2011) 40 Moral vs. personal 6 Written stories adapted from moral issues in media Had to judge if behaviour in stories was right from a moral
point of view. Decide between ’yes, rightly’ and ’no, not
rightly’ using button press
Takahashi et al. (2008) 15 Moral (beauty and
depravity) vs. neutral
4 Written sentences (Japanese) Read sentences silently and rate according to how moral/
immoral or praiseworthy/blameworthy the events were (no
overt judgement in scanner)
Number of subjects is the number included in the analysis that was extracted for this review (e.g., number of subjects in control group sample) not necessarily the total number of subjects in the experiment. Harenski et al. (2014)
coordinates for control group were sent by main author after email request.
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patterns of brain activation between these two types of moral deci-
sions. The ALE analyses found three significant clusters of shared
brain activation for both task types: the left MTG, CG and MFG.
Contrast analysis revealed that MRDs additionally activated the
right MTG, right precuneus and left MTG. These findings show that
making one’s own moral judgements about what to do in a moral
dilemma is associated with increased activation of differing brain
areas, as we predicted.
The brain region which has been most commonly implicated in
moral decision-making, based on neuroimaging and lesion studies
is the vmPFC. This region is not precisely defined in the literature
but usually refers to any brain areas in the ventromedial frontal
lobe, and BA’s 10, 11, 24, 25 and 32 (Nieuwenhuis & Takashima,
2011). We only found a significant cluster of activation of this
region for MEs (cluster 5 and 6, MFG BA 10) and also the adjacent
BA 9 (cluster 1, MFG), rather than MRDs, and this region did not
remain significant in the conjunction analysis, probably because
it was the smallest of the clusters found for MEs. The lack of a sig-
nificant cluster of activation in the vmPFC for MRDs highlights that
most previous conclusions about brain activation for moral
decision-making have been made based on ME tasks; further
research on the involvement of this region for MRDs is needed,
as the current review only identified 10 relevant MRD
experiments.
The three clusters of significant shared activation for both moral
task type (ME and MRD) - the left MTG, left CG, and left MFG - are
also involved in other processes, so are not unique or specific to
making moral judgements. Such a view that there is no ‘moral
brain’ suggests that many processes such as attention, working
memory, emotion recognition, empathic arousal and retrieval of
relevant schemas may be involved when making moral judge-
ments, thus many brain areas related to various domains are likely
to be recruited. All three significant clusters were found in the left
hemisphere, which is involved in language (Springer et al., 1999)
so this may reflect the fact that most of the tasks involve language
processing. It has been found that perceptual decisions engaged
the left hemisphere of the MFG (Talati & Hirsch, 2005) and that
the MTG is involved in multimodal semantic processing (Visser,
Jefferies, Embleton, & Ralph, 2012) with the left MTG being the
core component of the semantic network (Wei et al., 2012). The
cluster of activation in the cingulate gyrus was found in BA 31,
which is part of the posterior cingulate cortex and has been found
to show an increase in activation when judging the valence of emo-
tional words (Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003); increased
activation of this area for both types of moral task may reflect pro-
cessing of written emotional stimuli.
Relative to ME tasks, MRDs were found to additionally activate
the left and right MTG and the right precuneus. These findings sup-
port our hypothesis that MRDs will show increased activation of
more self-referential brain areas. The precuneus, a brain region
more highly developed in humans than other animals, is involved
in higher order cognitive processes including self-processing and
consciousness (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006) and egocentric spatial
processing (Freton et al., 2014). The MTG also showed an increase
in activation for MRDs but not MEs, suggesting it may play a role in
making one’s own decisions, particularly the right MTG which was
not a significant cluster in the conjunction analysis. While activa-
tion of the right precuneus in MRD tasks may reflect increased
self-referential processing compared to when making MEs of
other’s behaviour, it may just reflect differences between the moral
task types. The right precuneus is associated with metaphor com-
prehension (Mashal, Vishne, & Laor, 2014) and verbal creative
thinking (Chen et al., 2015), so activation of this region during
MRD tasks may reflect the fact that these tasks tend to involve
dilemmas that are not real life (e.g., choosing to kill one or five peo-
ple), thus may require more abstract thinking about unfamiliar
situations.
We hypothesised that the ME tasks would show increased acti-
vation of more ToM related areas than MRD tasks, as they involve
thinking about the mental states of others to judge moral beha-
viour. This hypothesis was not supported, as the contrast analysis
for MEs-MRDs did not reveal any significant clusters. The right
temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) has been suggested as an area
important for ToM (Saxe & Powell, 2006). The rTPJ is a vaguely
defined area but is also referred to as Brodmann Area (BA) 39
(Bzdok et al., 2013). Contrary to our hypothesis, the ALE analysis
revealed that the rTPJ (BA 39, MTG) showed significantly increased
activation across the MRD tasks (cluster 4) but not across the ME
tasks. The surprising finding of significant activation of this area
for MRDs but not MEs suggests that ToM processes are even more
involved when making one’s own moral decisions than when mak-
ing evaluations of others. One explanation may be that when
Table 3
Significant clusters of activation for moral evaluations, moral response decisions, and conjunction and convergence analysis.
# Volume (mm3) X y z Cerebrum Label Brodmann area
Moral evaluations 1 3296 6 44 20 Left MFG 9
2 2176 44 56 18 Left STG 39
3 2024 2 56 26 Left CG 31
4 744 50 6 20 Right STG 38
5 384 2 54 2 Right MFG 10
6 296 4 48 6 Left MFG 10
Moral response decisions 1 1968 44 64 20 Left MTG 39
2 1928 2 60 30 Left Precuneus 7
3 1512 2 44 36 Right MFG 6
4 1248 44 60 24 Right MTG 39
5 296 36 28 12 Right IFG 47
6 264 12 4 12 Left Caudate –
Conjunction of moral evaluations and
moral response decisions
1 712 44 60 18 Left MTG 19
2 680 2 56 28 Left CG 31
3 312 6 44 40 Left MFG 8
Moral response decisions-moral
evaluations
1 904 42.8 56 21 Right MTG 39
2 408 3 64 30 Right Precuneus 31
3 264 40 66 16 Left MTG 39
X, y, z coordinates are reported in Talairach space and refer to the maximum value of each cluster. Moral evaluation and moral response decision ALE analyses performed
using cluster-level = 0.05, 1000 permutations, p = 0.001. Conjunction and contrast analysis performed using p = 0.01, 1000 permutations, minimum volume = 200 mm3.
Labels and Brodmann areas generated by GingerAle 2.3.4. MFG = medial frontal gyrus, STG = superior temporal gyrus, CG = Cingulate gyrus, MTG = middle temporal gyrus,
IFG = inferior frontal gyrus.
B. Garrigan et al. / Brain and Cognition 108 (2016) 88–97 93
thinking about what to do in a moral dilemma, individuals think
about the consequences of their possible actions for others, e.g.
‘‘would my actions upset/harm someone?” ToM abilities develop
with age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) and the perspectives
of others are taken into account more as egocentric bias decreases
(Gibbs, 2013), and this may reflect the increased activation of the
rTPJ for MRDs amongst adults found in this meta-analysis.
Harenski, Harenski, Shane, and Kiehl’s (2012) ME study which we
included in our meta-analysis also included an adolescent sample,
and they found that involvement of the rTPJ while viewing moral
pictures increased with age. Developmental fMRI studies of MRDs
are needed, to establish whether the involvement of ToM regions
when making one’s own moral decisions increases with age. The
hypothetical dilemmas used in the included MRD experiments
involved other people, so participants may typically infer the men-
tal states or possible mental states of others when deciding their
Moral evaluation clusters
Moral response decision clusters
Conjunction analysis: Shared activation for moral evaluation and moral response decisions
Contrast analysis: Moral response decisions-moral evaluations
Fig. 2. Brain activation maps showing significant clusters of activation. Images created in GingerAle 2.3.4, overlaid onto Colin 2  2  2 template in Mango (Lancaster &
Martinez 2006–2015). Brain images are axial, sagittal and coronal view of main clusters of activation for each ALE analysis. Image labels: L = left, R = right, P = posterior,
A = anterior, S = superior.
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response. Some of the included ME tasks used did not reference
other people, such as judging sentences as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ so
would not have led to participants inferring mental states of
others. Contrary to our finding, Bzdok et al. (2012) found signifi-
cant activation in the rTPJ for their moral cognition domain. How-
ever, experiments were only included in their moral cognition
analysis if they involved participants making ‘‘appropriateness
judgements on actions of one individual towards others” (p. 785)
so always involved other people. The lack of rTPJ involvement for
MEs in this meta-analysis may reflect the type of evaluation tasks
used. Our finding suggested that not all types of moral decision-
making involve ToM processes - it depends on whether the
dilemma or stimuli involves other people, which can lead individ-
uals to infer the mental states of others when considering the pos-
sible consequences of their decisions. Real life moral dilemmas are
likely to involve other people, so ToM processes are likely to be
involved in such decisions, and involvement may change with age.
We compared our findings to those of two recent systematic
reviews of moral decision-making, Bzdok et al. (2012) and Sevinc
and Spreng (2014). As previously stated, the criteria for Bzdok
et al.’s (2012) moral cognition domain was that participants were
required to make appropriateness judgements, which is what we
have termed moral evaluations. We, therefore, compared our ALE
analysis results for MEs to Bzdok et al.’s (2012) results for the
moral cognition domain. Our results are fairly comparable to
Bzdok et al.’s (2012) with both finding activation in the left and
right MFG (BA 10, labelled by Bzdok et al. as vmPFC) and the right
STG (BA 38, labelled by Bzdok et al. as the right temporal pole). In
line with Bzdok et al.’s (2012) analysis, we also found a cluster of
activation in the left STG (labelled by Bzdok et al. as left TPJ),
though in our analysis this was BA 39 and from their analysis it
was BA 22, although these are adjacent areas. As previously stated,
Bzdok et al. (2012) found a cluster of activation in the rTPJ (BA 39),
which we did not find. Another discrepancy between our ME acti-
vation clusters and Bzdok et al.’s (2012) for moral cognition are
that they found a cluster of activation in the left amygdala, which
we did not find. Also, Bzdok et al. (2012) reported activation in the
precuneus, which was not found to be a cluster of significant acti-
vation for the ME experiments in our analysis, although our results
did reveal activation in the adjacent cingulate gyrus. Differences
between our findings and Bzdok et al.’s (2012) may be partly due
to discrepancies between Talairach labels and the SPM anatomy
toolbox, and also due to the differences of tasks for the included
experiments; Bzdok et al. (2012) included only experiments where
participants were required to make appropriateness judgements
on the actions of one individual towards others while we included
any ME judgement, including tasks where participants had to
judge moral sentences. Our ALE analysis results for MRDs are not
comparable with Bzdok et al.’s (2012) moral cognition results, sup-
porting the finding that judging the appropriateness of others
actions increases activation of different brain regions compared
to when making one’s own moral response decisions.
Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) systematic review compared brain
activation for active and passive moral tasks. As our review only
included tasks that required an active decision, we compared our
findings for MRDs and MEs to Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) findings
for active tasks. Our ALE results for MEs are fairly comparable to
Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) ALE results for active tasks, with both
finding clusters of activation in the left MFG (BA 9, labelled by
Sevinc & Spreng as medial PFC and anterior superior frontal sul-
cus), right MFG (BA 10, labelled by Sevinc & Spreng as vmPFC
and superior temporal sulcus), right STG (BA 38, labelled by Sevinc
& Spreng as MTG) and the left cingulate gyrus (BA 31, labelled by
Sevinc & Spreng as posterior cingulate cortex). Comparing our
results for MRDs to Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) active results, there
is no direct overlap but there are some similarities. Sevinc and
Spreng (2014) found a cluster of activation in the left MTG, BA
22, whereas our ALE analysis for MRDs revealed a cluster in the left
MTG BA 39, adjacent to BA 22. Sevinc and Spreng (2014) found
activation in the left IFG whereas we found activation in the right
IFG for MRDs. Again, differences may be due to discrepancies
between Talairach and MNI labelling and also differences between
tasks of the included experiments. For Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014)
active domain, four of the included experiments were also included
in our MRD domain, but we included an additional six MRD exper-
iments, and the majority of the active experiments in Sevinc and
Spreng (2014) were MEs.
4.2. Quality assessment and critique of tasks used in included
experiments
As far as we are aware, this review is the first ALE meta-analysis
to report on the quality of included experiments. In the absence of
a pre-existing standardised quality assessment tool for an ALE sys-
tematic review, the quality assessment tool was adapted from
guidelines for reporting fMRI studies (Poldrack et al., 2008). Future
reviews could use this checklist, or similar quality assessment
tools, and should exclude low quality experiments from ALE anal-
ysis. While the majority of included experiments in this systematic
review were found to be of high quality, based on the adapted
checklist, there were issues with some of the tasks used.
Firstly, there was a wide range of moral tasks used across the
included experiments, and it is important to acknowledge that dif-
ferences in brain activation may reflect differences in the tasks
used across studies, in terms of modality and content of the moral
stimuli, and the nature of the control task. The presentation modal-
ity varied, and while most tasks used written stimuli presented on
screens for participants to read, some experiments, such as
Bahnemann, Dziobek, Prehn, Wolf, and Heekeren (2010) used ani-
mated stimuli, with participants being asked to judge if the protag-
onist in the animations is violating a norm. Also, there were
differences in the context and amount of detail of moral stimuli
across moral tasks. Bahnemann et al.’s (2010) animations featured
a social violation where a protagonist is punching the other person
in the face. While this is a real life social and moral (harm) viola-
tion, it could be argued that this scenario would be more emotive
if the victim was murdered. Differences in emotional engagement,
paying more attention to out of the ordinary stimuli, or having to
think more about scenarios not previously encountered (such as
many of the life and death choices presented in moral tasks) are
likely to contribute to differences across experiments.
One limitation of some of the included experiments is the nat-
ure of the task that was used as a comparison to the moral task. For
some experiments, participants were asked to respond similarly
across control and experimental conditions, while the stimuli var-
ied. For example, in Parkinson et al. (2011), participants judged
whether a character’s actions were right or wrong within neutral
or moral tasks. Differences in brain activity may therefore have
been partially accounted for by differences in reading and process-
ing moral, compared to neutral scenarios, rather than for making a
moral compared to a neutral evaluation judgement, which the
authors did acknowledge (p. 3166). Similar issues exist across sev-
eral other experiments (Harenski et al., 2012; Harenski, Edwards,
Harenski, & Kiehl, 2014; Han, Glover, & Jeong, 2014; Moll,
Eslinger, & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll et al., 2002; Reniers
et al., 2012). Several of the included experiments used the same
moral task, classified as a MRD task, where participants were asked
‘‘would you do X?” after reading a scenario about Mr. Jones’
dilemma (Harrison et al., 2012; Pujol et al., 2008; Verdejo-Garcia
et al., 2014). For the control condition, participants were asked to
recall the correct answer to the non-dilemma vignette, which they
had been familiarised with before the scanner task, e.g., ‘‘will he go
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to the beach?” The control task used in these experiments was,
therefore, a recall rather than a decision task, thus the results show
brain activation differences for recall vs. a MRD judgement, rather
than brain activation for making a moral as opposed to a non-
moral decision. For some of the included experiments, the control
task may not have been an appropriate comparison for moral tasks
(i.e., not a non-moral or neutral judgement task), so we should be
cautious about the significant moral decision-making peak coordi-
nates from these experiments.
4.3. Limitations
There are several limitations to this review and meta-analysis.
Firstly, only 10 MRD experiments were identified from the litera-
ture, and 15 is the minimum recommended number of experi-
ments for ALE contrast analysis (Laird et al., 2010; Lancaster
et al., 2007). While significant clusters were still found for MRD
and ME judgements, and the findings are novel, the results should
be interpreted with caution as the MRD clusters are only based on
10 experiments. Secondly, there were some experiments where it
was ambiguous as to whether the task was a MRD or ME task.
We categorised the experiments based on the authors’ claims,
and the type of question participants responded to (evaluation or
response decision), but difficulty categorising some of the experi-
ments highlights the lack of consistency amongst moral tasks used
in fMRI experiments. Thirdly, some of the tasks appeared to lack
ecological validity as they did not seem to reflect how moral deci-
sions are made in real life situations. We recommend that future
neuroimaging experiments use more real life scenarios for assess-
ing moral decision-making, for example, everyday scenarios that
people are more likely to encounter than life or death situations.
Finally, to ensure comparability across studies, adolescents were
excluded. The conclusions drawn, therefore, only apply to adults.
Further neuroimaging studies focusing on children and adolescents
would help answer questions about moral development and the
developmental pattern of the neural correlates of moral decisions.
5. Conclusion
This is the first systematic review of moral decision-making to
explicitly acknowledge the different types of moral decisions, and
to compare brain activity for the two main types, MRDs and MEs.
Findings from the ALE analysis show that making one’s own moral
judgements about what to do in a moral dilemma involves
increased activation of additional brain areas compared to judging
the moral actions of others, suggesting different processes may be
involved. Making one’s own decisions appears to involve an
extended brain network, incorporating self-referential regions
which do not show an increase in activation when making moral
evaluations of others. Most previous conclusions about moral
decision-making have been based on moral evaluation tasks; fur-
ther neuroimaging studies employing moral response decisions
tasks of real life scenarios are needed before we can be confident
about which brain areas are needed for making one’s own, every
day moral response decisions.
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Corrigendum
Corrigendum to ‘‘The neural correlates of moral decision-making: A
systematic review and meta-analysis of moral evaluations and response
decision judgements” [Brain Cogn. 108 (2016) 88–97]
Beverley Garrigan a, Anna L.R. Adlamb, Peter E. Langdon c,d,⇑
aDepartment of Clinical Psychology, Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia, United Kingdom
b School of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, United Kingdom
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dHertfordshire Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust – Norfolk, United Kingdom
A cluster-level thresholding error in the version of GingerALE
software used by the authors (version 2.3.4) was reported by
Eickhoff et al. (2016) recently. The authors subsequently re-ran
the ALE analysis using version 2.3.6 of GingerALE. This resulted
in a change to the meta-analysis clusters, with the two smallest
clusters for moral evaluations (ME) and moral response decisions
(MRD) being no longer being significant. There was no change to
the conjunction analysis, or to the ME-MRD contrast (still no sig-
nificant clusters). The results for the MRD-ME contrast are slightly
different after re-running the analysis, although the area labels
remain the same. Table 1 below shows the corrected results
obtained from re-running the analysis in GingerALE version 2.3.6
and Fig. 1 displays the brain activation maps for MEs, MRDs and
the MRD-ME contrast based on the revised analysis.
We stated in our original paper that ‘‘six significant clusters of
activation were found across the ME experiments (18 experiments,
174 foci, 383 participants): two in the left medial frontal gyrus
(MFG), the left superior temporal gyrus (STG), left cingulate gyrus
(CG), right STG and right MFG. Six significant clusters were found
across the MRD experiments (10 experiments, 97 foci, 259 partic-
ipants): left middle temporal gyrus (MTG), left precuneus, right
MFG, right MTG, right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left caudate.”
(p. 91). After re-running the analysis in GingerALE 2.3.6, only four
significant clusters of activation were found for ME and MRD
Table 1
Significant clusters of activation for moral evaluations, moral response decisions, and conjunction and convergence analysis.
# Volume (mm3) X y z Cerebrum Label Brodmann area
Moral evaluations 1 3296 6 44 20 Left MFG 9
2 2176 44 56 18 Left STG 39
3 2024 2 56 26 Left CG 31
4 744 50 6 20 Right STG 38
Moral response decisions 1 1968 44 64 20 Left MTG 39
2 1928 2 60 30 Left Precuneus 7
3 1512 2 44 36 Right MFG 6
4 1248 44 60 24 Right MTG 39
Conjunction of moral evaluations and moral response decisions 1 712 44 60 18 Left MTG 19
2 680 2 56 28 Left CG 31
3 312 6 44 40 Left MFG 8
Moral response decisions-moral evaluations 1 896 42.9 56.9 23.4 Right MTG 39
2 328 2 61 31 Right Precuneus 7
3 280 39 64.5 16.5 Left MTG 39
X, y, z coordinates are reported in Talairach space and refer to the maximum value of each cluster. Moral evaluation and moral response decision ALE analyses performed
using cluster-level = 0.05, 1000 permutations, p = 0.001. Conjunction and contrast analysis performed using p = 0.01, 1000 permutations, minimum volume = 200mm3. Labels
and Brodmann areas generated by GingerAle 2.3.6. MFG = medial frontal gyrus, STG = superior temporal gyrus, CG = Cingulate gyrus, MTG = middle temporal gyrus.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.10.002
DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.07.007
⇑ Corresponding author at: Tizard Centre, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7LR, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: P.E.Langdon@kent.ac.uk (P.E. Langdon).
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experiments, with the two smallest clusters for each type being no
longer significant. There were no longer significant clusters for MEs
in the left and right MFG, Brodmann area (BA) 10, although the lar-
gest cluster for MFG, BA 9 remained. For MRDs, there was no longer
a significant cluster in the right IFG, BA 47 or the left caudate. The
number of experiments, foci and participants remained the same.
In terms of how the new results affected the discussion within
our original paper, we had stated that we found significant clusters
of activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) for
MEs: cluster 5 and 6, MFG BA 10. However, clusters 5 and 6 for
MEs were no longer significant after we re-ran the analysis, due
to the cluster-level threshold bug in GingerALE 2.3.4. Our
meta-analysis therefore only found one cluster (cluster 1 for
MEs; MFG, BA 9) adjacent to the regions commonly referred to
as the vmPFC. This further strengthens the argument that although
the vmPFC has traditionally been the brain region most commonly
implicated in moral decision-making, further research is needed to
establish whether this brain region is involved for different types
of moral evaluation tasks, and when making your own moral
decisions.
In our comparison of our ME results with Bzdok et al.’s (2012),
we previously said that we both found activation in the left and
right MFG, BA10, while our revised findings indicated significant
activation of the left MFG, BA9 only. Comparing our ME results
Moral evaluation clusters
Moral response decision clusters
Conjunction analysis: Shared activation for moral evaluation and moral response decisions
Contrast analysis: Moral response decisions-moral evaluations
Fig. 1. Brain activation maps showing significant clusters of activation. Images created in GingerAle 2.3.6, overlaid onto Colin 2 2 2 template in Mango (Lancaster & Martinez,
2006–2015). Brain images are axial, sagittal and coronal view of main clusters of activation for each ALE analysis. Image labels: L = left, R = right, P = posterior, A = anterior,
S = superior.
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with that of Sevinc and Spreng (2014), we had previously stated
that we both found activation in the right MFG, BA 10 but this clus-
ter was no longer significant in our revised analysis. In the compar-
ison of our MRD results with that of Sevinc and Spreng (2014) we
also previously stated that while they found activation in the left
IRF, we found activation in the right IFG, but this region is no
longer significant in our revised analysis.
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Abstract 
This chapter reviews models of social problem-solving and makes links with social 
neuroscience, moral development and social information processing (SIP) theories in 
relation to people with intellectual disabilities (IDs). These differing theoretical perspectives 
are drawn together into a single, unified framework: the Social Information Processing-
Moral Decision-Making (SIP-MDM) framework. Research into some of the aspects of this 
framework in children and adults with IDs is then briefly reviewed. The chapter concludes 
with a consideration of theoretical and clinical implications for people with IDs. 
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Introduction 
D’Zurilla and Nezu (2001, p. 212) defined problem-solving as “the self-directed cognitive-
behavioural process by which a person attempts to identify or discover effective or adaptive 
solutions for specific problems encountered in everyday living.”   Inherently, and 
diagnostically, people with intellectual disabilities (IDs) have difficulties with adaptive 
behaviour (World Health Organisation, 1994), and as a consequence, it will not be surprising 
that many people with IDs will also have difficulties with problem-solving, including social 
problem-solving (Ferretti & Cavalier, 1991).  Within this chapter, we will review models of 
social problem solving, making links with social information processing, moral development, 
and social neuroscience, drawing these related theoretical perspectives together in a single 
unified framework of social information processing and decision making.  The implications 
for people with IDs, both theoretical and clinical, will be considered.  
Theoretical Perspectives 
Social Problem-Solving.  There have been several attempts to characterise the process of 
problem-solving, from a cognitive perspective.  Belmont, Butterfield and Ferretti (1982) 
argued that there were six component processes:  (a) goal definition, (b) strategy selection, 
(c) goal monitoring, (d) strategy evaluation, and (e) strategy revision; although these were in 
reference to successful self-management.  D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971)  suggested that 
problem-solving comprised five stages or steps: (a) general-orientation, (b) problem 
definition and formulation, (c) generation of solutions or alternatives, (d) decision-making, 
and (e) solution implementation or verification, and went on to develop a model of social 
problem-solving which they defined as, “…the process of problem solving as it occurs in the 
natural environment or “real world” (D'Zurilla, Nezu, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2004, p. 11).   
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D’Zurilla et al. (2004, p. 11) further commented that this included, “…all types of problems 
that might affect a person’s functioning, including impersonal problems…personal or 
intrapersonal problems…interpersonal problems…as well as broader community and society 
problems.”    
D’Zurilla et al. (2004)’s model comprised two components: (a) problem orientation, and 
(b) problem-solving skills, also referred to as “problem-solving proper or style”.   Problem 
orientation was said to be a meta-cognitive process, involving schema, while problem-
solving skills were seen as the activities that occur when attempting to solve a problem.   
They outlined four “skills,” which were (a) problem definition and formulation, (b) 
generative of alternative solutions, (c) decision-making, and (d) solution implementation 
and verification.   They argued that individuals may have a positive or a dysfunctional 
problem orientation.  A positive problem orientation was seen when problems were viewed 
as “challenges”, with optimism about solvability, chances of success, and ability, and an 
understanding that problem-solving is effortful, but should be tackled quickly.  An avoidant, 
or a dysfunctional problem orientation, was associated with seeing problems as threatening, 
with little optimism about one’s ability, coupled with a tendency to become frustrated when 
faced with problems.  Linked to this, people have several different problem-solving styles 
which were (a) rational, defined as the “…rational, deliberate and systematic application of 
effective problem-solving skills” (D'Zurilla et al., 2004, p. 15) (b) impulsivity-carelessness, 
defined as “…narrow, impulsive, careless, hurried, and incomplete” (D'Zurilla et al., 2004, p. 
15) problem-solving,  or (c) avoidant, “…characterised by procrastination, passivity or 
inaction, and dependency” (D'Zurilla et al., 2004, p. 15).   
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Social Information Processing. While many are likely to make use of several multiple 
problem-solving styles at various points, effective social information processing is a 
necessity for solving problems within the social domain. The well-known social information 
processing model of Crick and Dodge (1994; 1996; Dodge, 1986; Dodge & Price, 1994), while 
developed in order to explain behavioural disorders in children, shares similarities with 
D’Zurilla et al. (2004)’s model.  Crick and Dodge (1994; 1996) argued that behaviours are a 
function of the processing of contextual cues, but also biological determined capabilities 
and stored information regarding past experiences. Social information processing was said 
to involve six steps: (a) encoding of cues, (b) interpretation of cues, (c) clarification of goals, 
(c) response access or construction, (d) response decision, and (e) behavioural enactment.  
The steps occur rapidly and in parallel, and are influenced by stored information (social 
schema, acquired rules, and social knowledge), while processing can modify this stored 
information, and these changes occurred with development and experience, along with 
developmental shifts in cognitive functioning.  
Integrating Social Problem-Solving, Social Information Processing and Moral 
Development. While Crick and Dodge (1994; 1996) attempted to explain the cognitive 
processes involved in social information processing, Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) attempted 
to expand the model to include emotion recognition and regulation. Temperament and 
emotion were seen as key influences on each step of processing, along with past 
experience, stored in the form memories, or in other words, latent mental structures.  
Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) integrated moral domain theory and social information 
processing, stating that both models emphasised the role of peer interactions and the 
formation of social knowledge.  Moral domain theory, also referred to as social domain 
theory, makes the important distinction between the personal, moral and social domains 
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(Smetana, 1999; Turiel, 1983, 2002), and Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) argued that moral 
domain theory provided a description of latent mental structures, while social information 
processing theory described online information processing. Although, Arsenio and Lemerise 
(2004) considered the domain model to be a primary approach in the field of moral 
development, this is not entirely the case, as other models are relevant, especially 
considering that some incorporate emotion and latent mental structures, or schema, rather 
well (Gibbs, 2003, 2010, 2013; Haidt, 2008; Hoffman, 2000; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & 
Thoma, 1999). 
Others have argued that moral psychology and social-cognitive theories can be readily 
integrated, and differences in social experience, age and personality lead to individual 
differences in the accessibility or availability of schemas (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005), including 
moral schemas, all of which are highly relevant to the process of social problem-solving.  
Although there have been some attempts to integrate social problem-solving and moral 
development (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005; Lemerise & Arsenio, 
2000), further consideration regarding the role of emotion and findings from social 
neuroscience is needed.  
The Role of Affect 
Social intuitionist perspectives on moral development have argued (Haidt, 2001) that 
moral judgements are a matter of affective intuition and moral reasoning is carried out  post 
hoc in order to justify a previously made decision.  Haidt (2001b) suggested that the 
important distinction between intuition and reasoning is that intuition occurs quickly, 
effortlessly and automatically, while reasoning is slow and requires more effort.  However, 
Turiel  (2006) argued that reasoning can be immediate and rapid and that you cannot 
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distinguish intuitions from reasoning on the basis of speed.  Linked to intuitionist 
perspectives of moral development, Damasio (1994) viewed somatic markers as a special 
instance of feeling generated by secondary emotions, which resulted in a ‘gut feeling’ which 
helped drive decision-making.  The somatic marker hypothesis proposed that when we think 
of a bad outcome connected with a given response option, we experience an unpleasant gut 
feeling which forces our attention onto the negative outcome and may lead to rejection of 
this option.  Damasio (1994) argued that this is an automatic step that helps to narrow 
down the number of response options, and that this process occurs before reasoning, 
increasing the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process. 
Important within all these theoretical perspectives is affect, especially empathy, 
along with perspective taking, which has been considered by several theorists (Eisenberg, 
Carlo, Murphy, & Court, 1995; Eisenberg, Eggum, & Edwards, 2010; Eisenberg, Spinrad, & 
Sadovsky, 2006; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses, 1990; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 
2002; Hoffman, 2000; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Selman, 1976, 1980).  Hoffman (2000) 
argued that cognition is used to make sense of emotion, and emotional responses become 
“paired” or “bonded” with cognition, such that both may determine behaviour. There 
clearly are similarities with the work of Haidt (2001b) and Damasio (1994), and there are 
implications for the understanding of social problem-solving.  This was recognised by  
Arsenio and Lemerise’s  (2004), and they incorporated aspects of affect, specifically 
emotional regulation, into their integrated model of moral domain theory and social 
information processing.  
Social Neuroscience – A New Framework 
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However, social neuroscience has been overlooked within many of these 
developmental theories.  Several attempts have been made to consider moral development 
within the context of social neuroscience (Baird, 2008; Kagan, 2008; Taber-Thomas & Tranel, 
2012; Yeates et al., 2007), including our understanding of the various brain regions involved 
(Garrigan, Adlam, & Langdon, 2016, 2017) but it is apparent that these theories have at 
times also overlooked developmental psychology.  Aspects of cognitive development, 
including attentional control, cognitive flexibility, and goal setting, or in other words, 
executive functions, are important for socialisation, including moral development and 
decision-making, and this has been recognised and argued by many (Anderson & 
Beauchamp, 2012; Gibbs, 1979, 2003, 2010, 2013; Hoffman, 2000; Hoffman, 1977; Johnson, 
1962; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1932; Taber-Thomas & Tranel, 2012; Tomlinson-Keasey 
& Keasey, 1974). However, one of the difficulties within this area is that moral development 
theory, neuroscience and neuropsychology, along with social problem-solving theory and 
social information processing have not been integrated effectively into a developmental 
theory that is dynamic and recursive, and context-dependent, such that it should effectively 
predict behaviour.   In order to achieve this, and directly building on the work of Arsenio and 
Lemerise  (2004), we wish to propose an integrated framework of moral development that 
incorporates and combines social information processing theory, moral development theory 
and associated theories, such as perspective-taking, along with constructs from 
neuroscience and neuropsychology (Figure 17.1).    
FIGURE 17.1 ABOUT HERE 
Within the framework proposed in Figure 17.1, the inner circle depicts the distal 
constructs that change over time, as a consequence of development (e.g. maturation of 
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brain regions, moral schema, and emotion regulation) or directly have an impact upon 
development (e.g. social participation, socioeconomic status).   Together, these constructs 
affect each other in a dynamic and recursive manner, developing as a consequence of 
maturation and socialisation.  Developmental changes to moral schema occur within the 
database, and this can be characterised by any of the various theoretical perspectives 
regarding moral development, although invariant and hierarchal assumptions are not 
necessary, which avoids some of the difficulties pointed out by others with traditional 
moral-cognitive developmental theory (Krebs & Rosenwald, 1977; Krebs & Denton, 2005; 
Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Denton, 1991; Wark & Krebs, 1997).  However, traditional 
stage-theories, although problematic, have strengths in that they characterise 
developmental maturation into broad age-trends which facilitate comparisons between 
different groups.   
 Maturation of the brain is vital, and the “social brain” includes areas such as the 
fusiform face area, posterior superior temporal sulcus, hippocampus, amygdala, 
temporoparietal junction, cingulate cortex, medial frontal cortex, and the anterior gyrus 
(Heyes, Sebastian, & Kadosh, 2012; Yeates et al., 2012). It has also been suggested that 
moral development depends upon a fronto-limbic network (Taber-Thomas & Tranel, 2012), 
and many factors such as environment, nutrition and substance abuse can affect the 
maturation of the adolescent brain (Arain et al., 2013). Maturation of the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) takes longer and continues to mature during adolescence (Arain et al., 2013), and has 
been linked to increased abilities in various components of our framework: abstract 
reasoning, attention, inhibition and processing speed (Arain et al., 2013; Yurgelun-Todd, 
2007). The PFC is also thought to be involved in the processing of secondary emotions and 
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the acquisition of somatic markers (Damasio, 1994), as well as the development of executive 
functioning (Anderson, 2002).   
Emotion regulation is partly based on the neurophysiological components that 
develop during the first year of life and provide the basis for more complex forms of 
emotional management (Thompson, 1994). We hypothesise that the maturation of the 
brain (and maybe the “social brain” network in particular) directly maps onto the 
components of our framework, resulting in an increased efficiency of social information 
processing, moral development, and problem-solving.  “Although morality is a social 
construct, it would not exist without the brain” (Tancredi, 2005, p. 34), and increasing 
maturation, leads to the building of connections between cognition and affect, similar to the 
relationship discussed by Hoffman (2000).  For a typically developing individual, social 
information processing becomes more efficient and elaborate with age due to maturation of 
skills and increasing social experience, considering that the human brain is still developing 
into the mid-twenties (Blakemore, 2008).  
The outer circle within the framework (Figure 17.1) represents the proximal 
processes that occur when an individual has to deal with a problem, and is strongly affected 
by contextual cues.  Some of the constructs that affect each step are listed within the 
framework, while the steps and processes are taken from Crick and Dodge (Crick & Dodge, 
1994; Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge, 1980, 1986), and again are dynamic and recursive, but 
mature over time, and moral development, including maturation of somatic or emotional 
markers, are vital for effective social problem-solving.  
Steps within the Framework 
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Step 1 is the encoding of cues. Emotion recognition is important at this step (Lemerise & 
Arsenio, 2000) so that others’ emotions can be correctly encoded and then processed when 
making a moral judgement. Hoffman (2000) argued that one of the requirements for mature 
empathic distress is the knowledge that facial expressions can reflect or mask feelings.  
Other components of step 1 are situational cues and attention. Situational cues partially 
determine what is encoded, for example, certain cues may trigger emotions (background 
feelings) which then determine which cues are encoded, while previous experience may bias 
encoding.   Attention is important as individuals need to be able to pay attention to relevant 
multiple features of a situation, so divided and selective attention is of particular 
importance, as attention deficits may lead to biased encoding of cues, affecting later 
processing steps.  
Step 2 is the interpretation of cues, and Crick and Dodge (1994) suggested that 
interpretation may consist of one of more independent processes. One such process is 
making inferences about the perspectives of others in the situation, including attributions of 
intent. This requires perspective taking and relies on Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalisation 
ability as an individual must be able to take another’s perspective in order to infer their 
beliefs and intentions, something which is also necessary for moral development.  ToM 
ability develops with age (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999) and the 
medial prefrontal cortex has been suggested to be involved in mentalising ability (Frith & 
Frith, 2006).  Other skills such as working memory, attention and face processing have also 
been linked to ToM (Korkmaz, 2011), which also appears within the framework as a distal 
construct.   As the brain develops, ToM skills (and related sub skills) develop, which affects 
the interpretation of cues via the ability to make inferences about the perspectives of others 
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in a situation, resulting in less egocentric processing, a process that is an integral part of 
moral development.   
According to Crick and Dodge (1994), other processes that may be involved in 
interpretation of cues are the evaluation of past performance, self-evaluations and other 
evaluations. This is similar to Baird’s (2008) focus on self-perception, other perception and 
the integration of past and present, which are facilitated by the maturation of the 
adolescent brain (Baird, 2008).  Such evaluations require working memory capacity, which 
develops with age (Gathercole, 1998) and has been linked to the development of the 
superior frontal and intraparietal cortex (Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002).    
Step 3 is clarification or selection of a goal. Crick and Dodge (1994) defined a goal as 
a focused arousal state that functions as an orientation toward producing (or wanting to 
produce) a particular outcome, which is related to problem orientation within the model 
developed by D’Zurilla et al., (2004).  Crick and Dodge (1994) proposed that individuals bring 
goal orientations to a social situation but also revise these and construct new goals in 
response to the immediate stimuli. Therefore, situational factors are important at this step, 
as the immediate situation can influence the goals that are constructed.  An individual must 
be able to think of a goal which they may not have previously experienced, which would 
draw on abstract thinking, which increases with age as the PFC matures (Yurgelun-Todd, 
2007).  Arousal regulation, including empathic responses, are also involved at step 3, and 
refers to the ability of an individual to regulate the arousal elicited by the current situation, 
which may be influenced by temperament and personality factors.  Empathic arousal is also 
important during Step 3, as it can be a motivator of moral behaviour (Eisenberg et al., 1995; 
Eisenberg et al., 2010; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Hoffman, 2000) and will determine goals.   
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Individuals with greater empathic arousal should set more pro-social goals within 
problematic social situations. 
Step 4 is response access or construction, where an individual accesses from 
memory possible responses to the situation, or constructs new behaviours if the situation is 
novel.  Abstract thought is important as individuals may need to construct a response with 
which they have no prior experience, or imagine the ideal response.  The somatic marker 
hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) is also relevant at Step 4 as it may automatically lead to the 
rejection of some outcomes.  Damasio (1994) stated that the PFC is critical to the acquisition 
of somatic markers, and individuals with PFC damage may be unable to filter out some 
responses that are accessed at step 4, which may impair their reasoning and decision 
making. Situational factors may influence, and bias, the responses that are generated at 
step 4. The responses accessed or constructed at step 4 are influenced by other steps of 
processing (e.g. the goal(s) set) and can also be influenced by information stored in the 
database and emotion processes occurring (e.g. certain moods may bias responses that are 
constructed).  The responses which were not automatically rejected at step 4, are then 
subject to deliberation at step 5.  
In our framework, step 5 is described as moral response decision, rather than 
response decision as described by Crick and Dodge (1994).  A moral response decision is a 
decision about how to act in a situation in the moral domain (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) 
i.e. decisions regarding moral issues such as justice, harm, fairness and life. Arguably, 
judgements within the social and personal domain may also feature here, and there is likely 
to be mixing of moral, social and person domain judgements (see Turiel, 1998 for more 
about domain theory).  Moral reasoning is one process that can guide moral decisions at this 
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step and it differs from other forms of reasoning because it is guided by morally relevant 
rules, knowledge and understanding, stored in memory as moral schemas. We would argue 
that moral reasoning is the process by which a moral decision is made, but agree that this 
can occur post hoc in order to evaluate and modify judgements, as suggested by Haidt 
(2001a).  Some initial judgements may arise rapidly as a consequence of cognitive and 
emotive processes, or intuitions, at step 4, but reasoning, which incorporates emotion, is 
required to confirm, reject or reformulate this into a moral judgement, and reasoning at 
step 5 can either confirm or lead to the reformulation of a moral decision accessed or 
constructed at step 4.  Moral reasoning is determined by moral schema, the morally 
relevant rules and knowledge, and by moral emotions (e.g. empathy and guilt), and these 
processes mature with age, facilitated by the development of skills such as logical inference, 
moral emotions, and by the refinement and increased accessibly of the moral schema.  
However, in some situations, context may activate different moral schema, and therefore 
moral reasoning associated with higher or lower developmental stages may be seen within 
the same person, and this will be determined by processing at other steps of the 
framework, and to what extent the situation activates different moral schema.   
Step 5 requires decision making skills and individuals need to be able to inhibit 
inappropriate responses. Decision making abilities and inhibition both develop with age as a 
result of maturation of the PFC (Yurgelun-Todd, 2007), and Couper, Jacobs, and Anderson 
(2002) found that children with frontal lobe lesions had lower levels of moral maturity.   
Step 5 involves evaluations, so as with step 2, working memory is important for such 
evaluations, as are situational factors, and particularly an individual’s evaluation of their 
self-efficacy to carry out their chosen response in a given situation.  Hoffman (2000) argued 
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that the expectation of guilt can motivate empathic responding, which would be activated 
at step 5 through the evaluation of emotion expectancies and drawing on memory of 
previous experiences, particularly affect-event links (i.e. when guilt may have been 
experienced in the past).  Guilt has been found to be associated with activation of the 
medial prefrontal cortex, left posterior superior temporal sulcus and visual cortex 
(Takahashi et al., 2004), suggesting that damage to these areas may affect the expectation 
of guilt, which would affect moral reasoning, judgement and development. There has been 
some research suggesting that mood can affect brain activity for emotion expectancies 
(Chung et al., 1996), and Ueda et al. (2003) found that the expectancy of emotional stimuli 
is mediated by the prefrontal and dorsolateral cortex; they also suggested that the 
amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex play an important role in the expectancy of 
unpleasant stimuli.  Damage to these brain areas may affect emotion expectancies, but 
further research is needed in order to establish the relationship with moral reasoning, 
judgement and development.  Perspective taking, or theory of mind are also important for 
step 5, as taking into account how others may respond can influence how an outcome is 
evaluated. 
   
Step 6 is behaviour enactment. The behavioural response is theoretically based upon 
the moral decision made during step 5, Although many factors are involved in determining 
behaviour, the actual behavioural act is preceded by a decision- making process which 
serves as the proximal control mechanism (Burks, Laird, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999) and  
will usually be enacted at step 6, unless factors intervene to override the decision made.  
For example, a sudden strong emotional feeling (e.g. somatic marker) may cause an 
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individual to change their chosen course of action, or at step 5 they may have 
overestimated their self-efficacy to enact their chosen behavioural response, and the 
process of social problem-solving may continue.   One of the premises of this framework is 
that the sequence of steps is not entirely linear as individuals may shift back and forth, or 
skips steps, depending upon the context, their past experience, evaluations and moral 
judgements.  
This theoretical framework is based upon the work of Arsenio and Lemerise (2004), 
although we are not as prescriptive with respect to the inclusion of moral domain theory, 
and instead adopt the view that cognitive-developmental moral theories (e.g. Gibbs, 2013) 
provide an excellent account of the developmental changes that occur to moral schema 
over time, and such changes should correlate with neuroplasticity.  As a consequence, 
social-problem solving and the associated descriptive processes, and the developmental 
changes, as described in Figure 17.1, allow for the prediction of behaviour, and inherently, 
the development of intervention programmes.    
People with Intellectual Disabilities 
The framework described clearly has implications for people with IDs, simply 
because people with IDs have a developmental disability. Within the framework, it is not 
inevitable or destined, that certain groups of people have “inappropriate” social problem-
solving skills.   The framework would predict that there would be inherent differences 
between typical and atypically developing populations, and such differences would indicate 
avenues for intervention and support, which could be within the social, psychological, or 
biological domains as described within the framework.   
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Children with Intellectual Disabilities. Is there any evidence that aspects of this 
framework may help understand the social problem-solving of children who have IDs?   
Several authors have attempted to look at individual aspects of the framework with people 
who have IDs.  For example, Herman and Shantz (1983) investigated the social problem-
solving abilities of children with IDs, concluding that they were poorer than their typically 
developing counterparts, and this related to maternal directiveness, which was thought to 
discourage reflection within the child, suggesting that socialisation was an important factor 
for the development of social problem-solving.  
There is support for aspects of our framework within the literature about children 
with IDs who have behavioural problems.  For example, children with IDs, as compared to 
children without IDs, tended to encode more negative cues within social vignettes in one 
study (van Nieuwenhuijzen, Orobio de Castro, Wijnroks, Vermeer, & Matthys, 2004a), while 
more recently, van Nieowenhuijzen et al. (2012) reported that working memory, 
perspective taking and facial emotional recognition ability all predicted the encoding of 
emotional cues amongst children with IDs.   There is also evidence that children with IDs 
tended to generate more submissive responses to social problems, while appraising 
aggressive and submissive responses more favourably than children without IDs (van 
Nieuwenhuijzen et al., 2004a; van Nieuwenhuijzen, Orobio de Castro, Wijnroks, Vermeer, & 
Matthys, 2004b).  The authors reported that some of the differences between children with 
and without IDs could be accounted by intellectual functioning and aggressive behaviour, 
after age, sex, and internalising behaviour were controlled (van Nieuwenhuijzen et al., 
2004a).  van Nieuwenhuijzen and Vriens (2012) reported that difficulties with inhibition 
predicted hostile attributions amongst children with IDs.  They also found that emotional 
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recognition, and interpretation of problems, predicted response generation and selection.  
There is also evidence to suggest that neuropsychological functioning, including impulse 
control, has an important impact upon social information processing in children with IDs 
(van Nieuwenhuijzen, Orobio de Castro, van Aken, & Matthys, 2009).  
Adults with Intellectual Disabilities. The literature involving adults has been 
inconsistent.  Pert, Jahoda and Squire (1999) reported that adults with IDs who had a history 
of aggression did have an hostile attributional bias within ambiguous situations, but both 
aggressive and non-aggressive people with IDs were able to generate assertive and passive 
solutions to problems.  The authors suggested that problem-solving difficulties may not 
relate to propensity to engage in aggressive behaviour amongst this population.   In a later 
study, Jahoda, Pert and Trower (2006b) reported that there was no differences between 
aggressive and non-aggressive adults with IDs on an emotional-recognition task, while 
aggressive individuals appeared to be better at aspects of the perspective-taking task. They 
suggested that “cognitive-deficits” inherent with having IDs cannot explain the differences 
between aggressive and non-aggressive people with IDs, and suggested that the differences 
may be associated with a bias held by people who have a history of engaging in aggressive 
behaviour.  This conclusion would be consistent with socialisation affecting the “database”, 
or schema of these individuals, leading to biased processing.  
In a third study, Jahoda, Pert and Trower (2006a) went on to demonstrate that 
individuals with IDs who have a history of aggressive behaviour did attribute more hostility 
to characters in stories where hostility was directed at participants, but not so when 
hostility was directed towards another character in the story.   However, this hostile 
attributional bias was not present when intent was ambiguous, but those with a history of 
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aggression tended to generate a higher number of aggressive responses.   Others have also 
reported that offenders with IDs do indeed appear to have a hostile attributional bias and 
social-problem solving difficulties, as would be predicted by our theory (Basquill, Nezu, 
Nezu, & Klein, 2004), although again, this has not always been consistent (Fuchs & Benson, 
1995). 
Although there is some inconsistency amongst these studies, there is evidence to 
suggest that both children and adults with IDs who have a history of aggression process 
information differently, and as a consequence, may choose different behavioural responses.  
Some of these differences may be explained by the ability of the experimental tasks to tug 
or activate desired schema, or possibly, the inability of tasks to activate emotions or 
“somatic” markers which affect processing.  There is supportive evidence that offenders 
with IDs tend to endorse a larger number of distorted, offence-supportive beliefs, consistent 
with biased information processing (Broxholme & Lindsay, 2003; Langdon, Murphy, Clare, 
Steverson, & Palmer, 2011b; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay & Michie, 2004; Lindsay et al., 
2006), but some of the inconsistencies across studies may be explained further by giving 
consideration to psychological development.  
Specifically, moral development is dependent upon perspective taking, along with 
cognitive development and social role taking opportunities (Gibbs, 1979, 2003, 2010, 2013; 
Hoffman, 2000; Kohlberg, 1958, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1932).  There is evidence that emotion-
recognition, perspective-taking and empathy may vary with intellectual ability (Moffatt, 
Hanley-Maxwell, & Donnellan, 1995), but several have shown that offenders with IDs are 
actually better or no different than non-offenders on empathy and other tasks associated 
with perspective taking (Langdon et al., 2011b; Proctor & Beail, 2007; Ralfs & Beail, 2012), 
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but this is not always consistent (Hockley & Langdon, 2015; Langdon & Hockley, 2012).  One 
of the reasons for these findings is that offenders with IDs may actually be developmentally 
more “mature” than non-offenders with IDs, as a consequence of development within other 
domains, which will have been brought about by socialisation, but at the same time may 
have led to biased cognitive and affective processing.   Langdon, Clare and Murphy (2011a) 
argued this, highlighting the relationships between intelligence, moral development and 
behaviour.    
Intervention Programmes 
There is much work to do in order to further examine whether our theorising has validity 
for offenders with IDs.   Nevertheless, there are several intervention programmes that 
should be mentioned, as they appear linked or related to our theory.   Trying to teach social 
problem-solving skills to people with IDs is not a new idea, and several authors have 
covered this elsewhere, often commenting that it is likely to aid community integration  
(Loumidis, 1992; Loumidis & Hill, 1997a).  Others have reported that social problem-solving 
training is efficacious for people with IDs, as it is associated with reductions in aggressive 
behaviour, and distress, as well as improvements in adaptive behaviour (Castles & Glass, 
1986; Loumidis & Hill, 1997b; Nezu, Nezu, & Arean, 1991), while Ailey, Friese and Nezu 
(2012) helpfully developed and piloted a social problem-solving programme jointly with 
people with IDs.    
However, many of these studies have not included adequate randomisation or blinding, 
and many people with IDs who have been invited to take part in these studies are not 
convicted offenders.    There is some emerging evidence that cognitive-behavioural 
interventions are effective for people with IDs, and within this literature anger-management 
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training, which traditionally has a problem-solving component, currently has a large effect 
size of, Hedges g = 0.827, 95% CI [0.508; 1.146] (Vereenooghe & Langdon, 2013).  Several 
authors have attempted to develop or adapt programmes that aim to address problem-
solving directly with offenders with IDs.  Lindsay et al. (2010) developed and piloted an 
impressive programme called the Social Problem Solving and Offence Related Thinking 
(SPORT) programme within forensic mental health services for offenders with IDs, reporting 
improvements in problem-solving skills following treatment.  Lindsay et al. (2010) 
commented that the intervention was designed to teach effective problem-solving skills 
which related to the social problem-solving steps, incorporating cognitive restructuring, role 
play, along with sessions designed to improve problem-recognition, response and solution-
generation, and effective appraisal of the consequences of choosing various solutions.   
Within the wider treatment literature pertaining to offenders, there are various 
intervention programmes which aim to improve social problem-solving skills, and 
restructure problematic cognitive distortions and schema, addressing “moral developmental 
delays”.   These include Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT; Little & Robinson, 1988), Anger 
Replacement Training (ART; Goldstein & Glick, 1994; Goldstein, Glick, & Gibbs, 1998), along 
with Reasoning and Rehabilitation (R&R) groups (Ross, Fabiano, & Ewles, 1988), which 
shares similarities with the Enhanced Thinking Skills (ETS) Programme common within 
criminal justice settings within the United Kingdom.   Lipsey, Landerberger and Wilson 
(2007) undertook a meta-analysis of cognitive-behavioural programmes for use with 
offenders, reporting that treatment programmes reduced recidivism by about 25%, with 
few differences between programmes.  However, while Lipsey et al. (2007) also found that 
the moral reasoning interventions did not improve treatment outcome, van Vugt (2011) also 
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undertook meta-analytic work (N = 15 992), and reported that there was a significant 
relationship between moral development and recidivism, which was better explained by 
moral cognition, rather than moral emotion. There is also similar supportive evidence for 
the link between moral reasoning and offending behaviours from the literature involving 
young offenders (Stams et al., 2006). 
There are others reviews of treatment programmes that include social problem-solving 
components.  Wilson, Bouffard and Mackenzie (2005) concluded that MRT reduced 
recidivism rates between 10 to 20%, while R&R reduced recidivism by 7 to 33%.  Pearson, 
Lipton, Cleland and Yee  (2002) reported that the effect size for R&R was small, while Joy, 
Tong and Farrington (2006) reported a larger effect size which varied according to risk and 
whether the programme was undertaken within the community or prison.  R&R has been 
piloted in the United Kingdom with offenders with mental health problems detained within 
hospital settings (Young, Chick, & Gudjonsson, 2010), and there is evidence that it leads to 
improvements in social problem solving, attitudes and coping skills (Yip et al., 2013). 
More recently, and relevant to our integrated framework Langdon, Murphy, Clare, 
Palmer and Rees (2013) piloted the Equipping Youth to Help One Another Programme 
(Potter, Gibbs, & Goldstein, 2001) with offenders with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities.   This programme was designed to target moral reasoning, distorted cognitions, 
and both social skills and social problem-solving ability.  The programme has roots in ART, 
and positive-peer culture (Vorrath & Brendtro, 1985), and is a multicomponent programme 
comprising two types of treatment sessions: a) Mutual Help Meetings, and b) Equipment 
Meetings.   Mutual Help Meetings provide a forum for participants to discuss their 
difficulties within a framework that allows for an appropriate resolution, and aims to 
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encourage problem-solving.  Equipment Meetings are “active treatment” meetings 
comprising three different types of sessions: a) anger management and thinking error 
correction, b) social skills training, and c) social decision-making training.   Social decision-
making aims to enhance perspective taking through a process of guided discussion and 
debate about problem situations.   Detailed information about the treatment programme 
can be found in Potter et al. (2001) and Gibbs et al. (1995). 
Langdon et al. (2013) suggested that the programme is likely to have a positive 
impact upon the culture of services, because of the creation of a positive-peer culture, but 
the wider evidence for EQUIP, excluding MRT and R&R, suggests that it is effective at 
reducing recidivism and improving social skills amongst young offenders without IDs 
(Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993).  There is also evidence that it can improve cognitive 
distortions amongst young offenders (Brugman & Bink, 2010; Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 
2005), although there is also evidence that it may not improve moral development and 
social skills (Brugman & Bink, 2010; Nas et al., 2005).  Although, in some of these studies, 
treatment fidelity may have been an issue.   Although there have been no large trials of 
EQUIP, as a treatment, it is theoretically robust.  This is because it is multicomponent in 
nature, including anger management, cognitive restructuring, problem-solving, and 
interventions that target moral development, all of which link to criminal offending 
behaviour.  However, there is clearly a need for much larger studies with offenders with IDs, 
as EQUIP and other programmes, such as MRT, are likely to be helpful.   Excluding anger-
management treatment, there is insufficient evidence to allow for the conclusion that 
psychological interventions for offenders with IDs, such as R&R, MRT, EQUIP, or other 
related programmes are empirically validated.   
Problem Solving                                                                                                                                       
25 
 
Conclusions 
In an attempt to further understand social problem-solving, we have tried to 
integrate social information processing, developmental psychology, and social neuroscience 
into a comprehensive framework. This suggested conceptual framework is not a working 
model but aims to serve as an illustration that the various components of moral 
development suggested by different theories could be incorporated into one integrative 
model of moral decision-making, showing how moral decisions can be guided by both 
emotional and cognitive factors, intuitions and reasoning. Such an approach can help to 
place moral decision-making alongside other types of decision-making, which could lead to 
better prediction of moral or antisocial behaviour. There appears to be some tentative 
supportive evidence for aspects of this theory from studies involving children and adults 
with IDs.  However, the broader landscape of supportive evidence from studies involving 
people with IDs is weak, and further research is clearly needed in order to refine, develop 
and consider our approach further.   There are immerging clinical interventions which are 
based upon social problem-solving and moral development for offenders with IDs, but there 
is little in the way of evidence that can be using to empirically validate these treatments.    
While treatments are further developed and tested, it is important to ensure that their 
theoretically underpinnings are robust and valid for people with IDs, and it is hoped that our 
framework can be used in this manner, once further supportive evidence has been 
generated.   
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Figure 17.1. A Social Information Processing Framework of Moral Decision-Making (SIP-MDM) 
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Abstract 
 
Traditionally, psychological theories of moral development have focused on either 
the cognitive or affective skills required for the development of moral maturity, such 
as empathy or working memory.  While some have emphasised the role of emotional 
intuitions, others have focused the cognitive reasoning as the driver of moral 
decisions. At times, theoretically divisions have hampered both research and the 
further development of theory. More recent theories have attempted to integrate 
affect and cognition, and other components thought to be relevant to moral decision 
making, such as personality and social information processing, but have not always 
sufficiently explained development. There is, to date, no comprehensive 
developmental theory incorporating all of the components or processes suggested to 
be involved in moral decision making and behaviour.  Such a theory would help to 
bridge the gap between traditional developmental theories and more recent social 
neuroscience perspectives and move the field forward. This paper aims to: a) review 
traditional and more recent theories of moral development and decision making, b) 
highlight the components that may be involved in moral development and discuss 
research into the development of these components, and c) integrate these 
components into an illustrative framework which can be used as a starting point for 
building an integrative theory of moral development. 
 
  
 
Keywords: Moral decision making, moral development, moral reasoning, 
perspective taking, social information processing 
 
 
Abbreviations: SIP: social information processing; ToM: theory of mind; PFC: 
prefrontal cortex; vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex;  
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Introduction 
 The terms ‘moral judgement’, ‘moral reasoning’, and ‘moral cognition’ are 
often used interchangeably, and with differing definitions.  This paper will use the 
broader term moral decision-making to refer to any decision, including judgements, 
evaluations, and response choices, made within the ‘moral domain’ (Smetana, 2006; 
Turiel, 1983) i.e. decisions regarding moral issues such as justice, harm, fairness and 
life. A moral decision can be a response decision about how to act in a real or 
hypothetical moral dilemma (a situation with moral rules or principles attached, 
where a response choice is required), or it can be a judgement or evaluation about the 
moral acceptability of the actions, or moral character of others, including judgements 
of individuals, groups or institutions. Moral reasoning is one process that can guide 
moral decisions but other processes are also involved. To fully understand moral 
decision making and behaviour is it is important to understand: a) how real time, 
online moral decisions are made, b) what component skills and processes need to 
develop to enable mature moral decisions, and c) how these components develop.  
 Traditionally, moral development theory has focused on the cognitive or 
affective skills involved in moral decision-making, bearing in mind that the 
processes are complex and are likely to involve other related skills, which have not 
always been included within theory.  Alongside this, many have focused on the 
processes involved in reaching a moral decision, or in other words, moral reasoning, 
while others have focused on development, while both are sometimes referred to 
synonymously, leading to some confusion. Within developmental psychology, there 
is obviously a tradition of trying to measure developmental stages, with a lack of 
focus on other factors, such as situational factors, which may influence moral 
decisions and behaviour. Studies from social neuroscience tend to typically measure 
either brain activation while making moral decisions, or the type of decisions made 
by individuals with damage to particular brain regions, without focusing on the 
moral reasoning process, and subsequently, development.  Neuroimaging moral 
decision-making studies can reveal which brain regions are more active during moral 
decision-making, and the brain regions involved change with development (Hareksni 
et al, 2012). However, instruments used in these studies tend to be limited in how 
much they can tell us about moral development, predominantly because they do not 
reference the rich tradition of moral developmental theory.  Moral reasoning 
 4 
 
instruments (e.g. Sociomoral Reasoning Measure Short-Form; Gibbs, Bassinger & 
Fuller, 1992 and So-Moral; Dooley, Beauchamp, & Anderson, 2010)  firmly 
grounded in developmental psychology, and moral developmental theory provide 
richer detail about developmental level, and an indication of a person’s highest 
capacity for moral reasoning across differing questions or moral dilemmas.  The 
difference in focus within developmental psychology and social neuroscience has 
limited the integration of theory and research.  Bridging the gap between traditional 
developmental psychology and social neuroscience would prove fruitful for 
advancing theory and research, potentially allowing for an explanation of how online 
moral decisions happen, and how they mature over time, partly as a result of the 
development of moral reasoning, and associated component skills and processes 
such as empathy, indexed or associated with the maturation of relevant brain regions.  
Alongside the gap between developmental psychology and social 
neuroscience, there has also been a longstanding debate about whether moral 
decisions are driven by cognitive, affective, or both cognitive and affective 
processes, with perhaps fewer studies examining the developmental interaction 
between the two constructs.  While moral development is the maturation of both 
moral decisions and reasoning, which typically develop with age, this maturation 
does not occur in isolation; it is facilitated by the development of related cognitive 
and affective skills or processes (e.g. empathy, perspective-taking, working memory, 
attention), which we term the ‘components of moral development’. These component 
skills, abilities or processes have not yet been integrated into one comprehensive 
theory of moral development. We wish to broaden the definition of ‘moral 
development’ to include not only the maturation of moral decisions and moral 
reasoning, but also the development of core related components.  The capacity to 
make mature moral decisions is an integral part of development, and whether mature 
decisions are made often depend on situational factors, as well as previous 
experience.  Real time, online moral decisions do not occur in isolation; they are 
affected by processes involved in other types of decision making, including 
situational factors, and how information is processed and the capacity to process the 
information, as well as the morally relevant influences, such as the moral rules 
attached to a situation, and the strength and accessibility of relevant moral schemas.   
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This paper will firstly review moral development theory and more recent 
neuroscience theories, which although not always developmental, offer some 
suggestions of what is involved in moral decision making. This paper aims to 
highlight what develops, i.e. the components of moral development and discuss what 
we know about how these components develop and mature. We will then discuss 
how online moral decisions may occur, based on a Social Information Processing 
(SIP) approach, and how development of the components can facilitate more mature 
online moral decision making. We will finish by discussing the future of moral 
development theory, in terms of the promise and limitations of creating an 
integrative developmental model.  
A brief review of moral  theory 
Historically, moral psychology has been dominated by the rationalist, 
cognitive-developmental theoretical perspective (Kohlberg, 1976, 1984; Piaget, 
1932), while the importance of emotion has increasingly been recognised and 
integrated into theory (Gibbs, 2013; Hoffman, 2000).  Although neuroscience studies 
measure moral decisions rather than developmental stages of moral reasoning, 
recently, social neuroscientists have introduced theories or perspectives of moral 
development (Baird, 2008; Kagan, 2008; Taber-Thomas & Tranel, 2012), 
highlighting the importance of brain development. In this section we will review 
both traditional developmental psychology theories and more recent social 
neuroscience approaches.  
Reasoning or intuition? 
One divide among moral development theories is the emphasis on whether 
moral decisions are driven by emotional intuitions or cognitive reasoning processes, 
and reconciliation between the two perspectives is needed.  
Piaget’s (1932) theory, often considered to be the first cognitive 
developmental theory of moral development, outlined four stages of logical 
reasoning and two stages of moral development. He proposed that logical reasoning 
develops alongside related cognitive processes such as abstract reasoning, and this 
paved the way for moral development. At stage four, logical reasoning is defined by 
the ability to use complex, abstract cognitive skills to solve problems, in turn 
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facilitating more mature moral decisions. Piaget (1932) hypothesised that moral 
development occurs as a child moves away from egocentrism, which required the 
cognitive capacity to differentiate between the ego and social environment, and is 
facilitated by the maturation of language and imagination. Kohlberg (1984a) 
expanded Piaget’s theory to encompass adolescence and adulthood, and argued that, 
“since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon 
advanced logical reasoning. There is a parallel between an individual’s logical stage 
and his or her moral stage” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 171). Kohlberg (1984a) and Piaget 
(1932) proposed that the development of logical reasoning facilitated moral 
development, with both of them highlighting the importance of cognitive 
development for moral development. 
Through their focus on logical reasoning development, early cognitive-
development theorists proposed that moral decisions are driven by reasoning, within 
the cognitive domain. On the other hand, more recent conceptualisations, such as 
social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001) have proposed that moral decisions are driven 
by emotionally-based intuitions, and that moral reasoning is constructed after a 
decision, to explain a decision that had been made intuitively. Haidt and Bjorklund 
(2008) argued that moral beliefs and motivations come from a small set of intuitions 
that have evolved. Support for the theory comes from studies which show ‘moral 
dumbfounding’; people give quick answers to moral dilemmas but then struggle to 
explain their answers (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). The real difference between rationalist 
and intuitionist theories is one of emphasis; while rationalists believe that the real 
action is reasoning, intuitionists believe that the real action is “gut feeling”, moral 
emotions and quick intuition (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). The social intuitionist view 
of intuitions driving moral decisions is not entirely dissimilar to Damasio’s (1994) 
somatic marker hypothesis, although there are differences with reference to the role 
of reasoning. Somatic markers are another intuitive, automatic process which may 
guide some moral decisions. The somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005; Damasio, 1994) recognised the role of emotions in decision making and 
proposed that when we think of a bad outcome connected with a given response 
option that comes to mind, we experience an unpleasant gut feeling, which is a 
‘somatic marker’. This somatic marker then forces our attention onto the negative 
outcome and may lead to rejection of this option. Somatic markers can be stored in 
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memory as affect-event links, which further aid future decision making (Damasio, 
1994) and they can also guide decision making by anticipating future events, even 
when not consciously recognised (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Damasio (1994) 
argued that this is an automatic step that helps to narrow down the number of 
response options and that this process occurs before reasoning, increasing the 
accuracy and efficiency of the decision process. This is in contrast to the social 
intuitionist view that reasoning is not involved in the decision making process but is 
only carried out to explain a decision already made.  
Haidt (2001) argued that the important distinction between intuition and 
reasoning is that intuition occurs quickly, effortlessly and automatically, while 
reasoning is slow and requires more effort, including attentional resources. In 
Kahneman’s book ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’  (2011) he uses the metaphors of 
System 1 and System 2 to describe fast and slow thinking. System 1 is responsible 
for intuitive, automatic thinking and operates with little or no effort, while System 2 
is responsible for more deliberate thought and reasoning and requires effortful 
mental activities. Kahneman argues that System 1 is responsible for more of the 
decisions we make than System 2, and his view seems to mirror that of the Social 
Intuitionists: “If System 1 is involved the conclusion comes first and the arguments 
follow” (p 45). System 2 is needed to monitor and control thoughts and actions 
suggested by System 1, however, so deliberate thought and reasoning are needed to 
confirm, reject or reformulate the automatic suggestions, or intuitions of System 1. 
In most situations, System 2 accepts the suggestions of System 1 without much, or 
any deliberation needed, but System 2 is activated when an event violates the model 
of the world that System 1 maintains (Kahneman, 2011).  This would suggest that 
most everyday decisions are made with very little deliberate thought, but we argue 
that some moral decisions differ from everyday decisions and may activate System 2 
(specifically, moral reasoning) to a greater extent. We hypothesise that moral 
decisions can be driven by both a rational reasoning process and more intuitive, 
automatic processes, which may by affective, cognitive, or both.  
Moral reasoning requires logical reasoning and cognitive skills but differs 
from other forms of reasoning because it is guided by morally relevant rules, 
knowledge and understanding, stored in memory as moral schemas; many of which 
have to be learned. We propose that some moral decisions are driven by automatic 
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processes, either a somatic marker or automatic activation of a strong moral schema, 
which then guides rapid moral reasoning which the individual is unaware of 
engaging in, or bypassing the reasoning process altogether resulting in a moral 
decision which feels intuitive. Such instances are likely to result from situations with 
strong moral rules engrained in cultural norms, such as those relating to incest, 
which are the type of examples used in social intuitionist studies (Haidt & Hersh, 
2001). As somatic markers can be stored in memory as affect-event links and guide 
future decision making, automatic activation of relevant moral schemas could also 
develop over time with increased exposure to the moral rules of a culture or society. 
Automatic activation of moral schemas may drive more moral decisions over time; 
familiar or more often encountered moral dilemmas may become driven by this 
automatic schema activation, or require less moral reasoning. Gibbs (2013) 
suggested that moral reasoning stages can be viewed as schemas rather than stages, 
with schemas developing with age and facilitating moral development. An 
integrative developmental theory of moral decision making should include both 
automatic processes and moral reasoning as factors which can drive online moral 
decisions, and which develop over time to increase the capacity for making more 
mature moral decisions. The relationship between reasoning and automatic processes 
may be bi-directional; engaging in moral reasoning or making a certain moral 
decision may trigger a certain moral schema or a somatic marker and vice versa, 
influencing further reasoning.  
Emotion or cognition? 
Another related, but differing theoretical divide among moral development 
theories is the emphasis on either cognitive or emotional processes. Whereas 
cognitive primacy theories view cognition as the main driver of moral decisions, 
affective primary theories view affective processes as the main driver, while others 
tend to integrate both in some way.  Traditional perspectives within this area have 
been published by Hoffman (2000), Rest (1983) and Gibbs (2013). 
Hoffman’s (2000) theory of empathy and moral development focused on 
affective empathy as the main driver of moral decision-making, though he did 
highlight the role of cognition for achieving a “self-other” distinction. His 
developmental framework of empathy involved four broad stages in the development 
 9 
 
of self and other, and he proposed that empathy is congruent with the moral 
principles of caring and justice, playing an important role in moral decision-making 
and reasoning.  Hoffman concluded that empathy, construed as affect, rather than 
cognition became bonded with moral principles gave the principles motive force, 
while empathy could act as a powerful retrieval cue, triggering moral schemas stored 
in memory. Hoffman (2000) also linked cognition with emotion, as he hypothesised 
that the attributions people make about the cause of events can affect the level of 
empathy experienced; empathic distress may be neutralised if a victim is viewed as 
being responsible for their own plight.  He hypothesised that a person’s moral 
structure, made up of empathic affects, cognitive representations and motives is 
internalised when they accept and abide by its principles without regard to external 
reward or punishment, which is similar to Piaget’s (1932) proposition that when 
children move from the heteronomous to the autonomous stage they realise that rules 
are worthy of respect.  
Rest’s componential model of moral developmental (Rest, 1984; Rest, 
Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) stated that the four components underlying moral action 
are moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation and moral character. Moral 
sensitivity involves interpreting the situation and an awareness of the relevant moral 
factors and implications, including how actions would affect others, which requires 
perspective taking. The moral judgement component involves deliberation over 
possible courses of action and deciding which would be most morally justifiable. 
The moral motivation component involves prioritising moral values over other 
competing values and moral character refers to skills and strategies that support the 
moral choice, such as self-control (Rest, 1984; Walker, 2002). This model integrates 
both cognitive and affective processes and also highlights both moral action and 
behaviour need explanation, not just moral judgements. Rest and colleagues (Rest et 
al., 1999) presented a neo-Kohlbergian approach, moving the field away from stage 
theory and argued that rather than one stage at a time, development is a gradual 
increase of higher over earlier forms of thinking. Rest et al (1999) also recognised 
the usefulness of schema theory to moral development, which was further developed 
by Gibbs (2013).   
Gibbs (2013) offered an alternative to affective or cognitive primacy theories, 
and argued that the most plausible position within developmental theory is that 
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moral motivation occurs as a consequence of affective and cognitive coprimacy; that 
is, both affect and cognition act as motives for moral action. Gibbs (2013) argued 
that the standard stages of moral development reflect gains in working memory and 
hypothesised that attentional abilities are required to develop for the maturation of 
moral decisions. Increases in attentional abilities allow individuals to attend to more 
than one feature of a situation, moving away from an egocentric bias, and gains in 
working memory capacity allow for more than one source of information in mind 
when making decisions.  Gibbs (2013) proposed that the mature stages of moral 
development are constructed through social perspective taking. He developed Rest et 
al’s (1999) proposition that moral stages should be conceptualised as schemas, 
proposing that adaptive refinement and reorganisation of schemas enables moral 
development to take place.  Schemas are “general knowledge structures that reside in 
long-term memory and facilitate information processing” (Walker, 2002, p. 361) 
with moral schemas being knowledge structures regarding moral events.  However, 
moral decisions do not just mature because they are based on an increased quality 
and quantity of empirical knowledge schemas are frameworks, and moral maturity, 
or “growing beyond the superficial” requires a deeper understanding of fairness and 
moral reciprocity (Gibbs, 2013).   
Rest (1983, 1999) and Gibbs’s work (2013) has been crucial for advancing 
the moral development field towards a co-primacy approach and in conceptualising 
moral stages as schemas.  However, further developmental of theory is needed to 
include both cognitive and affective processes, intuitions and moral reasoning, 
alongside contributions from social neuroscience research in order to explain both 
how online moral decisions are made and how they mature over time. 
Social neuroscience theories and perspectives. 
 There has been an increased interest in moral decision making amongst social 
neuroscientists (Beauchamp, Dooley, & Anderson, 2013; Dooley et al., 2010; 
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Mendez, Anderson, & 
Shapira, 2005). Here, we will outline social neuroscience theories and perspective of 
moral development, which can be useful in highlighting the importance of certain 
brain regions for moral decision making, and linking brain development to the 
cognitive and affective skills required for mature moral decision making.  
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Kagan (2008) presented a theory of the development of morality, drawing on 
both cognitive developmental stages and neuroscience, with the inclusion of 
affective components such as guilt and empathy. He argued that children follow a 
universal sequence of stages and each stage involves the emergence of a new 
cognitive achievement, which are due to corresponding changes in brain circuitry. 
Kagan’s fifth stage, occurring between ages 5 and 10 is an understanding of abstract 
constructs such as fairness and ideals, which is facilitated by profound maturational 
changes in the brain between ages 5 and 7.  Similar to Kagan (2008), Baird (2008) 
linked moral development to brain development within her theory, although she 
particularly focused on brain development in adolescence and argued that the 
maturation of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) produced significant improvements in 
behavioural and emotional control, decision making and abstract reasoning.  Baird 
(2008) also focused on the integration of emotion and cognition in adolescence, and 
argued that we have an innate capacity to develop a moral sense. She incorporated 
ideas from the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) to explain how emotional 
states can guide future decisions, by stating that developmental improvements in 
cognition lead to the development of self-conscious emotions.  Taber-Thomas and 
Tranel (2012) presented a cognitive neuroscience perspective of social and moral 
functioning, and argued that there is a functional hierarchy underlying socio-moral 
functioning, from basic functions such as processing emotion from faces, to higher 
cognitive processes such as moral cognition. They concluded that social and moral 
functioning critically depend on a core fronto-limbic network centred on the vmPFC, 
but acknowledged that this network does not function in isolation and relies on other 
social functions. As with Baird’s theory (2008), their perspective incorporated 
aspects of the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) and they asserted that the 
vmPFC is crucial for the anticipation of emotional consequences of behaviour. 
One frequently considered theory of moral cognition within this area is the 
dual-process theory of Greene and colleagues (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene 
et al., 2001). They proposed that people make moral decisions (specifically, 
hypothetical moral response choices) either based on negative emotional responses 
the dilemma elicits, or by engaging in utilitarian moral reasoning. Initial emotional 
responses can be overridden by moral reasoning but this requires increased cognitive 
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control. Support for this theory comes from studies showing increased activity in the 
medial PFC (emotional responses), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (cognitive 
reasoning) and the anterior cingulate cortex (signals need for cognitive control) when 
choosing responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas, mainly the trolley dilemma 
(Greene, 2009). One issue is that this theoretical perspective focuses only on 
explaining utilitarian moral decision making (i.e. approving harmful actions that 
maximise good consequences), and the life vs. death hypothetical dilemmas used in 
research studies do not tend to reflect everyday moral dilemmas. Also, while this 
theory can help in understanding how online moral decisions are made, it tells us 
little about how moral maturity develops.  
In Van Bavel et al’s (2015) recent review of the neuroscience of moral 
cognition, they argued that moral cognition depended on a widely distributed set of 
brain regions, including those involved in self and other-related processing, as well 
as many different component processes such as basic perception and abstract 
reasoning. Van Bavel et al (2015) also argued that hypothetical scenarios used in 
neuroscience research usually ignore the influence of social and contextual factors, 
and they advocated a shift from dual-process theories to a dynamic systems model of 
moral cognition. We agree that a model of moral decision making needs to 
incorporate more than two processes. While dual process theories such as Greene’s 
(2001) and Kahnemeann’s (Kahneman, 2011) are useful for understanding the 
automatic, intuitive processes and the slower, reasoning processes involved in 
decision making, they are not sufficient for explaining how online moral decisions 
are made, and how they mature over time. To fully explain moral decision making 
and behaviour, it is important to understand all the components that may be involved 
in making moral decisions, how these develop over time to increase the capacity for 
making mature moral decisions, and what influences whether a mature moral 
decision will be made in different contexts and social situations.  
There are other social neuroscience theories, which while not moral 
development theories, are of relevance here, as they incorporate moral reasoning and 
some of the relevant component skills. Anderson and Beauchamp (2012) presented 
SOCIAL, a theoretical developmental social neuroscience framework of social 
function. They defined social skills as social competence, social interaction and 
social adjustment. Within this framework, moral reasoning and theory of mind 
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(ToM) are categorised as sub skills of social cognition. Components from this 
framework could be incorporated into a model of moral development to add to our 
understanding of how social skills affect social interactions and moral behaviour. 
The SOCIAL framework (Anderson & Beauchamp, 2012)  contains moral reasoning 
as a sub skill of social cognition, while we propose that social cognition, and 
particularly ToM (both cognitive and affective perspective taking) is a sub skill of 
moral reasoning and decision making. However, immature moral reasoning could in 
turn impact on social interactions and the development of social skills, indicating 
that the relationship is bi-directional. Brain development is one of the components of 
the SOCIAL framework (Anderson & Beauchamp, 2012), a component which has 
not yet been explicitly included in any models of moral development.  
Summary of moral theories  
Taken together, traditional psychology theories of moral development and 
more recent insights from social neuroscience provide a fuller picture of the skills 
and processes required for mature moral decision making. An integrative theory 
would include both affective and cognitive processes and show how both intuitions 
and reasoning can guide moral decisions. Moral psychology theories have outlined 
that the cognitive and affective skills required for mature moral decision-making 
develop with age, but have not explicitly explained how this occurs as a consequence 
of brain development. More recent neuroscience perspectives have emphasised the 
importance of brain development for the maturation of moral reasoning and related 
skills, but often neglect the moral developmental psychology literature. The field of 
moral development would benefit from clearer integration of the moral 
developmental psychology literature with insights from social neuroscience research. 
 
 
 
Table 1. The components of moral development  
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Component type Component Main theories/perspectives 
which have suggested this 
component is involved in moral 
development 
Cognitive  Working memory Gibbs (2013) 
Perspective taking Baird (2008); Piaget (1932); Gibbs 
(2013); Kohlberg (1976; 1984a, b) 
Attention Gibbs (2013) 
Abstract thought Baird (2008) 
Logical reasoning Piaget (1932); Kohlberg (1984a, 
b) 
Schemas/scripts Gibbs (2013); Hoffman (2000) 
Attributions Hoffman (2000); Gibbs (2013); 
Arsenio & Lemerise (2004) 
Self-control Rest (1984; 1999) 
Memory organisation/store Baird (2008) 
Affective  Affective empathy Hoffman (2000);  Kohlberg 
(1984a, b); Gibbs (2013) 
Emotion regulation Eisenberg, Spinrad & Sadovsky 
(2006) 
Emotion recognition Anderson & Beauchamp (2012); 
Taber-Thomas & Tranel (2012) 
Somatic markers Damasio (1994) 
Intuition Haidt (2001) 
Social  Social 
functioning/competence/skills 
Anderson and Beauchamp (2012); 
Gibbs (2013); Yeates et al (2012) 
Peer interaction/socialisation Piaget (1932); Gibbs (2013); 
Hoffman (2000); Haidt (2001) 
Socio-economic status Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & 
Lieberman (1983); Anderson & 
Beauchamp (2012) 
Culture Haidt (2001) 
Parenting Piaget (1932); Hoffman (2000) 
Palmer (2003)  
Other Brain development Baird (2008); Kagan (2008); 
Taber-Thomas and Tranel (2012), 
Anderson & Beauchamp (2012) 
Temperament/personality Haidt (2001); Kagan (2008) 
Social information processing Arsenio & Lemerise (2004); 
Palmer (2000)  
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The components of moral development: What develops and how?  
“Central to any discussion of developmental issues is the consideration of 
“what develops”” (Crick & Dodge, 1994, p. 80). Following on from the review of 
moral development theory, this paper will now highlight ‘what develops’; the 
components of moral development, and discuss how the main components develop. 
Table 1 displays the main components of moral development suggested by the 
various theories and perspectives, some of which we have reviewed above. The 
components are grouped into broad categories of cognitive, affective, social and 
other. Some of the affective components listed could be viewed as either cognitive or 
affective (e.g. emotion regulation) but we have adopted the position that they are by 
and large mainly affective. We will firstly discuss selected research into the 
development of moral or prosocial behaviour and moral decision making before 
discussing selected research into the development of the main related components in 
turn.  
Development of moral behaviour and moral decision making 
Most research into moral decision-making has focused on moral evaluations 
or response choices in adults, but there is some research into the development of 
moral or prosocial behaviour in children and adolescents. Evidence of an 
understanding of moral rules, as well as showing moral preferences and expectations 
have been found to be present in children as young as 3 months, shown by their 
preference to attend to a prosocial character (Kiley Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010) 
and infants who behave altruistically also expect others to act pro-socially.  Svetlova 
et al (2010) found that children as young as 18 months old could help adults in 
instrumental, empathic and altruistic contexts, although empathic helping required 
greater communication input from the adults, and altruistic, costly helping was the 
most difficult for the infants. Findings from 18 and 30 month olds suggested that 
during the second year of life, prosocial behaviour moves from relying on action 
understanding and explicit communication to understanding others’ emotions from 
more subtle clues (Svetlova et al., 2010).  
Neuroimaging studies using moral decision making tasks have found that the 
brain region most commonly activated is the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC; Fumagalli & Priori, 2012).  There is evidence that people with damage to 
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the vmPFC make abnormally utilitarian moral judgements (Moretto, Làdavas, 
Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 2010; Thomas, Croft, & Tranel, 2011) and that early onset 
vmPFC damage affects moral decisions more than adult onset damage (Taber-
Thomas et al, 2014), suggesting that if development of this region is compromised it 
can affect moral decision making. The vmPFC is involved in emotional processing 
(Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011) so its recruitment during moral decision making 
offers some support for the view that moral decisions are driven by emotions. 
However, the majority of moral fMRI studies used moral evaluation tasks, which 
involved judging the actions of others’ (e.g. Avram et al., 2014; Parkinson et al., 
2011); more neuroimaging research into moral response decisions is needed for a full 
picture of the neural correlates of moral decision making. Neuroimaging studies 
which do use moral response decision tasks typically use hypothetical dilemmas 
where the choice is to kill or save a life (Greene et al., 2001), which may not reflect 
everyday moral decision making. Most neuroimaging studies of moral decision 
making are on adults so there is limited research into how the maturation of relevant 
brain correlates with mature moral decision making. Harenski and colleagues (2012) 
did include 15 adolescents in their fMRI sample (age 13-18) alongside an adult 
sample (age 19-53) and found a positive correlation between age and hemodynamic 
activity in the temporo-parietal junction when participants rated the severity of moral 
transgressions. This region is known to contribute to mentalising during moral 
decision making in adults, so these findings suggest that adolescents use mentalising 
less when rating moral transgressions. Another developmental fMRI study found 
age-related increases in activity in the vmPFC and increased functional connectivity 
when judging whether moral transgressions were intentional or not (Decety, 
Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012). These studies only concerned rating moral 
transgressions, not making moral response decisions; further developmental 
neuroscience research is needed into how the maturation of relevant brain regions 
affects the development of all types of moral decision making.  
Moral reasoning is often measured as an indicator of an individual’s highest 
capacity for reasoning across different questions or moral dilemmas. Research has 
found that moral reasoning scores develop with age to higher levels of reasoning 
maturity (Colby et al., 1983; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992). Moral developmental 
delay is the persistence of immature morality into adolescence (Gibbs, 2013) and 
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delayed moral reasoning has been found for offenders (Stams et al., 2006) and 
survivors of traumatic brain injuries (Beauchamp et al., 2013; Dooley et al., 2010). 
Eisenberg’s longitudinal research (1995) demonstrated age-related development in 
prosocial reasoning, with an increase in empathic reasoning coupled with a decrease 
in hedonistic reasoning between preschool and elementary school age children, 
suggesting a shift from self to other-orientation with age. This study also found that 
there was a significant correlation between moral reasoning and prosocial behaviour. 
This relationship was confirmed by Carlo et al (2010), who found that moral 
reasoning and emotions were interrelated and predicted prosocial behaviours. 
In addition to research into moral behaviour and moral decision-making, 
research about how the components of moral development mature is exceptionally 
relevant (Table 1). We will now discuss some research into the development these 
components and consider how they can be synthesised to take the form of an 
integrative framework.  
Development of perspective taking 
The component cited by most theories as being crucial for moral 
development is perspective taking. Perspective taking here is considered to be the 
cognitive component of empathy and refers to the ability to infer another’s mental 
states and attributions; also referred to as mentalisation ability or theory of mind.  
Lapsley stated that, “the root developmental achievement that underlies every 
domain of social cognitive development is perspective taking” (Lapsey, 2006, p. 58). 
Perspective taking is important for moral development as it allows for others’ 
thoughts and feelings to be taken into account when making moral decisions, as 
attributions of intent can affect how moral decisions are processed, and whether 
empathy is triggered. Although perspective taking can be viewed as a cognitive 
component, the ability to know, feel, and understand others’ mental states is highly 
relevant and often referred to as affective empathy (feeling another’s states), or 
‘affective resonance’ – this is affective perspective. 
 
 Perspective taking has been described as the “ultimate integration of emotion 
and cognition” (Baird, 2008, p. 334). Research has found that visual perspective 
taking develops between 12-14 months (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007) and that 
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by 4 years old children can pass false belief tasks (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001), showing an understanding that a person can have a belief that contradicts 
reality. Most ToM research has involved children but it has been found that the ToM, 
and its interaction with executive functions continues to develop into late 
adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010).  For example, Gredebäck 
et al (2015) conducted an event-related potential study of prosocial preferences in 6 
month old infants and found greater amplitude of P400 when infants watched agents 
who had previously helped rather than hindered another agent, suggesting that the 
P400 component indexes activation of the memory of agents pro or antisocial 
actions, and that this is processes is functional by 6 months.  A longitudinal study of 
13-18 year olds found that perspective taking increased during adolescence (Van der 
Graaff et al., 2014), while a study into the development of the neural network 
associated with perspective taking found that in adults (age 25-32), activity increased 
in the left inferior parietal cortex and precuneus when processing third person 
compared to first person judgments, and children (age 8-10) additionally showed 
increased activity in the dorsolateral PFC and the right inferior parietal cortex 
(Dosch, Loenneker, Bucher, Martin, & Klaver, 2010). There was also a decrease in 
reaction time differences between third and first person judgements with age, 
suggesting that adults are more efficient at processing third person judgements 
(Dosch et al., 2010).  While,  Lane et al’s (2010) longitudinal study found that theory 
of mind and emotion understanding both prospectively predicted young children’s 
moral reasoning and decision making, and further, while perspective taking is the 
component most frequently proposed to be involved in moral development, there is 
not a wealth of research linking the development of perspective taking to moral 
reasoning or decision making. 
 
Perspective taking is hypothesised to develop through role-taking and pretend 
play (Piaget, 1932; (Selman, 1976). A child’s social environment provides role-
taking opportunities, and participation in role-taking spurs on moral development 
(Kohlberg, 1976). The importance of peer interaction for perspective taking 
development in adolescence has been emphasised over parent interaction (Baird, 
2008). Research has found that children’s competence in peer interaction is 
significantly related to ToM understanding (Peterson, Slaughter, Moore, & Wellman, 
2016). As perspective taking develops through interaction with the social 
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environment, social factors can influence its development, which in turn affects 
moral development. A model of moral development, therefore, needs to include 
perspective taking, the factors affected by perspective taking (e.g. affective 
empathy), and the factors which influence the development of perspective taking 
(e.g. peer interaction).  
  
 Development of affective processes 
The main affective process seen as important to moral development is 
affective empathy. Affective empathy allows individuals to experience other’s 
feelings, including anticipated guilt when making a moral decision. Empathy can act 
as a motivator for moral behaviour and also a powerful retrieval cue (Hoffman, 
2000). The role of empathy in moral reasoning and decision making may be linked 
to other skills. For example, for empathy to motivate moral behaviour, this may 
involve or require the ability to recognise others’ emotions, regulate one’s own 
emotions and retrieve relevant empathy-cognition bonds from memory. Emotion 
regulation is the control of emotional experience and expression (Campos, Campos, 
& Barrett, 1989) and consists of extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for 
monitoring, evaluating and modifying emotional reactions (Thompson, 1994) and is 
also linked to empathy.  Eisenberg, Spinrad and Sadovsky (2006) argued that 
emotion regulation can influence whether children experience sympathy or personal 
distress, and this in turn can influence moral development, while Lockwood, Seara-
Cardoso and Viding (2014)  found that emotion regulation moderates the 
relationship between empathy and prosocial behaviour.  
Development of cognitive processes 
Attention and working memory are cognitive processes proposed to be required for 
moral development. Development of attention abilities allows for individuals to 
focus on more details within a situation while an increased working memory 
capacity allows for individuals to hold multiple features of a situation in mind while 
making a decision.  
Working memory capacity develops during childhood, with a linear increase 
in performance on various working memory tasks, from age 4-15 (Gathercole, 
Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004). De Wilde et al (2016) investigated the 
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developmental relationships between children’s working memory capacity and their 
social development. It was found that lower working memory scores were related to 
increases in teacher-child conflict one year later, and that teacher-child conflict was 
negatively associated with the development of working memory, suggesting that 
working memory can affect social development, and vice-versa. A longitudinal study 
into the neural networks of working memory in a sample of 6-25 year olds revealed 
that working memory capacity correlated with activity in frontal and parietal regions, 
cortical thickness in the parietal cortex, and white matter structure of fronto-parietal 
and fronto-striatal tracts, while fractional anisotropy in white matter tracts and 
caudate activity predicted future working memory capacity (Darki & Klingberg, 
2015). 
 
Visual attention develops rapidly during the first 5-10 months (Ross‐Sheehy, 
Schneegans, & Spencer, 2015). Staying alert to cues shows significant 
developmental improvement after age 7 in terms of speed of processing (Pozuelos, 
Paz-Alonso, Castillo, Fuentes, & Rueda, 2014), and executive attention develops 
strongly between ages 4-6 (Rueda, Rothbart, McCandliss, Saccomanno, & Posner, 
2005) showing further improvements in late childhood (Pozuelos et al., 2014). A 
study of 400 3-12 year olds found a staging in the development of attention and 
executive functions from age 6, starting with the maturing of inhibitory functions, 
followed by maturation of auditory and visual attention at age 10 and the 
development of fluency in adolescence (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 
2001). An MRI study of children (7-12) and adults (18-31) found that children 
showed greater functional connectivity of regions in the dorsal attention network 
compared to adults, whereas adults showed greater functional connectivity between 
regions within the ventral attention network than children (Farrant & Uddin, 2015). 
This pattern of development of attention networks may be a neural signature of the 
developmental shift from bottom-up attention mechanisms to top-down attentional 
capacities (Farrant & Uddin, 2015). 
 
The development of attention and working memory can also facilitate logical 
and abstract reasoning abilities, which in turn facilitates mature problem solving and 
moral decisions (Piaget, 1932). Abstract reasoning is the ability to base reasoning on 
relationships between representations rather than just simple features of a stimulus 
 21 
 
(Dumontheil, 2014), so it is important for moral development as it enables moral 
concepts and necessities to be understood and applied across different settings, even 
those not previously experienced.  The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is used as a 
measure of abstract reasoning, attention regulation and working memory in research 
studies and performance on the task has been found to increase with age (Bujoreanu 
& Willis, 2008; Somsen, 2007). A shift from using concrete to abstract strategies to 
solve algebra problems has been found by age 15-16 (Susac, Bubic, Vrbanc, & 
Planinic, 2014) and abstract reasoning has been found to be impaired in children and 
adolescents with autism spectrum disorders (Solomon, Buaminger, & Rogers, 2011). 
A neurodevelopmental study of relational reasoning (abstract reasoning) found that 
similar to adults, children recruited the rostrolateral PFC when processing relations 
but failed to use this region when integrating across two relations (Crone et al., 
2009). Despite the proposal of the importance of abstract reasoning to moral 
reasoning development, there is a lack of research linking these components. 
Brain development 
Brain development is important for moral decision making directly, through 
development of brain regions thought to be involved in making online moral 
decisions, and also indirectly through the development of brain regions involved in 
the component skills and processes, and also increased speed of processing with the 
development of connections between relevant brain regions. “Although morality is a 
social construct, it would not exist without the brain” (Tancredi, 2005, p. 34). Above 
we have discussed some neuroscience research into the components of moral 
development and will now discuss general brain development.  
The human brain is still developing into the mid-twenties (Blakemore, 2008) 
and there is a dramatic rearrangement in structure and function during adolescence 
(Andersen, 2003), which may partly account for moral decision making and 
reasoning maturing in late adolescence or adulthood. Adolescence, the period 
between childhood and adulthood, is second only to infancy in terms of the rate of 
developmental change in the brain (Arain et al., 2013). Many factors such as 
environment, nutrition and substance abuse can affect the maturation of the brain 
(Arain et al., 2013). Although the vmPFC has been found to be the most active area 
during moral decisions, it has been argued that there is no moral locus, as morality 
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consists of complex cognitive processes, supported by many areas of the brain 
(Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Young & Dungan, 2012). As we propose that many 
components are required for moral development then it follows that the maturation 
of many brain regions and connections between regions is important. The PFC is the 
last brain region to mature and it continues to mature during into adulthood (Arain et 
al., 2013). The development of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is linked to increased 
abilities in abstract reasoning, attention, inhibition and processing speed (Arain et al., 
2013; Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). The PFC is also thought to be involved in the 
processing of secondary emotions and the acquisition of somatic markers (Damasio, 
1994). The medial PFC has been suggested to be involved in mentalising ability 
(Frith & Frith, 2006) so the development of this area may be particularly important 
for perspective taking. Guilt has been found to be associated with activation in the 
medial PFC, left posterior superior temporal sulcus, and visual cortex (Takahashi et 
al., 2004) so the development of empathy-based guilt (Hoffman, 2000) may be 
influenced by maturation of these regions. The development of working memory has 
been linked to the development of the superior frontal and intraparietal cortex 
(Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002). A social brain network has also been 
suggested, which includes the fusiform face area, the posterior superior temporal 
sulcus, the hippocampus, the amygdala, the temporo-parietal junction, the cingulate 
cortex, medial frontal cortex, and the anterior gyrus (Heyes, Sebastian, & Kadosh, 
2012; Yeates et al., 2012) and developmental research has found that the social brain 
continues to develop structurally during adolescence, stabilising in the mid-twenties 
(Mills, Lalonde, Clasen, Giedd, & Blakemore, 2014). Development of these regions 
may facilitate the development of social skills and functioning, in turn facilitating 
moral development.  
Summary of components 
Research we have discussed outlined that the components develop and 
mature with age, and that this may be partly due to increased socialisation and brain 
maturation, with some abilities or processes being evident in early infancy. Taken 
together, neuroscience research into development of the components suggests that 
various brain regions and networks are involved in moral development, and that the 
structure and functional connectivity of these networks changes with age.  Some 
components such as perspective taking and empathy are proximal factors of moral 
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development, while other components are more distal factors. Social skills can be 
seen as distal factors as they affect the development of components such as moral 
schemas and perspective taking, which in turn facilitate moral development.  There 
are many bi-directional relationships between components, for example, peer 
interaction influences the development of perspective taking abilities, which in turn 
can affect an individual’s peer interactions. Some research has found developmental 
and predictive relationships between components, suggesting that the various 
components could be integrated into one model of moral development. Neuroscience 
research has highlighted that moral decision making is a dynamic process emerging 
from the integration and coordination of widely distributed brain regions (Van Bavel 
et al., 2015) and so neuroscience has much to offer to the field of moral psychology, 
moving it towards a more dynamic explanation. All the components together are 
important for moral development and behaviour due to their influence on each other; 
each component is necessary but not sufficient for moral development. 
Online moral decision making: Toward an integrative dynamic 
framework 
 
We have discussed the development of moral decision making and the related 
components and will now discuss how online moral decisions might occur, in order 
to provide a full picture of moral decisions and behaviour. Moral decision making 
differs from other types of decision making because the situation has moral rules 
attached, which may invoke moral reasoning and the activation of morally relevant 
schemas from memory. However, moral decision making shares similarities with 
other types of decision making as it involves processing information and making 
judgements, evaluations and response decisions which may lead to behavioural 
action, and is subject to influences such as situational factors, personality factors and 
biases.  
One issue with moral development theory and research is that moral 
reasoning does not always correlate with behaviour (Blasi, 1983) and it has been 
found that people do not always use their highest possible level of reasoning (Krebs 
& Denton, 1997). A recent meta-analysis (Villegas de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo, 
2015) found a significant association between moral judgements (measured using 
various instruments) and behaviour, with a medium effect size of .20. Findings from 
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this meta-analysis support Kohlberg’s (1984a) view that moral principles are 
necessary but not sufficient for moral action, and that research needs to examine 
other factors sufficient to explain moral action. We need to link what we know about 
the development of moral maturity and related components with what we know 
about decision making in order to gain a better understanding of how online moral 
decisions are made, how they mature over time and, in turn, a better understanding 
of moral behaviour. An integrative model of moral development should take into 
account factors which may influence an individual’s decision making, and other 
factors which may affect their behavioural response, to provide a full picture of 
moral action. Moral action can refer to any behaviour that occurs in a moral dilemma 
situation. Most antisocial or offending behaviours involve breaking moral rules or 
principles, so to explain moral action would explain antisocial or prosocial 
behaviours.  
A recent review of dual-process theories of moral cognition (Van Bavel, 
FeldmanHall, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015) concluded that neuroscience research 
shows the need to move beyond simple dual process theories or moral cognition, and 
argued that psychological models can benefit from incorporating neuroscience 
research. While traditional moral psychology theories either focused on intuitions or 
reasoning, there have been integrations which highlight the complexity of moral 
decision making, such as integrations of moral theory with social information 
processing theory (SIP ) (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004).  Here, we suggest that a SIP 
framework can be a useful starting point for developing an integrative, dynamic 
model of moral development, incorporating situational factors that influence online 
moral decision making, showing how both affective and cognitive processes can 
guide moral decisions, and incorporating findings from neuroscience research. We 
will now briefly outline SIP theory, add the components of moral development to a 
SIP framework and discuss how this can help to explain online moral decision 
making and guide future research. 
Social information processing theory 
Social information processing theory can provide a useful framework for 
explaining how online decisions are made, and can be adapted to include the 
components of moral development. The original SIP model was proposed as an 
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explanation of aggression in children (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Children who display 
aggressive behaviour can be construed as having atypical processing skills (Crick & 
Dodge, 1996; Dodge & Coie, 1987), suggesting that the SIP model provides a sound 
basis for explaining behaviour. Within the SIP model (Crick & Dodge, 1994), 
children’s behavioural responses are a function of the processing of information in a 
situation.  The model consists of six steps: (1) encoding of cues, (2) interpretation of 
cues, (3) clarification of goals, (4) response access or construction, (5) response 
decision, and (6) behavioural enactment. Children come to a social situation with a 
set of biologically determined capabilities and stored memories of past experiences, 
which can affect how information is processed (Crick & Dodge, 1994). The 6 steps 
represent a logical order but do not necessarily occur in this order and can co-occur.  
Although many factors are involved in determining the development of 
antisocial behaviour in young people, the actual behavioural act is preceded by a 
decision making process which serves as the proximal control mechanism (Burks, 
Laird, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999). Moral response decisions can be 
conceptualised as the response decision step in a SIP model, as the proximal decision 
before a behavioural response, although a behavioural response will only follow if it 
is perceived that one is necessary, and the intended action is able to be carried out. 
Emotional processes, such as empathic arousal were incorporated into the SIP model 
by (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000), suggesting that a SIP approach can be used to bridge 
the cognition vs. affect division within moral psychology. Rest’s (1984) moral 
sensitivity component involves interpretation of the situation, which is similar to step 
2 of the SIP model, and his proposed moral judgement component, which involves 
deliberation could be formulated step 5 of a SIP model. 
Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) integrated SIP with moral domain theory and 
argued that moral domain theory can be used to expand on the latent mental 
structures, or the ‘database’ suggested by Crick and Dodge (1994). Moral domain 
theory (also referred to as social domain theory) makes the important distinction 
between the personal, moral, and social domains and proposed that moral 
judgements are constructed through reciprocal social interactions (see Smetana, 
2006; Turiel, 1983). The majority of research based on domain theory has focused 
on establishing whether children of different ages can distinguish between moral and 
social conventional acts (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Smetana, 1985; Song, Smetana & 
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Kim, 1987; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). While such research has been helpful in 
highlighting the distinction between domains, the predictions made about how moral 
decisions develop and mature with age are tenuous. We propose that integration of 
SIP with moral theory can be taken further, adding components suggested by other 
moral theories. Crick and Dodge (1994) suggested that SIP ability developed with 
age due to a growth in experience with social interactions, developmental shifts in 
attentional ability, mental capacity or speed of processing, and the organisation and 
interpretation of social information. This is similar to how moral decisions are 
hypothesised to mature, according to the various moral development theories, 
suggesting that as well as explaining how online moral decisions are made, the 
integration of moral theory with SIP has the potential to explain how moral decisions 
develop and mature. 
 Here we introduce a conceptual, illustrative framework of moral 
development, showing how the components of moral development suggested by 
various theories can be integrated into one dynamic explanation of how moral 
decisions are made. The format owes much to the original (Crick & Dodge, 1994) 
and more recent models (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000) but 
we have added components to each step and reconceptualised the centre of the 
model, incorporating ideas from moral theories and social neuroscience. We will 
explain how this framework goes beyond previous integrations of moral theory with 
SIP, and suggest how such a framework has the potential to be developmental. We 
will also discuss how this illustrative framework can guide future research, and can 
be a step towards an integrative developmental model of moral decision making.  
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 Figure 1. A conceptual illustrative framework of moral development  
 
As with previous SIP models, the online processing steps of the suggested 
framework are labelled 1-6 to represent a logical order but this is not necessarily how 
processing occurs in all situations; the steps are not strictly sequential, can occur in 
parallel and involve continuous updating. This is in line with Rest’s componential 
model, which, although has a logical sequence, there is no set temporal or linear 
order (Walker, 2002). The 6 steps indicate the processing that is occurring when 
making a decision about how to behave when dealing with a moral dilemma. All of 
the processing steps are influenced by factors in the centre of the model, such as 
one’s previous experience in similar situations, and current mood. All of the 
components in the centre can influence online processing either directly, (such as 
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temperament influencing attributions made at step 2), or indirectly through their 
effect on development of the database. All the relationships in this model are multi-
directional: the factors in the centre of the model can influence each step of 
processing, and engaging in information processing can influence brain development 
and other factors within the centre of the model, in turn influencing future SIP. The 
thick arrows from the centre to each step indicate the factors in the centre influencing 
online decisions, and the dashed arrows indicate processing influencing development 
of factors in the centre. The arrows are separate, as this relationship is not entirely 
cyclical; although engaging in SIP can influence development of factors in the centre 
these developments occur over time and so cannot be used in the same online 
situation.  
Although the 6 steps are not necessarily how processing occurs in every 
situation, we will now use the order of the 6 steps to illustrate how a moral response 
decision may be made in an everyday moral dilemma (a situation with moral rules or 
principles attached where a response decision is required), using the example of 
deciding whether or not to cheat during a game of Monopoly with friends (an 
example scenario used in So-Moral, Dooley et al., 2010). We will describe how an 
individual may decide to cheat in this situation, based on the suggested framework, 
but will also discuss how the alternative action (not cheating) may occur. At step 1 
the individual will encode the cues such as looking at how much money each player 
has, encoding the other players’ emotions and encoding situational cues such as the 
opportunity to cheat (e.g. other players are distracted or have left the room). 
Encoding these cues will require attention abilities and emotion recognition, and 
which cues are encoded will affect subsequent processing. Encoded cues are then 
interpreted at step 2; this is an important step and is where a situation is recognised 
as having moral rules attached or not, through moral judgements and evaluations. 
For cheating at the game to occur, an individual may either not recognise that this 
situation has moral rules attached, e.g. they may think that because it is a game with 
friends that the moral rule of not cheating does not apply, or they do recognise the 
moral rules attached but still decide to cheat for various reasons, e.g. they are losing 
and want to win. In interpreting cues, the individual may engage in perspective 
taking; thinking how their friends might feel if they cheated, or thinking how they 
would feel if their friends cheated, which could influence the goals they set in the 
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situation. In interpreting cues, the individual may also engage in various evaluations 
such as evaluating theirs and their friends’ past performances of playing Monopoly, 
which will require working memory in order to keep various sources of information 
in mind. At step 3, goals for the situation are set, and these can be influenced by 
whether or not empathic arousal occurs, and also influenced by situational factors 
(e.g. does the opportunity to cheat still exist). This step is where an individual 
decides what they want from the situation, such as to cheat at the game by possibly 
gaining more money to play with, and increase their chances of winning. Possible 
responses are accessed or constructed at step 4. In this example, an individual may 
think of various ways in which they can cheat, such as taking some extra money 
from the bank or hiding some of the other players’ money. Responses thought about 
at this step can be influenced by somatic markers and situational factors, and may 
require abstract thought. A step 5, the moral response decision is made, i.e. to cheat 
and how to cheat. Deliberation occurs at this step, which may include engaging in 
moral reasoning and evaluating the expected outcome. A self-efficacy evaluation 
may also occur at this step, where the individual evaluates their ability to carry out 
their intended action, e.g. evaluating if they would be able to take extra money 
without being caught by the other players. Deliberation at this step could lead to a 
change in the selected goal, or a change to the chosen response option. The response 
decided upon at step 5, to cheat at the game, will be enacted at step 6 unless 
situational factors change (e.g. the opportunity to cheat no longer exists or the game 
ends), or the individual over estimated their ability to carry out their chosen course 
of action. As stated, the steps do not necessarily occur in this order, and processing 
can be rapid.  
 In terms of choosing a moral or prosocial course of action, in the Monopoly 
example, an individual may not cheat either because they do not consider cheating as 
a possible action, or they may consider it but decide against it for various reasons. If 
an opportunity to cheat was either not encoded (not noticed), or was not interpreted 
as such, then there is no moral dilemma and no response decision to be made. An 
individual may recognise the opportunity to cheat but not consider it a possible 
action, which may be due to knowledge of moral rules related to the specific 
situation (knowledge that cheating is bad), or due to a deeper understanding and 
moral necessities (an appreciation of fairness). As individuals develop moral 
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maturity, more decisions will be made based on a deeper understanding of moral 
necessities than on situation specific moral rules. At each step, certain components 
can influence an individual’s decision making, leading them to decide not to cheat. 
For example, engaging in perspective taking at step 2 may lead an individual to 
decide that the other players would not be happy if they cheated, or thinking about 
the ways to cheat at step might trigger a somatic marker which feels unpleasant and 
rules out cheating as a viable option.   
In terms of the development of moral decision making in such a framework, 
the development of each of the components of the framework leads to an increased 
efficiency of online decision making, for example, increases in the ability to 
recognise emotions (step 1) will enable such cues to be encoded and used in 
processing a situation, and increases in working memory (step 2) will allow for more 
features of a situation to be taken into account when making a decision. However, to 
fully achieve the capacity for mature moral decision making, the components in the 
database also need to develop. One important difference to this framework compared 
to previous SIP models is the extension of the database to add components thought 
to be crucial for moral development, such as perspective taking, an understanding of 
moral necessities, working memory, attention and abstract reasoning.  Moral 
development is not just achieved through an increase in moral knowledge, but also 
involves the development of perspective taking and an appreciation of moral 
necessities for “growth beyond the superficial” (Gibbs, 2013). This framework is 
dynamic and is in line with Rest et al’s (1999) argument that development is gradual 
rather than one step at a time. The horizontal arrow at the bottom of the framework is 
to illustrate that the whole process develops over time, but this developmental aspect 
could be greatly expanded upon by research into developmental relationships 
between components, and also adding what is known about peaks of brain 
development.  
Based on this framework, to be able to make a mature online moral decision 
to a moral dilemma, an individual needs to have both a developed database and 
sufficiently developed component skills and processes to be able to process the 
situation. In addition to this, situational factors will affect whether a mature moral 
decision is actually made, and if this is followed by a moral behavioural response. 
More mature moral decisions are more likely to result in prosocial behaviour but 
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other factors also influence behaviour, and such factors and their effects (e.g. peer 
influence) can change over time.  Behaviour enactment, at step 6 of this framework 
is a result of online processing that occurs in a situation, the integrity of the 
component skills and processes at each step and in the centre of the model, and also 
situational factors.  
This framework suggests how online moral decisions can be driven by both 
automatic processes and by reasoning. Somatic markers have been added (step 4) as 
a component which can affect decision making, narrowing down possible responses 
in a situation, and affect-event links have been added to the database, which may 
lead to some moral decisions becoming more automatic and efficient with increased 
experience. Moral reasoning has been added at step 5, as a component involved in 
making a moral response decision. Based on the suggested framework, an 
individual’s moral reasoning maturity level will indicate their capacity for reasoning, 
but does not imply that the highest level of moral reasoning will be employed in 
every situation involving a moral dilemma; it also depends on how information is 
processed in a given situation, for example whether or not a situation is recognised 
as having moral rules attached, and how others’ intentions are attributed. As with all 
other components at each step of the framework, moral reasoning can be affected by 
the database and can become more mature as moral principles are internalised and a 
deeper understanding of moral necessities occurs.  
Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) incorporated some aspects of moral theory by 
integrating SIP with domain theory but our framework takes integration further by 
adding components at each step, conceptualising step 5 as ‘moral response decision’ 
which is a decision about what to do in a moral dilemma, i.e. a situation with moral 
rules attached and reformulating the centre of the model.    
The behaviour enactment at step 6 in this framework is, therefore, any 
behaviour in a situation involving moral principles such as harm or justice. Although 
the steps of the model are not strictly sequential, a moral response decision is the 
proximal step made before behaviour enactment Moral decisions which are not 
response decisions, such as judging or evaluating others’ actions have been added at 
step 2, as such decisions made when interpreting a moral situation can influence the 
response decision that is chosen at step 5. These moral decisions at step 2 can also 
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influence whether a situation itself is viewed as moral or not, which will influence 
whether moral schemas are activated. Whether an individual views a situation in 
moral or personal terms has an influence on their reasoning and decision making 
(Judith G Smetana, 1981). 
The framework suggested here also reformulates the centre of the model, 
incorporating social factors and brain development alongside the database (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994) and emotional processes (Lemerise &Arsenio, 2000). Social factors 
can influence the development of other components, such as peer interaction, which 
can in turn influence the development of perspective taking. As the brain develops, 
this can influence both online decisions and the development of other components. 
Brain activation of areas associated with moral decisions may be particularly 
important for online decisions and the maturation of brain regions and the 
connections between regions can also have an impact upon SIP through, for 
example, increased speed of processing. Decreases in reaction times for adults 
compared to adolescents when making moral decisions indicates that adults become 
more efficient at processing such information (Dosch et al., 2010). Perspective 
taking (or ToM) has also been added to the database as it has been proposed as a pre-
requisite for moral development, and is related to affective empathy and empathic 
arousal at certain steps. 
. The suggested framework also adds components to each step, above what has 
been suggested by previous SIP models. Although Crick and Dodge (1994) proposed 
that development of attention is important for SIP, and attention has been proposed 
to be important for moral development (Gibbs, 2013), it has not been explicitly 
included in previous SIP models. Kahneman (2011) points out that deliberate 
thought and reasoning requires attention, and is disrupted when attention is drawn 
away, and although some processes such as seeing are automatic, they rely on the 
allocation of attention to the relevant stimulus. Step 1, encoding of cues is where an 
individual selectively attends to a situation and encodes cues. Only the encoded cues 
can then be used in subsequent processing. Encoding of cues relies primarily on 
attention, which can be biased, so is important at this step. As attention capacity 
develops with age, this allows for more features of a situation to be encoded.  
Related to this, working memory has also been proposed to be important for moral 
development (Gibbs, 2013) and has been added to steps 2 and 5 as we propose it will 
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be most important to hold information in mind while interpreting cues and making a 
moral decision. Perspective taking has also been added at step 2, as making 
appropriate attributions relies on the ability to infer others’ beliefs and intentions. As 
perspective taking ability develops this will influence processing at step 2, resulting 
is less egocentric processing. At step 3, individuals bring some goal orientations or 
tendencies to a situation but also revise and construct goals in response to immediate 
stimuli (Crick and Dodge, 1994).  We have added abstract thinking at step 3 as it 
will be involved in allowing an individual to think of a goal which they may not 
have previously experienced. Empathic arousal has also been added at step 3; 
empathy can be a motivator of moral behaviour (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg, 
Eggum, & Edwards, 2010; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Hoffman, 2000) and this can guide 
the goal that is ‘selected’. Step 4, response access or construction is where an 
individual accesses from memory possible responses to the situation, or constructs 
new behaviours if the situation is novel, which can occur in a rather automatic 
fashion. Abstract thought will be important at this step as individuals may need to 
construct a novel response, or imagine their ideal response. Step 4 is where we 
propose that somatic markers (Damasio, 1994) are relevant; some response outcomes 
(moral response decisions and behavioural responses) which elicit a strong emotional 
response (‘gut feeling’) are automatically rejected at this step without further 
deliberation at step 5.  
We have  renamed step 5 as ‘moral response decision’, and added moral 
reasoning, inhibition/self-control and working memory at this step. We propose that 
inhibition and self-control is important at this step for inhibiting inappropriate 
responses generated at step 4.  Moral reasoning is just one of the components which 
guides moral decisions, although it draws upon and is dependent upon other 
components such as emotion expectancies, attention, encoding, working memory, 
and perspective taking. Even though initial decisions may be driven by some somatic 
markers or automatic activation of a moral schema at step 4, reasoning is required to 
confirm, reject or reformulate this into a moral decision. Moral reasoning in a given 
situation depends on the processing at other steps of the model, and to what extent 
the situation activates moral schemas. 
‘Situational factors’ have also been added at steps 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 as they can 
affect how information is processed at these steps. Situational factors may be of most 
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importance at step 6; following the moral response decision at step 5, the enacted 
behaviour at step 6 can be affected by situational factors, or if an individual 
overestimated their self-efficacy to carry out the action. More research is needed on 
the exact situational factors that affect processing and behaviour, but this framework 
acknowledges that some will have an influence and so need to be taken into account 
when explaining behaviour.  Measuring some of the components of this framework 
in an individual (e.g. their moral reasoning level and SIP skills) may allow us to 
predict how they are likely to act in moral situations, but without further exploration 
of all relevant situational factors, we would be unable to predict behaviour.  
This suggested conceptual framework is not a working model but aims to 
serve as an illustration that the various components of moral development suggested 
by different theories could be incorporated into one integrative model of moral 
decision making, showing how moral decisions can be guided by both emotional and 
cognitive factors, intuitions and reasoning. Such an approach can help to place moral 
decision making alongside other types of decision making, which could lead to better 
prediction of moral or antisocial behaviour. This SIP framework can be a useful 
starting point for explaining the different components and processes involved, 
integrating diverging fields and suggesting avenues for future research and theory 
development in this area.  
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we have reviewed moral development theory, highlighted what 
develops, i.e. the components of moral development and discussed research into how 
these develop. We have also suggested how online moral decision making may occur 
by introducing an illustrative framework based on SIP.  While not a working model, 
this framework can be used as a starting point to guide further research in this area. 
We will now discuss the future of moral development theory and research, focusing 
on the promise and limitations of an integrated developmental theory or moral 
decision making and suggested areas for further research. 
Promise and limitations of an integrated developmental framework of moral 
decision making 
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Looking to the future of moral theory development, our suggested framework 
integrates views from various theories into one explanation of moral decision 
making. While not a working model, this framework can offer predictions to be 
tested by future research studies, leading to further clarification of the framework, 
hopefully increasing insight into developmental relationships between components, 
leading to better predictions of behaviour, and hopefully more creative ways of 
helping those who have difficulties within are of the areas described within our 
framework.  
Divides in moral development theory have had an effect upon both research 
and theoretical developments, such that moral development theory does not always 
sufficiently explain moral behaviour. The framework suggested here attempts to 
address this by demonstrating how suggested components from various moral 
theories can be integrated, and combining both automatic processes (somatic 
markers and schemas) and moral reasoning, showing how both can guide moral 
decisions. The framework also incorporates other cognitive and affective processes 
and places moral decision making alongside other types of decision making by 
highlighting that situational factors can also influence decisions and behaviour. 
Moral psychology theories have mostly focused on explaining reasoning and 
decisions (judgements, evaluations and response choice) rather than explaining 
moral behaviour. We propose that ideas from these theories can help to explain 
moral behaviour when incorporated into a SIP framework. Our suggested framework 
goes beyond previous integrations with SIP theory as it incorporates ideas from 
various moral theories rather than just moral domain theory. As well as explaining 
how online moral decisions occur, the framework can also be developmental. 
Development of the components at each step increases the capacity for more 
efficient processing and decision making, and development of the database enables 
moral maturity. The framework also attempts to incorporate ideas from social 
neuroscience, placing brain development at the centre of the model to highlight its 
importance and moving towards a dynamic explanation of moral development (Van 
Bavel et al., 2015). Each of the components of the model develops with age and 
experience, either due directly or indirectly to the maturation of the brain, which 
occurs with growth and socialisation. Damage to the brain may alter the 
developmental trajectories of these components, resulting in less efficient social 
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information processing and delayed moral development, having a subsequent effect 
upon behaviour.  
To understand moral decision making and behaviour is it is important to 
understand how real time, online moral decisions are made, the components involved 
in moral decision making and development, and also how these components develop 
and mature to facilitate mature moral decisions. This paper has highlighted ‘what 
develops’, i.e. the components of moral development suggested by various theories, 
discussed research into how these components develop and added the components to 
a framework to explain how online decision making may occur and mature. What 
develops is actually the capacity for more mature moral decisions, but whether or not 
mature online decisions are made can depend on situational factors. Using the term 
‘moral decision making’ places moral decisions alongside other types of decision 
making, which can help in thinking about the general influences and processes that 
guide such decisions (e.g. situational factors), along with the morally specific 
processes, creating richer explanations of decisions and behaviour. Our suggested 
framework describes how online moral decisions may occur, based on a SIP 
approach. “Judgments and decisions of any sort — including those that involve 
matters of morality — are not a matter of magic but result from processing of 
information” (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2015, p. 139). Each of the components is 
necessary but not sufficient for moral development; the capacity to make mature 
moral decisions requires development of many component skills and processes, 
including the database, and whether mature online moral decisions are actually made 
depends on the processing that occurs, which can be influenced by situational 
factors. This framework is a step towards a dynamic model of moral decision 
making, which was suggested by Van Bavel et al (2015), showing how moral 
decisions are not just driven by automatic intuitive processes and/or slower 
reasoning processes, but that many other components are factors are involved. This 
framework includes brain development but also references the rich tradition of 
developmental psychology, helping to bridge the gap between traditional moral 
theory and social neuroscience. Although brain development has been placed in the 
centre of the model, this can be greatly expanded on, further integrating what we 
know about moral development and decision making from social neuroscience 
research. We did not add specific brain regions to the framework because although 
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some regions such as the vmPFC have been found to be involved when making 
moral judgements regarding hypothetical moral dilemmas, it has also been suggested 
that a wide range of brain regions and networks are required for moral decision 
making rather than a specifically moral part of the brain (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; 
Van Bavel et al., 2015; Young & Dungan, 2012). 
As antisocial behaviour involves breaking moral rules of a culture or society, 
bearing in mind that many of these rules are socially constructed, it could be 
explained using a moral SIP framework In our suggested framework, antisocial 
behaviour could be explained as behaviour based on immature moral decision 
making, which could either be the result of a) developmental delay or deficiencies in 
one or more of the component processes such as perspective taking or working 
memory, or b) due to an underdeveloped database (a lack of adaptive moral schemas 
or an understanding of moral necessities), or c) it could be the result of poor 
information processing, such as failing to attend to all the salient feature of a 
situation, a misinterpretation of cues, or failing to recognise a situation as having 
moral rules attached. This fits with the Situational Action Theory of crime 
(Wikström, 2005; Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, & Hardie, 2012) which proposes 
that crimes are moral actions, that crime involves an interaction of personal and 
environmental factors, and that whether an individual views crime as a possible 
action in a situation is determined by their moral evaluation of action alternatives. 
Screening some of the component skills of our suggested framework in atypically 
developing individuals, or those at risk of engaging in antisocial behaviours could 
allow for targeted interventions which may prove more useful than general 
interventions. For example, people with brain injuries and also offender populations 
have been found to have deficits in facial emotion recognition (Croker & McDonald, 
2005; Robinson et al., 2012). If an individual has deficits in emotion recognition, our 
framework would suggest that they will have problems encoding this information, 
which may potentially bias subsequent processing and moral decisions and 
behaviour. Teaching generic social problem solving skills may be of limited utility in 
such a case, as in a real life situation the individual will still struggle to use 
information from others’ facial expressions in their moral decision making, so 
emotion recognition training may be more beneficial.  It is possible to increase moral 
behaviour and reduce antisocial behaviour by training individuals in some of the 
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components of moral development.  A study which trained perspective taking 
abilities in preschool children found that training increased visual, cognitive and 
affective perspective taking, and that these increases were related to increased 
prosocial behaviour and decreases in aggressiveness (Cigala, Mori, & Fangareggi, 
2015). Further increases in prosocial behaviour and decreases in aggression may 
potentially be achieved by training individuals in some additional components of 
moral development, such as moral reasoning, moral rules and attention and working 
memory.  
While there is promise of what a fully integrative working model of moral 
decision making and development could offer, developing such a model that predicts 
online moral decision making and moral development is an ambitious task. In 
incorporating all of the components thought to be involved in moral development, 
online decision making and all the factors required for their development (e.g. 
specific brain regions and networks and all social factors), there is a risk of creating a 
theory of everything, which is either too broad and non-specific or is overly 
complicated. There are also challenges in reconciling differing theories and 
philosophical viewpoints, and also incorporating social neuroscience research which 
has largely developed separately from developmental psychology research. Bearing 
in mind these limitations, we will now discuss some suggestions for future research, 
which we see as the next step to creating an integrative model.  
Suggestions for future research 
The framework we have presented here is so far just a suggestion of how 
online moral decision making may occur and how development of the components 
can increase the capacity for mature moral decision making. Research is needed to 
either confirm or reject the predictions of this framework, for example, do 
developments in emotion recognition abilities affect what is encoded in a moral 
dilemma, and does this in turn have any effect on moral reasoning and decision 
making? The suggested framework can be used to generate hypotheses about online 
moral decision making and moral development, to guide research and theory 
development.  
Conceptualising online moral response decisions within a SIP framework 
allows for such decisions to be measured with a SIP instrument, using vignettes 
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which depict violations of moral rules or principles. Measuring moral decisions this 
way can allow for an investigation of how more real-life moral response decisions 
are made, based on a response constructed by the individual rather than forced-
choice judgements to hypothetical dilemmas. For example, the social information 
processing test (van Nieuwenhuijzen, Vriens, Scheepmaker, Smit, & Porton, 2011) 
includes a vignette of a boy in a wheelchair being bullied, which relates to the moral 
principles of justice and harm, and decisions about this dilemma are more ‘real-life’ 
than choosing to kill one person or to kill five people (Greene et al, 2001). Future 
studies could use a SIP measure alongside measure of moral reasoning and other 
component skills to provide a better understanding of relationships between 
components for online moral decision making. Also, further research into the 
situational factors that may affect moral decision making will help to better predict 
moral behaviour. Situational factors have been incorporated into some steps but we 
acknowledge that we have not elaborated on specific situational or contextual 
factors. This is an area that needs further research and clarification in order to 
improve the predictive power of such a framework in different situations. Situational 
factors that affect moral decision making may change over time, for instance, peer 
influences may be particularly important during adolescence. So far, moral reasoning 
measures can provide us with an indication of an individual’s capacity for reasoning 
but we do not yet have a full picture of what affects whether this highest capacity is 
used or not in different situations. 
It was beyond the scope of the current paper to systematically review all 
research into the development of all of the components of moral development but we 
have summarised selected research, which suggests that they all of the components 
mature with age. Studies typically just measure one component of moral 
development or decision making, but some studies have found developmental an 
predictive relationships between components (Carlo et al., 2010; de Wilde et al., 
2016; Eisenberg et al., 1995; Peterson et al., 2016) and that training some of the 
components can lead to improvements in prosocial behaviour (Cigala et al., 2015). 
Further developmental research which measures moral reasoning and decision 
making alongside some of the other component skills and processes (e.g. perspective 
taking and emotion recognition), SIP skills and behaviour can help to provide a 
clearer picture of the relationships between all of these factors, including predictive 
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relationships. Our framework describes ‘what develops’ but the ‘and how?’ could be 
expanded on by further research into the developmental relationships between 
components. A better understanding of relationships between components, and 
which components are the best predictors of behaviour can help further theory 
development and also help in targeting interventions to increase the capacity for 
mature moral decision making.  
Most moral neuroscience research has been informed by the dual-process 
theory (Greene et al., 2001), focusing on investigating whether cognitive or affective 
brain regions are recruited when making hypothetical dilemmas. Neuroimaging 
studies typically measure moral evaluations, such as judging the appropriateness of 
others’ actions (Parkinson et al., 2011) or identifying statements as morally right or 
wrong (Avram et al., 2014). Fewer neuroimaging studies measure brain activity for 
moral response decisions and those which do tend to use versions of the utilitarian 
life or death scenarios first used by Greene et al (2001) (Chiong et al., 2013; Han, 
Glover, & Jeong, 2014) Future moral neuroscience research could use dilemmas 
which are more real life than the life or death scenarios, and also focus more on 
investigating brain activity for moral response decisions. There has been some 
developmental neuroscience research linking brain development and functional 
connectivity to judging moral transgressions (Decety et al., 2012; Harenski et al., 
2012) but there is a lack of such studies linking brain development to moral 
reasoning or response decisions. Research which measures brain development from 
infancy to adulthood alongside measuring moral reasoning, moral decision making 
and related components such as perspective taking would provide a fuller picture of 
the brain networks required for moral decision making. Such research would allow 
the ‘brain development’ of our framework to be greatly expanded upon, pinpointing 
which brain regions are most important for the maturation of moral decision making, 
and highlighting developmental windows of importance which can be useful in 
training to enhance moral decision making. 
Conclusion 
Moral development is a complex process involving many factors. We have 
expanded the definition of moral development to incorporate the maturation of the 
component skills or processes, as well as the maturation of moral decision making 
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and reasoning. We argue that each of the components is necessary, but not sufficient, 
for mature moral decision making. Development of component skills and processes, 
including the database, can lead to increase in the capacity for making more mature 
moral decisions, but whether a mature online moral response decision is made, and 
results in a moral behaviour, depends on situational factors and the processing that 
occurs in that situation. This is the first attempt to incorporate all of the suggested 
relevant components into one descriptive framework of moral decision making and 
behaviour. Such a framework can explain how online moral decisions are made and 
can help in describing the components that need to develop in order for mature moral 
decisions to be able to occur. Further research in this area can provide either support 
for this framework, or arguments for reformulation. For a fully working model which 
explains both online moral decision making and behaviour alongside moral 
development specific situational factors need to be further explored and 
developmental processes expanded upon. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Beverley Garrigan is supported by a PhD studentship stipend from the University of 
East Anglia.  
Peter E Langdon is funded by a National Institute for Health Research Postdoctoral 
Fellowship. This article presents independent research funded by the National 
Institute for Health Research (NIHR). The views expressed are those of the author(s) 
and not necessarily those of the National Health Service, the National Institute for 
Health Research or the Department of Health. 
  
 42 
 
References 
Andersen, S. L. (2003). Trajectories of brain development: point of vulnerability or window 
of opportunity? Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 27(1), 3-18.  
Anderson, V., & Beauchamp, M. (2012). SOCIAL: A Theoretical Model of Developmental 
Social Neuroscience. In V. Anderson & M. Beauchamp (Eds.), Developmental Social 
Neuroscience and Childhood Brain Insult (pp. 3-23). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Arain, M., Haque, M., Johal, L., Mathur, P., Nel, W., Rais, A., . . . Sharma, S. (2013). 
Maturation of the adolescent brain. Neuropsychiatric disease and treatment, 9, 
449.  
Arsenio, W. F., & Lemerise, E. A. (2004). Aggression and moral development: Integrating 
social information processing and moral domain models. Child Development, 75(4), 
987-1002.  
Avram, M., Hennig-Fast, K., Bao, Y., Pöppel, E., Reiser, M., Blautzik, J., . . . Gutyrchik, E. 
(2014). Neural correlates of moral judgments in first-and third-person perspectives: 
implications for neuroethics and beyond. BMC neuroscience, 15(1), 39.  
Baird, A. (2008). Adolescent Moral Reasoning: The integration of Emotion and Cognition. In 
W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain 
disorders, and Development (Vol. Moral Psychology, Vol 2, pp. 323-343): MIT Press. 
Beauchamp, M., Dooley, J. J., & Anderson, V. (2013). A preliminary investigation of moral 
reasoning and empathy after traumatic brain injury in adolescents. Brain Injury, 
Early Online, 1-7.  
Bechara, A., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of 
economic decision. Games and economic behavior, 52(2), 336-372.  
Blakemore, S.-J. (2008). The social brain in adolescence. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(4), 
267-277.  
Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. 
Developmental Review, 3(2), 178-210. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0273-
2297(83)90029-1 
Bujoreanu, I. S., & Willis, W. G. (2008). Developmental and neuropsychological perspectives 
on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test in children. Developmental Neuropsychology, 
33(5), 584-600.  
Burks, V., Laird, R. D., Dodge, K. A., Pettit, G. S., & Bates, J. E. (1999). Knowledge structures, 
social information processing, and children’s aggressive behavior. Social 
Development, 8(2), 220-236.  
Campos, J. J., Campos, R. G., & Barrett, K. C. (1989). Emergent themes in the study of 
emotional development and emotion regulation. Developmental Psychology, 25(3), 
394.  
Carlo, G., Mestre, M. V., Samper, P., Tur, A., & Armenta, B. E. (2010). Feelings or 
cognitions? Moral cognitions and emotions as longitudinal predictors of prosocial 
and aggressive behaviors. Personality and Individual Differences, 48(8), 872-877.  
Chiong, W., Wilson, S. M., d'Esposito, M., Kayser, A. S., Grossman, S. N., Poorzand, P., . . . 
Rankin, K. P. (2013). The salience network causally influences default mode 
network activity during moral reasoning. Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 136(6), 
1929-1941. doi:10.1093/brain/awt066 
Cigala, A., Mori, A., & Fangareggi, F. (2015). Learning others' point of view: perspective 
taking and prosocial behaviour in preschoolers. Early Child Development and Care, 
185(8), 1199-1215.  
Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., Lieberman, M., Fischer, K., & Saltzstein, H. D. (1983). A 
longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monographs of the Society for Research in 
Child Development, 1-124.  
 43 
 
Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1994). A review and reformulation of social information-
processing mechanisms in children's social adjustment. Psychological bulletin, 
115(1), 74.  
Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1996). Social information‐processing mechanisms in reactive 
and proactive aggression. Child Development, 67(3), 993-1002.  
Croker, V., & McDonald, S. (2005). Recognition of emotion from facial expression following 
traumatic brain injury. Brain Injury, 19(10), 787-799.  
Crone, E. A., Wendelken, C., Van Leijenhorst, L., Honomichl, R. D., Christoff, K., & Bunge, S. 
A. (2009). Neurocognitive development of relational reasoning. Developmental 
science, 12(1), 55-66. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00743.x 
Damasio, R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: 
HarperCollins. 
Darki, F., & Klingberg, T. (2015). The Role of Fronto-Parietal and Fronto-Striatal Networks in 
the Development of Working Memory: A Longitudinal Study. Cerebral Cortex, 25(6), 
1587-1595. doi:10.1093/cercor/bht352 
de Wilde, A., Koot, H. M., & van Lier, P. A. (2016). Developmental links between children’s 
working memory and their social relations with teachers and peers in the early 
school years. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 44(1), 19-30.  
Decety, J., Michalska, K. J., & Kinzler, C. D. (2012). The contribution of emotion and 
cognition to moral sensitivity: A neurodevelopmental study. Cerebral Cortex, 22(1), 
209-220. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhr111 
Dodge, K. A., & Coie, J. D. (1987). Social-information-processing factors in reactive and 
proactive aggression in children's peer groups. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 53(6), 1146.  
Dooley, J. J., Beauchamp, M., & Anderson, V. A. (2010). The measurement of sociomoral 
reasoning in adolescents with traumatic brain injury: A pilot investigation. Brain 
Impairment, 11(02), 152-161.  
Dosch, M., Loenneker, T., Bucher, K., Martin, E., & Klaver, P. (2010). Learning to appreciate 
others: Neural development of cognitive perspective taking. NeuroImage, 50(2), 
837-846.  
Dumontheil, I. (2014). Development of abstract thinking during childhood and adolescence: 
The role of rostrolateral prefrontal cortex. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 
10, 57-76.  
Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I. A., & Blakemore, S. J. (2010). Online usage of theory of mind 
continues to develop in late adolescence. Developmental science, 13(2), 331-338.  
Eisenberg, N., Carlo, G., Murphy, B., & Court, P. v. (1995). Prosocial Development in Late 
Adolescence: A Longitudinal Study. Child Development, 66(4), 1179-1197. 
doi:10.2307/1131806 
Eisenberg, N., Eggum, N. D., & Edwards, A. (2010). Empathy-related responding and moral 
development. In W. F. Arsenio & E. A. Lemerise (Eds.), Emotions, aggression and 
morality in children: bridging development and psychopathology. Washington DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
Eisenberg, N., Spinrad, T., L., & Sadovsky, A. (2006). Empathy-Related Responding in 
Children. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of Moral Development (pp. 
517-551). Mahwah, New Jersey London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Etkin, A., Egner, T., & Kalisch, R. (2011). Emotional processing in anterior cingulate and 
medial prefrontal cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(2), 85-93.  
Farrant, K., & Uddin, L. Q. (2015). Asymmetric development of dorsal and ventral attention 
networks in the human brain. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 165-174.  
Fiedler, S., & Glöckner, A. (2015). Attention and moral behavior. Current Opinion in 
Psychology, 6, 139-144.  
 44 
 
Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (2006). The Neural Basis of Mentalizing. Neuron, 50(4), 531-534. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2006.05.001 
Fumagalli, M., & Priori, A. (2012). Functional and clinical neuroanatomy of morality. Brain, 
135(7), 2006-2021.  
Gathercole, S. E., Pickering, S. J., Ambridge, B., & Wearing, H. (2004). The structure of 
working memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Developmental Psychology, 40(2), 177.  
Gibbs, J. C. (2013). Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg, 
Hoffman, and Haidt: Oxford University Press. 
Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral maturity: Measuring the development 
of sociomoral reflection: Routledge. 
Gredebäck, G., Kaduk, K., Bakker, M., Gottwald, J., Ekberg, T., Elsner, C., . . . Kenward, B. 
(2015). The neuropsychology of infants’ pro-social preferences. Developmental 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 106-113.  
Greene, J. D. (2009). The cognitive neuroscience of moral judgment. In M. S. Gazzaniga, E. 
Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, J. E. LeDoux, S. J. Luck, 
G. R. Mangan, J. A. Movshon, H. Neville, E. A. Phelps, P. Rakic, D. L. Schacter, M. 
Sur, & B. A. Wandell (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (4th) ed. (pp. 987-999). 
Cambridge, MA US: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive 
load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107(3), 1144-
1154. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The Neural 
Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment. Neuron, 44(2), 389-400. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An 
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 
293(5537), 2105-2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment. Psychological review, 108(4), 814.  
Haidt, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2008). Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral 
psychology. Moral psychology, 2, 181-217.  
Haidt, J., & Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of 
Conservatives and Liberals1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31(1), 191-221.  
Han, H., Glover, G. H., & Jeong, C. (2014). Cultural influences on the neural correlate of 
moral decision making processes. Behavioural Brain Research, 259, 215-228.  
Harenski, C. L., Harenski, K. A., Shane, M. S., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Neural development of 
mentalizing in moral judgment from adolescence to adulthood. Developmental 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 2(1), 162-173. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2011.09.002 
Heyes, S. B., Sebastian, C. L., & Kadosh, K. C. (2012). Brain Development and the Emergence 
of Social Function. Developmental Social Neuroscience and Childhood Brain Insult: 
Theory and Practice.  
Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and 
justice: Cambridge University Press. 
Kagan, J. (2008). Morailty and its Development. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), The 
Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain disorders, and Development (Vol. Moral 
Psychology, Vol 2, pp. 297-313): MIT Press. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow: Macmillan. 
Kiley Hamlin, J., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2010). Three‐month‐olds show a negativity bias in 
their social evaluations. Developmental science, 13(6), 923-929.  
 45 
 
Killen, M., & Smetana, J. G. (1999). Social Interactions in Preschool Classrooms and the 
Development of Young Children's Conceptions of the Personal. Child Development, 
70(2), 486-501. doi:10.2307/1132102 
Klenberg, L., Korkman, M., & Lahti-Nuuttila, P. (2001). Differential Development of 
Attention and Executive Functions in 3- to 12-Year-Old Finnish Children. 
Developmental Neuropsychology, 20(1), 407-428. 
doi:10.1207/S15326942DN2001_6 
Klingberg, T., Forssberg, H., & Westerberg, H. (2002). Increased brain activity in frontal and 
parietal cortex underlies the development of visuospatial working memory capacity 
during childhood. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(1), 1-10.  
Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: theory, research 
and social issues (pp. 31-54). New York; London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology or moral development: the nature and validity of moral 
stages (Vol. 2). San Francisco; London: Harper and Row. 
Krebs, D. L., & Denton, K. (1997). The forms and functions of real-life moral decision-
making. Journal of Moral Education, 26(2), 131.  
Lapsey, D. K. (2006). Moral Stage Theory. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of 
Moral Development (pp. 37-67). Mahwah, New Jersey London: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Lemerise, E. A., & Arsenio, W. F. (2000). An integrated model of emotion processes and 
cognition in social information processing. Child Development, 71(1), 107-118.  
Lockwood, P. L., Seara-Cardoso, A., & Viding, E. (2014). Emotion regulation moderates the 
association between empathy and prosocial behavior.  
Mendez, M. F., Anderson, E., & Shapira, J. S. (2005). An investigation of moral judgement in 
frontotemporal dementia. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18(4), 193-197. 
doi:10.1097/01.wnn.0000191292.17964.bb 
Mills, K. L., Lalonde, F., Clasen, L. S., Giedd, J. N., & Blakemore, S.-J. (2014). Developmental 
changes in the structure of the social brain in late childhood and adolescence. 
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(1), 123-131. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nss113 
Moretto, G., Làdavas, E., Mattioli, F., & di Pellegrino, G. (2010). A physiological investigation 
of moral judgment after ventromedial prefrontal damage. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 22(8), 1888-1899. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21367 
Palmer, E. J. (2000). Perceptions of parenting, social cognition and delinquency. Clinical 
Psychology & Psychotherapy, 7(4), 303-309.  
Palmer, E. J. (2003). Offending behaviour: Moral reasoning, criminal conduct and the 
rehabilitation of offenders: Willan Publishing  
Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P. E., Mendelovici, A., McGeer, V., & 
Wheatley, T. (2011). Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural systems 
underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 23(10), 3162-3180. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00017 
Peterson, C., Slaughter, V., Moore, C., & Wellman, H. M. (2016). Peer social skills and 
theory of mind in children with autism, deafness, or typical development. 
Developmental Psychology, 52(1), 46.  
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of children: London: Routledge& Kegan-Paul. 
Pozuelos, J. P., Paz-Alonso, P. M., Castillo, A., Fuentes, L. J., & Rueda, M. R. (2014). 
Development of attention networks and their interactions in childhood. 
Developmental Psychology, 50(10), 2405-2415. doi:10.1037/a0037469 
Rest, J. R. (1984). The major components of morality. Morality, moral behavior, and moral 
development, 24-38.  
 46 
 
Rest, J. R., Bebeau, M. J., & Thoma, S. J. (1999). Postconventional moral thinking: A neo-
Kohlbergian approach: Psychology Press. 
Robinson, L., Spencer, M. D., Thomson, L. D., Sprengelmeyer, R., Owens, D. G., Stanfield, A. 
C., . . . McKechanie, A. (2012). Facial emotion recognition in Scottish prisoners. 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 35(1), 57-61.  
Ross‐Sheehy, S., Schneegans, S., & Spencer, J. P. (2015). The infant orienting with attention 
task: Assessing the neural basis of spatial attention in infancy. Infancy, 20(5), 467-
506. doi:10.1111/infa.12087 
Rueda, M. R., Rothbart, M. K., McCandliss, B. D., Saccomanno, L., & Posner, M. I. (2005). 
Training, maturation, and genetic influences on the development of executive 
attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 102(41), 14931-14936.  
Selman, R. L. (1976). Social-Cognitive Understanding: A Guide to Educational and Clinical 
Practice. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: theory, research and 
social issues (pp. 299-317). New York; London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Smetana, J. G. (1981). Reasoning in the personal and moral domains: Adolescent and young 
adult women's decision-making regarding abortion. Journal of Applied 
Developmental Psychology, 2(3), 211-226.  
Smetana, J. G. (1985). Preschool children's conceptions of transgressions: Effects of varying 
moral and conventional domain-related attributes. Developmental Psychology, 
21(1), 18.  
Smetana, J. G. (2006). Social–Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistencies and Variations in 
Children's Moral and Social Judgments. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), 
Handbook of Moral Development (pp. 119-155). Mahwah, New Jersey London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Sodian, B., Thoermer, C., & Metz, U. (2007). Now I see it but you don't: 14‐month‐olds can 
represent another person's visual perspective. Developmental science, 10(2), 199-
204.  
Solomon, M., Buaminger, N., & Rogers, S. J. (2011). Abstract reasoning and friendship in 
high functioning preadolescents with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of autism 
and developmental disorders, 41(1), 32-43. doi:10.1007/s10803-010-1017-8 
Somsen, R. J. M. (2007). The development of attention regulation in the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task. Developmental science, 10(5), 664-680. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2007.00613.x 
Song, M.-j., Smetana, J. G., & Kim, S. Y. (1987). Korean children's conceptions of moral and 
conventional transgressions. Developmental Psychology, 23(4), 577.  
Stams, G. J., Brugman, D., Deković, M., van Rosmalen, L., van der Laan, P., & Gibbs, J. C. 
(2006). The moral judgment of juvenile delinquents: A meta-analysis. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 34(5), 692-708.  
Susac, A., Bubic, A., Vrbanc, A., & Planinic, M. (2014). Development of abstract 
mathematical reasoning: The case of algebra. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8.  
Svetlova, M., Nichols, S. R., & Brownell, C. A. (2010). Toddlers’ prosocial behavior: From 
instrumental to empathic to altruistic helping. Child Development, 81(6), 1814-
1827.  
Taber-Thomas, B. C., & Tranel, D. (2012). Social and moral functioning: A cognitive 
neuroscience perspective. In V. Anderson & M. Beauchamp (Eds.), Developmental 
Social Neuroscience and Childhood Brain Insult (pp. 65-91). New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Takahashi, H., Yahata, N., Koeda, M., Matsuda, T., Asai, K., & Okubo, Y. (2004). Brain 
activation associated with evaluative processes of guilt and embarrassment: an 
fMRI study. NeuroImage, 23(3), 967-974. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.07.054 
 47 
 
Tancredi, L. (2005). Hardwired behavior: What neuroscience reveals about morality: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Thomas, B. C., Croft, K. E., & Tranel, D. (2011). Harming kin to save strangers: further 
evidence for abnormally utilitarian moral judgments after ventromedial prefrontal 
damage. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(9), 2186-2196.  
Thompson, R. A. (1994). Emotion Regulation: A Theme in Search of Definition. Monographs 
of the Society for Research in Child Development, 59(2/3), 25-52. 
doi:10.2307/1166137 
Tisak, M. S., & Turiel, E. (1988). Variation in seriousness of transgressions and children's 
moral and conventional concepts. Developmental Psychology, 24(3), 352.  
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Van Bavel, J. J., FeldmanHall, O., & Mende-Siedlecki, P. (2015). The neuroscience of moral 
cognition: from dual processes to dynamic systems. Current Opinion in Psychology, 
6, 167-172.  
Van der Graaff, J., Branje, S., De Wied, M., Hawk, S., Van Lier, P., & Meeus, W. (2014). 
Perspective taking and empathic concern in adolescence: Gender differences in 
developmental changes. Developmental Psychology, 50(3), 881.  
van Nieuwenhuijzen, M., Vriens, A., Scheepmaker, M., Smit, M., & Porton, E. (2011). The 
development of a diagnostic instrument to measure social information processing 
in children with mild to borderline intellectual disabilities. Research in 
developmental disabilities, 32(1), 358-370. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ridd.2010.10.012 
Villegas de Posada, C., & Vargas-Trujillo, E. (2015). Moral reasoning and personal behavior: 
A meta-analytical review. Review of General Psychology, 19(4), 408-424. 
doi:10.1037/gpr0000053 
Walker, L. J. (2002). The model and the measure: An appraisal of the Minnesota approach 
to moral development. Journal of Moral Education, 31(3), 353-367.  
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta‐analysis of theory‐of‐mind 
development: the truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655-684.  
Wikström, P. O. H. (2005). The social origins of pathways in crime: Towards a 
developmental ecological action theory of crime involvement and its changes. 
Integrated developmental and life-course theories of offending, 14, 211-245.  
Wikström, P. O. H., Oberwittler, D., Treiber, K., & Hardie, B. (2012). Breaking rules: The 
social and situational dynamics of young people's urban crime: OUP Oxford. 
Yeates, K. O., Bigler, E. D., Gerhardt, C. A., Rubin, K., Stancin, T., Taylor, H. G., & Vannatta, K. 
(2012). Theoretical Approaches to Understanding Social Function in Childhood 
Brain Insults: Toward the Integration of Social Neuroscience and Developmental 
Psychology. In V. Anderson & M. Beauchamp (Eds.), Developmental Social 
Neuroscience and Childhood Brain Insult (pp. 207-231). New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Young, L., & Dungan, J. (2012). Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe 
nowhere. Social Neuroscience, 7(1), 1-10.  
Yurgelun-Todd, D. (2007). Emotional and cognitive changes during adolescence. Current 
opinion in neurobiology, 17(2), 251-257. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2007.03.009 
 
